Imaginative Resistance Research Articles

Imagining and Fiction: Some Issues

AbstractIn this paper, I survey in some depth three issues arising from the connection between imagination and fiction: (i) whether fiction can be defined as such in terms of its prescribing imagining; (ii) whether imagining in response to fiction is de se, or de re, or both; (iii) the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ and various explanations for it. Along the way I survey, more briefly, several other prominent issues in this area too.

Race and Imaginative Resistance in James Cameron's Avatar

This article modifies philosopher Tamar Szabó Gendler's theory of imaginative resistance in order to make it applicable to film and analyze a distinctively adverse kind of resistant response to James Cameron's Avatar (2009). Gendler's theory, as she states it, seeks to explain resistance to literary stories in a straightforwardly cognitivist, but narrowly rationalistic fashion. This article introduces elements from recent work at the intersection of philosophy of film and the emotions to augment Gendler's theory so that it can be used to explain why some viewers hesitate or even refuse to imagine some cinematic fictional worlds. The method used is analytic philosophy of film. The analysis reveals that some viewers are cognitively impoverished with regard to imagining race in general: they will likely have extreme difficulty in centrally imagining racially "other" characters, which also bodes ill for their real-world prospects for moral engagements concerning race.

"Perhaps the Words Remember Me": Richard Brautigan's Very Short Stories

This essay situates Richard Brautigan within a literary genealogy reaching back to the eighteenth century. It views him as an exponent of a particular type of American writing—working in and against the traditions of Franklin, Thoreau, Hemingway, Jack London, and Ezra Pound—and as an artist insisting upon the relevance of that tradition to the present. Thus, Brautigan is no casual tourist in the American canon; instead, his work provides an updating of quintessential themes and a series of implicit and explicit references to the trans-historical resonances of texts offering imaginative resistance to hegemonic control. The essay focuses on Brautigan's very short stories "The Scarlatti Tilt" (1970) and "A Short Story about Contemporary Life in California" (1969) as exemplifications of his ability to combine formal experimentation with intertextual allusion in commentaries on (post)modern American existence. Reading his fiction, it is apparent that Brautigan detects narratives and monuments that limit human freedom everywhere he looks and that he believes escaping the control they wield requires constant vigilance and imagination. This is a process that is exemplified in the very short stories that strip almost all the layers of representational form that are normally present in fiction.

IMAGINATION, EMPATHY, AND MORAL DELIBERATION: THE CASE OF IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE

abstractThis essay develops a new account of the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. Imaginative resistance is best conceived of as a limited phenomenon. It occurs when we try to engage imaginatively with different moral worlds that are insufficiently articulated so that they do not allow us either to quarantine our imaginative engagement from our normal moral attitudes or to agree with the expressed moral judgment from the perspective of moral deliberation. Imaginative resistance thus reveals the central epistemic importance that empathy plays for our understanding of rational agents in a context where we try to make sense of the moral appropriateness of their reasons for acting. Reflecting on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance allows us to recognize important features of the relationship between imaginative perspective taking and ordinary moral deliberation.

Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance

IntroductionIt is standard practice in philosophical inquiry to test a general thesis (of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’) by attempting to construct a counterexample to it. If we can imagine or conceive of an F that isn't a G, then we have evidence that there could be an F that isn't a G — and thus evidence against the thesis in question; if not, then the thesis is (at least temporarily) secure. Or so it is standardly claimed.But there is increasing skepticism about how seriously to take what we can imagine or conceive as evidence for (or against) a priori philosophical theses, given the many historical examples of now-questionable theses that once seemed impossible to doubt — and also the recent experimental research suggesting that our verdicts on Gettier cases, trolley cases, and the scenarios depicted in other familiar thought-experiments may be affected by cultural, situational, and other adventitious factors.

IMAGINING REASONS

abstractIn this article, I explore the implications of Karsten Stueber's account of imaginative resistance, particularly as it relates to the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding described by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues. I suggest that Stueber's account allows us to redescribe the phenomenon as a failure of the folk psychological project of interpretation and so to challenge Haidt's metaethical conclusions. I close by considering some implications for moral deliberation and judgment in those, such as autistic people, whose interpretive capacities are impaired.

L’éthique de la vertu et le critère de l’action correcte

RÉSUMÉ : Selon la version de l’éthique de la vertu la plus répandue (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebski, 1996), l’action moralement correcte dans des circonstances données est celle que ferait un agent pleinement vertueux dans ces circonstances. Ce critère soulève toutefois deux objections. Dans certaines situations, il donne des indications erronées, et dans d’autres situations, il ne donne pas d’indication du tout. Nous soutenons que ces objections sont en réalité le résultat soit d’une simple résistance imaginative, soit d’une pétition de principe. Nous proposons alors de modifier le critère en excluant le caractère de l’agent non vertueux des circonstances moralement pertinentes. Nous envisageons enfin les implications pour la question du développement moral.

Imaginative resistance without conflict

I examine a range of popular solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. According to each solution in this range, imaginative resistance occurs only when we are asked to imagine something that conflicts with what we believe. I show that imaginative resistance can occur without this sort of conflict, and so that every solution in the range under consideration fails. I end by suggesting a new explanation for imaginative resistance—the Import Solution—which succeeds where the other solutions considered fail.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)moral Character of Art Works and Inter‐Relations to Artistic Value

Up until fairly recently it was philosophical orthodoxy – at least within analytic aesthetics broadly construed – to hold that the appreciation and evaluation of works as art and moral considerations pertaining to them are conceptually distinct. However, following on from the idea that artistic value is broader than aesthetic value, the last 15 years has seen an explosion of interest in exploring possible inter-relations between the appreciative and ethical character of works as art. Consideration of these issues has a distinguished philosophical history but as the Compass survey article suggests (‘Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value.’ Philosophy Compass 1.2 (2006): 129–43), it is only very recently that figures in the field have returned to it to develop more precisely what they take the relationships to be and why. Consensus is, unsurprisingly, lacking. The reinvigoration of the issues has led sophisticated formalists or autonomists to mount a more considered defence of the idea that aesthetic and literary values are indeed conceptually distinct from the justification or otherwise of the moral perspective or views endorsed in a work (Topic I). The challenges presented by such a defence are many but amongst them are appeals to critical practice (Lamarque and Olsen), scepticism about whether or not art really can give us bona fide knowledge (Stolnitz) and the recognition that truth often seems to be far removed from what it is we value in our appreciation of works (Lamarque). One way to motivate consideration of the relevance of a work’s moral character to its artistic value concerns the phenomena of imaginative resistance. At least sometimes it would seem that, as Hume originally suggested, we either cannot or will not enter imaginatively into the perspective solicited by a work due to its morally problematic character (Topic II). In some cases, it would seem that as a matter of psychological fact, we cannot do so since it is impossible for us to imagine how it could be that a certain attitude or action is morally permissible or good (Walton). The question then is whether or not this is a function of morality in particular or constraints on imaginative possibility more generally and what else is involved. At other times, the phenomena seem to be driven by a moral reluctance to allow ourselves to enter into the dramatic perspective involved (Moran) or evaluation of the attitude expressed (Stokes). Nonetheless, it is far from obvious that this is so of all the attitudes or responses we judge to be morally problematic. After all, it looks like we can and indeed often do suspend or background particular cognitive and moral commitments in engaging with all sorts of works (Nichols and Weinberg). If the moral character of a work Philosophy Compass Teaching & Learning Guide, Philosophy Compass 5/5 (2010): 426–431, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00299.x

What's Wrong with Alienation?

Can art encourage social progress without invoking empathy? Bertolt Brecht thought so. He built convention violations into his plays in order to alienate audiences from their empathetic responses. He did this in order to encourage reasoned responses among his audience members. In so doing, Brecht ran the risk that spectators would imaginatively resist the play and focus exclusively on the convention violations. This kind of imaginative resistance does in fact undermine Brecht's purpose of achieving social progress. Contrary to Brecht's assessment, empathy is cognitive in nature and is a vehicle by which Brecht could have effectively realized his goal.

Künstliche Welten – echte Gefühle? Zum Problem der moralischen Bewertung von Kunst

Is there a correspondence between the ethical and the aesthetic value of a work of art? A negative kind of moderate moralism suggests that the ethical defects of an artwork can sometimes impair its aesthetic value. Ethical defects sometimes prevent the recipient from responding appropriately to the work. Developing an “imaginative resistance”, we may be reluctant to imagine worlds that are morally different from ours. In morally deviating worlds people do not just think differently about morality; different things are morally good. Several approaches to this problem are considered, and an emotion-based account is defended.

IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

We experience resistance when we are engaging with fictional works which present certain (for example, morally objectionable) claims. But in virtue of what properties do sentences trigger this ‘imaginative resistance’? I argue that while most accounts of imaginative resistance have looked for semantic properties in virtue of which sentences trigger it, this is unlikely to give us a coherent account, because imaginative resistance is a pragmatic phenomenon. It works in a way very similar to Paul Grice's widely analysed ‘conversational implicature’.

Imaginative Resistance. An Emotion-Based Account

For about fifteen years now there has been an increasingly vivid discussion of the so-called »puzzle of imaginative resistance«: we feel resistance to imagining worlds that are morally different from our world. In morally deviating worlds people do not just think differently about morality, but different things are morally good in these worlds. I will start with some introductory thoughts about the different dimensions of the problem. Then the general functioning of imagination has to be scrutinized. As I see it, imagining consists in the entertaining of a mental content without asserting it. However, this can be done in different ways: just by supposing the truth of a proposition, or in an experiential mode that involves also sensory and affective qualities. This brings us to a distinction made by Richard Moran (Philosophical Review 103: 75–106, 1994). He distinguishes two modes of imagining: a hypothetical and a dramatic one. Dramatic imagining is a form of imaginatively adopting a total perspective including thoughts, sensory qualities and emotions. From Moran's point of view, imaginative resistance depends mainly on the feelings involved in dramatic imagining. Therefore, I call it an affective account of imaginative resistance. Yet, it has been argued that imagined emotional responses are only »make-believe« or pretend. We, therefore, have to find out whether this objection is threatening the force of Moran's account. His answer to the challenge is based mostly on the affective aspect of dramatic imagining. Although he is right in emphasizing the role of feeling in emotional imagining, it does not suffice to explain the arousal of imaginative resistance. Therefore, we have to proceed from an affective to a full-fledged emotion-based account. Emotions in the full sense of the term cannot be reduced to mere feelings, they have a representational content. I suggest understanding the representational content of emotions following Kenny (Action, Emotion and Will, 1963) in terms of their formal objects which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. If an imagined content is not presented as a viable instance of the formal object of an emotion, the imagining will fail. As a consequence, I will develop a multi-layered model of failures to imagine something emotionally due to the specific ways in which the representational content and the affective dimension interact in emotional imagining. We also have to get a firmer grip on the nature of the feelings involved in emotions in order to understand their impact on imaginative resistance. From my point of view this has to do with their nature as bodily feelings, which makes emotional imagining in a way intrusive that distinguishes it from other kinds of imagining. We will then have to reconsider how the bodily feelings involved in emotional imagining relate to their representational content. Finally, I will discuss why it is specific to imaginative resistance that the imagining does not just fail, but a feeling of repulsion is evoked.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Some Questions in Hume's Aesthetics

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Some Questions in Hume's Aesthetics

Imaginability, morality, and fictional truth: dissolving the puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’

This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’. In part 1 of the paper I argue that the imaginability of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the ‘thickness’ of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments. I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, I argue that the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part 2, I claim that it is the so-called ‘alethic’ puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible and should be rejected in favour of an interpretive view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at all.

IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY

Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance offers some evidence that we regard our moral commitments as necessary, but in a way compatible with viewing them as dependent on desires (in some way). A limited strategy for defending sentimentalism against a common criticism is also offered.

Imagining Other Lives

In his recent book Reflective Democracy, Robert Goodin argues that ‘external-collaborative’ models of democratic deliberation procedures need to be supplemented by ‘internal-reflective’ deliberation. The exercise of the moral imagination plays a central role in Goodin's account of ‘democratic deliberation within’. By imaginatively putting ourselves in the place of a range of different others, he argues, including those who may not be able to represent their own interests, we can make their points of view ‘communicatively present’ in deliberation. Goodin's argument emphasises the role of art and other forms of cultural representation in helping to bring about this expansion of moral imagination. Drawing on debates in philosophy of mind concerning the cope and limits of our capacities to simulate other minds, I argue that Goodin's analysis of ‘democratic deliberation within’ conflates different kinds of imaginative project. In doing so, it underestimates both the difficulties of imaginatively putting ourselves in the place of others and the political risks of doing so. I argue, alternatively, that moral engagement with others involves the capacity for sympathy and that art and other forms of cultural representation can enlarge the cope of our sympathies by assisting us to overcome imaginative resistance to alien points of view. In developing this argument, I provide a qualified defence of Iris Young's claim that respect for others involves ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’.

The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance

A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses instead on the character of certain kinds of imaginings, arguing that we resist in such cases given the rich evaluative character of the imaginings prescribed, and the agent-dependent constraints on imagining in such ways

V. F. Perkins' Functional Credibility and the Problem of Imaginative Resistance

V. F. Perkins' Functional Credibility and the Problem of Imaginative Resistance

RESISTING IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE

Recently, philosophers have identified certain fictional propositions with which one does not imaginatively engage, even where one is transparently intended by their authors to do so. One approach to explaining this categorizes it as 'resistance', that is, as deliberate failure to imagine that the relevant propositions are true; the phenomenon has become generally known (misleadingly) as 'the puzzle of imaginative resistance'. I argue that this identification is incorrect, and I dismiss several other explanations. I then propose a better one, that in central cases of imaginative failure, the basis for the failure is the contingent incomprehensibility of the relevant propositions. Why the phenomenon is especially commonplace with respect to moral propositions is illuminated along the way.