Identity Prejudice Research Articles

A critical analysis of UK media characterisations of Long Covid in children and young people.

Long Covid is the continuation or development of symptoms related to a SARSCoV2 infection. Those with Long Covid may face epistemic injustice, where they are unjustifiably viewed as unreliable evaluators of their own illness experiences. Media articles both reflect and influence perception and subsequently how people regard children and young people (CYP) with Long Covid, and may contribute to epistemic injustice. We aimed to explore how the UK media characterises Long Covid in CYP through examining three key actor groups: parents, healthcare professionals, and CYP with Long Covid, through the lens of epistemic injustice. A systematic search strategy resulted in the inclusion of 103 UK media articles. We used an adapted corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis in tandem with thematic analysis. Specifically, we utilised search terms to locate concordances of key actor groups. In the corpus, parents highlighted minimisation of Long Covid, barriers to care, and experiences of personal attacks. Mothers were presented as also having Long Covid. Fathers were unmentioned. Healthcare professionals emphasised the rarity of Long Covid in CYP, avoided pathologising Long Covid, and overemphasised psychological components. CYP were rarely consulted in media articles but were presented as formerly very able. Manifestations of Long Covid in CYP were validated or invalidated in relation to adults. Media characterisations contributed to epistemic injustice. The disempowering portrayal of parents promotes stigma and barriers to care. Healthcare professionals' narratives often contributed to negative healthcare experiences and enacted testimonial injustice, where CYP and parents' credibility was diminished due to unfair identity prejudice, in their invalidation of Long Covid. Media characterisations reveal and maintain a lack of societal framework for understanding Long Covid in CYP. The findings of this study illustrate the discursive practices employed by journalists that contribute to experiences of epistemic injustice. Based on our findings, we propose recommendations for journalists.

Epistemic Injustice in the Medical Context: Introduction to Special Issue

ABSTRACT This special issue aims to delve deeper into the manifestations of epistemic injustice within asymmetric relationships, such as those between laypersons and experts (e.g. patients and physicians). We focus on distinguishing between warranted and unwarranted epistemic exclusions, recognizing that some epistemic harms may stem from justified exclusions, thus necessitating consideration of both just and unjust exclusions. Using examples from the medical field, including instances of misdiagnosis based on statistical correlations, we highlight the intricate nature of epistemic exclusions and their ethical implications. While some exclusions may align with established epistemic practices, others arise from unnecessary practices fueled by identity prejudice or power dynamics, thus presenting as instances of epistemic injustice. Additionally, our exploration of epistemic gaps, particularly within complex environments like medicine, illuminates the challenges individuals face in effectively conveying their experiences and accessing pertinent information. While certain forms of epistemic isolation may be warranted, others result from structural barriers hindering knowledge exchange, prompting critical reflection on the ethical dimensions of such practices.

Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering

ABSTRACT In this paper, we look at what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical injustice” as it arises in the medical context. By drawing on the history of hysteria, I argue that the concept of hysteria has been held in place by power structures affected by negative prejudice against women. In this sense, the concept of hysteria fits the central conditions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice as characterized by Fricker. Yet, reflection on the case of hysteria also signals the need for widening the understanding of hermeneutical injustice. I thus propose to ameliorate the concept of hermeneutical injustice and show how, once thus ameliorated, it can be used as a powerful tool to advocate for the amelioration of the concept of woman. I then return to the concept of hysteria and argue that it is still in use in everyday contexts, where it embodies identity prejudice against women and constitutes a particularly pernicious form of put-down that perpetrates various forms of epistemic injustice. I conclude that also in that kind of context the concept of hysteria should be abandoned. Like with other loaded concepts, the only admissible uses of that concept would then be in contexts of reclaiming or re-appropriation.

Challenging Prejudice as the Necessary Condition for Testimonial Injustice: Unveiling the Role of Epistemic Vice

ABSTRACT The conception of epistemic injustice as a campaign tool has generated considerable debate. The challenge lies in identifying instances of testimonial injustice within complex real-world situations. Miranda Fricker suggests that credibility deficits and identity prejudice serve as necessary conditions for recognizing testimonial injustice. However, this approach faces conceptual generalisation: certain cases that intuitively seem to fit the definition fail to meet the criteria, while some cases that meet the criteria appear counterintuitive. Addressing this issue by introducing additional conditions alongside the original ones seems ineffective and redundant. Simply reverting to Fricker’s original definition is not a straightforward solution either. Identity prejudice plays a decisive role in Fricker’s establishment of testimonial injustice, but it is itself a broad and vague concept. The blurry boundary between heuristics and prejudices has led to many difficulties. An examination of the nature of prejudice indicates that the initial prejudice condition should be modified. It is epistemic inertia, rooted in our thought processes, that serves as the catalyst rendering heuristics unreliable and triggering various epistemic vices, including identity prejudice. Therefore, the prejudice condition is too narrow, while the superordinate concept of epistemic vice is more fundamental as a necessary condition for testimonial injustice.

Unravelling epistemic injustice in medical education: The case of the underperforming learner.

Epistemic injustice refers to a wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower. While philosophers have detailed the pervasiveness of this issue within healthcare, it is only beginning to be discussed by medical educators. The purpose of this article is to expand the field's understanding of this concept and to demonstrate how it can be used to reframe complex problems in medical education. After outlining the basic features of epistemic injustice, we clarify its intended (and unintended) meaning and detail what is required for a perceived harm to be named an epistemic injustice. Using an example from our own work on introversion in undergraduate medical education, we illustrate what epistemic injustice might look like from the perspectives of both educators and students and show how the concept can reorient our perspective on academic underperformance. Epistemic injustice results from two things: (1) social power dynamics that give some individuals control over others, and (2) identity prejudice that is associated with discriminatory stereotypes. This can lead to one, or both, forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. Our worked example demonstrates how medical educators can be unaware of when and how epistemic injustice is happening, yet the effects on students' well-being and sense of selves can be profound. Thinking about academic underperformance with epistemic injustice in mind can reveal an emphasis within current educational practices on diagnosing learning deficiencies, to the detriment of holistically representing its socially constructed and structural nature. This article builds upon recent calls to recognise epistemic injustice in medical education by clarifying its terminology and intended use and providing in-depth application and analysis to a particular case: underperformance and the introverted medical student. Equipped with a more sophisticated understanding of the term, medical educators may be able to re-conceptualise long-standing issues including, but also beyond, underperformance.

Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices

ABSTRACT This article focuses on unjust credibility deficits in cases of testimony about emotional reactions towards acts of oppression. It argues that the injustice in these cases is not rooted in the hearer’s identity prejudices against the speaker, but the hearer's problematic way of dealing with his simulation of being in the speaker's situation. The simulation is in itself not morally problematic. However, I focus on a case where the hearer either recklessly or negligently fails to consider knowledge about the differences in people’s emotional reactions and comes to believe that his simulated reaction is the only possible reaction, thus believing that the speaker does not report her emotions truthfully.In this case, the ‘epistemic poison’ results from the recklessness or negligence not necessarily from identity prejudice against the speaker. This credibility deficit is unjust, yet its persistent and systematic nature stems from the fact that a hearer who is not from the same marginalized or oppressed group as the speaker will simulate different emotional reactions to those reported by the speaker. Hence, the unjust credibility deficit can be connected to other forms of social injustices suffered by the speaker.

Willful testimonial injustice as a form of epistemic injustice

AbstractIn the debate on epistemic injustice, it is generally assumed that testimonial injustice as one form of epistemic injustice cannot be committed (fully) deliberately or intentionally because it involves unconscious identity prejudices. Drawing on the case of sexual violence against refugees in European refugee camps, this paper argues that there is a form of testimonial injustice—willful testimonial injustice—that is deliberate. To do so, the paper argues (a) that the hearer intentionally utilizes negative identity prejudices for a particular purpose and (b) that the hearer is aware of the fact that the intentionally used prejudices are in fact prejudices. Furthermore, the paper shows how testimonial injustice relates to recognition failures both in terms of a causal as well as a constitutive claim. In fact, introducing willful testimonial injustice can support the constitutive claim of such a relation that has so far received little attention. Besides arguing for a novel form of testimonial injustice and contributing to the recent debate on the relation between epistemic injustice and recognition failures, this paper is also motivated by the attempt to draw attention to the inhumane conditions for refugees at the border of Europe as well as elsewhere.

'The program director's word … it's stronger than the word of God': Epistemic injustice revealed through narratives of remediated graduate medical education residents.

Though graduate medical education (GME) residency training provides positive experiences for many trainees, it may also result in major stressors and negative experiences, particularly for those requiring remediation. Residents requiring remediation may experience feelings of dismay, shame and guilt that can negatively affect their training, self-efficacy and their medical careers. Power differentials between educators and residents may set the stage for epistemic injustice, which is injustice resulting from the silencing or dismissing a speaker based on identity prejudice. This can lead to decreased willingness of trainees to engage with learning. There is a paucity of literature that explores GME experiences of remediation from the resident perspective. To synthesise the narratives of physician experiences of remediation during residency through the lens of epistemic injustice. Between January and July 2022, we interviewed US physicians who self-identified as having experienced remediation during residency. They shared events that led to remediation, personal perspectives and emotions about the process and resulting outcomes. Interviews were analysed using narrative analysis with attention to instances of epistemic injustice. We interviewed 10 participants from diverse backgrounds, specialties and institutions. All participants described contextual factors that likely contributed to their remediation: (1) previous academic difficulty/nontraditional path into medicine, (2) medical disability or (3) minoritised race, gender or sexual identity. Participants felt that these backgrounds made them more vulnerable in their programmes despite attempts to express their needs. Participants reported instances of deflated credibility and epistemic injustices with important effects. Participant narratives highlighted that deep power and epistemic imbalances between learners and educators can imperil GME trainees' psychological safety, resulting in instances of professional and personal harm. Our study suggests applying an existing framework to help programme directors (PDs) approach remediation with epistemic humility.

Evidential reasoning, testimonial injustice and the fairness of the criminal trial

The article argues that the assessment of the relevance and of the probative value of an item of evidence is susceptible to an evaluation on moral grounds (such as fairness), rather than just to an evaluation on epistemic grounds (such as accuracy). In particular, the article shows that an assessment of relevance and of probative value is unfair, and renders the trial unfair, when this assessment instantiates epistemic injustice of the testimonial kind; and that it instantiates such an injustice when, due to identity prejudice against a social group to which one of the parties in the proceedings belongs, the evidence is assessed without considering the experience and stock of knowledge of thisparty. The article offers several examples of this phenomenon. The upshot is that higher courts, whose role includes checking that proceedings have been fair, should dirty their hands more readily than they are currently doing with the evidential reasoning of the first-instance adjudicator. However, the focus should be on preventing unfairness, rather than treating it.

Credibility Trouble: When ‘I Believe You’ is an Epistemic Wrong

ABSTRACT This article defends the counterintuitive conclusion that public assignments of credibility – including statements, by hearers, of ‘that’s right’, ‘she is credible’, or ‘I believe you’ – can actually constitute a pernicious form of epistemic wrong. Sometimes referred to colloquially as ‘lip service’, the wrong occurs when, owing to ethically poisonous epistemic failures, hearers outwardly validate testifiers’ credibility despite not fully or duly believing them. To explain this wrong, I introduce a distinction between performed and internal credibility assignments (PCA and ICA) and describe an epistemic dysfunction in which they misalign. I focus on cases in which misaligned PCA of ‘credible’ falsely – although sometimes non-deliberately – signal to testifiers and bystanders that testifiers have been believed; Republican hearers’ positive reception of Christine Blasey Ford’s 2018 testimony serves as a central case. Although some misaligned PCA are not wrongful, when epistemic and ethical failures including forms of identity prejudice and pernicious ignorance lead PCA of ‘credible’ to misalign, the PCA wrong testifiers in their capacities as knowers. These epistemic wrongs are particularly pernicious because the PCA conceal that testimony has not been efficacious, inflicting and exacerbating distinct harms.

Popular music and art-interpretive injustice

ABSTRACT It has been over two decades since Miranda Fricker labeled epistemic injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their capacity as a knower. The philosophical literature has proliferated with variants and related concepts. By considering cases in popular music, we argue that it is worth distinguishing a parallel phenomenon of art-interpretive injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their creative capacity as a possible artist. In section 1, we consider the prosecutorial use of rap lyrics in court as a central case of this injustice. In section 2, we distinguish art-interpretive injustice from other categories already discussed in the recent literature. In section 3, we discuss the relationship between genre discourse and identity prejudice. The case for recognizing the category of art-interpretive injustice is that it allows one to recognize a class of harms as being importantly related in ways that one would otherwise overlook.

Contesting misrecognition online: Experiences of epistemic in/justice by vloggers with contested illnesses

Contested illnesses, such as fibromyalgia, myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), and chronic Lyme disease (CLD), are surrounded by polemic debates regarding their etiology, symptomology, treatment, and even their existence. People who suffer from these contested illnesses arguably also suffer from “epistemic injustice.” This concept, coined by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, captures how people's knowledge may be discredited because of identity prejudices. In our paper, this concept is used to understand how seven Dutch women with contested illnesses experience the emancipatory potential of their vlogging practices. Our findings show how these women understood their vlogging as a means to break with epistemic smothering, understood as the propensity to cater ones testimony to one's audience (Dotson, 2011), and as a means to attain and enhance epistemic justice. However, our findings also show how vlogging about contested illnesses did not seem to allow these women to fully break with their epistemic smothering practices, and that the ableist design and gendered norms of YouTube were experienced as obstacles to attaining epistemic justice. We conclude that, even though social media do seem to hold emancipatory potential for these women, the experiences of individual users are diverse and ambiguous.

Эпистемологическая несправедливость: эпифеномен рекламной коммуникации

Abstract. Advertising as a simulacrum, an artifact of modern mythologized society has for a while been in the focus of philosophical research, but the phenomenon of epistemic injustice generated by advertising communication still requires reflection. The article reveals the role of advertising mechanisms in forming epistemic injustice in modern social landscape; the relationship between trust in advertising, its reliability and the development of epistemic virtue among the participants in the communication process is determined; the classical typology of epistemic injustice put forward by M. Fricker is further elaborated. The author comes to the conclusion that modern advertising generates a special type of epistemic injustice, affecting both the recipient of the message, who is always potentially deceived when in contact with advertising, and the informant, who suffers from identity prejudices and related testimonial injustice. The problem of the epistemological status of advertising becomes one of the epistemic virtue of the consumer, who must be able to correctly assess the context and take responsibility for the economic choice, since advertising as a communicative phenomenon a priori has the right to distort reality for the sake of survival of one of the elements of the business system and consumption in society as a whole. Current legislation which is designed to promote the rights of citizens to receive reliable information about products or services, does not guarantee the truth of advertising claims, as it is aimed at maintaining the dominant discourse, just like advertising. The way out of the situation of epistemic injustice seems to be switching from the experience of consuming advertising messages to the experience of consuming the product itself, cultivating acquired epistemic virtue and introducing a non-institutionalized form of social control that involves monitoring in order to detect false advertising and disseminating this information in the communicative space of the society of the post-knowledge era.

Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter

To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.

The Adultification of Black Girls as Identity-Prejudicial Credibility Excess

On Miranda Fricker’s influential account, the central case of testimonial injustice occurs if and only if the speaker receives a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice of the hearer. Her critics have taken issue with her view, arguing that cases in which speakers are given more credibility than they deserve, may also amount to testimonial injustice. Furthermore, they argue, these cases cannot be captured by Fricker’s account of objectification as the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice; rather, it is an account of othering that best captures a wide range of epistemic injustices. In this paper, I join Fricker’s critics in advancing a novel case of testimonial injustice through identity-prejudicial credibility excess – the adultification of black girls in testimony-giving settings. When testifying, black girls are likely to receive a credibility excess with respect to adult topics such as sex and consent because they are perceived as older, more self-reliable, and mature than they actually are by the hearers. Nevertheless, when examining the girls’ intersecting social identities defined by age, race and gender, it becomes clear that this constitutes an unjustly and prejudicially inflated estimation of their credibility. These cases also involve hermeneutical injustice since the identity-prejudicial credibility excess denies the victims a meaningful opportunity to make sense of their traumatic experiences of sexual assault. I conceptualize this compounded injustice as testimonial obfuscation, where an identity-prejudicial credibility evaluation (either in excess or deficit) causes an experience to remain unintelligible to the hermeneutically marginalized speaker.

Epistemic Injustice in Late-Stage Dementia: A Case for Non-Verbal Testimonial Injustice

ABSTRACT The literature on epistemic injustice has thus far confined the concept of testimonial injustice to speech expressions such as inquiring, discussing, deliberating, and, above all, telling. I propose that it is time to broaden the horizons of testimonial injustice to include a wider range of expressions. Controversially, the form of communication I have in mind is non-verbal expression. Non-verbal expression is a vital, though often overlooked, form of communication, particularly for people who have certain neurocognitive disorders. Dependency upon non-verbal expression is a common feature of some forms of neurocognitive disorders such as ‘intellectual disabilities’, autism and late-stage dementia. According to the narrow definition of testimonial injustice currently championed in the literature, people who express non-verbally are exempt from testimonial injustice. However, when we consider cases where meaningful communications from non-verbal people are dismissed or ignored in virtue of identity prejudice, there seems to be a distinct testimonial harm at play. Using late-stage dementia as a case study, I argue that the definition of testimonial injustice should be expanded to include all communicative practices, whether verbal or non-verbal, to encompass the epistemic harms inflicted upon some of the most marginalised in our society.

“Conjoint Communicated Experience”: Art as an Instrument of Democracy

“Conjoint Communicated Experience”: Art as an Instrument of Democracy

Testimonial Injustice and Prediction Markets

ABSTRACT This essay argues that prediction markets, as one approach for aggregating dispersed private information, may not only be praised for their epistemic accuracy. They also feature characteristics that are morally desirable from the point of view of epistemic justice. Notably, they are a promising approach when we are trying to address testimonial injustice. The impersonality of market transactions effectively tackles the issue of identity prejudice, which underlies many forms of testimonial injustice. This is not to say that prediction markets do not pose challenges for epistemic justice of their own like the risk of excluding knowers based on ability to pay. Or, in light of identity prejudice’s systematicity, the risk of discouraging some knowers because of differences in education or social background that lead to a certain unease when faced with prediction markets. The essay discusses these challenges, concedes limitations but also offers countermeasures to certain worries – e.g. hosting prediction markets on a play-money basis. Throughout, the essay addresses the question of the potential scope of using prediction markets for epistemic purposes, notably by means of the practical example of a prediction market for monetary policy.

The Dead Brother’s Ballad as a Balkan Shared Place of Memory

There is a ballad saved in the folklore and oral literary tradition of several Balkan peoples and their collective memory under different names, but with the same proto narrative: “The Dead Brother’s Song” (Greek), “The Return of the Dead Brother” (Macedonian), “Brother and Sister” (Serbian, Montenegrin, Bosnian), “Lazar and Petkana” (Bulgarian), “Constantin and Doruntinë” (Albanian), and “Voika” (Romanian). Appearing in several linguistic and stylistic variants, this ballad can be considered as an illustrative shared place of collective Balkan memory. Saved both as a local (national), and regional (transnational) cultural heritage, Тhe Dead Brother’s Ballad contains the most significant aspects of the Balkan cultural paradigm: mythical, mystical, folkloric, religious, ethical, and historical ones. The interpretation of this ballad in the mythopoetic context demystifies the Balkan identity prejudices and the misinterpretation of the shared cultural heritage. Methodologically, the present interpretation of the Balkan ballad is syncretic, combining diverse theoretical and interpretative tools from mythology, theory of literature, culturology and post-postcolonial criticism. Instead of giving an ultimate conclusion, this paper deconstructs the dominant interpretative strategies of the Balkan spiritual and historical heritage in the last two centuries (adoptive, contestable, convertible, competitive) showing that they all actualise the conservative principles of cultural hegemony on the Balkans. Having a scientific consensus for the transnational aspects of the Balkan cultural heritage might be a starting point for a new, empathetic strategy of their perception.

Testimonial Injustice and Mutual Recognition

Much of the recent work on the nature of testimonial injustice holds that a hearer who fails to accord sufficient credibility to a speaker’s testimony, owing to identity prejudice, can thereby wrong that speaker. What is it to wrong someone in this way? This paper offers an account of the wrong at the heart of testimonial injustice that locates it in a failure of interpersonal justifiability. On the account I develop, one that draws directly from T. M. Scanlon’s moral contractualist framework, a hearer who fails to accord sufficient credibility to a speaker, owing to identity prejudice, cannot justify his response to that speaker, insofar as the speaker can reasonably reject principles that would permit the hearer to prejudicially discount the speaker’s testimony. I argue that my account can better illuminate the idea, shared among many philosophers, that testimonial injustice centrally involves some kind of failure, on the hearer’s part, to appropriately recognize the speaker. In contractualist terms, this consists in a failure of mutual recognition—a failure to acknowledge the speaker as having standing to co-determine the terms on which the hearer and speaker, as epistemic agents, are to engage with each other in testimonial exchanges.