Human Operator Behavior Research Articles

Ineffectiveness of “time out” punishment in suppressing human operant behavior

Human Ss procured monetary reinforcement on a fixed-ratio schedule. In one component of the schedule, rather than procuring reinforcement responding produced either 0, 1, or 4 min of time out from reinforcement. Response-contingent time outs of these durations did not reduce rates below levels in other components of the schedule. The failure of time out punishment to produce response suppression was attributed to the fact that reductions in rate would have been accompanied by reductions in reinforcement frequencies as well.

A Preliminary Study of Human Operator Behavior Following a Step Change in the Controlled Element

A most important time-varying problem in manual control systems is that of a step change in the controlled element, as typified by, say, a stability augmenter failure in a manned aircraft. This communication describes an experimental investigation aimed at understanding human operator behavior during such a change, and the determination of some limitations on operator descriptions and measurement methods which might be employed.

Money reinforcement and human operant (work) behavior: 3. Piecework-payment and time-payment comparisons.

Two groups of 10 college male Ss were given different money reinforcement schedules in single 1-hr. work periods for each S (following a combination of “pretests” and a questionnaire, used for reasons described). The work was that of repetitively pulling a manipulandum against a constant-tension spring requiring 25 lb. of force, horizontally, through 5/8-in. distance. The control group was paid at a rate of 10¢ for each 1000 pulls. The test Ss were paid in advance with instructions that they had the job of working at the machine for 1 hr, if they wished (though they were required to remain in the room) and were given the maximum rate of pay ($1.50 per hour) which it was anticipated the control Ss might earn. The test Ss were told that their work “may provide information on which to base later studies.” As predicted, the control Ss showed markedly greater output (approximately 100% greater) than that obtained from Ss paid in advance, on a time basis.

Conditioning history and maladaptive human operant behavior.

Two experiments are presented which examined the effects of different past experiences (histories of conditioning) upon maladaptive human behavior in an operant conditioning laboratory situation. In Exp. I, unnecessary punished responding under a fixed-interval reinforcement schedule was shown to result from a history of fixed-ratio conditioning. In Exp. II low rates of variable-interval responding which produced unnecessary reinforcement loss followed a history of conditioning under a differential reinforcement of low rate schedule.

EFFECT OF SIZE AND FREQUENCY OF MONEY REINFORCEMENT ON HUMAN OPERANT (WORK)BEHAVIOR.

40 college males were assigned by counterbalancing to four equal groups in a 2 × 2 factorial design which involved mean ratios of reinforcement of 1/500 and 1/2500, and magnitudes of monetary payoff of 1¢ and 25¢. The work was that of repetitively pulling a manipulandum against a constant tension spring requiring 25 lb. of force, horizontally, through 5/8 in. Analysis of variance showed significantly smaller work output for the 1¢ groups and for the 1/2500 ratio groups, for the 30-min. work period.

CONDITIONING HISTORY AND HUMAN FIXED-INTERVAL PERFORMANCE.

The effects of two different conditioning histories upon human operant behavior under a FI 10-sec schedule of point reinforcements were investigated. Relatively high rates of continuous inter-reinforcement responding characterized the FI 10-sec performance of subjects with an FR 40 conditioning history. Low response rates with little or no inter-reinforcement responding were emitted by Ss with a DRL 20-sec conditioning history.

Effects of Punishment Intensity on Human Operant Behavior

In an attempt to develop techniques which might lead to quantitative measures of human conflict behavior, female college students were placed in a free operant situation where responding was concurrently reinforced (with money represented by counter tally) and punished (with electric shock) with increasing severity for successive responses. Ss were able to reset the shock to a low level by making a second response, which resulted in subtraction of counter tallies. Results indicate that as shock intensity increases, total responding decreases, and the average number of responses before reset also decreases. Variations in the magnitude of positive reinforcement failed to have any effects. Several factors which might have been involved were discussed. Suggestions were made for clarifying the role that duration of exposure to shock plays in the situation.

Response cost and the aversive control of human operant behavior.

The effects of cost (point-loss per response) upon human avoidance, escape, and avoidance-escape behavior maintained by PLPs (point-loss periods) were investigated. Cost had a marked but differentially suppressive effect upon responding under all schedules. The greatest number of PLPs taken under cost occurred on the escape schedule. In most instances PLPs were more frequent on the avoidance-escape schedule than on the avoidance schedule under cost. Inferior avoidance performance appeared only under cost conditions. Under no-cost, all subjects (Ss) successfully avoided all PLPs after the first hour of conditioning. These results indicate that the development and maintenance of human avoidance and escape behavior may, in part, be dependent upon response cost conditions. Aversive control of human operant behavior may be limited without an adequate specification of response-cost conditions.

Unaware of where's awareness: some verbal operants--notates, monents, and notants.

For some years now, problems of leammg without awareness have ansen m a number of contexts, they have created a theoretical —and sometimes an expenmental—fuss Willy-mUy, those who mvestigate human operant behavior sooner or later are among those mvolved, whether they have leaped, shpped, or been dragged mto the fray These seem to be the avenues by which participants enter mto scientific controversies, as well as mto barroom brawls The courses of development of these two kmds of controversy are rather similar They show a certam orderlmess. In both, as the dispute nses m heat, and the blows—or expenments—^get exchanged at higher rates, the ongmal issue tends to get lost, if there was one to begm with In the present case, the issue summarizes Itself m You can't, can, in progressively stronger inflections Just what can or cannot be done either has been omitted, or repeatedly redefined, as the controversy has extended itself It IS not surpnsmg that seemmgly contradictory results tum up To this wnter, the present dispute, which seems to have somethmg to do with the subject's abihty to state expenmental contmgencies, is a regrettable one As it has developed it seems to have led to the performance of expenments on mappropnate forms of behavior, and to a proliferation of speculative theory By mappropnate forms of behavior, I mean this the expenments that have been—by now— repeated over and over with only mmor modifications are those that have confounded at least two questions, the identification of response^ classes and the stabihty (habituabihty) of remforcers Saymg plural nouns, constructing sentences m the first person, Mm-hmm, and Good

Human vigilance and operant behavior.

The analysis of vigilance as operant behavior treats illumination (observing) responses as operants that produce signal-detections. Evidence is presented that the relationship is an artifact of the procedure, and that no vigilance factor is involved in illumination-responses.

Some aspects of human operant behavior

Some aspects of human operant behavior

The human operator as a servo system element

This paper considers the role of human elements in certain closed loop control systems. A quantitative description of human dynamics useful to control system designers is essential to understanding and analysis of such systems. Accordingly, the human behavior description must be expressed in terms which are compatible with conventional descriptions of control system components. This compatibility is achieved by the use of a quasi-linear mathematical model for the human operator. The model is composed of two components—a describing function and remnant. The describing function, which for a linear system is identical with the conventional transfer function, is established to characterize that portion of the operator's output which is linearly correlated with his input. The input, upon which the describing function is based, is selected on the basis of a priori estimates of the nature of certain human non-linear behavior. Human output power which cannot be characterized by the operation of the describing function on the input is designated as the remnant. After presenting the analytic basis for measurements of human dynamics, steady-state describing functions measured by the various experiments in the field are discussed and the adaptive, optimalizing behavior of the human operator is demonstrated. The remnants are also discussed and plausible sources for their origin are postulated. Knowledge of the range of parameter adjustment of which the human operator is capable in his adaptation as well as knowledge of his criteria for adjusting these parameters enables the designer to specify input functions and operator controlled dynamics compatible with both desirable human operator behavior and good system performance. By judiciously trading off system complexity against operator preferences, while still making proper engineering use of the human operator's adaptability, a control system may be optimized for both performance and reliability.