DURING the past ten years, there has developed the widely held belief that the future defense of our country and its institutions must be based principally upon technological advances in the field of push-button warfare. This belief has been fostered by frequent public accounts of the omniscient and omnipotent properties of guided missiles, glowing with optimism but shrouding the details in mystery and mumbo jumbo. One sees the guided missile in its offensive role as the relentless and ineluctable dealer of death and destruction; and in its defensive role as the sure savior from all who will harm us, the universal protector that encloses us in safety as with a magical cloak. (The fact that these two capabilities are mutually contradictory is frequently overlooked.) The appeal to blind faith of this sort is dangerous, and in no way justified. From one point of view, one may regard guided missiles as an advanced form of artillery. However, when thinking in terms of air power, a more natural viewpoint (and the one adopted here) is to regard guided missiles as delivery vehicles whose primary distinguishing characteristic is the absence of a human crew. One is reminded, perhaps, of Tenniel's famous Punch cartoon on the resignation of Bismarck, Dropping the Pilot. It is certainly pertinent to inquire whether dropping the pilot is a good thing; or, more generally, under what circumstances it may be a good thing. Naturally, it is not intended here to argue that the only feature which sets missiles apart from piloted aircraft is the absence of the pilot. Rather, it is intended to begin with this definitive feature, and attempt to determine in a rather general sort of way what are its implications in the design and operation of weapons systems, and how these considerations fit in with the concept of air warfare in the future. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to clear away some of the semantic debris which has collected around the subject of guided missiles.