Aesthetics and Morals in the Philosophy of David Hume

Abstract

A PARALLEL between David Hume's theory of taste and his moral theory is now widely acknowledged. Both are ‘sentimental' in the sense that the eighteenth century understood that term. Timothy Costelloe has now provided a detailed treatment of these parallels. Costelloe is very knowledgeable about the relevant literature as his ‘Hume's Aesthetics: The Literature and Directions for Research' (Hume Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 87–126) shows. He draws extensively on this knowledge in his succinct, 110-page study of the way that Hume interweaves morals, taste, and beauty. Costelloe begins with a discussion of Hume's essay, ‘Of the Standard of Taste', and what he takes to be its reliance on general rules. He distinguishes two ‘influences'. The first is formed by the imagination. Such an influence is ‘natural and unavoidable' (p. 7). But general rules also operate reflectively to correct the first influence. The knowledge provided by rules of the second influence is ideal; it may not actually correct the rules of the first influence, but it is the standard by which they are judged. Costelloe then applies this understanding of general rules to ‘Of the Standard of Taste'. Actual judgements follow the general rules in the first influence; the standard must be supplied by general rules in the second influence, which are necessarily ideal. Hume's true judge ‘is best interpreted as ideal: a perfect manifestation of the rules that govern aesthetic judgment and find expression as general rules in their second influence' (p. 18).