Hungarian Crisis Research Articles

The Hungarian crisis of 1956: the Soviet decision

The Hungarian crisis of 1956: the Soviet decision

The Austrian State Treaty and Neutrality in Eastern Europe

International chroniclers differ in their appreciation of the significance of the Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955, in the history of EastWest relations. Some see it as an oasis in the desert of sterile argument which preceded and followed it. This point of view finds confirmation in the fact that the eastern part of Austria and the Finnish peninsula of Porkala were and remain the only territories in Europe which, at one time occupied by Soviet forces, were afterwards (practically at the same time) evacuated, without leaving behind strongly entrenched Communist governments. Indeed, in two later instances, openly and outrageously in Hungary in 1956, sub rosa and shrewdly in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet forces were sent back to make sure that communist governments remained in power. Other chroniclers see the Austrian treaty as the moment when Soviet policy in Europe started the descent from the frozen peaks of the Cold War to the rolling slopes of the diplomacy of co-existence. This view is confirmed by the fact that in spite of the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and the Berlin crisis of 1958, relations in Europe between the U.S.S.R. and the Western powers have improved continuously since 1955. The present brief re-examination is more concerned with another trend in European policy for which the Austrian treaty undoubtedly remains the outstanding point of reference: the trend towards neutrality as a solution to the problems of Europe after World War II. From this point of view the Austrian treaty can be seen as standing at the crossroads of two contrary developments. Although it was used by the U.S.S.R. as an example and an encouragement for a neutral solution to the problem of Germany, it coincided with the end of the long

The Rise of Nationalism in the Habsburg Empire

In 1848–49 Austria could have introduced reforms which conceivably might have insured her continued existence for many generations and possibly might have finally made a true state out of the Habsburg domains. … [In] the course of the two [subsequent] generations until 1918 there never appeared an equally promising opportunity for the empire to carry out reform without risking its disintegration. This is not to say that Austria should not have taken this risk, which was smaller at the time of the compromise in 1867 than it was in 1905 and smaller in 1905 at the height of the Hungarian crisis than it was in 1917, when Engels' ominous prediction finally came true that with the victory of the Russian Revolution Austria would disintegrate.