Image Thinking Research Articles

Love you in Throat Gristle: Subvocal Speech and Tainted Proprioception in the Work of William S. Burroughs

The notion of subvocal speech looms over the American writer William S. Burroughs’ work and its defining feature is an involuntary continuity. Burroughs borrows the concept from the behaviorist psychologist John B. Watson’s attempts between the 1920s and ‘30s to come up with an image of thinking which foregrounds speech and its laryngeal correlates. Yet, while adopting this picture, Burroughs brings a much more pragmatic and experimental slant to subvocal speech, waging battle against a heteronomy lived as an impossibility of silence. Trying out a mimetic intervention that appropriates this elusive language conduct and the discourse of its description, he positions his formal experiments (“cut-ups”) as a medium of registration and acceleration that tries to disable the compulsory character of subvocal speech by taking it to its most extreme conclusions. When these experiments seem to reproduce instead of removing the heteronomy associated with subvocal speech, he explores other approaches, with the organic and evolutionary implications providing material for new directions in narrative, and the polyvalent status of the human throat coming under a detailed focus. Accordingly, Burroughs’ work opens out to a series of “organological” inquiries the richness of which finds philosophical and anthropological resonances. While philosophers like Deleuze and Guattari find inspiration in Burroughs for a concept of “the body without organs,” phenomenology also turns out to have a lot to contribute to a renewed understanding of subvocal speech. In sum, this paper aims to demonstrate that subvocal speech as an originally behaviorist notion has a much more layered character than is visible at first glance, enlisting at once the modes of cut-up, routine, and evolutionary speculation aside from straightforward critique.

We Still Do Not Know What a Body Can Do

Throughout much of his career, Deleuze repeats a problem he attributes to Spinoza: “we do not even know what a body can do.” The problem is closely associated with Deleuze’s parallelist reading of Spinoza and what he calls ethology. In this article, I argue that Deleuze takes ethology to be a new model for philosophy which he intends to replace ontology. I ground my claim in Deleuze’s sugges-tion that Spinoza offers philosophers the means of “thinking with AND” rather than “thinking for IS.” The argument is developed through Deleuze’s monographs and collaborations on Spinoza and alongside his meta-philosophical critique of the Image of Thought.

Introduction

Introduction

Information as the Image of Thought: A Deleuzian Analysis

ABSTRACTIn this essay I take up the scope and nature of information in its relation to thought. To be precise, I argue that information constitutes the contemporary image of thought and, although information has become ubiquitous, we can date its arrival to Hayek's 1945 essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” Information is no longer merely a metaphor for thinking about or describing thought, I suggest; rather, information is, at bottom, the sole content of thought and thinking is nothing other than the processing of information.

Protestant traditions of the Backgrounds of Bioethics. Part 2

Term and concept of bioethics (Bio-Ethik) originally were developed by Fritz Jahr, a Protestant Pastor in Halle an der Saale in 1927, long before the period, when bioethics in the modern sense was recreated in the US in 1970s and since that time has spread globally. Jahr’s bioethical imperative, influenced by Christian and humanist traditions from Assisi to Schopenhauer and by Buddhist philosophy holds its own position against Kant’s anthropological imperative and against dogmatic Buddhist reasoning: ‘Respect each living being as an end in itself and treat it, if possible, as such’. Jahr interprets the 5th Commandment ‘Thou shall not kill’ offensively and liberally as ‘common morality’ which includes the obligation of caring for one’s own health, public health and health education within the wider framework of a universal bioethical Sittengesetz.
 In the article-translation the actual contemporary thoughts about the bioethical imperative, which serves not only the object of interdisciplinary study, but also the practical approach to acquiring responsibility and environmental image of thinking, are found. Didactic considerations of Yahr go beyond the paternalistic upbringing, they point to the content and methodological purpose of teaching ethics to ethical discourse. According to Yahr, ethics does not regulate philosophical, theological or political knowledge, does not act as a dictatorship of a way of behavior. Ethics is the conduct of discussions, the culture of discussion and communication. Following the philosophy of Yahr, Professor Hans-Martin Zass formulated the geo-ethical imperative: "Respect the Mother Earth and all natural life as it is, for which the responsible person is an end in itself, and get around as much as possible in this way!". In respect for all living things, there is a relationship between man and animals, plants, nature, including the health systems, educational-informational and research organizations. Pastor Fritz Jahr, who had no immediate influence during his times, built a strong first Protestant foundation for contemporary theological and ethical concepts in medical ethics, bioethics, and environmental ethics.

The Life of an Idiot: Artaud and the Dogmatic Image of Thought after Deleuze

The conceptual persona of the idiot recurs and evolves over the decades between Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition and his final book with Guattari, What is Philosophy?, shifting from a philosophical question to a nonphilosophical one that allies thought with literature and life. The great figure of this shock of literature is Antonin Artaud who, Deleuze argues, refinds thought’s creative capacity by putting it back in touch with its immanent outside – with a machinic and pre-personal ‘unthought’. This essay will argue that by turning to works from later in Artaud’s œuvre, especially the 1946 poem-cycle Artaud le Mômo, the problem of idiocy meets a correlative problem concerning life and death. Artaud establishes a four-fold of thought-unthought-life-unlife which is problematically resolved in what he calls a ‘body’, a figure which I will argue requires that we rethink the relationship Artaud experiences between idiocy and suffering.

Teenage Mental Health: Troubled teens left in limbo

Nursery WorldVol. 2016, No. 11 AnalysisTeenage Mental Health: Troubled teens left in limboCharlotte GoddardCharlotte GoddardSearch for more papers by this authorCharlotte GoddardPublished Online:22 Jun 2016https://doi.org/10.12968/nuwa.2016.11.10AboutSectionsView articleView Full TextPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail View articleAbstractThe ‘epidemic’ requires a mix of early intervention and later support services, finds Charlotte Goddard FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byAn Introduction: For New Images of Thought in the Study of Children’s Drawings22 October 2022 30 May 2016Volume 2016Issue 11ISSN (print): 0029-6422ISSN (online): 2059-9358 Metrics History Published online 22 June 2016 Published in print 30 May 2016 Information© MA Education LimitedPDF download

Perspective Study on the Thinking Image between Drinking and Health of Women's University Students.

Perspective Study on the Thinking Image between Drinking and Health of Women's University Students.

Do Not Just Do as I Do: Knowledge and Learning in the Image of Thought

What does it mean for philosophy to take seriously the chaos that haunts and threatens to undermine the fleetingly static formations that populate our epistemological landscapes? What does it mean to learn, think and know on a plane detached from transcendent truths, from recognition and representation, from the inverted image of falsity? We risk badly mangling our answers to these questions so long as we take for granted the orthodoxal image of thought and its conservative postulates. But critique is not enough, we need reconception, creativity; we need thought. This paper locates in Deleuze's ‘Image of Thought’ precisely these resources in the form of a philosophy of learning, taking as its guiding light the claim that learning ought no longer to name a merely transitory movement between a lack of knowledge and its fulfilment in the apprehension of truth, but the domain from which the transcendental conditions of thought itself are to be drawn.

New Materialist Spectatorship: The Moving-Image-Body, the Mockumentary and a New Image of Thought

In this article I propose to rethink spectatorship as analytic category within cinema studies. Through an engagement with new materialist theory I shift the conversation from the locked positions of spectator and text towards an acknowledgement of the spectatorial event as a becoming increased or decreased in capacity to affect and be affected. By doing so I argue that what is effectuated in the event of spectating is in fact the production of a certain body, what I call a moving-image-body. This, I claim, develops in connection with different so-called spectatorial contracts, contracts that produce different agential conditions. An examination of some examples from the realm of the mockumentary, notably I’m Still Here (Affleck, 2010), leads me to discuss the core of the issue as one pertaining to the potential production of new realities, and my methodological proposal as a way towards mapping, not what the event of spectating means, but rather what it does. KEYWORDS Spectatorship, Mockumentary, New Materialism, Genre theory, Audiovisual Event.

Earth Jurisprudence, Wild Law, Emergent Law: The Emerging Field of Ecology and Law—Part 2

The article does two things. First, it explores the emerging field of ecology and law through the examination of Earth Jurisprudence developed in the work of Berry, Cullinan, and Burdon. Second, it puts this Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law in connection with the wide ranging philosophical work of Deleuze & Guattari. Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law are introduced through the exploration of four themes that characterise the field of study: a critique of the dominant western worldview and image of thought; a new philosophy of nature widely informed by contemporary science and cosmology; a new relation to the Earth and nature in affectual intensities, image of thinking, and investment of the social field; and, the realisation of the necessity and centrality of a fundamental reconceptualization of legality and governance. The Earth Jurisprudence of Berry, Cullinan, and Burdon (particularly Cullinan’s Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice) is then explored substantively in Cullinan’s reconceptualization of legality, the Grand Jurisprudence that informs Earth Jurisprudence, the Earth Jurisprudence of the promotion of mutual ecocentric human–Earth enhancement, the development of Earth rights, the reconceptualization of property and land, and the Wild Law that Earth Jurisprudence produces as the outcome of its creativity. Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law are a far-reaching development within legal studies, with potentially profound implications for our contemporary conceptualisation of legality and governance and the creation of a concept of law for a new Earth. When put into connection with the wide ranging philosophical joint work of Deleuze & Guattari there emerge striking commonalities, convergences, and a common jurisprudential project of the creation of a legality for a new Earth. The article concludes with the argument that the work of Deleuze & Guattari could provide a key resource for the development of Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law, particularly the Deleuze & Guattari jurisprudential concept of emergent law.

Earth Jurisprudence, Wild Law, Emergent Law: The Emerging Field of Ecology and Law—Part 1

The article does two things. First, it explores the emerging field of ecology and law through the examination of Earth Jurisprudence developed in the work of Berry, Cullinan, and Burdon. Second, it puts this Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law in connection with the wide ranging philosophical work of Deleuze and Guattari. Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law are introduced through the exploration of four themes that characterise the field of study: a critique of the dominant western worldview and image of thought; a new philosophy of nature widely informed by contemporary science and cosmology; a new relation to the Earth and nature in affectual intensities, image of thinking, and investment of the social field; and, the realisation of the necessity and centrality of a fundamental reconceptualization of legality and governance. The Earth Jurisprudence of Berry, Cullinan, and Burdon (particularly Cullinan’s Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice) is then explored substantively in Cullinan’s reconceptualization of legality, the Grand Jurisprudence that informs Earth Jurisprudence, the Earth Jurisprudence of the promotion of mutual ecocentric human-Earth enhancement, the development of Earth rights, the reconceptualization of property and land, and the Wild Law that Earth Jurisprudence produces as the outcome of its creativity. Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law are a far-reaching development within legal studies, with potentially profound implications for our contemporary conceptualisation of legality and governance and the creation of a concept of law for a new Earth. When put into connection with the wide ranging philosophical joint work of Deleuze and Guattari there emerge striking commonalities, convergences, and a common jurisprudential project of the creation of a legality for a new Earth. The article concludes with the argument that the work of Deleuze and Guattari could provide a key resource for the development of Earth Jurisprudence and the emerging field of ecology and law, particularly the Deleuze and Guattari jurisprudential concept of emergent law.

National Mentality of Kazakhs in the Context of Ecology Culture: Tradition and Innovation

Kazakhstan needs new innovative ideas and new identification of mentality. Hence, today Kazakh national idea should be transformed into general Kazakhstan's, Eurasian idea carrying universal and general character. It should reject blind following to globalizational standards and worshipping market as panacea from all disasters. As form of self-consciousness of own cultural originality, national idea differs from concepts such as mentality, national spirit and character. National mentality, as sacred system of spiritual world outlook principles, is not focused on the fixation of cultural psychological peculiarities of nation. Above-mentioned concepts may be united into one term ‘ecology’ of culture or its archetype. Term introduced by K. Jung for identification of ‘collective unconsciousness’, which defines general moments of images of thinking and behavior of definite type of culture. Mental peculiarities of Kazakh culture were thoroughly described (as noticed by scientists it is better to describe mentality, rather than define, since it has virtual character) in works of Kazakhstan's authors, which were used as source base for this article.

Images of thinking in feminist materialisms: ontological divergences and the production of researcher subjectivities

Qualitative feminist studies are much challenged by the contemporary critique of social constructionist postmodernism, as well as the renewed search for the body and materiality. The result is (at least) two diverging research accounts: a renewed feminist materialism, relying on some foundational ontologies and what has been called a new materialist feminist account that constitutes radical ontological rewritings. The aim of this paper is to investigate what kind of researcher subjectivities these different accounts produce for qualitative inquiry. This investigation will be unfolded using an example from a collaborative research process involving 10 PhD students. The example is woven into Deleuze and Guattari’s discussions on the Image of Thought and the three images of thinking outlined in A Thousand Plateaus. The investigation shows that although the aim of our collaborative process was to resist the assumed Cogito/“I” of philosophy and qualitative inquiry, we still got caught up in taken-for-granted images of thinking and doing analysis. A deterritorializing of habits of thinking and practicing in order for new and other researcher subjectivities to emerge required collaborative efforts that put to work a rhizomatic image of thinking and operated from within an ontology of difference.

Images of Thought and Their Relation to Classification: The Tree and the Net

KO KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION , Seite 366 - 374

A Relentless Spinozism: Deleuze's Encounter with Beckett

If I begin by stating that this paper will focus on the encounter between Gilles Deleuze and Samuel Beckett, that is, if I suggest that the nature of Deleuze’s engagement with Beckett took, and continues to take, the form of an encounter, this is in part because the notion of the encounter in Deleuze’s work has still not received the attention it deserves. 2 Most frequently discussed are notions of becoming, planes of immanence, or lines of flight—notions of flux, we might say, rather than those of articula tion or delimitation. Yet the articulating concept of the encounter may be singularly more characteristic of Deleuze’s thought than any other, if at the very least because it is characteristic of what thought is for Deleuze, in general. Every encounter produces effects in two directions: in one, in the direction of sensation, because what is encountered always takes the form of a sensible sign. Hence Deleuze claims that the “primary characteristic” of the encounter is that “it can only be sensed” [“il ne peut etre que senti] (Difference and Repetition 139/182fr.). In the other direction, it poses a problem, a problem that can only be thought, and that transmits to thought an irrevocable necessity. The sensible encounter, in short, is nothing less than the condition of thought. This is not to say that thought is occasioned by a body or material object, because objects as such have already been constituted as objects of recognition for subjects. Rather, it is to assert the necessity of sensation to the exercise of thought, as Deleuze makes clear in his central chapter of Difference and Repetition, “The Image of Thought” (144). What is encountered is not an object but a difference in sensation, one that wounds or strains existing categories of sense perception, and that transmits a shock to thought because it disrupts thought’s ready concepts, determining instead a mutation in thought (Zourabichvili 38). The primacy of the encounter as the condition of thought means that thought has a constitutive and positive relation to what it has not yet thought or been able to think: to what bites and scratches, to what it will drag, kicking and screaming, into thought. The encounter is not the beginning of thought but thought’s genetic middle point; it is thought’s confrontation with its own limit, which in turn

Deleuze and the Image of Thought

La pensee est comme le Vampire, elle n'a pas d'image, ni pour constituer modele, ni pour faire copie. Deleuze & Guattari There is a schism in the work of Gilles Deleuze. The early Deleuze of, primarily, Difference et repetition (1968), the first book written in his voice, advocates the destruction of what he names the of thought and calls instead for a thinking image.2 For the later Deleuze, not least the writer of the 1994 Preface to the English translation of the same book, the task is to think a new of thought.3 Indeed, by the time of s« 'est-ce que la philosophie?, published the same year as the English Preface, great philosophers are defined by their ability to dresse une nouvelle de la pensee.4 It is important to delineate this difference internal to Deleuze's thought because it embodies a certain struggle philosophy has in dealing with the image. Between the Preface and that which it prefaces, between the body and that which faces the body after the fact but which nevertheless comes before it, there is a schism and in that schism we find the play of word with image, philosophy with art. Before we are thinking, thinking in an authentic or proper sense according to Deleuze, a sense which is proper because it is improper, we are caught up in an image of thought, and this of thought is inauthentic not because of what it is an of but because it is an image. Deleuze devotes a good deal of his early work to critiquing the of thought. According to its author, the most and concrete part of Difference et repetition is the third chapter, L'image de la pensee. We have cause to think that it is this section on the of thought that leads Deleuze to remark of the book that it is the first one written in his own voice. Throughout his work Deleuze characterises the idea of as a voice foreign to itself, a voice in which the foreigner or the minority is given voice. This gives us a clue as to how to understand why Deleuze himself says in the English Preface that the chapter on the of thought is the most necessary of this the first book written in his own voice. Were we to follow Deleuze's logic we would have to say that it is in this chapter that what is foreign to Deleuze's thought is voiced by him. The of thought is Deleuze's characterisation of what comes before thinking: that which philosophy implicitly presupposes and explicitly projects, a pre-philosophical and natural and hence dogmatic of what thinking is. The dogmatic supposes that what thought wants, wants both materially and wilfully, is the true. Morality leads us to presuppose this. It is pre-supposed in the sense that everybody knows what it means to think, as though it were common sense. We all have this common picture of what it means to think. It's an in which subject and object and being and beings are already assigned their proper place and relation one to the other. And so long as philosophy holds to this it does not matter what it goes on to think conceptually. If the of thought guides the creation of concepts then those concepts will be part of the same projected. Moreover, it is the supposition of a natural capacity to think in this way that permits philosophy to claim to begin without suppositions. It is a supposition which is endowed with the power to undercut the conditions of the present moment and its attendant perversions. It is not a particular of thought that worries Deleuze; it's that thought is pre-conceived as an image in general. This is philosophy's subjective presupposition and the frame of Deleuze's critique. Nous ne parlons pas de telle ou telle de la pensee, he says, variable suivant les philosophies, mais d'une seule Image en general qui constitue le presuppose subjectif de la philosophie dans son ensemble.5 Part of the image, its stance as it were, is that thought is construed as naturally upright. …

Minissale Gregory, Images of Thought, Visuality in Islamic India 1550-1750, Cambridge Scholars Press, Newcastle, 2006, 271 p.

This is a much needed and compelling work, the first of its kind in the abundant literature on the great art of Mughal painting. Gregory Minissale’s book “Images of Thought “circumscribes its investigation in the time frame of 1550-1750 in which the most significant works were produced. As the author states in the very beginning of the introduction, his objective is not to “tell a story, at least not the kind of characters and events that has been told in art history many times”. This stateme...

The Image of Thought

The image of thought that Rembrandt proposes with his Philosopher in Meditation still wears the mask of the old philosophical pedagogy based on ascent and the heights, but it ushers in new percepts and affects corresponding to the philosopher's concept, fold, that Leibniz elevates to the status of the principle of Baroque variation. The fold unleashes a power that carries forms and statements over a variety of disjunctive statements.

Decreasing Putting Yips in Accomplished Golfers via Solution-Focused Guided Imagery: A Single-Subject Research Design

An across-subjects multiple-baseline design was used to evaluate the effects of solution-focused guided imagery (SFGI) on putting yips (e.g., jerk in the putting stroke) in three experienced (24 years or more), accomplished (handicap less than 7), male golfers located in the Southeastern United States. Each golfer participated in at least five SFGI sessions designed to guide him to create vivid images of thinking, feeling, and behaving in ways devoid of the problem (i.e., putting with a smooth continuous stroke). Data collected during participants’ regularly scheduled weekly golf rounds showed an immediate and sustained decrease in yips after SFGI sessions. Maintenance data collected three weeks after the last sessions showed that these decreases were maintained. Discussion focuses on future research and practice related to treatment of the yips and similar focal hand dystonia.