Hybrid Threat Research Articles

Understanding COVID-19: A Hybrid Threat and Its Impact on Sport Mega-Events. A Focus on Japan and the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games.

The spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020 affected the sports industry with the cancellation of many professional sports competitions worldwide. Thus, the postponement and organization of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games behind closed doors became a significant disruption to the global sports landscape. In this paper, we present a novel, conceptual discussion, signifying and defining the pandemic via the concept of international security as a hybrid threat. We associated the term hybrid threat to clarify better the difficult times facing sport mega-events. First, the paper proffers that the COVID-19 pandemic is a form of hybrid threat while reflecting on the connected implications of using sport as a soft power tool for nations. Secondly, we discuss the impact of COVID-19 on sport mega-events globally and explain the implications of COVID-19 on the Tokyo 2020 summer Olympic Games. This paper although drawing on some figures associated with COVID-19 and the Tokyo Olympic Games presents a theoretical contribution to knowledge in the area of sport mega events, soft power and hybrid threat. We outline how the threats, triggered by the pandemic, have impeded a successful Olympic Games and clarify how these threats have affected Japan's opportunity to use the Games as a soft power tool, which is the paper's key contribution to the field.

Responses to digital disinformation as part of hybrid threats: a systematic review on the effects of disinformation and the effectiveness of fact-checking/debunking.

The dissemination of purposely deceitful or misleading content to target audiences for political aims or economic purposes constitutes a threat to democratic societies and institutions, and is being increasingly recognized as a major security threat, particularly after evidence and allegations of hostile foreign interference in several countries surfaced in the last five years. Disinformation can also be part of hybrid threat activities. This research paper examines findings on the effects of disinformation and addresses the question of how effective counterstrategies against digital disinformation are, with the aim of assessing the impact of responses such as the exposure and disproval of disinformation content and conspiracy theories. The paper's objective is to synthetize the main scientific findings on disinformation effects and on the effectiveness of debunking, inoculation, and forewarning strategies against digital disinformation. A mixed methodology is used, combining qualitative interpretive analysis and structured technique for evaluating scientific literature such as a systematic literature review (SLR), following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) framework.

Hybrid Threats - a New Challenge or a Bogey of Post-democracy? (Western Discourse)

As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict developed after the events of 2014, and especially with the start of a “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russia in the political mass media of the countries of the West received the status of the main source of hybrid threats. The vagueness of the terms “hybrid threat” and “hybrid war” for the majority of the population made this accusation even more ominous and causing panic in front of everything associated with Russia. At the same time, historically, these phenomena, or rather, political constructs, have nothing to do with these events and were generated by the military-political thought of the United States a quarter of a century before them. However, realizing that in this new geostrategic situation, constructs that are beginning to leave the political topic are quite convenient for the purposes of information confrontation, a number of Western countries began to use them to interpret any actions of Russia that contradict the interests of the United States and NATO, and at the same time for the generality of other "non-democratic" countries. Calls appeared in official documents to inform people about the existence of “hybrid threats” and how to deal with them, to develop a common knowledge-based response. The article concludes that at present, in such appeals, the component is more likely to be propagandistic than anticipating a threat.

Multilevel analysis of the 2021 Poland-Belarus Border Crisis in the Context of Hybrid Threats

This article aims to provide a deeper context of the Poland-Belarus crisis, which is interpreted through the lens of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. A multilevel analysis of the crisis assesses four dimensions: political, strategic, tactical, and operational. Emphasis is put on the executive (operational and tactical) dimensions, which are well suitable for analysing the effects of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. The author argues that the crisis per se may be considered a hybrid threat, but in a broader context, it is a part and one of the tools of hybrid warfare. A DIMEFIL classification is proposed for analysing and designing tools for addressing hybrid threats and warfare.

Evaluation of hybrid threats to DU technologies transfer

An object of this research is to evaluate the premises of transfer of dual use technologies appeared in Ukraine and other CIS countries. It aims to highlight a hybrid impact of political, historical and other potential barriers faced between technology offeror/recipient nowadays.
 The investigated problem. Apart from the highlighted affect of political, historical and other potential barriers faced between technology supplier /recipient these days, the paper also discusses how the covid pandemic and democracy crisis on the global joined to and affect an efficiency, proper functioning and transparency of technology transfer process. The experience and practice show that the process of technology transfer is rather complicated, multi-leveled and involves more than two players. It is impacted with and follows few factors and conditions that constrain its success or failure at the end. It was shown that the development of dual use technologies continues in a quagmire of conflicting interests, in light of discussed factors therein, national security and export control rationales. For the time being, debates on dual use (DU) technologies and their misuse lack creativity and rather dim; political and diplomatic initiatives came finally to nowhere trying to find turnkey solutions, thus the discussed set of factors affecting the efficient transfer and strategic export control, is quite a challenge nowadays.
 The main scientific results. The discussed therein factors imply the hybrid threat to transfer of technologies, closely interrelated and possess a profound significance, tho. From today and forward each step towards optimization of transfer should be carried out considering all groups and specifics of high level of science intensity of advanced technologies. Ukraine being a country with still transitional (from socialist to capitalist) type of economy, a mechanism for IP protection with regard to their scientific and technical results providing this necessary level of science intensity of technology, in the analyzed period of time has not yet been properly worked out and not enshrined in bylaws.
 The result of this eresearch makes a solid background for further debates as to technology transfer in terms of political science and export control

DESTABILIZING EUROPE: RUSSIA’S HYBRID WARFARE

The European Union is in a political and security crisis. The crisis tends to become existential, which undermines the future of the EU as an integration project. The conflict of values between liberal democracy and authoritarianism is becoming an important factor in international security.
 Negative current trends in the international security environment increase risks for the EU. In its foreign policy the EU does not demonstrate the ability to speak with one voice. It does not support EU’s ambition to be a global international actor. Within the EU, centrifugal tendencies and Euroscepticism appear to be gaining ground. Among the destructive external and internal factors affecting European security, the hybrid threat posed by Moscow’s ambitious plans and aggressive actions is at the forefront. These actions are aimed at undermining democracies, international solidarity and security. Russia is systematically acting to destabilize the EU, using a set of means of destructive influence, trying to undermine European unity both externally and internally.
 Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, operations in Syria and Libya, interference in domestic processes in the EU, etc., are exacerbating destructive trends in the European security environment. In this con- text, the EU faces the need to increase its resilience, as a tool to deter destructive actions of the Russian Federation and a means to mitigate their effect.
 The purpose of the article is to analyze the causes and consequences of Russia’s hybrid influence against the EU, plus to identify the means of Russia’s destructive impact, such as the spread of misinformation, active special operations, energy pressure, etc.
 The article examines the imperatives of Russian foreign policy, the impact of the value crisis on the European project and its future, as well as obstacles to strategic dialogue between the EU and Russia.
 Europe returns to searching for its collective European identity, discussing revitalization of the global European narrative. Maintaining a system of liberal democratic values is a key precondition for the future of the EU in order to avoid the risk of disintegration of the European Union.
 Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, its national security could be guaranteed only by full-fledged integration into the European political, economic and security space. Europe’s hesitations regarding the European perspective for Ukraine, which arise under pressure from the Kremlin and internal contradictions in the EU, negatively affect the security environment in Europe.

A hybrid threat model for system-centric and attack-centric for effective security design in SDLC

Threat modeling is an essential activity in the security development lifecycle. To provide security at the design phase of software development, Microsoft introduced threat modeling stride to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks of application. An efficient solution is necessary to deal with these issues in the software development life cycle. In this context, the paper focused on the analysis of threats and attack tree techniques that are traditionally available and frequently used. Automated Threat modeling enables to simulate attacks and visualized the existing vulnerabilities and misconfiguration. A hybrid model is proposed based on system-centric and attacker-centric to identify the threats in the software application during the software design phase. This model is built by STRIDE by defining security architecture and then analyzed the risks regarding its security characteristics and applied to its real application system. Our model is applied in a case study of the health center management system and shows a better result is identifying the threats and severity in the design phase. And also attack tree defines the stages of threats to understand the severity.

MULTIPLICATIVE EFFECTS OF HYBRID THREATS*

The purpose of this article is to develop methodological approaches to assess the likelihood of multiplicative effects of hybrid threat combinations based on their systematization according to the key areas of hybrid confrontation. Methodology. Methods of analysis and synthesis are used to identify the key areas of hybrid confrontation; methods of abstraction and generalization - to justify the multiplicative effects of implementing combinations of hybrid threats; method of mathematical modeling – to formalize the criterion of effectiveness of various hybrid aggression tools. The research is based on scientific publications, materials of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and European analytical services. Results of the study. It has been proved that the transformation of modern interstate conflicts takes place in the direction of acquiring by them signs of hybridization, provided that it is understood as a process of using various means of pressure, predominantly of non-military nature. It is argued that the urgent task in the context of counteracting hybrid threats is to assess the probability of multiplicative effects from the implementation of their combinations. The military, economic and information spheres have been identified as key dimensions of the hybrid confrontation. The specifics of hybrid threats in the economic sphere are those that would allow the country initiating the aggression to disguise its participation in the conflict, and the target country to obtain critical resources for the development of its economic system. The essence of synergy and cumulation effects is considered and their interpretation in the coordinates of hybrid warfare is given. The relevant effects are defined as multiplicative, that is, those that have a multiplier effect, providing accumulation (accumulation) and synergy (amplification) from the implementation of threats in different areas of hybrid confrontation. Practical implications. Assessing the likelihood of the multiplier effect of a variety of hybrid threats will focus on countering those combinations of threats that can have a significant impact on the political and economic system of the state of hybrid aggression. Value/originality. Justification and formalization of conditions for obtaining multiplicative (cumulative and synergistic) effects from the use of various hybrid confrontation tools.

THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN AN OPERATING ENVIRONMENT DEFINED BY HYBRID THREATS

Abstract: This paper's theme comes from the necessity for an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon called "hybrid warfare" that seems to have returned today with the inducement of the crisis in Ukraine in early 2014 and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. In this sense, starting from the assuption that the hybrid threat mix has the "potential" to change the paradigm of warfare, and Romania could be the target of such approaches, we set out to understand this type of war and identify possible prevention countermeasures.

Social Media as An Incubator of Youth Terrorism In Indonesia: Hybrid Threat and Warfare

The presence of technology, such as social media in cyberspace brings its own benefits to the terrorist groups. Terrorist groups use social media to recruit, influence, rally and invite as many people as possible to join them. Adolescent has become terrorist groups’ new target for their regeneration. The characteristics of adolescents who are looking for self-value and having an interest towards social media, makes them vulnerable to be targeted by terrorist groups. This research is a qualitative research with a case study method of four teenagers’ terrorists. This study aims to analyze how social media acts as an incubator of terrorism among Indonesian teenagers and to analyze how this phenomenon can be categorized as part of Hybrid warfare. The analytical techniques in this study are documentation studies from the news that spread across social media. This research shows that terrorist groups through social media provide anxiety narratives, and provide a role for teenagers to contribute through the path of jihad. To overcome this, the Indonesia government needs to place cyber terrorism in the framework of Hybrid warfare so that the weaponry components and strategies used can be holistic and multidimensional.

FOREIGN POLICY IN HYBRID WARFARE ENVIRONMENT – WAY FORWARD FOR PAKISTAN

Hybrid warfare is neither a novel idea nor a new phenomenon. It has been evolving for ages, yet its manifestation in the contemporary era has intensified. Taking advantage of politico-ethnic fault lines, socio-religious vulnerabilities, and identity conflicts, hybrid warfare advocates using all means available including regular or irregular and conventional or unconventional ways of warfare to subdue the will of an adversary. An externally motivated and supported threat requires essential measures in the foreign policy domain to thwart and foil it outside the borders. Therefore, this paper deals with the conceptual aspects of hybrid warfare and highlights the contours of the hybrid threat currently confronting Pakistan. It navigates through the challenges for foreign policy formulation and implementation in a hybrid warfare environment and identifies loopholes and grey areas while recommending tangible measures. 
 
 Bibliography Entry
 Naz, Imtiaz Hussain. 2021. "Foreign Policy in Hybrid Warfare Environment – Way Forward for Pakistan." Margalla Papers 25 (1): 1-11.

Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?

This article examines the use of coercive engineered migration as a hybrid threat during the 2015 EU refugee crisis. The authors argue that coercive engineered migration can be used as a threat by a state, even when it is not the source of outflows; that it is possible under conditions of an internal or external conflict in the state that is the source of migration; that a state-challenger would most probably be an authoritarian state that supports the government of the emigration state. The authors state that the sound action for Turkey and the EU in the conditions of a crisis that of 2015, would be to develop a migration diplomacy initiative that could contribute not only to a deal but to a sustainable, mutually beneficial solution for both parties.

The ambiguity of hybrid warfare: A qualitative content analysis of the United Kingdom's political–military discourse on Russia's hostile activities

ABSTRACT Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, hybrid warfare has become a widely used yet ambiguous term to describe Russia's hostile activities. In academic publications and policy documents, there have been a plethora of different definitions and concepts to make sense of hybrid warfare. This article takes a bottom-up approach and analyzes the discourse of political and military representatives in the United Kingdom to explore how they understand hybrid warfare by Russia and what the implications are for defense policy. Using qualitative content analysis with quantitative aspects, the results show not only a range of different terms used to describe Russia's hostile activities, but also that the discussed topics do not reflect one particular definition of hybrid warfare. The analysis further reveals that representatives highlight non-military aspects of hybrid warfare over the military ones and consider the role of defense policy dependent on the nature of a particular hybrid threat.

Hybrid Warfare or Hybrid Threat – The Weaponization of Migration as an Example of the Use of Lawfare – Case Study of Poland

This article aims to address the issue of alleged hybrid warfare attacks on Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. The scope of the article covers the Belarus operations conducted in 2021. Firstly, the author addresses the issue of pushing migrants from a descriptive perspective. Secondly, he debates whether Belarus operation was conducted within the scope of hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, and lawfare? The author concludes that the Republic of Belarus has operated lawfare falling within the hybrid threat spectrum. It means that the situation is not to be classified under the law of armed conflict from the perspective of international and non-international armed conflicts and ius ad bellum violation. Thirdly, the author claims that Belarus has violated international law, so certain legal redress is appropriate and justified. Belarus's actions may result in a court proceeding before the International Court of Justice and before other international institutions.

Mass Migration as a Hybrid Threat? – A Legal Perspective

Migration as a weapon sounds like a policy statement by resurgent nationalistic parties (and governments) in the West. However, politics and the human cost aside, what if an adversary (both state and non-state actor) does exploit the current global crisis of mass migration due to globalization, war, and political unrest? This article will look at the ongoing mass migration to the European Union within the wider security context of the so-called hybrid threats and/or ‘grey zone’ tactics. It looks at the various legal categories of migration as how the law can be weaponized as so-called ‘lawfare’ to undermine the existing legal frameworks distinguishing between legal and illegal migration. The authors recognize the possibility that this article will be used as an argument by the political actors involved for their nationalistic and anti-migration politics and policies. Yet, we believe that the potential of abusing the current vacuum for political gains along ideological party lines makes it necessary to provide a wider legal-security focused perspective on mass migration.

A Hybrid Threat: The Night Wolves Motorcycle Club

Hybrid threat actors are dynamic and often intentionally disguise their intentions. While the Russian motorcycle club Night Wolves dress comparably to outlaw motorcycle gangs, open source materials describe the club as posing a distinctly different national security threat. The Night Wolves’ ambiguity and covert activities make the club hard to analyze; however, this case study uses open source materials to provide insight into their activities and characteristics across an array of security domains. International incidents indicate members and associates have the capability and resources to engage in crime, corruption and politically-motivated violence both for personal interests, as well as the furtherance of Russian goals.

THE STRATEGY OF WAGING HYBRID WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Over the last decade, the concept of hybrid warfare has aroused great in-terest among the global community dealing with security issues, both military, and non-military. The specificity of hybrid warfare is that the fight is not for territories, but for the minds, and attitudes of citizens of other countries, and the means of combat are very sophisticated. Any hybrid war is based on a strategy that involves achievement victory by setting goals, overall plan and systematic impact on ene-my's vulnerabilities using a hybrid threat complex. In connection with the above, the aim of the article is to present the role of the strategy in waging hybrid war-fare, as well as in developing mechanisms to counteract hybrid threats.

Human Factor Failure in Hybrid Warfare and its Impact on Airport Security

The human factor is a source of errors that arises not only in airports activities but also in the process of internal and external communication. The hybrid campaign consists of a spectrum of classic tools, called DIMEFIL, which affect the dimensions of power in seven areas (diplomacy / politics, information, armed forces, economics, finance, intelligence, public order and the rule of law) [1]. Hybrid threats are a complex and multidimensional threat caused by the convergence and interconnection of various elements of social life [2]. The hybrid threat aim is to weaken mutual ties and conduct different types of espionage. Espionage can be part of the attack preparation, mostly in a latent form, or to get information security technological progress. Determining the level of cyber security requires investigating phenomena and activities that could pose real or potential threats to the internal and external communications of critical infrastructure [3, 4]. Security of critical infrastructure is important not only in aviation but also in other industries such as metallurgy. This is mainly due to environmental protection and the possibility of an ecological disaster [5]. Modern society is not only connected by computer networks, but we are increasingly dependent on technical infrastructure. The interconnectedness of the infrastructure systems creates a dependency where the failure of one infrastructure subject affects the functionality of other infrastructure elements [6]. Mutual multilevel infrastructure systems interconnection is a modern society development basic prerequisite. Assessing the level of infrastructure vulnerability is directed in two ways, technical and human failure. The authors analyzed aerospace technical infrastructure inter-connectivity and an internal communication vulnerability. The authors analyzed the elements of an inter-connectivity level protection of aerospace technical infrastructure and internal communication vulnerability. The authors concluded that by reducing the disconnection point’s number and splitting internal ways, they are a possible solution to cut the penetration possibility into the internal network of air transport entities. The results of the research show that interdependent systems should have internal systems divided into open systems for outdoor and indoor access, with no external access. Protection against intrusion is the first phase and requires the firewalls and antivirus programs implementation in the critical infrastructure network. The monitoring systems implementation is the most suitable solution to protect against data leaks, which is the most risky area, by employees and visitors. An aircraft monitoring system gains, monitors, process, and records aircraft system condition (characteristics) and failures [7]. The authors believe that the ongoing use of penetration tests [8] based on a simulated hacker attack is a proper method of verifying the level of cyber security.

Komplex biztonság, hibrid konfliktusok, összetett válaszok

A tanulmány célja a hibrid fenyegetés kérdését a 21. század komplexitása felől megközelíteni. Arra fókuszál, hogy nemcsak a hibrid fenyegetés újszerű, hanem az egész környezet is, amelyben a 21. század államainak a rendet és a biztonságot oltalmazniuk kell. A szerző ezért szemléletváltást szorgalmaz. Véleménye szerint a biztonság és a védelem megközelítésének kell változnia, és majd ennek a tapasztalatain lehet a komplex állami válaszokat és fejlesztéseket megvalósítani a hibrid fenyegetések elleni védelem terén is. Ez a változás azonban több a hibrid fenyegetésekre történő felkészülésnél, ez egyfajta átállás lenne a 21. századi komplex biztonság szavatolására.

2019-nCoV как гибридная угроза системе прав человека

2019-nCoV как гибридная угроза системе прав человека