Human Language Faculty Research Articles

Basic operations: Minimal syntax-semantics

In this programmatic paper, we articulate a minimalist conception of linguistic composition, syntactic and semantic, with the aim of identifying fundamental operations invoked by the human faculty of language (HFL). On this view, all complex expressions are formed via the operation COMBINE(A, B). But this operation is not primitive: COMBINE(A, B) = LABEL[CONCATENATE(A, B)]. We take labeling to be a computationally simple but perhaps distinctively human operation that converts a mere concatenation of expressions, like A^B, into a more complex unit like [A A^B], with the subscript indicating a copy of the dominant constituent. We discuss several virtues of this spare conception of syntax. With regard to semantics, we take instances of COMBINE(A, B) to be instructions to build concepts. More specifically, we claim that concatenation is an instruction to conjoin monadic concepts, while labeling provides a vehicle for invoking thematic concepts, as indicated by the relevant labels.

Neural circuitry of the bilingual mental lexicon: Effect of age of second language acquisition

Numerous studies have proposed that changes of the human language faculty caused by neural maturation can explain the substantial differences in ultimate attainment of grammatical competences between first language (L1) acquirers and second language (L2) learners. However, little evidence on the effect of neural maturation on the attainment of lexical knowledge in L2 is available. The present functional magnetic resonance study addresses this question via a cross-linguistic neural adaptation paradigm. Age of acquisition (AoA) of L2 was systematically manipulated. Concrete nouns were repeated across language (e.g., French–German, valise suitcase–Koffer suitcase). Whereas early bilinguals (AoA of L2 < 3 years) showed larger repetition enhancement (RE) effects in the left superior temporal gyrus, the bilateral superior frontal gyrus and the right posterior insula, late bilinguals (AoA of L2 > 10 years) showed larger RE effects in the middle portion of the left insula and in the right middle frontal gyrus (MFG). We suggest that, as for grammatical knowledge, the attainment of lexical knowledge in L2 is affected by neural maturation. The present findings lend support to neurocognitive models of bilingual word recognition postulating that, for both early and late bilinguals, the two languages are interconnected at the conceptual level.

Externalization and Emergence: On the Status of Parameters in the Minimalist Program

1. The Tension Raised by Parameters in a Minimalist Setting It is widely assumed that the Minimalist Program imposes a boundary condition on theories of language, namely, that the human language faculty (FL) has a Principles‐and‐Parameters (P&P)-like architecture (Chomsky 1981, 1993). Hornstein et al. (2005: 5), for example, maintain that this perspective represents the “consensus view of the overall structure of the language faculty”. Accompanying this core tenet is the Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT), which holds that FL is perfectly/optimally designed to meet the interactive needs of the languageexternal (but organism-internal) cognitive sub-systems with which it interfaces, namely, the conceptual‐intentional (C‐I) and sensorimotor (SM) systems. Taken together, these two hypotheses raise a fundamental tension that is rarely considered. One goal of this brief is to bring this issue to light in hopes of stimulating sustained productive discussion and thus begin chipping away at admittedly broad and challenging related inquiries. The basic question that the SMT raises in a P&P-model of grammar is this: To what extent would a parameter-free FL represent a departure from optimal design? One might put it another way. Why did FL evolve with flexible (i.e. parameterizable) principles over a more minimal/streamlined format consisting solely of fixed principles? We might reason that the net effect of a rigid FL would be to minimize surface language variation. From the perspective of communicative economy, this would appear to be a non-trivial boon. Thus, in light of the SMT, the P&P hypothesis raises challenging questions about the evolution of FL and the origin of parameters (i.e. the roots of language variation). Given the success of the model in resolving tensions of descriptive and explanatory adequacy, it is unlikely that the P&P lens will be abandoned anytime soon. Pursuing the SMT alongside the parameterized FL hypothesis thus forces one to confront a formidable question. In what way can the flexibility of parameterization be squared with the optimal design of FL? Before addressing this issue, it is important to acknowledge that although

Antisymmetry and the lexicon

Introduction. In this paper, I will try to show that what we think of as the noun-verb distinction can be understood as a consequence of antisymmetry, in the sense of Kayne (1994). (I will also make some remarks (in the first two sections) concerning counterparts of the human language faculty in other species.1) Properties of nouns will, from this perspective, lead me to suggest that sentential complements (and derived nominals) involve relative clause structures.

Minimalist Meaning, Internalist Interpretation

This article offers a conception of semantics, and of what makes the human language faculty distinctive, based on five theses: Meanings are instructions to build concepts; concatenation calls for conjunction of monadic concepts; grammatical relations invoke certain thematic relations and a kind of existential closure; lexicalization is a partly creative process of abstraction; and meanings are internalistic properties of expressions. Each of these claims is defended elsewhere. The aim here is to connect them explicitly, and compare the result with alternatives, in the hope of providing a plausible conception of natural language meaning that coheres with Chomsky’s minimalist program.

The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory

The object of inquiry in linguistics is the human ability to acquire and use a natural language, and the goal of linguistic theory is an explicit characterization of that ability. Looking at the communicative abilities of other species, it becomes clear that our linguistic ability is specific to our species, undoubtedly a product of our biology. But how do we go about determining the specifics of this Language faculty? There are two primary ways in which we infer the nature of Language from the properties of individual languages: arguments from the POVERTY OF THE STIMULUS , and the search for universals that characterize every natural language. Arguments of the first sort are not easy to construct (though not as difficult as sometimes suggested), and apply only to a tiny part of Language as a whole. Arguments from universals or typological generalizations are also quite problematic. In phonology, morphology, and syntax, factors of historical development, functional underpinnings, and limitations of the learning situation, among others, conspire to compromise the explanatory value of arguments from observed crosslinguistic regularities. Confounding the situation is the likelihood that properties found across languages as a consequence of such external forces have been incorporated into the Language faculty evolutionarily through the BALDWIN EFFECT . The conflict between the biologically based specificity of the human Language faculty and the difficulty of establishing most of its properties in a secure way cannot, however, be avoided by ignoring or denying the reality of either of its poles.*

Reply to Bowles (2008)

In response to Bowles (2008), we wish above all to reiterate one of the main points of our original discussion (henceforth LDK 2008), which is the following: If there is to be a field of biolinguistics that makes a useful contribution to our understanding of the human language faculty, then it is important to adopt Boeckx & Grohmann’s (2007) ‘strong’ sense of biolinguistics. We are naturally pleased that our work has elicited detailed comment from an adherent of ‘weak biolinguistics’, but we feel that, in his eagerness to equate biolinguistics with Minimalist research in formal linguistics and to evaluate our work according to the standards of that research paradigm, Bowles has missed our point about the need for genuinely interdisciplinary investigation. We are well aware of the logical problems associated with conclusions based on correlations. However, as we tried to make clear in LDK, the consequence we draw is that we need to look for evidence in other sources of data, not (as Bowles does) merely think harder about the logic of our claims. When Bowles says (p. 247) that biolinguistic research “still faces classic problems related to the issues of correlation and causality, evidence, counterexample, and refutation”, he ignores our general suggestion (LDK 2008: 122) that we need to bring together “linguists and others in equal measure, making use of their respective methodologies with a full understanding of their assumptions, and trying to resolve any incompatibilities using shared standards of falsifiability and argumentation”. When he rightly points out (p. 248) that there is “no clear way in which to distinguish the natural development of tonogenesis in languages with speakers who do not have the muted [sic] allele pairs from the development of tonogenesis in languages with speakers who do have the muted allele pairs”, he ignores the fact that nothing in our work suggests that there should be. When he wonders (p. 249, fn. 3, and again p. 250, questions (1c) and (1e)) “what would constitute a genuine counter-example” to our claim, he is thinking in terms of the kinds of theoretical enquiry in which counter-examples play an important role in shaping conclusions; he ignores Dediu & Ladd’s (2007: 10947) explicit suggestion that their correlational finding “warrants future experimental work, which will help test and refine the hypothesis of a causal effect”. A more concrete problem with Bowles’s discussion is that, despite his disclaimers, many of his points seem to be based on the assumption that there are specific genes that code for specific linguistic features in the individual. Among

Cultural evolution: implications for understanding the human language faculty and its evolution.

Human language is unique among the communication systems of the natural world: it is socially learned and, as a consequence of its recursively compositional structure, offers open-ended communicative potential. The structure of this communication system can be explained as a consequence of the evolution of the human biological capacity for language or the cultural evolution of language itself. We argue, supported by a formal model, that an explanatory account that involves some role for cultural evolution has profound implications for our understanding of the biological evolution of the language faculty: under a number of reasonable scenarios, cultural evolution can shield the language faculty from selection, such that strongly constraining language-specific learning biases are unlikely to evolve. We therefore argue that language is best seen as a consequence of cultural evolution in populations with a weak and/or domain-general language faculty.

Numbers, language and the human mind (review)

Reviewed by: Numbers, language and the human mind Cliff Goddard Numbers, language and the human mind. By Heike Wiese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xi, 346. ISBN 0521831822. $106 (Hb). This book is sure to become a classic in its field. As declared on the dust jacket by luminaries such as Terrence Deacon (evolutionary anthropology), Karen Wynn (developmental psychology), and Ray Jackendoff (linguistics), it provides an impressive synthesis of findings and leading ideas across multiple fields, including the philosophy of mathematics, as well as those just mentioned. That it does all this in clear and accessible language will make the book an invaluable reference work for virtually anyone interested in 'exploring the distinctive way in which numerical cognition is intertwined with the human language faculty' (8). Just as importantly, Wiese advances her own account of how key insights can be stitched together into a coherent story that has explanatory force at different levels—cognitive, linguistic, developmental, and evolutionary. The [End Page 672] book has an introduction, eight substantive chapters, and five appendices containing technical information on mathematical modeling of number systems. What are numbers really? This question is the subject of the two opening chapters: 'Numbers and objects' (9–46) and 'What does it mean to be a number?' (47–74). These run through some of the leading ideas from the philosophy of mathematics about the nature of number and what is involved in making a number assignment (saying, for example, 'there are three pens on my desk'). W reviews different views on the nature of numbers by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Richard Dedekind, all of which rely on set-theoretical concepts in one way or another. The key ideas are that cardinality ('how many') is a property of a set of items, and that among the essential properties of cardinal numbers are that they be distinct (well distinguished) from one another and form a strict progression (i.e. they are in a successor relationship). In addition to indicating cardinality (three runners), W distinguishes two other kinds of number assignment: ordinal (the third runner) and nominal/labeling (runner #3). Ch. 1 also informally introduces the representational theory of measurement (RTM), which W says can provide a unified account of all forms of number assignment. The key element is the notion of dependent linking, that is, the systematic mapping from an 'empirical relational structure' of some kind onto the numerical-reference relationship structure. The psychological plausibility of this theory is perhaps open to question, but W keeps it in the background for most of the book. This is a good thing in the sense that explicit reference to the RTM would interfere with an otherwise accessible exposition, but it also means that certain of W's theoretical or ontological assumptions are kept out of view. Simply put, W seems to accept a realistic view of numbers, with the implication that number words are conceptual tools for working with preexisting realities. Alternative intuitionalist, constructivist, or cognitivist views of numerical cognition (cf. Shapiro 2000, Lakoff & Núñez 2000) do not feature in this book. The book really takes off with Ch. 3, 'Can words be numbers?' (75–100), the longest chapter. The first part of the argument is that numbers begin ontogenetically as counting words, and that counting words do not REFER to numbers, but are better viewed as numerical tools that can be used as numbers. The English language of course has an infinite progression of counting words generated by morphosyntactic rules, but as Wpoints out, in some cultures, such as the Oksapmin of Papua New Guinea, the same function is served by a system involving sequential touching of body parts. The crucial thing is to have a fixed sequence of clearly differentiated items—be they words, fingers or other body parts, or some other kind of 'props'—that can be paired oneto one with the items being enumerated. Counting words are initially acquired by young children as a series of meaningless words in an unbreakable string or chain, like the elements in a nursery rhyme or the letters of the alphabet. It is only afterwards that children learn to pair the counting words with objects 'in a stylised repetitive...

Chomsky'sMinimalist Program: A Brief Linguistic Primer

AbstractChildren around the world, no matter what their native language, follow a similar course in language acquisition from the emergence of first words to the mastery of syntax. The uniformity and rapidity of first language acquisition is possible because human infants are born with a biologically endowed innate language faculty within the brain that drives the course of language development. Although this premise was doubted 50 years ago, today biologists and linguists alike accept it. Our human language faculty orchestrates and shapes the acquisition of language. Neurotypically developing children need only the surrounding language input to acquire language. In contrast, children with receptive language delays, including many of those who are or will become augmentative and alternative communication (AAC) users, need more than exposure to language if they are to develop adult competence in their native language.

Psicologia evolucionista e a seleção sexual: o caso da linguagem

Na tentativa de entender o caráter adaptativo e a história evolucionária dos processos cognitivos subjacentes ao comportamento lingüístico, uma série de mecanismos e conceitos advindos da teoria evolucionária tem tido, recentemente, sua potencial relevância aferida em uma série de estudos, entre eles, o chamado "Efeito Baldwin" e a teoria da seleção inclusiva (Kin Selection Theory). No presente trabalho, é oferecida, além de uma breve revisão do conceito de seleção sexual e do seu uso e status na Psicologia Evolucionista, uma crítica de uma proposta particular acerca do papel que o processo de seleção sexual possa ter tido no desenvolvimento da capacidade de linguagem na linhagem do Homo sapiens sapiens. Além de pontos específicos à hipótese sujeita à análise, são levantados também problemas e questões de natureza mais ampla e relevante para pesquisas posteriores.

The BIOLINGUISTICS Manifesto

Exactly fifty years ago Noam Chomsky published Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957), a slim volume that conveyed some essential results of his then unpublished Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (Chomsky 1955/1975). The results were presented in such a way as to emphasize key aspects of the combinatorial properties of grammar (a reflex of the fact that the volume grew out of class notes for an audience of engineers), but, as is well-known, Syntactic Structures had an important subliminal message that was made explicit in Chomsky’s famous review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959), and even more so in chapter 1 of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky 1965). The message, decidedly psychological in character, defines the central goal of the generative enterprise as that of identifying the properties of the human language faculty. This central goal can be broken down into a series of more precise questions (see Chomsky 1986,

Monitoring the Learner—Who, Why and What For?

This paper is the result of a need to develop a conceptual framework for monitoring the learner in a computer-mediated language learning environment. In agreement with Chapelle, who suggests that technological capacities must be questioned in the terms of SLA theory, the position held here is that theory is needed even in the case of practical research. The authors' theoretical assumptions are clearly explicited. They cover the nature of the human faculty of language, recent theories on the dual nature of language production, key processes in L2 acquisition and the role of nativisation. Expliciting theory leads to defining concepts such as mediation, help, learning aids, monitoring, follow-up, feedback, scaffolding and tutoring which are constantly being referred to in the study. This set of definitions points to the fact that monitoring should not be perceived as an end in itself, but should rather be understood as a means to achieve an end. Reflecting on technological mediation and the learning situation leads to a view of the learning cycle as a coherent interplay of macro- and micro-tasks. Distance plays a key role in learning and taking it into account will help define what is to be tracked/monitored. The paper then presents two concrete examples that illustrate the passage from theory to practice. Many questions are raised which open up many new areas for research.

Universal moral grammar: a critical appraisal

A new framework for the study of the human moral faculty is currently receiving much attention: the so-called 'universal moral grammar' framework. It is based on an intriguing analogy, first pointed out by Rawls, between the study of the human moral sense and Chomsky's research program into the human language faculty. To assess UMG, we ask: is moral competence modular? Does it have an underlying hierarchical grammatical structure? Does moral diversity rest on culture-dependant parameters? We review the evidence and argue that formal grammatical concepts are of limited value for the study of moral judgments, moral development and moral diversity.

A simple computational model for classifying small string sets

Recent research hypothesizes that the capacity for syntactic recursions forms the computational core of a uniquely human language faculty. Contrary to this hypothesis, Gentner et al. claimed that the capacity to classify sequences from recursive, center-embedded grammar is not uniquely human. We show in this paper that the patterns Gentner used are classified by a Bayesian classifier, a simple and fundamental classifier in machine learning, and consequently we claim that their argument is flawed.

Free-ranging rhesus monkeys spontaneously individuate and enumerate small numbers of non-solid portions

Fundamental questions in cognitive science concern the origins and nature of the units that compose visual experience. Here, we investigate the capacity to individuate and store information about non-solid portions, asking in particular whether free-ranging rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) quantify portions of a non-solid substance presented in discrete pouring actions. When presented with portions of carrot pieces poured from a cup into opaque boxes, rhesus picked the box with the greatest number of portions for comparisons of 1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 3, and 3 vs. 4, but not for comparisons of 4 vs. 5 and 3 vs. 6. Additional experiments indicate that rhesus based their decisions on both the number of portions and the total amount of food. These results show that the capacity to individuate non-solid portions is not unique to humans, and does not depend on structures of natural language. Further, the fact that rhesus’ ability to represent non-solid portions is constrained by the same 4-item limit typically ascribed to the system of parallel individuation that operates over solid objects suggests that the visual system recruits common working memory processes for retaining information about solid objects and non-solid portions. We discuss our results with respect to theories of visual processing, as well as to the role that the human language faculty may have played in both the evolution and development of quantification.

Game Dynamics with Learning and Evolution of Universal Grammar

We investigate a model of language evolution, based on population game dynamics with learning. First, we examine the case of two genetic variants of universal grammar (UG), the heart of the human language faculty, assuming each admits two possible grammars. The dynamics are driven by a communication game. We prove using dynamical systems techniques that if the payoff matrix obeys certain constraints, then the two UGs are stable against invasion by each other, that is, they are evolutionarily stable. Then, we prove a similar theorem for an arbitrary number of disjoint UGs. In both theorems, the constraints are independent of the learning process. Intuitively, if a mutation in UG results in grammars that are incompatible with the established languages, then the mutation will die out because mutants will be unable to communicate and therefore unable to realize any potential benefit of the mutation. An example for which these theorems do not apply shows that compatible mutations may or may not be able to invade, depending on the population's history and the learning process. These results suggest that the genetic history of language is constrained by the need for compatibility and that mutations in the language faculty may have died out or taken over due more to historical accident than to any straightforward notion of relative fitness.

Biolinguistic Explorations: Design, Development, Evolution

Biolinguistic inquiry investigates the human language faculty as an internal biological property. This article traces the development of biolinguistics from its early philosophical origins through its reformulation during the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and outlines my views on where the biolinguistic enterprise stands today. The growth of language in the individual, it is suggested, depends on (i) genetic factors, (ii) experience, and (iii) principles that are not specific to the faculty of language. The best current explanation of how language is recursively generated is through Merge, an operation that takes objects already constructed, and reconstructs a new object from them, generating a ‘language of thought’, perhaps in a manner close to optimal (relying on principles of category (iii)), with externalization (hence communication) a secondary process. The concluding section of the article offers several objectives for future research in the field.

Reconsidering recursion in syntactic theory

This paper considers the role of recursion in syntactic theory, and three particular aspects of this broad topic are addressed. The use of recursive devices in formal grammars in the 1950s is summarised, and the work of Bar-Hillel and Chomsky from this period is analysed in some detail. Having established this historical context, the role of recursive definitions within the Minimalist Program is discussed at length, and the main focus falls upon comparatively recent claims concerning the centrality of recursion in the context of biolinguistics. Specifically, the hypothesis that recursion constitutes a species-specific property of the human language faculty that is particularly associated with natural language is (re)assessed, and it is suggested that, in the context of syntactic theory, the problematic term ‘recursion’ should be abandoned and replaced by less ambiguous terminology such as ‘inductive definition’.

What We Cannot Learn From Neuroanatomy About Language Learning and Language Processing. Commentary on Uylings

Cognitive neuroscience aims at specifications of human cognition as instantiated in the human brain. This requires that information from multiple levels be taken into consideration and that information at one level be used to guide the investigations at another level. With regard to the human language faculty, linguistics specifies structural descriptions of the relevant knowledge types such as phonological, syntactic, and semantic structures. Psycholinguistics specifies the processing architectures of different language functions such as speaking, reading, and listening. These processing architectures explain how, in real time, the different sources of linguistic knowledge in long-term memory are recruited and exploited in mapping sound or orthography onto meaning (in listening and reading) or vice versa (in speaking and writing). Finally, (cognitive) neuroscience specifies how the processing architectures are instantiated in the human brain. In this context, an account of the neural architecture of language should specify which brain areas are recruited for different language functions, as well as how these areas communicate while these