Human Intelligence Sources Research Articles

Book Review: Covert human intelligence; a view from the police

More than 20 years ago Gary Marx broke ground with his foray into the sociology of undercover policing. His view was, and still is, that these policing tactics are essentially a necessary evil, but that they are a double-edged sword and that it is conceivable that such methods can, in principle, be regulated and controlled in order that the worst excesses and least desirable (unintended) outcomes are avoided. In his review of the original book, the European criminologist Cyrille Fijnaut basically agreed, but he also signaled his awareness of the corrupting potentiality of police undercover practices and of the need to bring them under the cover of law and legality. Covert policing tactics raise troubling questions that are with us still. Roger Billingsley’s slim edited collection is a recent addition to this literature and, although under theorized and largely descriptive, it will be a useful resource to academic criminologists and other scholars who are interested to explore and understand the latest developments. Whilst mainly focused on the contemporary situation in the United Kingdom, the contributions in the book (mostly penned by former or currently serving police officers or lawyers) offer many useful insights into one crucial tactic in the broad array of covert policing practices: the use of clandestine informers. The book is divided into three sections. The first deals with legal issues: the perspective of defense lawyers, the administrative regulation of covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), the use of promises of immunity in informant handling, Crime Law Soc Change (2010) 53:205–206 DOI 10.1007/s10611-009-9218-9

Duty of Care for Informers

This article considers the use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources, or informers, by law enforcement agencies and examines whether sufficient ‘duty of care’ is being afforded them. It reflects on the implications of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which provide stringent controls and inspection processes for the management and use of informers by public authorities. The article examines those criminal cases of relevance, especially relating to the civil law of tort, to determine whether law enforcement agencies could have claims made against them for a lack of duty of care, or negligence. The use of a transparent risk management process is recommended, and the article provides examples of some areas of improvement considered necessary, including the use of an independent and objective inspections body. The policeman does not care about the informant's reputation among his fellows, except as it effects the work of the policeman. (J. H. Skolnick, 1966, Justice Without Trial. New York: Wiley, 132.)

The Soviet 'spy gaps'

The capabilities of the Soviet Union to monitor US compliance with arms agreements is reviewed. Soviet capabilities include the use of satellites, surface ships, and submarines off US shores, as well as monitoring stations on land. These technical capabilities are each briefly described and discussed. It is argued that, in contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union can also take advantage of the openness of US society, through an array of human intelligence sources and methods, to monitor arms control compliance. Soviet agents also gain access to considerable information through contacts and operative within the US government and the extensive contractor community that supports the defense establishment. It is concluded that Soviet technical collection capabilities for monitoring arm control compliance lag behind those of the United States, but that this technical lag does not appear to have deterred the Soviets from entering into many arms control agreements with the United States over the past 25 years.