Credibility Trouble: When ‘I Believe You’ is an Epistemic Wrong

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article defends the counterintuitive conclusion that public assignments of credibility – including statements, by hearers, of ‘that’s right’, ‘she is credible’, or ‘I believe you’ – can actually constitute a pernicious form of epistemic wrong. Sometimes referred to colloquially as ‘lip service’, the wrong occurs when, owing to ethically poisonous epistemic failures, hearers outwardly validate testifiers’ credibility despite not fully or duly believing them. To explain this wrong, I introduce a distinction between performed and internal credibility assignments (PCA and ICA) and describe an epistemic dysfunction in which they misalign. I focus on cases in which misaligned PCA of ‘credible’ falsely – although sometimes non-deliberately – signal to testifiers and bystanders that testifiers have been believed; Republican hearers’ positive reception of Christine Blasey Ford’s 2018 testimony serves as a central case. Although some misaligned PCA are not wrongful, when epistemic and ethical failures including forms of identity prejudice and pernicious ignorance lead PCA of ‘credible’ to misalign, the PCA wrong testifiers in their capacities as knowers. These epistemic wrongs are particularly pernicious because the PCA conceal that testimony has not been efficacious, inflicting and exacerbating distinct harms.