IAEA Safety Series Research Articles

Overview of the Application of the Specific Safety Requirements to BATAN Research Reactors

BATAN owns and operates three research reactors for supporting R&D in nuclear science and technology, namely TRIGA-2000, 2MW, Kartini, 100 kW and RSG-GAS, 30 MW reactors. The reactors were built in 1965, 1979 and 1987 consecutively whenever the safety recommendations were based on IAEA Safety Series of that period of time. In 2016, IAEA has published a Safety Standard Series namely Specific Requirments for Research Reactor SSR-3. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the applicability of this new requirements to the BATAN reactors by comparing those to the existing safety analysis reports. The results show that principally the the specific requirements in SSR-3 are applicable to the BATAN reactors although those reactors are classified as old reactors.

Floor response spectra for beyond design basis seismic demand

Vulnerability assessment of Structures Systems and Components (SSCs) of nuclear facilities for earthquake ground motion exceeding the design basis ground motion has become a key issue to ensure safety in case of highly improbable but possible extreme earthquake event beyond design basis. In order to assess seismic safety of SSCs located at different floors of the building, floor response spectra (FRS) for such beyond design basis seismic demand, taking into account possible nonlinear behavior of structure, is required. Currently used methods (e.g. IAEA Safety Series 28) do not capture softening of structure at increased demand. A performance based approach would be ideal under such situations. FRS for higher seismic demand may be developed through nonlinear time history analysis of the structure. However, this approach is complicated and cumbersome for structural configurations such as that of NPPs and requires deep insight of solution algorithm and large resources for numerical solution. In this work a simplified methodology for FRS generation for higher level of seismic demand using linear time history analysis of an equivalent linear structural model is proposed. Nonlinear behavior of structure and associated damping are estimated from Nonlinear Static Pushover Analysis. Through this approach realistic estimation of stiffness degradation of the structure and increase in damping at different levels of seismic demands can be made. Subsequently, linear time history analysis is performed on degraded structure, accounting for stiffness reduction and hysteretic damping to obtain the floor time histories which are then converted to FRS. Application of this method is shown through case studies.

갑상선 진료환자 관련 방사성폐기물의 처분을 위한 방사능 측정 및 평가

의료현장에서의 방사성폐기물은 방사성동위원소의 사용량의 증가와 더불어 급격히 늘어나고 있다. 특히, 갑상선 질병의 진단 및 치료용으로 사용량이 증가하고 있는 I-131 핵종의 경우 8.02 일의 짧은 반감기를 가지고 있으며, 관련 폐기물은 모두 자체처분 방법으로 처분하고 있다. 이와 관련하여 국제원자력기구(IAEA)는 개인선량(10 <TEX>${\mu}Sv/y$</TEX>) 및 집단선량(1 man-Sv/y)과 핵종별 농도에 근거하여 각각 폐기물의 규제해제기준을 제시(IAEA Safety Series No 111-P-1.1, 1992 및 IAEA RS-G-1.7, 2004)하였다. 이 연구에서는 의료현장에서 발생하는 I-131 핵종 관련 폐기물을 사용상 종류별로 수집 및 측정하여 방사능농도의 측정 방법 및 절차를 수립한다. 또한, 측정 결과를 바탕으로 핵종의 감쇠 유도식을 산출하고, 이것을 바탕으로 자체처분 가능일자를 산출하여 이론식의 경우와 대비하여 고찰하였다. 측정 결과를 바탕으로 유도 감쇠식을 신정하여 이론적 반감기와 유효 반감기를 비교해 본 결과, I-131 핵종의 이론적 반감기가 유효반감기(7.72일)에 비해 긴 반감기를 가지고 있음을 확인하였다. 측정결과를 바탕으로 한 유효 반감기를 적용한다면, 현재보다 더 짧은 기간 동안 I-131 핵종 폐기물을 보관하였다가 자체처분을 할 수 있다. 이 연구 결과는 ISO 표준으로 추진할 예정이다. The generation amount of radioactive waste has been rapidly increased by increase of the usage of radioisotope source in medical field. Especially, the use of the radioactive source of I-131 with short half-life of 8.02 days used in treatment of thyroid has been increased, and all of the wastes concerned have been disposed by means of the self-disposal method. IAEA proposed criteria for clearance level of waste which depends on the individual (10 <TEX>${\mu}Sv/y$</TEX>) and collective dose (1 man-Sv/y), and concentration of each nuclide (IAEA Safety Series No 111-P-1.1, 1992 and IAEA RS-G-1.7, 2004). In this study, various radioactive wastes in medical fields are collected and measured for establishing the disposal methods and procedures of radioactive wastes. In addition, comparison evaluation of decay storage period between the half-life which was calculated by attenuation curve based on real measurement and analytical half-life is considered. With comparing the theoretical half-life and the effective half life(7.72 days) which was based on the decay equation of measured data, it is resulted in the theoretical half-life is longer than effective half-life. The storage period of radioactive waste for self-disposal may be curtailed. The result of this study will be proposed as ISO standard.

Harmonising different approaches to patient release after radionuclide therapy: iaea safety series report no. 63: 'Release of Patients after Radionuclide Therapy'

Harmonising different approaches to patient release after radionuclide therapy: iaea safety series report no. 63: 'Release of Patients after Radionuclide Therapy'

IAEA Safety Series Report Series: No. 60: 'Radiation Protection in Newer Medical Imaging Techniques: Cardiac CT' * IAEA Safety Series Report Series: No. 61: 'Radiation protection in Newer Medical Imaging Techniques: CT Colonography'

IAEA Safety Series Report Series: No. 60: 'Radiation Protection in Newer Medical Imaging Techniques: Cardiac CT' * IAEA Safety Series Report Series: No. 61: 'Radiation protection in Newer Medical Imaging Techniques: CT Colonography'

SU‐GG‐P‐02: The Role of Medical Physicists in the Revised International Radiation Safety Standards

Purpose: The 1996 version of the International Basic Safety Standards for the Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS) [IAEA Safety series 115], used world‐wide as the basis for radiation protection legislation/regulations, is being revised by several cosponsoring international organizations to be consistent with the new ICRP Recommendations. This paper will focus on major changes regarding medical exposures and the role of medical physicists. Method and Materials: The current BSS draft is including, for the first time, the term “medical physicist”, replacing the expressions in the previous version: “expert” in “radiotherapy physics”, “radiodiagnostic physics” and/or “nuclear medicine physics”. This step is crucial towards the recognition by the International Labor Organization of medical physicists as health professionals, a pre‐requisite in many countries for hiring medical physicists in hospitals. The draft is also expanding the medical physicist's role in medical exposures, now a “principal party” together with the “radiological medical practitioner” and the “employer, owner and/or administrator”. Results: Medical physicists are responsible for imaging, calibration, dosimetry and quality assurance requirements. “For therapeutic uses of radiation”, these activities shall “be conducted by or under the supervision of a medical physicist with competence in the relevant field (radiation oncology or nuclear medicine)”. “For diagnostic and image‐guided interventional uses of radiation”, they shall be “fulfilled by, or under the oversight of or with the advice of, a medical physicist with competence in the relevant field”; the degree of involvement “determined by the omplexity of the particular use of radiation and the ensuing radiation risks”.Conclusion: The AAPM should play a prominent role in the BSS revision process through two mechanisms: the IOMP, the international organization representing medical physics globally, and the official delegation of the US, which, as any member state of the cosponsoring organizations, has to approve the standards.

ANF-10: A New Developed Transport Container for Fresh BWR Fuel Assemblies According to IAEA Safety Series 6 and Safety Standards St-1 Requirements

The ANF-10 shipping container has been developed to transport unilTadiatedBWR uranium dioxide fuel assemblies (including enriched reprocessed uranium dioxide). IAEA requirements (Safety Series 6 and Safety Standards ST-1) are met and all necessary tests were pelformed. The package is licensed in Germany as type IF. BWR fuel assemblies (ATRIUM™)and BWR/PWR fuel rods up to a maximum enrichment of 5,05 wt% 235U can be shipped. The fuel assemblies can be supplied with or without fuel channels, according to customer demand. Verification of criticality safety is conservatively provided for a transport index TI = 1. The package consists of a bottom part, a container cover and a head cover with two internal casings to protect the fuel assemblies. The internal casings are made from boronated austenitic steel sheets. The container body is made from stainless steel and can be easily surveyed and decontaminated, if necessary. No wooden outer box is now required.

A LOGIC SCHEME FOR REGULATING SAFE OPERATION OF RESEARCH REACTORS

This work presents a logic scheme for regulating the safe operation of research reactors in accordance with the IAEA Safety Series SS-35-S2 and revised by the Codes of Fedral Regulations 10 CFR. It emphasizes the regulatory inspection and enforcement (RI&E) program in the reactor operation licensing phases. It is developed to provide information ,guidance and recommendations to be taken when constructing a RI&E program to be applied in the operational phase of the Egyptian research reactors. The RI&E procedures for regulating safe operation of research reactors are presented as flow charts, and then developed as a computer logic scheme. The software program is efficient , friendly, simple and interactive in nature such that the program asks the user certain questions about essential steps that guide the RI&E for research reactors and the user responds by (yes) or (no) and the program proceeds based on this response until all the necessary RI&E steps are accomplished. Samples of results of the RI&E software execution showing some violation cases with their inspective and corrective paths throughout the program are presented and discussed.

Limiting Activities and Activity Concentrations in the Transport of Radioactive Materials

The activity limits for Type A packages are determined by a set of criteria and hypothetical exposure scenarios known as the Q system. This system was first used to calculate activity limits for Type A packages for inclusion in the 19.85 IAEA regulations and the methodology has been described in the explanatory material for the regulations, IAEA Safety Series No 7. The new IAEA Basic Safety Standards incorporate revised dose coefficients for intakes of radionuclides. For the latest IAEA Transport Regulations, the Q system has been updated to take into account these more recent dosimetric data, and more comprehensive nuclear data. The updated Q system is described and some of the consequent changes in activity limits for Type A packages are illustrated. Member States of the European Union are subject to a Basic Safety Standards Directive, which contains radionuclide specific Exemption Values. The derivation of these values together With their application to transport is discussed.

Independent Design Appraisal and Container Certification

AbstractUnder the IAEA Safety Series 6, waste and transport containers for radioactive materials must comply with specified standards of design, manufacture and test. In all cases, the consignor carries responsibility, but will generally neither design nor manufacture the container himself. Design appraisal, inspection during manufacture, and witnessing of tests by an independent third party can therefore be of benefit. In the case of ISO freight containers, such services can also incorporate Certification of containers as required by the International Container Safety Convention (CSC).

Regulations Relevant to the Transport of Radioactive Materials in Switzerland

AbstractAs is the case in many countries, the transport of radioactive materials in Switzerland is primarily regulated by the national regulations for the transport of dangerous goods. Currently these regulations, in the case of radioactive material, incorporate the 1985 IAEA Safety Series 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (As amended 1990). However, as is also the case in some other countries, consignors, shippers and carriers of radioactive materials must also comply with additional laws when shipping radioactive materials. The most important of these other laws and their accompanying regulations are those concerned with radiation protection (import, export and carriers licences) and nuclear power (import, export, inland transport and transit licences). This paper sets out to describe the collective requirements resulting from all three of these sets of regulations.

Translation of Selected Passages from IAEA Safety Series No.102, Recommendations for the Safe Use and Regulation of Radiation Sources in Industry, Medicine, Rasearch and Teaching

Translation of Selected Passages from IAEA Safety Series No.102, Recommendations for the Safe Use and Regulation of Radiation Sources in Industry, Medicine, Rasearch and Teaching

LSA/SCO Provisions in IAEA Safety Series No.6: Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material

The first edition of the IAEA Transport Regulations was published in May 1961, just four years after the Agency was formed, and two years after the United Nations asked it to develop transport regulations. The Low Specific Activity radioactive material provisions in that first edition were based on existing US Interstate Commerce Commsssion regulaiions and the International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail. Thirty years later much of the original provisions are still in force, with additions related to transport of contaminated objects and solidified wastes. A number of significant changes have occurred through four major revisions of the regulations, some considered good, and some bad. Somehow, however, experience with the regulations filters out the bad and preserves the good. The result is that, considering the decisions of the most recent Technical Committee meeting in October 1993, the IAEA Transport Regulations should be, for the most part, effcient, effective, and defendable. The major decision of the recent Technical Committee to extend the concept of Surface Contaminated Objects to include objects which are themselves radioactive, recognises the need for efficient transport of wastes from decommissioning facilities. The decision to require Type A packages for transpott of LSA-II, LSA-III, and CO-II materials is a major step toward simplification. The major decision to retain the existing Type B package and all its criteria for transpott of LSA/CO material avoids the complication of having yet another Type B package. The major decision, to make the consignor responsible for imposing vehicle limits on shipments of LSA/CO, by either shipping under exclusive use or providing quantity information to the carrier in terms of a multiple of A2, makes that segment of the regulaiions defendable.

The Application of Quality Management Systems for the Handling, Loading and Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel from German Reactors to European Reprocessing Plants

AbstractThe tasks carried out by NTL-Hanau, which has been working in the field of transport of radioactive material for more than 20 years, are described. The NTL Group procedures, which were drafted nearly 10 years ago, have been developed into a comprehensive Quality Assurance system. This paper describes the QA system following ISO 9001 and IAEA Safety Series No 37 but which, for German QA requirements, has also to conform to German KTA Standard No 1401. The preparation of shipments includes, inter alia, the planning of the transport, flask utilisation, the provision of transport vehicles and the assignment of personnel. The flask handling procedures are also described, including the essential QA step of identifying fuel elements before loading. NTL-Hanau generally acts as the consignor of each shipment and this entails the provision of services such as the performance of final flask checks, completion of transport documentation and proper labelling of the package. In addition NTL-Hanau is continuousl...

Book reviews

This booklet forms an addendum to the IAEA Safety Series No. 77 (1986) Principles for Limiting Releases of Radioactive Effluents into the Environment and discusses, in more detail, the concept of “upper bounds” used in that document.

Book reviews

This guide is similar in structure to the previous publication, IAEA Safety Series No. 43, the main difference being that the discussion of hazards by work environment is omitted. This enables the current guide to deal more effectively with the planning, implementation and interpretation of monitoring methods in mines and mills, which it does very well. A particularly useful approach is the separate description, for each monitoring method, of the principles, equipment, procedures and limitations, with graphs and tables of calculation factors. Some of the material is the same as in the earlier guide, but much has been expanded and updated. Several more recent measurement methods are described, producing a comprehensive reference volume from which the characteristics of all the most common procedures can readily be evaluated. Descriptions are also included of some more specialized methods of measurement more suitable for research work.

Evaluation of the environmental transfer parameters for 131I and 137Cs using the contamination produced by the Chernobyl accident at a site in central Italy

This paper describes some simple methods for evaluating the transfer parameters for 137Cs and 131I within the deposition-vegetation-milk pathway (dry-deposition velocity, washout-proportionality constant, weathering-decay constant, vegetation-interception factor, transfer factor from vegetation to cow's and sheep's milk). These methods were applied to the contamination data collected at a site in central Italy (Anguillara Sabazia—ENEA CRE Casaccia Institute) following the Chernobyl accident. The values calculated here are approximately equal to those generally used in conservative models (e.g. IAEA Safety Series No. 57). The only estimated parameter which differs significantly from the accepted conservative value is the dry-deposition velocity of 137Cs. This discrepancy is not surprising; indeed, the dry-deposition velocity is influenced by a variety of factors, such as the nature of the depositing particles, the properties of the surface on which deposition occurs and the micrometeorological conditions. This parameter, then, shows a high degree of variability according to the particular circumstances of deposition.

「海洋環境への放射性廃棄物処分の管理」（ＩＡＥＡ Ｓａｆｅｔｙ Ｓｅｒｉｅｓ Ｎｏ．６１）に至るまで

「海洋環境への放射性廃棄物処分の管理」（ＩＡＥＡ Ｓａｆｅｔｙ Ｓｅｒｉｅｓ Ｎｏ．６１）に至るまで