ABSTRACT Threat perception may be interpreted, understood, and applied differently depending on many factors. How Russia perceives the Western world primarily focused on the United States, NATO, and Europe, is a topic that seems to be under-communicated after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This article does not provide a complete picture or claim to have definite answers, but explores one avenue of approach investigating Russian threat perception and if anything has changed after 1917. Looking back on the Bolshevik Revolution and how Communist thinking framed how the Soviet Union identified, neutralized, and combatted various enemies of the state, a simple model is suggested. The latter separates false from imaginary enemies within and outside the state. The same model, with the same outlook, is also applied to contemporary Russia—with an analysis based on Western thinking and political rationale. The article’s core is to explore the role and function of the Soviet/Russian intelligence and security apparatus with a possible deeper understanding of Russia in general and President Vladimir Putin in particular. His origin and background from the KGB and FSB are perhaps not fully appreciated, at least not fully comprehended in the West. This article seeks to shed light on historical roots to better understand how history may have shaped Putin and his thinking and definition of enemies.
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