Illiberal Regimes Research Articles

The missing arc of a backlash? Thirty years of constitutional debate on ‘women’s equality’ in Hungary

The argumentation in this paper is based on the proposition that constitutions play a key role in defining the approach to women’s social status, not just by determining ordinary legislation and public policy, but also through constitutional review. The focus is on Hungary, a country that is not famous in Europe for a high level of equality between men and women, surrounded by a (liberal) international political discourse which asserts a backlash and claims that women’s equal rights are being curtailed even more during the era of Orbán’s illiberal government. Against this discursive backdrop, the paper highlights a counterintuitive phenomenon: since the democratic transition (1989–1990) all the key constitutional disputes related to equality between the sexes have been initiated by men claiming instances of discrimination against men, as if women were too privileged in Hungary. A relevant contextual feature is that while equal legal standing for the sexes is guaranteed (due partly to the heritage of state socialism, then to efforts related to EU integration), affirmative measures for women are also constitutionally ensured. The Constitutional Court has deployed surprisingly poor-quality reasoning in these disputes, suggesting that it never considered equality between the sexes to be an important issue. This leads us to claim that certain persistent features have characterized this field since the 1990s, not the dynamics of reversal since the 2010s. With our empirical findings, we aim to contribute to the academic discourse in a way that challenges the backlash narrative regarding developments in Hungary from a specific perspective.

Economic Nationalism Goes Global: Illiberal Governments Instrumentalizing Globalization in Eastern Europe

What are the consequences of electing illiberal leaders for the liberal international order? Traditional responses suggest they either want to increase their influence or change it radically. By understanding the illiberal domestic agenda of economic nationalism and statism in a world of increased financialization, I argue that the economic concentration taking place domestically will result in illiberal leaders instrumentalizing globalization for their political survival. This means these leaders have learned to selectively pick those parts of globalization most likely to sustain their regime—for example, criticizing multilateral organizations such as the European Union while reaping the benefits of EU membership. In this article, I begin by examining the trend of illiberal governments adopting economic nationalism and statism. I then theorize the nuanced ways in which illiberal leaders still use the liberal order for their political survival—in spite of espousing an illiberal economic agenda. I examine this phenomenon with an emphasis on illiberal leaders in Hungary and Poland and provide evidence from the last two decades of economic and political developments in Eastern Europe, as well as explore the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the recent war in Ukraine on the future of illiberal leaders’ approach to globalization.

Authoritarianism: Is There a Future?

Author analyzes the role of authoritarian regimes in the contemporary world, he characterizes their specific features in the first place determined by their historical traditions and political culture. The author pays attention to post-communist, post-soviet as well as Muslim authoritarian models. Also, he estimates perspectives of authoritarianism for the future, its capacities for the survival in conditions of the modern world. How great is the potential of authoritarianism, how limited is it by its conservatism, and how open is it to innovation? What is the effectiveness of an authoritarian system in the context of global changes taking place in the world, which are largely determined by scientific and technological progress, communication technologies? The author tries to consider these issues on the example of the countries of the East. On the one hand, some authoritarian regimes are ready to adapt to ongoing transformations, including in the political sphere, for the sake of their survival. In their practice, they use democratic norms, allow the activities of parliament, opposition parties, while striving, however, to fully maintain their own control over the state. They are aware that the softening, liberalization of the authoritarian system can lead to its elimination. And therefore, on the other hand, authoritarians use any situation, especially its aggravation, to tighten their rule. Authoritarianism has existed in various forms at almost all times. It was formed on the basis of the political culture in which the title role belonged to the state, and therefore to those who were currently in power. In this context, current authoritarianisms have direct analogies with their predecessors. Some analysts tend to view each variant of illiberal government as a unique, "competitive" democracy, as a "hybrid" authoritarianism. Whatever definitions are offered, the essence of authoritarianism does not change from this. Taking into account the national specifics in each individual country, authoritarianism remains a global, one might say, inevitable phenomenon that will continue to exist in different versions, and may even strengthen its position, which is the case today.

Human Rights Foreign Policy Under Bolsonaro: Pleasing The Conservative Constituency

Why is it difficult for Brazilian civil society organizations to stop the shift of Brazil’s positions in international human rights arenas? Why does the human rights dimension of Brazilian foreign policy suffer from the changes brought by Bolsonaro’s government? Based on new rational choice institutionalism and of foreign policy analysis, this study analyzes Bolsonaro’s human rights foreign policy, with a special focus on gender issues. Our hypotheses are that (1) Bolsonaro’s illiberal government, based on conservative and anti-human-rights positions of his constituency, instrumentalizes foreign policy because it allows him space to be more ideological and less pragmatic; and (2) the international arena is nestedwithin the electoral arena (the most important one), and the main objective of international inflections in the human rights issues of the Bolsonaro government is to please and energize Bolsonaro’s most conservative electorate. From these two hypotheses, we argue these changes are linked with a reconfiguration of the responsiveness of Brazilian foreign policy to societal pressures, privileging evangelical conservative organizations at the expense of progressive human rights organizations.

Вплив транзиту гегемонії на структури символічного насильства в капіталістичній світ-системі

One of the key concepts of world-system analysis is the concept of liberal hegemonic states, which not only arise, develop, and decline within the capitalist world-system, but also expand and re-establish it on new principles. Precisely, the transition of power between different hegemonic states occurred during the most significant world wars – 1618–1648, 1794–1815, and 1914–1945. This article examines the processes of symbolic violence and institutional isomorphism during the transition of hegemony. It argues that the hegemonic state creates an organizational field that spreads the phenomenon of institutional isomorphism within the capitalist world-system, which leads to some homogenization of the pseudo-independent states that are part of it. Although, speaking of such ‘standardization’, it is necessary to compare each state not with the hegemon but with other representatives of its zone in the capitalist world-system. The formation process of ‘universal’ institutions creates common cultural and political meanings, stabilizing transnational class alliances and allowing the hegemonic state to exercise its symbolic power at all levels of the capitalist world-system. Therefore, one of the most destructive manifestations of the hegemony transition is the collapse of global system of symbolic violence and institutional isomorphism, which leads to the failure of monopoly on symbolic and, consequently, physical violence. Moreover, it gives the reasons for numerous grassroots uprisings and leads to the emergence of competing illiberal government projects.

Gender-Balanced Representation and the Erosion of Global Liberal Norms

ABSTRACT How will the rise of China and other illiberal regimes affect the behaviour-shaping power of global liberal norms? The paper uses updated dyadic data on ambassadorial appointments to address this question. It focuses on the fate of a global liberal norm on gender-balanced representation. It argues that when powerful international partners discount the importance of gender balance, governments become less likely to prioritise gender balance themselves. The pattern of nodding toward partners’ norms is particularly pronounced for governments of structurally dependent, poorer countries. We find that the gender-balanced representation norm has eroded in the last five years. In this period, countries like Sweden and Germany have increased their support for global liberal norms, but China has become an increasingly vocal opponent. We also find that countries’ international power positions—not their broad cultural value systems (e.g. ‘Asian values’)—affect partner countries’ approaches. We suggest that the pressure for states to prioritise women’s political representation will weaken further unless rising powers dramatically reorient their current behaviours.

The Crucial Role of Domenico Losurdo in the Historical, Political and Philosophical Understanding of the “Chinese Way”

ABSTRACT Domenico Losurdo traveled to Beijing for the first time in the 1970s, when (Western) Maoism thrilled a large number of Western progressive intellectuals. But when these intellectuals turned away from China—which they accused of having consolidated an “illiberal totalitarian political regime” but also of having “restored capitalism”—by contrast Losurdo remained a friend of China. For him it was from the Chinese experience and its ability to survive the end of the USSR that one could draw inspiration to confront the most important event in the life of an entire generation: the radical crisis of Marxism and the defeat of the communist movement in the West. Western Marxism, born out of the shock of the First World War, is characterized by a utopian messianism prone to anarchism (the thesis of the extinction of the state, for example, or the claim of an immediate cancelation of borders, or hostility towards economy and technology). In China, on the other hand, Marxism has become the basis of national awareness and the consequent liberation struggle. Once political independence is reached, however, the revolution continues today in order to achieve economic independence. Hence the need for a re-elaboration of the same Marxian category of class struggle.

The World of Uncertainty: Is America Losing Its Leverage Towards a Looming New China–Russia Alliance?

The recent deterioration of US–China and US–Russia relations has stumbled the formation of a better world order in the 21st century. Washington’s concerns of the “great power realignment”, as well as its Manichean battle against China’s and Russia’s “illiberal regimes” have resulted in the activated alliance-building efforts between Beijing and Moscow, prompting the Biden administration to consider some wedging strategies. Despite their coordinated preparation to deter the US power, the Chinese and Russian leaderships seek to avert a conflict with Washington by diplomatic means, and the characteristic of their partnership is still leaving a “window of opportunity” for the United States to lever against the establishment of a formal Sino–Russian alliance.

Of Constitutions, Campaigns and Commissions: A Century of Democratic Centralism under the CCP

AbstractDemocratic centralism, a hallmark of Leninist party organizations, has played a formative role in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet despite being hailed as an “inviolable” and “unchanging” Party principle, understandings of democratic centralism have shifted dramatically over the century of its existence. This study traces the long arc of the concept's evolution across successive Party Constitutions, focusing on three critical historical junctures: the Sixth Party Congress, which formally adopted democratic centralism into its Constitution as an organizational principle; the Seventh Party Congress, which adopted rectification as the Party's practice of democratic centralism; and the 19th Party Congress, which set a new milestone in codifying the system as a disciplinary tool. I argue that while democratic centralism exemplifies the CCP's institutional plasticity and adaptive governance and is critical to understanding Party-driven constitutionalism in contemporary China, it also highlights an irresolvable paradox inherent in Party rule. Adaptability does not necessarily impart resilience. I conclude that the CCP's normatively unconstrained extra-constitutional leadership under Xi Jinping highlights the essentially and increasingly irrationalist aspects of its illiberal governance project.

The mutual constitution of illiberal civil society and neoauthoritarianism: Evidence from Turkey

Recent scholarship on state–civil society dynamics in neoauthoritarian contexts demonstrates that the space for civil society is rapidly shrinking worldwide. Faced with legal, administrative, and extralegal measures that restrict operations and resources, civil society actors are forced to choose between marginalization or co-optation. This article examines the ruling party–Islamic civil society symbiosis in Turkey and identifies mutual constitution as an alternative model of the state–civil society relationship in hybrid regimes. Defined as utilitarian reciprocity between the ruling authority and civil society actors where both parties expand and consolidate their respective domains, the mutually constitutive relationship between the AKP government and Islamic civil society actors has facilitated the consolidation of neoauthoritarianism. Drawing attention to the recent rise of conservative civil society actors worldwide, the article urges the civil society and neoauthoritarianism research program to shift its focus to non-state actors that endorse non-democratic socio-political agendas and function as co-constitutors of illiberal regimes.

Forging, Bending, and Breaking: Enacting the “Illiberal Playbook” in Hungary and Poland

In recent years, Central and Eastern Europe have furnished several examples of illiberalism in power. The most prominent and consequential cases are Fidesz, which has ruled in Hungary since 2010, and Law and Justice (PiS), which has ruled in Poland since 2015. In both cases, illiberal governments have embarked upon an extensive project of political reform aimed at dismantling the liberal-democratic order. We examine the nature, scope, and consequences of these processes of autocratisation. We first argue that illiberal changes are ideologically founded and identify how both populism and nativism figure in the policymaking of illiberals in power. We then show how these practices emerge from a common “illiberal playbook”—a paradigm of policy change comprising forms of forging, bending, and breaking—and elaborate on the notion that illiberal governments are using legalism to kill liberalism. The fine-grained approach that we employ allows us to distinguish between different rationales and gradations of illiberal policymaking, and assess their implications for the rule of law, executive power, and civil rights and freedoms

Formalism and anti-formalism in the Chinese Communist Party’s governance project

AbstractThis article argues that the governance project of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) oscillates between rule-based formalism and anti-formalist scepticism about rule-based governance. In this dichotomy, anti-formalist arguments support CCP leaders’ efforts to maintain and increase the Party’s influence over the judiciary and other state organs, which is a key justification for the Party’s power. Formalist language, in contrast, supports Party leaders’ attempts to constrain lower-level cadres’ uses of power within the Party. Formalist language is particularly prominent in the writings of Party ideologues on the interpretation of the Party’s internal regulations, including the CCP Constitution. At the same time, Party ideology also provides for various anti-formalist arguments about rule-based governance within and outside the Party. Paradoxical as it may be, the Party leadership seeks to exert rule-transcending political leadership through formal rules. While the focus of this article is on China, it argues that other illiberal regimes may also be studied in terms of similar, potentially incoherent approaches to rule-based governance.

Legislative resistance to illiberalism in a system of coalitional presidentialism: will it work in Brazil?

ABSTRACT Illiberal governments typically attempt to undermine representative democracy by adhering to a single comprehensive doctrine sustained through a majoritarian account of legitimacy that is suspicious of the rationality of liberal constitutional democracies. But perhaps there is hope for a system of coalitional presidentialism, such as Brazil. It has been argued that coalitional presidentialism may be in a better position to resist an illiberal project to erode democracy because of its centripetal and conservative forces, which might constitute a firewall against the concentration of powers in the executive branch. The legislature can either slow the pace of authoritarian measures or subject the government to relevant political defeats, raising the chances of democratic reconstruction. Should we expect success for legislative resistance to illiberal populism? What can the Brazilian experience under the first eighteen months of Bolsonaro's government teach us about it? Even though it might be too early for a conclusive assessment of these matters, we try to offer in the following sections a moderately optimistic response to the first question based on our assessment of the second.

The Rise of Neo-Illiberalism

This paper expands on the notion neo-illiberalism, signifying a symbiosis between neoliberal capitalism and variegated illiberal nationalisms, offering deeper reflections on its geopolitics, key drivers, and conceptual puzzles. It is argued that the West has entered an age of political illiberalization, replicating political operating logics of variegated illiberal(izing) regimes elsewhere, corroding domestic institutions and the western-dominated international liberal order, constituting an historic geopolitical shift. Although centrist parties have been variably attracted to the far right, particularly seeing center-right parties reinvent themselves as nationalist challengers to the ‘globalist’ status quo, in power they mostly radicalize the neoliberal encasement of capital, transforming a range of liberal-democratic institutions, procedures, and rights into illiberal political fortifications. Neoliberalism’s illiberal mutation is being realized amidst the intersections of rampant financial offshoring and digitization defining contemporary capitalism, allowing billionaire-class factions to ‘hack’ liberal-democratic governments and operating systems. With the rollout of data-driven technologies increasingly requiring the rollback of liberal protections by design, the fusion of digitizing capitalism and illiberal nationalisms is increasingly escaping accepted notions of liberalism.

Ill-neoliberalism

In a recent contribution Hendrikse (2018) has coined the concept of neo-illiberalism to signify mainstreaming of illiberal doctrines among neoliberal elites, thereby signifying a ‘mutation and restoration of transatlantic neoliberalism’. After a critical appraisal of his concept, this contribution argues that it is too early to claim that neoliberalism is mutated and suggests that the present conjuncture can better be termed ill-neoliberal instead. Following numerous scholars who have argued that we have arrived at an interregnum, I argue, also by applying Gramscian framework, that neoliberalism is increasingly malfunctioning, ‘ill’ or even dying, while something new is yet to be born. Yet in contrast to those who apply a Gramscian approach, I do not regard the rise of Trump or the European far right as ‘morbid symptoms’, but as attempted remedies (or authoritarian restorations) for neoliberalism. Neoliberal elites, somewhat reluctantly, welcome illiberal actors and doctrines in an effort to keep existing hierarchies in place or even restore old ones, now by even more authoritarian means. This transformation in the transatlantic neoliberal heartlands towards more illiberal regimes differs, then, from the emerging (and already) illiberal or authoritarian world powers such as China. If we were to accept the validity of the term ‘neo-illiberalism’ this should be exclusively applied to those regimes that are consistently illiberal, but increasingly rely on an ever-growing private economy (cf. Aiyar. 2016). Yet, whether such powers will be able to install a new (global) order depends foremost on the ability of the transatlantic heartlands to overcome neoliberalism. The article therefore concludes by pointing at some outlooks for the renewal and further contestation of an increasingly malfunctioning neoliberalism.

China's Digital Colonialism: Espionage and Repression Along the Digital Silk Road

Through the Digital Silk Road Initiative (DSR), announced in 2015, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is building expansive global data infrastructure and exporting surveillance technologies to dictators and illiberal regimes throughout the developing world.1 In some cases, these exports involve the trade of technology for access to sensitive user data and facial recognition intelligence. Domestically, China uses this type of technology to assert authority over its citizens, censor the media, quell protests, and systematically oppress religious minorities. Now, over eighty countries are enabled to do the same with Chinese surveillance technology.2 This report explores three primary concerns related to China's digital colonialism. China's DSR projects in the least developed regions of the world create a power imbalance between China and the recipient nations, resulting in a high risk for privacy and cybersecurity in those regions. China's export of intrusive artificial intelligence-enabled technologies and ideologies to illiberal regimes around the world enables authoritarianism and systemic oppression and degrades democratic values. Chinese digital dominance poses both a critical cybersecurity threat to the world and a growing threat to competitors' markets through the assertion of new Chinese-style standards of internet governance. As China builds new global internet infrastructure through the Digital Silk Road, it will co-opt billions of new Internet of Things (IoT) devices, servers, and foreign resources to its cyber arsenal. The author's firm, Recorded Future, posits that Beijing will conduct extensive influence operations in conjunction with the development of Chinese-style internet governance in participating Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries. If left unchecked by the rest of the world, China will reshape internet governance by replacing democratic values and standards with authoritarian principles.

The Tragedy of Transition: Development, Deterioration, Decay. The Case of Hungary, 1990-2020

The essay is about the economic and political development of Hungary in the last 30 years. It can be neatly divided into three periods which coincide with the calendar decades almost perfectly. After the collapse of the communist system, the first period constituted a glorious decade in development: the first two governments implemented almost all indispensable structural reforms required for a successful transition. After the financial stabilization in 1995, a consistent macroeconomic policy was applied, leading to export and investment-driven, hence sustainable economic growth. The next decade brought deterioration: reforms were stalled, and a sharp turn to consumption-led and debt-fuelled growth resulted in twin deficits which, by the time of the Great Recession, almost triggered a sovereign debt default. After a short period of successful financial stabilization, a populist-nationalist government came to power in 2010. A decade of decay set in: reversal of structural reforms, nationalization, monopolization, protectionism, market-distorting taxation and subsidization, state capture by a corrupt oligarchy, together with inconsistent macroeconomic policy. In addition, the self-styled „illiberal regime” of Viktor OrbĂĄn demolished the rule of law and all institutions representing checks and balances in a democracy. Corruption was elevated to the level of official government policy. With the help of the huge amount of subsidies coming from the EU, the regime maintained financial equilibrium and achieved significant growth during the time of global boom between 2014-2019. However, given the fact that private investments and productivity stay rather low in the non-tradable sector of the domestic economy, real convergence to Western efficiency and living standards remain elusive. Today Hungary constitutes a primary example of an economy pushed into a typical middle-income trap by its oligarchic and authoritarian regime. It also proves that transition reforms are all reversible; institutions are fragile. Restoration of the rule of law and democracy seems to be an indispensable prerequisite for convergence and development.

Policing a Pandemic: Understanding the State and Political Instrumentalization of the Coercive Apparatus in Duterte’s Philippines

As the world was mired in distress, some leaders saw opportunities to exploit the pandemic and further consolidate their grip on power. It is, thus, the objective of this article to discuss how, when, and why the state’s coercive apparatus has been instrumentalized by its leader amid a crisis. It will also explain how such apparatus has shaped both the aura of invincibility of the state and social order within the polity. The deployment of the Philippine National Police by President Rodrigo Duterte will be analyzed and discussed. The main argument of the article is that while the police has been given extensive powers to amplify the state’s power and assist in administrating a crisis-stricken society, they have also been instrumentalized to bolster an illiberal regime. In particular, the police were bestowed positions of authority within the state’s pandemic response apparatus, provided a broader leeway to wield violence through a contentious anti-terrorism law, and mobilized to unfairly enforce government-imposed measures. Thus, amid the COVID-19 pandemic in Duterte’s Philippines, civil liberties were violated, cultures of violence and impunity worsened, and the executive powers were consolidated.

“Those on the Right Take Chloroquine”: The Illiberal Instrumentalisation of Scientific Debates during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Brasil

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Brasilian government has undergone a significant political dispute over the use of hydroxychloroquine as a measure to confront the disease and contested scientific and healthcare organisations findings related to the drug's effectiveness. In this article, we seek to understand the manner in which an illiberal populist government and the supporters thereof refer to scientific discourse during the pandemic, with a focus on the debates on Brasilian far-right networks on Twitter. Using a mixed methodology with statistical methods, social media analysis, natural language processing and qualitative content analysis, this study seeks to investigate which sources and stakeholders were referenced and the narratives that structured the arguments of far-right supporters who defended the use of hydroxychloroquine. The results highlight the use of sources that are ideologically aligned to the right and a reconfiguration of scientific authority that was supported by illiberal values. Among the main discourses, we observed an epistemic challenge with a partisan bias, which led to the scientific authority legitimising some arguments and discrediting others. We also identified the spread of conspiracy theories that reflected the epistemic challenge, in addition to conservative, revivalist and individualistic postures.

Populisms: Inherently Illiberal or Plausibly Democratic?

The central question of this paper is whether a constructive relationship between populism and democratisation may exist, or whether all types of populism inevitably lead to illiberal regimes. Anglo-Saxon and Eurocentric traditions tend to identify populism with fascism, as in the case of authoritarian right-wing regimes, or with left-wing politics as in the case of socialist or communist systems that produce totalitarian regimes. Critical theorists consider populism to be a reaction to a perceived gap separating democratic institutions from the popular sovereignty from which political regimes derive their legitimacy. This paper examines populisms from three main perspectives: (1) negative views of populism from a liberal democracy perspective; (2) positive views from theorists who see populism as a legitimate expression of popular sovereignty; and (3) some ways in which populism may be viewed based on Leonardo Morlino’s definition of a hybrid regime and the experiences of several Latin American countries.