Hurricane Katrina Disaster Research Articles

Hurricane Katrina storm surge distribution and field observations on the Mississippi Barrier Islands

Hurricane Katrina (23–30 August 2005) struck low-lying coastal plains particularly vulnerable to storm surge flooding. Maximum storm surges, overland flow depths, and inundation distances were measured along the Gulf Coast of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. The vehicle based survey was complemented by inspections with the reconnaissance boat along the Gulf Coast and the Mississippi Barrier Islands. The storm surge peaked to the East of Katrina’s path exceeding 10 meters in several locations along the Mississippi coastline. The storm surge measurements show that the lower floors of specially designed buildings were damaged by the surge of seawater and associated wave action, while the upper floors sustained minimal wind damage. Furthermore, the storm surge measurements along New Orleans’s Lake shore indicate that the 17th Street Canal levee failed prior to overtopping. The land loss on the barrier islands resulted in an increased vulnerability of the US Gulf Coast to future hurricane storm surges.

Hurricane Katrina disaster diplomacy

Hurricane Katrina struck the United States at the end of August 2005. The consequent devastation appeared to be beyond the US government's ability to cope with and aid was offered by several states in varying degrees of conflict with the US. Hurricane Katrina therefore became a potential case study for 'disaster diplomacy', which examines how disaster-related activities do and do not yield diplomatic gains. A review of past disaster diplomacy work is provided. The literature's case studies are then categorised using a new typology: propinquity, aid relationship, level and purpose. Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath are then placed in the context of the US government's foreign policy, the international response to the disaster and the US government's reaction to these responses. The evidence presented is used to discuss the potential implications of Hurricane Katrina disaster diplomacy, indicating that factors other than disaster-related activities generally dominate diplomatic relations and foreign policy.

The Katrina Hurricane Spectacle and Crisis of the Bush Presidency

The August 2005 Hurricane Katrina media spectacle put on display the glaring inequities of race and class that define the United States in the new millennium. The inability of the federal government to respond to the catastrophe called attention not only to the failures and incompetence of the Bush administration but also to the crisis of neoliberalism whereby the market alone cannot provide for the needs of citizens and deal with crises. Katrina also called attention to a "politics of disposability" whereby certain people are deemed disposable and not worthy of care and help. The biopolitics of inequality and disposability was put on full display in the Katrina spectacle and may be one of the most important aftereffects of the tragic episode.

Managing the Hurricane Katrina Disaster in the Midwest

Displaced evacuees from the Hurricane Katrina Disaster were sent to Indianapolis requiring a disaster response system activation. Throughout the entire disaster response period, there were a total of 80 disaster patients seen in the Wishard emergency department, 1,508 prescriptions filled for 300 patients by the Wishard pharmacy, and 125 patients treated at the outpatient disaster clinic. This article reviews the incident timeline, discuss the unique challenges encountered during the protracted incident command, and provide suggestions for other health systems' management for disasters and emergency situations.

Observations of Structural Damage Caused by Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi Gulf Coast

The loads associated with Hurricane Katrina led to the destruction or severe damage of approximately 130,000 homes and over 200 deaths in the state of Mississippi. This paper discusses the results of a field inspection of structural damage along the state's Gulf Coast area caused by this hurricane. It was found that reinforced concrete, steel frame, and heavy timber structures generally performed well, with minimal structural damage. Precast concrete, light frame wood, and bridge structures generally performed poorly. Nonstructural components of all building types, in particular facades and interior partitions subjected to storm surge, were typically destroyed. For various structures, the primary cause of failure was found to be insufficient connection strength. A comparison of Katrina's storm surge and wind loads is made to those specified in current design standards. It was found that Katrina's forces exceeded those specified in design standards in many parts of the state.

Critical theory and Katrina

This paper uses the theoretical and analytical resources of critical theory to explore the processes and conflicts over efforts to present tragic events as spectacles, focusing on a case study of the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent government response have intensified uncertainty and unpredictability, disclose a new insecurity in US cities, and showed how a predicted disaster could wreck havoc within the US economy and political system. I first examine the ways in which the logic of spectacle and entertainment permeate a major disaster like Katrina. Next, I investigate how media coverage and political commentary on Katrina insinuates its own immanent critique of racial and class divisions in urban America. Finally, I draw attention to how critical tendencies are immanent to the commodification process itself, in the form of disaster tourism and the production of Katrina souvenirs that embrace spectacle to criticize federal policy and build global awareness of New Orleans’s plight. Overall, my goal is to show how the category of immanent critique can play an important role in drawing out the implications of disaster‐as‐spectacle, illustrating the intersection of race and class in US cities, and highlighting the multidimensional, conflictual and contradictory character of spectacles.

Interdisciplinary studies in science, technology, and society: “New Directions: Science, Humanities, Policy”

This introductory paper reviews the origin and context of the articles assembled in the following special issue of Technology in Society. In March 2006 a workshop on the Hurricane Katrina disaster of August 2005 in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast attempted to promote interdisciplinary deliberations that would identify contributions that the humanities might make to an understanding of the many interactions between technology and society—interactions that were at the heart of this catastrophe and thus critical to an effective, long-term response. The workshop was itself another activity in an ongoing interdisciplinary effort known as “New Directions: Science, Humanities, Policy.” This paper thus summarizes previous workshops in this project before briefly commenting on the twelve papers and their themes.

The Lessons of Katrina for Intelligent Public Decision Making

Was the Hurricane Katrina disaster an aberration, or did it emerge from decision-making processes similar to those governing other public outcomes? Is it more reasonable to expect post-disaster analyses to lead to systematic learning and improved policy, or not to change very much? Most generally, what can be learned about appropriate expertise and usable knowledge from the Katrina experience? I argue that many of the same processes and institutions are at work to create vulnerable populations, design the built environment carelessly with respect to public values, place barriers in the way of preventive action, and make it difficult for experts to contribute to improved outcomes. No doubt there will be some hurricane-specific learning in Katrina's wake, such as more houses on stilts, but political influentials are unlikely to revamp the systemic norms, practices, and institutions that helped shape the disaster. Implications are discussed for interdisciplinary, problem-focused research and community service by scientists, engineers, and other experts.

Risk, Fairness, and the Geography of Disaster

This article examines risk and distributional fairness as they relate the Hurricane Katrina disaster and climate change. To be sure, these catastrophes are different. Katrina was regional, not global, and was fast-acting. Climate change is global, slow-moving and will come in multiple stages in a series of sudden and incremental changes throughout the world. Yet both present challenges for policy makers concerned with managing risk and protecting the most vulnerable members of society. The issues of risk management and social vulnerability are both tied to geography, an additional theme that helps shed light on the interconnection between the Katrina tragedy and climate change. An overly narrow focus on cost-benefit studies kept the United States from adequately appreciating the destructive force of Gulf hurricanes and the vulnerability of its levees and land-use policies. This same attention to cost-benefit analysis is similarly distorting the threats that global warming now poses. A lack of attention to America's social safety net also insured that the destruction of Hurricane Katrina would place an enormously disproportionate burden on minorities, women, the poor, and other vulnerable groups. Today's predictions of climate disruption envision a similarly disproportionate burden on the world's poor, women, and people of color. Yet without aggressive efforts to strengthen the physical and economic infrastructures of developing countries, particularly those in Africa and southern Asia, the world's weakest (and least culpable) peoples will bear the brunt of global catastrophe. This article argues that the same ideas now recommended for New Orleans—a more precautionary risk-management approach and a strengthening of the social safety net—are the same prescriptions for the international community as it faces the prospects of global warming. In keeping with the theme of geography, the article includes a series of thought-provoking, full-color maps to suggest that what we see is unavoidably linked to how we see it.

In Closing…Children’s Literature in a Post-Katrina World

The author reflects on the role of reading and the power of children’s literature to help children and families heal after the Hurricane Katrina disaster.

Information System Supporting Disaster Response of a Local Government in the 2005 Hurricane Katrina Disaster

Information System Supporting Disaster Response of a Local Government in the 2005 Hurricane Katrina Disaster

When the Levees Broke: A Requiem in Four Acts

ABSTRACT Spike Lee's documentary about the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans is a harrowing assemblage of personal testimonies from city residents and an indictment of the response from government agencies. This review analyzes When the Levees Broke as a documentary film and a powerful testimony to a catastrophe.

Hurricane Katrina

Abstract The paper presents an overview of higher education response to the training and educational needs of the emerging field of emergency and disaster management by exploring the deepening associations between FEMA and higher education, the recent lessons of the Katrina hurricane disaster and a general discussion of a “full measure” of the philosophy of higher education in action via the development of emergency and disaster educational programs. As a central fundamentally involved social vehicle and having a critical role in the development of citizens and leaders at all levels of private and government organizations, higher education must rise to the needs and challenges of its responsibility to educate, train, and support the first duty in emergency and disaster response. It's not just about tactics; it's about values through performance.

AERA Co-Sponsors Hill Briefing on Children of Hurricane Katrina and Other Disasters

AERA Co-Sponsors Hill Briefing on Children of Hurricane Katrina and Other Disasters

Special recognition for the Times‐Picayune

The Times‐Picayune, New Orleans' only daily newspaper, has justly been praised for the determination of its publisher and staff to keep publishing in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which occurred one year ago. Despite having to evacuate its building, which sustained serious damage, and despite the fact that many staff members lost their own homes to Katrina's storm surge and levee breaks, the paper never missed an issue—although for the first few days, it produced only its electronic edition. The paper demonstrated the highest standards of community service.At the 2006 Joint Assembly, AGU presented a special certificate of merit to The Times‐Picayune, but it was not for the paper's post‐Katrina tour de force. Rather, AGU stepped back and took note of all the paper had done to inform readers of crucial scientific and environmental issues that affect the well‐being of residents of New Orleans and southern Louisiana.

Mental Health and Recovery in the Gulf Coast After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

HURRICANE KATRINA WAS THE MOST DEVASTATING natural disaster in US history. Large parts of New Orleans and nearby Louisiana parishes were destroyed. About 90 000 square miles of the Gulf Coast, an area roughly the size of Great Britain, was declared a federal disaster area. The often contaminated flood waters covering much of New Orleans for almost 2 months contained a mix of raw sewage, bacteria, millions of gallons of oil, heavy metals, pesticides, and toxic chemicals, raising health concerns for residents and cleanup workers. As recently as June 19, 2006, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials estimated that as many as 2.5 million Gulf Coast residents may have been displaced from their homes by hurricanes Katrina and Rita; this number is based on FEMA applicants whose mailing addresses were outside of their home ZIP code and the assumption that each applicant represents an average of 2.5 people. Although more than 1.5 million residents fled the storm, hundreds of thousands remained behind, many of whom died or were injured during or in the immediate aftermath of the storm. As of July 2006, more than 1800 deaths were reported, including 1577 in Louisiana, and 231 in Mississippi. The number of fatalities would undoubtedly have been higher without prestorm evacuation and the efforts of many government and military personnel, first responders, area citizens, and volunteers.

On Evacuation and Deaths from Hurricane Katrina

| 754 the next hurricane. More knowledge about a hazard is usually associated with the person taking more protective actions or adjustments, but knowledge can be inconsistent, thus reducing its impact. Some individuals with more knowledge become overconfi dent and consider themselves less vulnerable due to their knowledge. Women perceive risk diff erently from men and are more likely to be risk averse and to perceive hazards as risky. Racial and ethnic minorities and individuals with low income and little education tend to have higher perceptions of risk from natural hazards, perhaps due to their lack of resources and their vulnerable positions in society. However, studies also show that African-Americans are less likely to evacuate than whites. Households with children are more likely to evacuate from a hurricane, while households with elderly are less likely to evacuate. Baker reports that the three most important factors in determining whether people evacuate are 1) the vulnerability of their locations; 2) whether they believe they have been told by authorities that they must evacuate; and 3) the severity of the hurricane. People who live on beaches or barrier islands or who live in the surge zone or in mobile homes realize their vulnerability and are more likely to evacuate than those who live inland in nonsurge zones. People who evacuate usually perceive a personal risk to themselves or to their family. Th e perceived risk is aff ected by whether the evacuation is “recommended (voluntary)” or “ordered (mandated),” and by the forecast severity of the storm. An “evacuation order” is most effi cient for convincing people to evacuate, but dissemination by the media may not be suffi cient. Baker reports that the public is most eff ectively informed when authorities go door-to-door notifying residents of the need to evacuate or drive through neighborhoods announcing the evacuation over loudspeakers. For some, such as those in health care facilities, evacuation may not be off ered as an individual option. Others who do not evacuate do not perceive a large risk, or stay at home to look aft er their property and pets or for work-related reasons. Th us, residents of New Orleans might have chosen to stay at home because they did not perceive a high risk. Th ey had been warned to evacuate for Category-4 hurricanes ON EVACUATION AND DEATHS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA

Hurricane Katrina, Children, and Pediatric Heroes

Supplement Articles| May 01 2006 Hurricane Katrina, Children, and Pediatric Heroes : Hands-on Stories by and of Our Colleagues Helping Families During the Most Costly Natural Disaster in US History Pediatrics (2006) 117 (Supplement_4): ii. https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.117.S4.ii Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Hurricane Katrina, Children, and Pediatric Heroes : Hands-on Stories by and of Our Colleagues Helping Families During the Most Costly Natural Disaster in US History. Pediatrics May 2006; 117 (Supplement_4): ii. 10.1542/peds.117.S4.ii Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All PublicationsAll JournalsPediatricsHospital PediatricsPediatrics In ReviewNeoReviewsAAP Grand RoundsAAP NewsAll AAP Sites Search Advanced Search Topics: hand, hurricane katrina, natural disasters You do not currently have access to this content.

Critical Concepts for Children in Disasters Identified by Hands-on Professionals: Summary of Issues Demanding Solutions Before the Next One

This supplement contains many hands-on experiences of pediatricians and others who cared for children during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. They have all offered significant insightful suggestions to help planners better prepare for care of children during the next disaster. This summary focuses on a few of the key lessons learned. All too often, planners assume that any hospital and any licensed health care provider can care for the full range of pediatric needs, including in times of crisis. Even for those who do recognize that seriously ill or injured children need to be cared for by pediatricians and pediatric subspecialists, it is sometimes assumed that existing hospitals are, in fact, sufficiently staffed and equipped to handle unlimited numbers of such cases. Few planners recognize the limited supply of pediatric hospital beds in their area and, therefore, do not prepare before a disaster for the potential transfer of children to distant facilities as needed, even if it requires consideration of out-of-state hospitals. More study is required to determine when and how adult-oriented providers and facilities can, in fact, care for children. Special protocols and understandings for the care of children in the midst of disasters need to be refined. Surge capacity is exceeded when the number of children requiring inpatient care exceeds the number of beds, staff, and equipment available. Obviously, with Katrina, all of the pediatric beds in Louisiana were overwhelmed, demonstrating the need to plan for care (including evacuation) of existing pediatric inpatients as well as new patients requiring admission within an impacted area. Disaster plans for children should include regional capacity and … Address correspondence to Carden Johnston, MD, FAAP, FRCP, Department of Pediatrics, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1600 7th Ave S, Birmingham, AL 35233. E-mail: cjohnston{at}aap.org

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