Ideological Enemies Research Articles

Broadcasting Jazz into the Eastern Bloc—Cold War Weapon or Cultural Exchange? The Example of Willis Conover

For jazz lovers worldwide, and particularly for listeners in Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War, Willis Conover's Voice of America show, Music USA (“The Jazz Hour” segment) provided the main source of knowledge for this music, and it was largely through the filter of his broadcast that each of the tens of millions of listeners crafted his or her understanding of “America.” Conover's popularity in Cold War-era Eastern Europe would be hard to overstate.Mainstream assessments of jazz posited—and continue to posit—equivalence between “jazz” and the “American way of life;” during the Warsaw Pact era, jazz functioned as a kind of “window to the West.” From such a viewpoint, Conover's wild popularity seems to anoint him as a victorious Cold War warrior for the West, but such equivalences and their conclusions are misleading, even mythical. Rather, the reception of Conover's radio program can be seen as part of a general mobilization of a whole generation. “The Jazz Hour” both reflected and added impetus to a modernization process in the Eastern Bloc—a process which began with the advent of the Cold War and continued over several decades. However, this modernization was both responsive to, and at the same time independent of, jazz's associations with the United States.With the beginning of Conover's jazz broadcast, both US-dominated NATO and Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact factions used jazz for their own purposes. The US administration and Conover himself regarded his penetration into Soviet Bloc radio as an important victory in the Cold War over their ideological enemy. But, as jazz gained a foothold in Soviet countries, both Conover's Music USA and the state-affiliated radio stations began to broadcast local or regional versions of jazz (labelled “own” jazz). The State socialist governments could thus claim victories of their own, now that listeners of their countries could turn to state radio stations for jazz, as opposed to American ones. The US administration intended to use jazz's popularity to weaken the loyalty of Eastern Bloc inhabitants to their governments, while the Soviet regime sought to establish a local, “own” jazz sensibility as a way of undermining the United States' strategy.Both strategies failed. Eastern Bloc inhabitants did not rise against their regimes, but implemented jazz within their own cultures. Eastern Bloc rulers managed a degree of control over the dissemination of jazz, but they failed also, because they could not stop the spread of an American orientation in jazz, despite of the strategy to promote their “own” jazz.Conover was an instrument for both sides. For the US government, he advertised US music and US values; for Eastern Bloc regimes, his broadcasts' inclusion of Eastern Bloc jazzmen promoted local and regional pride in the emerging “own” jazz styles played within the Eastern Bloc, and now transmitted internationally. If Conover really helped to destabilize anything, then he destabilized both systems, creating a worldwide listening community which proceeded to act beyond bloc boundaries.

Liu Na’ou And The 1930s Soft Film Movement: A New Approach In Revisionist Chinese Film Historiography

This essay analyzes how the 1930s Chinese “Soft Film” movement emerged and developed in film historiography, and finds it is a discursive formation by the Leftists to create an ideological enemy that serves to define its own group’s identity through a struggle against an “other”. It challenges the naming of “Soft Film” through examining documents beyond the official archive. Unearthing the film writings of Liu Na’ou as the movement’s leading figure is a good entry point into excavating the history of the people and films associated with the label “Soft Film”. Reconstructing this “reactionary cinema” will reveal previously unknown cultural connections with classical and avant-garde Western film theories, and more importantly renovate the established Chinese film canon of the 1930s.

Missed Ideological Opportunities and George W. Bush’s Middle Eastern Policies

Numerous analysts have criticized George W. Bush's Middle Eastern policies for their strong ideological content. This article agrees with a core premise of these critiques, but it does so for very different reasons from most analyses. Ideological rigidity on some issues, paradoxically, prevented the Bush administration from taking advantage of the full range of ways in which ideologies shape international relations. There were three major opportunities to advance US interests in the Middle East during Bush's presidency that were created by the effects of ideologies. First, liberalizing parties in otherwise illiberal regimes tended to be significantly more supportive of US interests than other ideological groups in the same country at the same time. Second, major ideological differences among different types of illiberal enemies of the United States enhanced America's ability to adopt “wedge” strategies toward various hostile coalitions. Finally, the existence of different types of ideological enemies in the Middle East created incentives for some illiberals to align with the United States because of mutual ideological enmity for a third ideological group. The Bush administration, however, failed at key times to take advantage of these openings. If Bush administration officials had been less ideologically dogmatic while, somewhat paradoxically, making better strategic use of ideologies’ major international effects, America's security would have been significantly advanced in critical cases.

Review: The Triumph of the Dark European International History 1933-1939

THE TRIUMPH OF THE DARK European International History 1933-1939 Zara S. Steiner Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 1248 pp, US$65.00 (cloth) ISBN 978-0199212002With the second and final volume of her study of European international politics between 1919 and 1939, Zara Steiner has completed what is now the touchstone for several generations and beyond of international historians, international relations specialists, and the wider reading public interested in the period between the two world wars of the 20th century. Together with the first volume, this study is an immediate classic - one based on 20 of research and, before that, a distinguished scholarly record and accumulation of knowledge stretching back to the late 1950s. Demonstrating the same deft analytical hand that dissected the vagaries of European international history from the Paris peace conference to the collapse of the Weimar republic, a command of English and foreign language sources, and lucid prose, Steiner provides an exegesis that neither preaches about nor excuses the generation of statesmen, politicians, military leaders, diplomats, and journalists who dominated Europe and hold responsibility for the outbreak of a second world war in 1939. In the first volume of her study, she argued that by the end of the 1920s, the problems spawned by the First World War were resolved and continental stability had emerged from the chaos of war and revolution. This process was then undermined by the hinge years of the Great Depression, beginning in late 1929 when the disruption of the international economy, the concomitant undermining of democratic government, and the rise of radical prescriptions to meet the apparent failure of capitalism and democratic governance emerged.In this context, the central figure of this book is Adolf Hitler, the German chancellor after January 1933, supreme German leader after August 1934, and fountainhead of National Socialist ideology. Steiner's initial chapter, Brown dawn, looks closely at the Nazi revolution and the end of the quest for disarmament. She sees Hitler's ideology as nourishing the roots of a foreign policy designed to make Germany supreme in Europe and laying the basis for an eventual struggle with the United States to make Germany the sole world power: territorial expansion to the east, whereby the newly created states, including German- speaking Austria, would have to be brought within the Reich; the complete destruction of Nazidom's ideological enemy, Bolshevik Russia; and cleansing Europe of its subhuman races, especially the Jews. Through his dark social Darwinian lens, Hitler looked for the means and opportunity to achieve his foreign policy goals.Opportunism is central here. In his influential 1961 book, The Origins of the Second World War, the revisionist A.J. P. Taylor argued that Hitler did not follow a diplomatic blueprint but was pragmatic in foreign policy: announcing German rearmament in 1935, remilitarizing the Rhineland in 1936, forcing the annexation of Austria in March 1938, detaching the German-speaking Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia six months later, occupying the Czechoslovak rump in March 1939, and initiating the Polish crisis in September 1939. In contrast, Steiner shows clearly that while Hitler was opportunistic, he was an opportunist who knew where he was going. He gambled on inaction by the other great powers, took risks, and proved daring in exploiting the openings given to him. He took the initiative and the other powers' leaders reacted.In Steiner's estimation, these responses were crucial to the origins of the Second World War. Engaged in a pyrrhic competition among themselves, all the successor states except Czechoslovakia gradually moved into the German orbit because the new Bolshevik Russian threat differed little from the old tsarist one. In Italy, Benito Mussolini found common ground with Hitler after the Italian conquest of Abyssinia in May 1936 and led his country away from London and Paris, which had temporarily united with Rome in a vain effort to contain Germany. …

Secret Affairs

This book deals with the old-new issue pertaining to the dialectics of Western,particularly the British“Islamists” collusion during the decades of thetwentieth century and into the twenty-first century. The issue is old becausemuch of such collaboration has been either known or suspected, especiallyduring the era of the visible rise of threatening communist ideology sincethe Russian Revolution of 1917, as well as other socialist ideas. It is newbecause of the twists it has taken in the context of the sudden disappearanceof the common Soviet ideological enemy, which had glued both partiesto each other—and the ensuing so-called war on global terrorism. Theissue is also dialectical as it pertains to the seeming love-hate relationshipthat permeated Western-Islamist interaction, and which despite all soundingsof mutual vituperations and appearances of alleged resentment, neverreally stood in the way of both finding reasons and ways for colluding ...

From “Ideological Enemies” to “Strategic Partners”: A Rhetorical Analysis of U.S.-China Relations in Intercultural Contexts

By using the theoretical frameworks of rhetorical traditions of both cultures, and realism and post-realism on foreign policy rhetoric, this article examines the dynamics of U.S.-China relations from 1940 to 1990s in historical, political, ideological, and economic contexts as facilitated by media and the discourse of national leaders. It explores the rhetorical construction of U.S.-China relations evolving from “military allies” to “ideological enemies,” and from “moral adversaries” to “strategic partners” in responding to international environment and domestic needs. The author contends that rhetoric on U.S.-China relations is largely shaped by the cultural orientations and national interest of each country. This is particular evident in the interplay of moralistic and pragmatic rhetorical orientation in seeking mutual economic benefits and global cooperation. The article offers implications on international communication from the points of how powerful nations can achieve intercultural understanding and peaceful co-existence.

State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in Post-Independence Mozambique (1975–1983)

This article explores state discourse on domestic security threats and the way the Mozambican party-state sought to counter them in the decade after independence. It analyses the ways in which government forces dealt with ideological enemies, crime and social disorder. It is argued that Frelimo's quest for hegemony and its obsessive aim of building a state-nation under the project of ‘socialist revolution’ led to harsh intolerance of all that was considered a hindrance to these objectives. As obstacles to the project arose from the outset, the party-state developed a political analysis of security that did not distinguish internal from external security threats. The result was the institutionalisation of a politics of punishment as a state instrument of power and social control aiming to repress, deter and educate party-state opponents and all individuals outside the realm of socialist and revolutionary principles defined by the party-state. The article demonstrates that much of this politics of punishment represented to considerable sections of Mozambican society a return to the ‘old regime’ insofar as the post-independence state reproduced some colonial mechanisms of punishment and social control.

“A little bit more mysterious…”: Ambience and Art in the Dark

“A little bit more mysterious…”: Ambience and Art in the Dark

Reification of the Chinese Intellectual

Research has largely overlooked the reification of the intellectual ( zhishifenzi) after the 1949 Communist revolution. Studying this major feature of Chinese socialism can illuminate the workings of the Chinese Communist Party, state-society relations, and the experience of so-called intellectuals. This article explores the social and ideological contexts that first nurtured the party’s concept of intellectuals. It focuses on the debate about the intellectual class ( zhishi jieji) in political and literary circles from the late 1910s to the mid-1920s. During the May Fourth era, socialists, anarchists, and other activists regarded the intellectual class as a distinct social category with internal cleavages based on age and political consciousness. Under the influence of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists recast the intellectual class as the primary ideological enemy. The debate about the intellectual class profoundly affected the party’s understanding of the intellectual. The article concludes by suggesting new directions for research on the reification of the intellectual.

THE CLEAN WEHRMACHT, THE WAR OF EXTERMINATION, AND BEYOND

ABSTRACTThis article surveys recent research on the German Wehrmacht's anti-partisan campaign in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. German anti-partisan warfare in the Soviet Union was conducted not just against partisans, but also as cover for annihilating the Reich's ‘ideological enemies’ and plundering ‘bandit areas’ for resources. The Wehrmacht's role was significant, constituting an important element of its wider participation in Nazi crimes. The review sketches the historical background and surveys the historiography's development to the late 1990s. It then examines at length the significant works that have emerged since, dividing them according to the operational levels on which they focus: higher command, individual regions, and, finally, middle-level units.

Woven of War-Time Fabrics: The globalization of public health surveillance

This article considers the imbrication of war-time logics with the ideational and institutional development of public health surveillance. It suggests that, as the Cold-War–era gave way to the ‘age of globalization’, public health discourse became less concerned with ideological enemies, and more concerned with ontological enemies. The discourse of emerging infectious disease exemplifies this preoccupation and illustrates how public health surveillance, dominated by war-time logics, is both globalized and predisposed to marginalized local orders of concern. However, at the same time that militarized configurations of public health surveillance set certain tendencies in motion, local orders of concern deconstruct, contest, resist, and negotiate these tendencies. Hence, this article concludes with a call for further empirical attention by Surveillance Studies scholars to the multiplicity of local sites that enact public health surveillance.

Science in Dachau's shadow: HEBB, Beecher, and the development of CIA psychological torture and modern medical ethics

In August 2006, the U.S. Army’s surgeon general, General Kevin Kiley, appeared before the national convention of the American Psychological Association (APA) dressed in full combat uniform to defend the participation of psychologists in interrogation. “Psychology,” he declared, invoking a military maxim that many present may have found unsettling, “is an important weapons system” (Levine, 2007; Lewis, 2004). For over half a century, from the Cold War to the War on Terror, psychology has served the U.S. intelligence community as a secret weapon in wars against its ideological enemies, first communism and now Islamic fundamentalism. From the start of the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community has lavished rewards on the psychology profession, both generous funding for experimental researchers and employment for clinical specialists, producing a variant of what psychiatrist Robert Lifton has called a “Faustian bargain.” In this case, the price paid has been the APA’s collective silence, ethical “numbing,” and over time, historical amnesia (Lifton, 1986, pp. 418–419). Illustrative of this latter phenomenon, only months after General Kiley’s extraordinary address to the APA, the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences published a discussion by two psychologists that, instead of debating these ethical issues or probing this troubled past, engaged in a collective attack on a study that tried to break this silence over the CIA’s patronage of cognitive science—my recent book, A Question of Torture. In a disjointed 15-page critique, the psychologist Richard Brown accused me, incorrectly, of fabricating text to lend credibility to his catalogue of my supposed scholarly derelictions.1 Moreover, in defending Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 43(4), 401–417 Fall 2007 Published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/jhbs.20271 © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The Nazis' Religionspolitik: As Assessment of Recent Literature

THE NAZIS' RELIGIONSPOLITIK: AN ASSESSMENT OF RECENT LITERATURE The Holy Retch: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945. By Richard Steigmann-Gall. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Pp. xvi, 294. $34.99) Richard Steigmann-Gall, Was National Socialism a Political Religion or a Religious Politics? in Michael Geyer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds.), Religion und Nation: Nation und Religion. Beitrage zu einer unbewaltigten Geschichte (Gottingen:Wallstein Verlag, 2003), pp. 386-408. euro30.00 Himmlers Glaubenskrieger: Der Sicherheitsdienst der SS und seine Religionspolitik, 1933-1941. By Wolfgang Dierker. 2nd ed. (Paderborn: Schoningh Verlag. 2002. Pp. 639. euro82.20.) Scholarly investigation into the relationship between the German churches and National Socialism invites controversy. The judgments meted out by historians, journalists, and theologians reveal little consensus even after almost forty years of acrimonious exchanges and debates. They have portrayed the churches beleaguered institutions struggling to keep their heads above water in the face of relentless state persecution, heroic individuals courageously spearheading resistance against Nazism, or opportunists eagerly offering to collaborate with the regime either out of tactical calculations or ideological conviction.1 Yet in spite of these clashing verdicts, most scholarly accounts show a great deal of unanimity in their depictions of the churches the objects of unwelcome intrusions and outright persecution from the National Socialist state, in which the initiative lay almost completely with the Nazi regime. To date, most depictions of the churches under Nazi rule have portrayed this complex relationship between religious and secular authorities primarily through the eyes of the churches themselves. Two notable recent works turn this picture upside down.They focus on the motivations and tactics not of church luminaries but of the Nazis themselves, who usually (but not always) remained in the driver's seat in this relationship. Arguing that many Nazis sincerely believed themselves to be good Christians, Richard Steigmann-Gall elucidates the religious beliefs of the leading Nazis, including Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann.Though he covers this same terrain, Wolfgang Dierker analyzes in great detail the religious politics and religious beliefs of one particular branch of the Nazi state, the SD, the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuhrers SS. The SD was an offshoot of the SS created to gather intelligence on ideological enemies of National Socialism. Only recently have historians researched its activities.2 These two books have certain superficial features in common. Both appeared with first-rate publishing houses at roughly the same time. Wolfgang Dierker's book, Himmlers Glaubenskrieger: Der Sicherheitsdienst der SS und seine Religionspolitik, 1933-1941, arrived in 2002 part of the so-called Blaue Reibe, or blue series, an extremely well-regarded series produced by the Roman Catholic historical association, Die Kommission fur Zeitgescbicbte. Richard Steigmann-Gall's book, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945, was published in 2003 by Cambridge University Press. Both works were the outgrowths of dissertations by promising younger scholars who had carried out their research in the 1990's. But here the similarities end. Steigmann-Gall's book bears the burden of unusually high praise. On the cover-jacket, Helmut Walser Smith extolled this work as a brilliant and provocative work that will recast the whole debate on Christianity and Nazism. Additional encomia by the eminent scholars Richard Evans and Michael Burleigh only bolstered its reputation a path-breaking revisionist work that would destroy existing orthodoxies. Such advance endorsements ensured of course that The Holy Retch would be widely reviewed. Its revisionism has earned it not only acclaim but also trenchant criticism, so much so that its claims are to be the subject of an upcoming forum in the Journal of Contemporary History, of which Evans himself is an editor. …

The Escalation of German Reprisal Policy in Occupied France, 1941-42

This article deals with the escalation of German reprisal policy in occupied France in the years 1941 and 1942. The consequences of the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 became apparent to the occupiers in August and September 1941, when the number of cases of active resistance increased. After a demonstration on 13 August 1941, the first draconic measures were imposed by the Wehrmacht, leading to the execution of two communists and the imprisonment of c. 3000 Jews. Two months later, the first mass executions of hostages were ordered after two members of the German armed forces were assassinated. However, the military administration in Paris soon realized the negative impact of mass executions on the overall situation in France. Therefore, the military commander argued for limited executions and the mass deportation of ‘Jewish Bolsheviks’. The following conflict between Berlin and Paris over the appropriate reprisal policy led to the resignation of the military commander Otto von Stülpnagel and the appointment of his cousin Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel as his successor, as well as the creation of the post of Higher SS and Police Commander in Paris. It will be shown that, despite these changes in 1942, there was a strong continuity in reprisal policy which in 1941 and 1942 targeted the ideological enemies of the Third Reich: the Jews and the communists. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that after the arrival of the Higher SS and Police Commander in the summer of 1942 reprisal policy became even more ideologically rooted. Accordingly, when discussing reprisal policy one cannot describe the occupation of France as benign.

China's evil genius

Not since the Cultural Revolution have China's leaders mobilised their forces so rabidly against an ideological enemy

Trading Words, Waging War: The Mystified Relationship between British Radicals and French "Révolutionnaires"

he question of interactions between British radicals and their French counterparts during the 1790os is complex when studied in terms of responses to the French Revolution in Britain, and answers are even more elusive when the opposite perspective is considered. This elusiveness is reflected in, as well as reinforced by, the paucity of historical studies from the French perspective, in sharp contrast to the rich bibliography on the British militant groups and their special relationship with revolutionary France. The enduring lack of interest in the topic among French historians can be traced back to the nineteenth century and might well be interpreted as a symptom of the prevailing patriotic reading of the French Revolution-although such an interpretation, however convincing in the case of Michelet, would be much less likely to explain, for instance, de Tocqueville's indifference not only to the British radicals but also to any form of British influence on the events in France. However, there is no avoiding another possibility-namely, that the lack of interest among historians simply mirrors or repeats a similar indifference on the part of the French revolutionaries toward their British counterparts and associates. Assessing the impact of British radical thought or experience on the French revolutionaries involves a frustrating attempt to give some historical shape to a slippery, deceptive episode; but here again, the frustration might well reflect the very nature of a relationship best described as a political and cultural rendez-vous manque'. Over the span of only a few years, British radicals and French revolutionaries traded words-of encouragement, of praise, of affection. They also borrowed from each other phrases, slogans, and newly coined terms that they could brandish against their mutual ideological enemies. On the French side, particularly, the semantic and rhetorical aspects of the relationship appear to have been much more important than the political ones. It should be useful, then, to address the question of the French revolutionaries' attitude toward the British radicals in terms of language.

From national identity to national interest: The rise (and fall) of Germany's new right

This article analyses the ideology of the so‐called German ‘New Right’ and explains its apparent failure in the 1990s in terms of both ideological and institutional factors. After dissecting the ‘conceptual anatomy’ of New Right thinking and highlighting the importance of rewriting the history of National Socialism for New Right intellectuals, it is argued that the phenomenon has to be understood against the background of various strands of conservative thinking in west Germany. Contrary to observers who have claimed an analogy with the 1920s ‘Conservative Revolution’, the New Right was akin to nationalist intellectuals in the Federal Republic, and suffered from the same structural dilemma which conservatism had encountered there. Its failure is attributed to a lack of ideological innovation, an excessive fixation on the 68ers as the ideological enemy, and, finally, a lack of party support. Conclusions about German political culture are then drawn from the failure of the New Right.

Neo‐nationalism and the ‘liberal school of history’

1990s Japan appears to be in the grip of a revisionist trend which many people associate with the emergence of neo‐nationalism. This paper argues that, while the leading proponents of revisionist history in the 1990s are superficial and intellectually unpersuasive, they nonetheless ought to be taken seriously by Japan scholars. Through a study of the ‘Liberal School of History’ and the ideas and person of its figurehead, Fujioka Nobukatsu, the logic expounded by revisionists and the alleged historical antecedents for these ideas are identified. The tumultuous context of the 1990s, including the Gulf War, death of Hirohito and the fiftieth anniversary of defeat in 1945, have provided a fertile environment for arguments in favour of a more patriotic history education for Japanese junior and senior high‐school students. Conservative and rightist politicians across party lines have developed activist groups in support of Fujioka's programme, and he has received considerable financial backing from the private sector. Analysis of 1990s revisionism reveals a closer affinity with pre‐war and wartime nationalism than with any kind of ‘new’ post‐war nationalism. It has revived a State‐centred nationalism that explicitly regards post‐war democracy as its ideological enemy.

History, Memory, and Humanism in the Recent Writings of Tzvetan Todorov

conquest of the New World and on racial or ideological enemies by the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, he warns against the excesses of memory and rejects the notion of collective guilt of peoples and cultures. Similarly, Todorov analyzes the unspeakable treatment inflicted on human beings in the Nazi and Stalinist camps in order to elucidate the fundamental moral principles essential to everyday life. Moreover, after revealing the linguistic underpinnings and rhetorical mechanisms that structure the narrative, Todorov reaffirms the value of the literary text as a vehicle for transmitting ideas and experiences that would otherwise remain outside our grasp. Underlying these studies of specific social, cultural, and political conflicts, Todorov articulates a new humanism and a defense of its concomitant values: the dignity of the individual, personal autonomy, democratic institutions, and the search for objective, universal truth. While these positions go against the grain of the strident anti-humanism dominating American criticism of the past few years, Todorov avoids the polemical mode in favor of careful consideration of specific cases: rather than defending tradition, he argues that the best way to overcome the strains of racism, cultural hegemony, and violence that exist in Western culture is not to champion one nation, culture, ethnic group, or gender over another, but rather to affirm our common humanity. This broad range of issues finds its most cogent expression in L 'Homme ddpays6,' whose title refers both to the current confusion of the human individual as such, as well as to Todorov's own

The humanities, in memoriam

Robert Conquest: Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California A century ago, Matthew Arnold in t roduced into c o m m o n English usage the word Philistine. He characterized the Philistine as ~a strong, dogged opponen t o f the chosen people, of the children of light. But we should r e m e m b e r that Israel's early troubles weren ' t always f rom this straightforward foe. O n the o ther flank lay a more insidious enemy of their own blood, the Moabites, who, f rom their capital at Shittim, inffitrated temple and ha rem and set the children of light whoring after strange doctrine. The great belief of all Moabites is that literary and artistic criteria, as such, should be abolished. Smugly, self-righteously, they seek to advance this grand design with, as one o f Dostoevsky's characters remarks, a social excuse for everything nasty they do. They see ideological enemies everywhere. For once, let us spring to the defense o f classical Marxists in whose mant le the Moabites like to cloak themselves. It is t rue that Marx ideologized every-