Human Moral Agency Research Articles

Deciphering the global research trends and significance of moral intelligence via bibliometric analysis.

Moral Intelligence (MI) as a concept has gained importance in recent years due to its wide applicability in individual, organizational, and clinical settings or even policy making. The present study employed Bibliometric analysis to understand the emerging topics associated with MI and its global research trend. This paper's primary aim was (i) to explore the temporal and geographic growth trends of the research publication on MI. (ii) to identify the most prolific countries, institutions, and authors, working on MI, (iii) to identify the most frequent terminologies, (iv) to explore research topics and to provide insight into potential collaborations and future directions, and (v) to explore the significance of the concept of moral intelligence. Bibliometric analysis was used to understand the emerging topics associated with MI and its global research trend using the SCOPUS database. VOS viewer and R were employed to analyze the result. Through the analysis conducted, the development of the construct over time was analyzed. Results have shown that Iran and the United States and these two combined account for 53.16% of the total country-wise publications. Switzerland has the highest number of Multi-county publications. Authors from Iran and Switzerland have the most number of publications. Emerging topics like decision-making, machine ethics, moral agents, artificial ethics, co-evolution of human and artificial moral agents, green purchase intention etc were identified. The application of MI in organisational decision-making, education policy, artificial intelligence and measurement of moral intelligence are important areas of application as per the results. Research interest in MI is projected to increase according to the results delineated in this article.

Animals and Artificial Intelligence: Nonhumans as Moral Agents?

There is a widely debated issue regarding the status and impact of exponentially growing artificial intelligence. The article deals with the problem of the moral agency of animals, and artificial intelligence. The author addresses several criteria for moral agents and tries to find the answer to the question of whether we can treat animals and AI as moral agents. The author uses mostly method of philosophical analysis and comparative method. The author claims that moral agency is not a necessary condition for moral status and doubts the practicality of attributing full moral agency to animals and AI. Moreover, claims that moral agency comes in degrees and different kinds and therefore we have to consider the complex nature of moral agency when dealing with moral actions. For instance, even human moral agents are not all on the same level of development as suggested not just by empirical evidence but also virtue ethics.

On not being alone in lonely places: preferences, goods, and aesthetic-ethical conflict in nature sports

ABSTRACT Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these rights are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals’ functional goods.

Values Sub Ratione Boni: A Thomistic Defense of Values Work in Psychotherapy

The concept of values and its place in psychotherapy are once again under attack. I examine some new and old critiques of values work in psychotherapy, and of values language more generally. I argue that charges of moral relativism are unfounded from a Thomistic perspective. This is because Thomists have reasons to conceive of values as genuine human goods. I develop this argument on the basis of two Thomistic principles: (1) the principle of desire, that human moral agents can desire and choose only under the aspect of good; and (2) the principle of finality, that the goods to which agents are ordered are determined by nature and therefore are nonarbitrary. Given these principles, values work cannot produce the kinds of deleterious results that values critics allege. I address concerns about moral wrongdoing and the problem of rank ordering, and conclude by offering two additional reasons Thomists have for finding values work not only benign, but salutary.

On the existence of moral certainties: The case of the pisa‐suaves

AbstractRecently, José María Ariso and Samuel Laves have critically debated whether killing innocent and non‐threatening people [=WK] is a universal moral certainty. One of the main topics of their discussion concerns the case of the pisa‐suaves, children born in the context of the Colombian civil war who grew up with the FARC guerrillas. While Laves argues that such children hold WK, Ariso rejects his claim and stresses that pisa‐suaves have no moral code of conduct. In my work, I side with Laves and contend that WK is a universal moral certainty. Accordingly, I maintain that (i) either pisa‐suaves possess WK and thereby count as human moral agents, or (ii) if they do not possess any moral code of conduct, then they cannot count as human moral agents and, in turn, their existence does not undermine WK's universality.

A Theological Account of Artificial Moral Agency

This article seeks to explore the idea of artificial moral agency from a theological perspective. By drawing on the Reformed theology of archetype-ectype, it will demonstrate that computational artefacts are the ectype of human moral agents and, consequently, have a partial moral agency. In this light, human moral agents mediate and extend their moral values through computational artefacts, which are ontologically connected with humans and only related to limited particular moral issues. This moral leitmotif opens up a way to deploy carebots into Christian pastoral care while maintaining the human agent's uniqueness and responsibility in pastoral caregiving practices.

Ought we align the values of artificial moral agents?

In the near future, the capabilities of commonly used artificial systems will reach a level where we will be able to permit them to make moral decisions autonomously as part of their proper daily functioning—autonomous cars, personal assistants, household robots, stock trading bots, autonomous weapons, etc. are examples of the types of systems that will deal with simple to complex moral situations that require some level of moral judgment. In the research field of machine ethics, we distinguish several types of artificial moral agents, each of which has a different level of moral agency. In this paper, we focus on the moral agency of Explicit and Full-blown artificial moral agents. We form an opinion regarding their level of moral agency, and then examine the question of whether it is morally right to align the values of (artificial) moral agents. If we assume or are able to determine that certain types of artificial agents are indeed moral agents, then we ought to examine whether it is morally right to construct them in such a way that they are “committed” to human values. We discuss an analogy to human moral agents and the implications of granting or denying moral agency from artificial agents.

DU FU 杜甫 ON THE HAN DYNASTY: A MEDIEVAL VIEW OF THE CLASSICAL CHINESE EMPIRE

AbstractDu Fu, one of the two most celebrated poets of the Tang, was very much a product of his era in the way that he found a usable past in Han-dynasty verse, episodes, and people. From 750 on, his writings were replete with allusions to the Han, some subtle and others more forthright. Taken together, these allusions suggest his firm beliefs in the course of history determined by human moral agency, in morality as “a man's own charge”; also in the role of fate determining the succession of dynasties, even as he deplored the workings of capricious fate on individual lives. Such beliefs are unremarkable in content, being much closer to conventional Tang concepts of the individual than most commentaries on Du Fu allow.

A Moral Metaphysics and a Metaphysics of Morals: Xunzi and Kant

Abstract I explore two important ways of thinking that the philosophical understanding of morality requires metaphysics: the moral metaphysics I ascribe to Xunzi and Kant’s metaphysics of morals. Both Xunzi and Kant held that a metaphysics of nature is inadequate for a metaphysical understanding of human moral agency. Xunzi invoked the human Dao to allow for the agency of the heart-mind, and Kant invoked the Categorical Imperative to allow for the agency of the moral self. Both Xunzi and Kant stretched metaphysics through rejecting the wrong sorts of rigour as preventing us from having an appropriate understanding of metaphysics and morality. I turn to their different placements of humanity that reflect deep differences in Xunzi’s and Kant’s underlying metaphysics. Xunzi placed humanity as a virtue or power that allows our psychology to become a moral psychology. Kant placed humanity as an ideal that allows our psychology to be a moral psychology.

Rethinking the concept of God and the problem of evil from the perspective of African thought

AbstractIn this article, I show that: (1) There is a transcendence strain in African Traditional Religion (ATR) and traditional African thought that agrees perfectly with traditional monotheism and legitimizes the question of the relation of God with evil in the world. (2) There is incontrovertible evidence of the conception of God as a limited deity that subverts the categories of omnipotence and omniscience. (3) African philosophers of religion must show how a transcendent or, conversely, a limited God is related to the evil that exists in the world, since the overwhelming stance of ATR is that God is the creator of the world and wields effective power. I substitute the categories of omnipotence and omniscience with the novel categories of power and glory and argue that while a powerful and glorious God is not the author of evil and cannot eliminate evil in the world, such a God can be conceived as working to reduce the evil in the world through the instrumentality of human moral agency.

Solving moral dilemmas with AI: how it helps us address the social implications of the Covid-19 crisis and enhance human responsibility to tackle meta-dilemmas

ABSTRACT When combined with an appropriate level of human judgement, machine learning applications were crucial resources insupporting decision-making in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, resulting in more efficient and better-informed responses to ethicalissues. This paper focusses on four social dimensions (bioethical, political, psychological, and economic) from which the decisionstaken in the context of the Covid-19 crisis derived major ethical implications. On the one hand, I argue against the possibility ofaddressing these issues from a purely algorithmic approach, elaborating on two types of limitations for automated systems toaddress ethical issues. This leads me to discuss how different ethical situations call for different performance metrics with regards tothe ‘contextual explicability and performance issue’, as well as to enunciate a gold principle: ‘legitimacy trumps accuracy’. On the otherhand, I present practical examples of machine learning applications which enhance, instead of dilute, human moral agency in betteraddressing these issues. I also suggest a ‘moral perimeter’ framework to ensure the responsibility of algorithms-assisted decisionmakersfor critical decisions. The unique potential of AI to ‘solve’ moral dilemmas by intervening on their conditions of possibility thenprompts me to discuss a new type of moral situation: AI-generated meta-dilemmas.

The Ethics of the Enactment and Reception of Cruciform Love: A Comparative Lexical, Conceptual, Exegetical, and Theological Study of Colossians 3:1–17

The Ethics of the Enactment and Reception of Cruciform Love: A Comparative Lexical, Conceptual, Exegetical, and Theological Study of Colossians 3:1–17

Autonomous Weapons Systems, Artificial Intelligence, and the Problem of Meaningful Human Control

In this article, I explore the (im)possibility of human control and question the presupposition that we can be morally adequately or meaningfully in control over AI-supported LAWS. Taking seriously Wiener’s warning that “machines can and do transcend some of the limitations of their designers and that in doing so they may be both effective and dangerous,” I argue that in the LAWS human-machine complex, technological features and the underlying logic of the AI system progressively close the spaces and limit the capacities required for human moral agency.

The Human Side of Artificial Intelligence.

Artificial moral agents raise complex ethical questions both in terms of the potential decisions they may make as well as the inputs that create their cognitive architecture. There are multiple differences between human and artificial cognition which create potential barriers for artificial moral agency, at least as understood anthropocentrically and it is unclear that artificial moral agents should emulate human cognition and decision-making. It is conceptually possible for artificial moral agency to emerge that reflects alternative ethical methodologies without creating ontological challenges or existential crises for human moral agents.

Genealogical Relationships Do Not Support Indirect Speciesism

Abstract In this article, I will identify an argument for the conclusion that all human moral agents have stronger moral reasons regarding other human beings than they do regarding nonhuman animals, and I will explain why I think this argument is unsound. The argument employs an empirical claim, that all human beings are more closely genealogically related to all other humans than they are to any nonhuman animals, and a moral claim, that one’s genealogical relationship to an individual is a morally relevant consideration. The moral claim is supported by a comparison between genealogically related individuals and a family.

Demands of Dignity in Robotic Care

Having a sense of dignity is one of the core emotions in human life. Is our dignity, and accordingly also our sense of dignity under threat in elderly care, especially in robotic care? How can robotic care support or challenge human dignity in elderly care? The answer will depend on whether it is robot-based, robot-assisted, or teleoperated care that is at stake. Further, the demands and realizations of human dignity have to be distinguished. The demands to respect humans are based on human dignity and the inalienable high and equal moral standing that everyone has. For human moral agents, these demands take the form of negative and positive duties. For robots, they arguably take the form of corresponding ought-to-be norms. The realizations of dignity consist in variable responses to these demands, by oneself by others, and by society at large. This article examines how robot-based, robot-assisted, and teleoperated care can amount to realizations of dignity. The varieties of robotic care can, in different ways, be responsive to the demands of dignity and recognize humans as vulnerable beings with needs, as autonomous agents, and as rational subjects of experience, emotion, and thought.

“Second-personal morality” and morality

ABSTRACT“Second-personal morality” features as an important initial stage in Michael Tomasello’s natural history of morality. In order to play the role that Tomasello assigns it, however, it must contain within it universalizing trends that push beyond elective interactions between individuals to help underwrite the idea of a universal morality that binds all human moral agents. I attempt here to bring out universal elements that, at least philosophically, are present in second-personal morality from the beginning.

Artificial moral agents: moral mentors or sensible tools?

The aim of this paper is to offer an analysis of the notion of artificial moral agent (AMA) and of its impact on human beings’ self-understanding as moral agents. Firstly, I introduce the topic by presenting what I call the Continuity Approach. Its main claim holds that AMAs and human moral agents exhibit no significant qualitative difference and, therefore, should be considered homogeneous entities. Secondly, I focus on the consequences this approach leads to. In order to do this I take into consideration the work of Bostrom and Dietrich, who have radically assumed this viewpoint and thoroughly explored its implications. Thirdly, I present an alternative approach to AMAs—the Discontinuity Approach—which underscores an essential difference between human moral agents and AMAs by tackling the matter from another angle. In this section I concentrate on the work of Johnson and Bryson and I highlight the link between their claims and Heidegger’s and Jonas’s suggestions concerning the relationship between human beings and technological products. In conclusion I argue that, although the Continuity Approach turns out to be a necessary postulate to the machine ethics project, the Discontinuity Approach highlights a relevant distinction between AMAs and human moral agents. On this account, the Discontinuity Approach generates a clearer understanding of what AMAs are, of how we should face the moral issues they pose, and, finally, of the difference that separates machine ethics from moral philosophy.

A Transcendentalist Nature Religion

Scholars of religion have often pointed to the Transcendentalists as progenitors of a distinct tradition of nature religion in the United States. Nevertheless, this work has not fully dealt with the problematic qualities of “nature” in light of growing concerns about the ethical and socio-political implications of human powers in the Anthropocene. This paper presents a brief overview of “nature religion” while focusing on the often uneasy way that Ralph Waldo Emerson is treated in this work. By looking at how Emerson is viewed as a stepping stone to Henry David Thoreau, I argue that it is precisely what the tradition of nature religion finds problematic in Emerson—his strains of recurrent idealism—that allows him to have a more expansive notion of nature as the environments in which we live, while preserving the importance of human moral agency. What follows, then, is a more nuanced position in environmental ethics that is informed by an Emersonian sense of the irreducible tension between being created and being a creator.

Book Review: The Authority of the Gospel: Explorations in Moral and Political Theology in Honor of Oliver O'Donovan

The Authority of the Gospel: Explorations in Moral and Political Theology in Honor of Oliver O'Donovan. Edited by Robert Song and Brent Waters. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing, 2015. xxi + 294 pp. $45.00 (cloth).In his foreword to this festschrift Rowan Williams describes Oliver O'Donovan as of the most serious thinkers the Anglican family has nurtured in the last century or so (p. viii). Although Reinhold Niebuhr and Stanley Hauerwas may have had wider general influence, if one considers the field of Christian ethics, then in terms of erudition in scholarly languages, theological insight, historical engagement, and the sheer range of issues of concern to which O'Donovan brings his illuminating analysis, he is without peer.This festschrift is reflective of the broad range of O'Donovan s interests: political theology, of course (historical and contemporary), ethical theory (practical reason, natural law, virtues), detailed engagement with the application of moral principles in complex situations (for example, just war), and the life of the Christian in the world and in the church (preaching and liturgy).There are several essays on the intersection of church and world, of public and private morality, an area where the insights of Augustine are still bearing fruit. Eric Gregory has a fine essay on the civic virtues. Brian Brock has a helpful essay on What Is ?the Public'?, interacting with Augustine, O'Donovan, and Bonhoeffer and reflecting, for example, on the misguided French authorities banning forms of Muslim dress in public on the basis of false universals. Jonathan Chaplin also deals with the challenge of pluralism in modern society, and how governments can make judgments about controversial issues in the context of a variety of fundamental moral and religious convictions. The complexity and diversity of the world itself should be reflected in the complexity of such judgments.Christian character and moral virtue, supported by sound theology, is foundational to the effective witness of the church in the world. In fact, the festschrift underscores this point by bracketing the entire collection with treatments of Christian love: in the first essay Bernd Wannenwetsch explores the dialectic of faith and love in Augustine and Luther. And in the final essay we have O'Donovan himself returning to the theme of self-love, its degeneration to material self-interest, and the problems with modern notions of equality.The virtue of prudence is in large part a form of seeing things correctly (as well as making good judgments), and Hans Ulrich brings Old and New Testament material to bear on the importance of discernment. The late John Webster has a very helpful analysis of the role of sorrow in the Christian life, largely based on interaction with Thomas Aquinas.Moving from the Christian individual to corporate life in the church, we have Shinji Kayama and Joan O'Donovan. Kayama, a pastor in Yokohama, Japan, writes on preaching as moral pedagogy, drawing lessons from the different (and sometimes questionable) ways in which Augustine dealt with the challenge of re-incorporating the Donatists in the Catholic Church, and how he developed the central concept of pax ordinata. There are many valuable insights in Joan O'Donovan's reminder of the Tudor reformers' theological intentions in framing the Anglican liturgies, such as this part of her conclusion: Only the eschatological renewal of human moral agency and action through the church's practice of proclamation, centred in her common worship, can overcome the tyranny of the law . …