Hume's Essay Research Articles

Hume's ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’ and Scottish political thought of the 1790s

ABSTRACT This article traces the reception of Hume's ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’ (1752) among a circle of Scottish Whigs supportive of the French Revolution. While the influence of Hume's essay on American Federalists like James Madison has long been a subject of debate, historians have overlooked the appeal that the plan held for Hume's intellectual heirs in Scotland. In the early 1790s, theorists such as John Millar, James Mackintosh, and Dugald Stewart believed European governments – above all France – could progress in the direction of the ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’. Hume modelled his plan after The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) by James Harrington. In so doing, he helped transmit a version of institutional republicanism to a generation of Scottish intellectuals searching for more explicit political reforms. Thinkers like Millar and Stewart interpreted Hume's essay as both a justification for idealist political ‘speculation’ and a ‘practicable’ plan for rebalancing political power in a large commercial state.

David Hume's ‘A Character of Sir Robert Walpole’: Humean Factional Fears, the ‘Rage against the Scots’ and Future Historians

In this article we explore David Hume's essay of 1742, ‘A Character of Sir Robert Walpole.’ Modern scholars have not given this early, and admittedly minor, piece much attention. Hume's contemporaries did, and we find that it offers a surprisingly useful point of entry to larger concerns that engaged Hume throughout his career as a man of letters. In particular, the publishing history of Hume's ‘Character’ reveals significant developments in his thoughts on factionalism. Those developments become even more apparent when the essay and its revisions are put in context and read alongside other editorial decisions that Hume made about his Essays and Treaties and his History of England.

Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence?

In 1979 astronomer Carl Sagan popularized the aphorism “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (ECREE). But Sagan never defined the term “extraordinary.” Ambiguity in what constitutes “extraordinary” has led to misuse of the aphorism. ECREE is commonly invoked to discredit research dealing with scientific anomalies, and has even been rhetorically employed in attempts to raise doubts concerning mainstream scientific hypotheses that have substantive empirical support. The origin of ECREE lies in eighteenth-century Enlightenment criticisms of miracles. The most important of these was Hume’s essay On Miracles. Hume precisely defined an extraordinary claim as one that is directly contradicted by a massive amount of existing evidence. For a claim to qualify as extraordinary there must exist overwhelming empirical data of the exact antithesis. Extraordinary evidence is not a separate category or type of evidence--it is an extraordinarily large number of observations. Claims that are merely novel or those which violate human consensus are not properly characterized as extraordinary. Science does not contemplate two types of evidence. The misuse of ECREE to suppress innovation and maintain orthodoxy should be avoided as it must inevitably retard the scientific goal of establishing reliable knowledge.

David Hume's no-miracles argument begets a valid No-Miracles Argument

Hume's essay ‘Of Miracles’ has been a focus of controversy ever since its publication. The challenge to Christian orthodoxy was only too evident, but the balance-of-probabilities criterion advanced by Hume for determining when testimony justifies belief in miracles has also been a subject of contention among philosophers. The temptation for those familiar with Bayesian methodology to show that Hume's criterion determines a corresponding balance-of-posterior probabilities in favour of miracles is understandable, but I will argue that their attempts fail. However, I show that his criterion generates a valid form of the so-called No-Miracles Argument appealed to by modern realist philosophers, whose own presentation of it, despite their possession of the probabilistic machinery Hume himself lacked, is invalid.

Educating Sentiment: Hume's Contribution to the Philosophy of the Curriculum Regarding the Teaching of Art

From the perspective of art education, the worst-case philosophical scenario is the hedonist-subjectivist account of art. If we measure art by the pleasure we gain from it, it may seem senseless to attempt teaching the reception of art. David Hume's ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ provides an argument for the art-education enthusiast, explaining that—even on a subjectivist account—art education crystallises our own preferences. While I refer to a historical debate and provide a close reading of an 18th-century essay, my goal is to offer a philosophical solution to an ongoing dilemma; I use Hume's essay to ground the justification of art education.

Impact and Overrule : two models of belief-assessment in Hume's essay Of Miracles.

The article seeks to explicate two models of belief-assessment that appear to be operative in Hume's essay Of Miracles and that correspond to the two parts of the striking phrase destruction. One, which we tag Impact, treats the mutual interaction of bodies of evidence and testimony on the model of a collision between two physical objects, and seeks to calculate the resultant quantities. The other, which we tag Overrule, operates on the quasi-judicial model of the inadmissibility of certain evidence as tainted by its provenance or by its intrinsic implausibility. The suggestion is made that the compresence of these two models may help understand why it is so hard to identify the basic argument of Hume's essay; the question is left open of whether or not Hume has, perhaps in addition to the two models presented, any decisive way of providing an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion.

Cicero's Ears, or Eloquence in the Age of Politeness: Oratory, Moderation, and the Sublime in Enlightenment Scotland

This paper argues that Hume's essay, "Of Eloquence," should be read as part of a Scottish Enlightenment attempt to accommodate the sublime to commercial modernity. Hume inherits the sublime of ancient oratory not as a matter for narrow stylistic regulation—to be rejected in a new age of politeness, as some have argued—but as a moral problem at the heart of modern subjectivity. Hume looks to taste to regulate and contain the sublime, but it is Adam Smith who solves the problem of the sublime by recouping its excess as a mark of the possibilities for virtue in the modern age.

A Reference to John Selden's Table-Talk in Hume's essay, 'Of the Middle Station of Life'

HUME, in his essay, ‘Of the Middle Station of Life’, remarks, ‘A certain Pope, whose Name I have forgot, us’d to say, Let us divert ourselves, my Friends, the World governs itself’.1 The most likely source for Hume’s quotation is John Selden’s Table-Talk where, in the section simply entitled ‘Pope’, Selden says: He was a wise Pope, that when one that used to be merry with him, before he was advanc’d to the Popedom, refrain’d afterwards to come at him, (presuming he was busie in governing the Christian World) the Pope sends for him, bids him come again, and (says he) we will be merry as we were before, for thou little thinkest what a little Foolery governs the whole World.2

Twenty Questions about Hume's “Of Miracles”

Hume's essay on the credibility of miracle reports has always been controversial, with much debate over how it should be interpreted, let alone assessed. My aim here is to summarise what I take to be the most plausible views on these issues, both interpretative and philosophical, with references to facilitate deeper investigation if desired. The paper is divided into small sections, each headed by a question that provides a focus. Broadly speaking, §§1–3 and §20 are on Hume's general philosophical framework within which the essay is situated, §§4–11 and §19 are on Part 1, §12–18 are on Part 2, and the final three sections §§18–20 sum up my assessment of his arguments.

Remarks on the Varieties of Prejudice in Hume's Essay on Taste

The last of Hume's five requirements of the ‘true judge in the finer arts’, is that he be ‘cleared of all prejudice…'. I argue here that, lurking in this innocuous-sounding requirement of the true judge, is a complexity that reveals a significant tension in Hume's argument. It is that tension that I want briefly to explore.

Aesthetics and Morals in the Philosophy of David Hume (review)

Reviewed by: Aesthetics and Morals in the Philosophy of David Hume Christopher Williams Timothy M. Costelloe . Aesthetics and Morals in the Philosophy of David Hume. New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xvii + 138. ISBN 978-0-415-80298-7, Paperback, $39.95. In the opening chapter of this book, Timothy Costelloe develops an interpretation of Hume's doctrines in "Of the Standard of Taste" and then proceeds, in the second chapter, by extending (or "applying," in Costelloe's words) that interpretation to Hume's moral philosophy. According to Costelloe, the "real value" of his attempt to clarify Hume's essay is to be found in the broader application (22). But since that value will not be real unless the interpretation of the essay has merit, the first chapter is clearly vital to the enterprise, and so deserves particular attention. Costelloe sides with those who emphasize, on Hume's behalf, the rules of art rather than the joint verdict of true judges, and he wants to understand these rules in the light of a contrast that Hume draws, in the Treatise section "Of unphilosophical probability," between two "influences" of general rules. In their first influence, general rules reflect an imaginative disposition to associate two objects where the association is a false inference. In a possible second influence, a general rule can correct the mistaken first association. Costelloe explicates rules in their second influence, in turn, by an intriguing appeal to Michael Oakeshott's notion of practical knowledge as an abridgment of a concrete activity, a post hoc summary that is pedagogically useful but which cannot assure mastery of the activity. The conjunction of Hume's idea of a general rule, as understood on [End Page 109] Costelloe's lines, and Oakeshott's idea of abridgment supplies the most original aspect of this book's exegesis of Hume's essay. General rules in their second influence, in aesthetic settings, involve taking an unprejudiced view of an object and recognizing both part-whole relations and the end for which the object is intended. A person of good taste—in the limit, the true judge—is someone who manifests or expresses these rules (which Costelloe also calls "standards"), and he or she thus occupies a derivative position in the explanatory scheme. The true judge is an ideal embodiment of the rules-or-standards; and if there is disagreement over whether actual persons possess the characteristics of a true judge, "this only shows . . . that aesthetic judgments do not depend upon such people or the judgments they make" (21). The second chapter charts parallels between aesthetic and moral judgments, but also proposes—and here the shadow of the first chapter is more apparent—that the rules of morality, as abridgements of practice, do not guarantee perfect practice, and that the figure of the "moral expert" corresponds to the true judge. The third chapter, on the antinomies of reason, is devoted as much to Kant as it is to Hume. (Because of its Kantian focus, this chapter seems somewhat tangential to the book's main argument.) The fourth chapter, returning to the main theme, explores Hume's notion of character, though the rationale for the exploration is not always evident. (To say that "character constitutes the normative dimension of Hume's moral thought, derived from producing philosophical rules in their second influence" [53] is not helpful.) In the fifth and sixth chapters, Costelloe addresses three questions that are prompted by his account of Humean morality. First, if morality is an immediate reaction to beauty and deformity, why is perfect virtue not the condition of everyone? Second, if morality depends on sentiment, how can moral judgments be objective and claim universal validity? And third, if there are general standards, how is it that morality changes and even improves over time? These last two chapters are the ones furthest removed from aesthetics, and readers who are not aestheticians may find them to be the most convenient point of entry in the book. I confess, however, that Costelloe's first question seems very oddly framed to me. Why would there be any reason to suppose, on the basis of sentimentalism, that perfect virtue might be the universal condition? We would not...

Interpreting Hume on miracles

AbstractContemporary commentators on Hume's essay, ‘Of miracles’ have increasingly tended to argue that Hume never intended to suggest that testimonial evidence must always be insufficient to justify belief in a miracle. This is in marked contrast to earlier commentators who interpreted Hume as intending to demonstrate that testimonial evidence is incapable in principle of ever establishing rational belief in a miracle. In this article I argue that this traditional interpretation is the correct one.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Some Questions in Hume's Aesthetics

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Some Questions in Hume's Aesthetics

Aesthetics and Morals in the Philosophy of David Hume

A PARALLEL between David Hume's theory of taste and his moral theory is now widely acknowledged. Both are ‘sentimental' in the sense that the eighteenth century understood that term. Timothy Costelloe has now provided a detailed treatment of these parallels. Costelloe is very knowledgeable about the relevant literature as his ‘Hume's Aesthetics: The Literature and Directions for Research' (Hume Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 87–126) shows. He draws extensively on this knowledge in his succinct, 110-page study of the way that Hume interweaves morals, taste, and beauty. Costelloe begins with a discussion of Hume's essay, ‘Of the Standard of Taste', and what he takes to be its reliance on general rules. He distinguishes two ‘influences'. The first is formed by the imagination. Such an influence is ‘natural and unavoidable' (p. 7). But general rules also operate reflectively to correct the first influence. The knowledge provided by rules of the second influence is ideal; it may not actually correct the rules of the first influence, but it is the standard by which they are judged. Costelloe then applies this understanding of general rules to ‘Of the Standard of Taste'. Actual judgements follow the general rules in the first influence; the standard must be supplied by general rules in the second influence, which are necessarily ideal. Hume's true judge ‘is best interpreted as ideal: a perfect manifestation of the rules that govern aesthetic judgment and find expression as general rules in their second influence' (p. 18).

Some Questions in Hume's Aesthetics

AbstractThe central problem posed in Hume's essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ concerns the mutual adjustment of two things: a skepticism about the correctness of tastes, and a belief that artistic productions genuinely differ in their merits. In response, Hume modifies the skepticism by proposing that the ‘joint verdict of true judges’ is the standard of taste. This article surveys three sets of issues in connection with this solution: the role of rules in grounding verdicts; the possibility of circularity in the judge‐verdict relation; and the relevance of the judges’ verdicts to those that non‐judges would or should make.

Hume's Standard of Taste and the De Gustibus Sceptic

In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ Hume aspires to silence the ‘extravagant’ cavils of the anything-goes de gustibus sceptic by developing a programme of aesthetic education that would lead all properly-trained individuals to a set of agreed-upon aesthetic judgements. But I argue that if we read Hume's essay as an attempted direct theoretical refutation of de gustibus scepticism, Hume fails to achieve his aim. Moreover, although some recent commentators have read the essay as aiming at a less ambitious ‘sceptical solution’ to the de gustibus challenge, I argue that this ‘sceptical solution’ reading also fails to save Hume's project. Thus the anything-goes de gustibus sceptic remains unvanquished.

Hume's Principles of Taste: A Reply to Dickie

George Dickie argues that Hume's principles of taste have value-laden properties as their subjects, including those properties we now refer to as 'aesthetic'. I counter that Hume's principles have value-neutral properties as their subjects, and so exclude those properties we now refer to as 'aesthetic'. Dickie also argues that Hume's essay on taste provides 'the conceptual means for recognizing the problem of the interaction of aesthetic properties with other properties of artworks'. I counter that the very passages Dickie takes to provide these conceptual means in fact suggest that Hume recognizes no such problem.

James Shelley on Critical Principles

James Shelley claims that Hume's principles of taste have value‐neutral subjects rather than value‐laden ones that, for example, refer to aesthetic properties. I try to rebut his claim. I argue that Hume's essay on taste contains the conceptual means for recognizing the problem of the interaction of aesthetic properties with other properties in artworks, even if he does not explicitly make this point. I also deny Shelley's contention that I claim that principles are used as part of a temporal process to infer evaluational conclusions. Against Shelly's attack, I defend my use of the isolation clause in formulating evaluational principles. Finally, I show a way to formulate evaluational principles without the isolation clause by substituting an interaction clause.

Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles (review)

Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 1, April 2002, pp. 161-167 JOHN EARMAN. Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 217. ISBN 0-19-512737-4, cloth, $47.50; ISBN 0-19-512738-2, paper, $22.95. This book is divided into two parts. The first (73 pages plus notes and a two-page appendix on probability) is Earman's harsh critique of Hume's essay and its conclusions. The second part of the book (95-212) contains selections from primary texts of Locke, Spinoza, Clarke, and others, along with the text "Of Miracles," recording changes that Hume made. There is little in the way of explanation, a single paragraph in the preface, as to why these texts have been selected. Presumably, Earman sees each of these as containing something significant to contribute to the formulation of his theses in the first part of the book—especially his claim that Hume's arguments are largely derivative. Earman thinks he is dealing a blow to Hume scholarship in general and to the commentary on Hume's essay on miracles in particular. He says, It is almost universally assumed, by Hume's admirers and critics alike, that "Of Miracles" offers a powerful and original argument against miracles. On the contrary, I contend that Hume's argument is largely derivative, almost wholly without merit where it is original, and worst of all, reveals the impoverishment of his treatment of inductive reasoning. Hume scholars will no doubt be enraged by this charge. Good! There has been too much genuflecting at Hume's altar, (vi) And he continues, "to be blunt, I contend that Of Miracles' is an abject failure " (3). "Hume has generated the illusion of deep insight by sliding back and forth between various theses, no one of which avoids both the Scylla of banality and the Charybdis of implausibility or outright falsehood" (48). As it turns out Hume scholars have nothing to fear, and little to gain, from Earman's book. Those familiar with even a moderate portion of the literature on Hume's essay will recognise Earman's above contentions as anything but novel. However, one who begins a book in this supercilious manner had better understand the argument that they claim so totally lacks merit. I do not think that Earman does. His repeated claims that Hume's "Of Miracles" is a morass of confusion is, in my view, a projection of his own confusions concerning Hume's position onto Hume. Hume Studies 162 Book Reviews To grasp Hume's principle argument in part 1 in "Of Miracles" and why it fails, it must be set not just in terms of his account of induction, but in the wider context of Hume's philosophy where his account of induction is itself based. Earman does not do this. In fact, he treats "Of Miracles" in almost total isolation from Hume's philosophy (Book 1 of the Treatise being most crucial), thereby losing any hope of seeing what is distinctive in the argument or of understanding it. Although Earman is aware of the fact that there is good reason to treat Hume's argument in the context of the Treatise (6), he ignores it. In a letter to George Campbell, Hume is explicit about the connection . It is not enough to talk about Hume's views on induction in general terms—in isolation from his more fundamental empiricist principles—because not even his views on induction can be understood in apart from his empiricism. Apart from this wider context of Hume's philosophy, his argument(s) in "Of Miracles" is bound to appear derivative. Earman misses what is distinctive about Hume's argument because he ignores (and he is not alone in this) the fact that the argument, along with Hume's account of induction is embedded in his empiricism. Consider an interpretation of Hume's argument against justified belief in miracles that does make an explicit connection with his theory of a posteriori reasoning and empiricism. Even if this interpretation is not quite right (though I think it exactly right), it illustrates that what is distinctive about Hume's argument...

Moral Prejudice and Aesthetic Deformity: Rereading Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste"

Twenty years ago, a philosopher reassessing Hume's aesthetics wrote that his essay Of the Standard of Taste had been underrated.1 Twenty years later, Hume's essay occupies a prominent place in philosophical aesthetics, particularly among philosophers concerned with Hume's suggestion that moral considerations are relevant to the evaluation of art.2 Despite the proliferation of philosophers who cite Hume-whether as ally or foe-in debates over moralism in art criticism, however, we still lack an adequate account of Hume's own moralist aesthetics.3 Thus, although Hume's essay on taste may no longer be underrated, I believe that some problems raised by the essay's endorsement of a moralist aesthetics remain misunderstood. I hope to illuminate Hume's moralist aesthetics by pursuing one such problem. The problem, which I call the moral dilemma, arises when one attempts to square an account of the freedom from prejudice that Hume requires of true aesthetic judges with what he says about the relevance of moral considerations to the evaluation of art. I introduce and then attempt to disarm the dilemma by offering an interpretation of Hume's aesthetic point of view and drawing attention to the taxonomy of prejudices by which he justifies the true judge's moralism. The result is a reading of the essay that distinguishes Hume's aesthetic point of view from his moral point of view while defending the plausibility of assigning a moral dimension to aesthetic evaluation.