Values Sub Ratione Boni: A Thomistic Defense of Values Work in Psychotherapy

Abstract

The concept of values and its place in psychotherapy are once again under attack. I examine some new and old critiques of values work in psychotherapy, and of values language more generally. I argue that charges of moral relativism are unfounded from a Thomistic perspective. This is because Thomists have reasons to conceive of values as genuine human goods. I develop this argument on the basis of two Thomistic principles: (1) the principle of desire, that human moral agents can desire and choose only under the aspect of good; and (2) the principle of finality, that the goods to which agents are ordered are determined by nature and therefore are nonarbitrary. Given these principles, values work cannot produce the kinds of deleterious results that values critics allege. I address concerns about moral wrongdoing and the problem of rank ordering, and conclude by offering two additional reasons Thomists have for finding values work not only benign, but salutary.