Human Cognitive Capacities Research Articles

What is a Cognitive Process Model? A Disambiguation

Our article proposes a general framework for cognitive process models. A large number of models, including accumulator, exemplar, diffusion, heuristic, and network models, are called process models, and working definitions of the term are numerous. Yet, scientific concepts of process models differ. Researchers lack consensus about which models rightfully merit the label. The literature lacks consensus about which aspects related to form (simple form, probabilistic form), content (reaction time, discrete time), or data (process data, behavioral data) matter for process models. The theoretical framework proposed in this paper defines process models as characterized by four dimensions: (a) they have a tri-modal conceptual scope which individuates the information entering the cognitive system, the phenomena leading to the behavior of interest, and the behavior to be modeled; (b) they allow precise, testable predictions to be derived for both, the behavior and the process; (c) the process predictions can be derived separately from the behavioral predictions, and specifically without reverse inference from the behavioral data, and (d) the information transformation in the model is plausible in the sense of being compatible with the contemporary body of knowledge about human cognitive capacities. The framework can be applied to cognitive models before or after they are empirically tested. It provides dimensions on which process models can be compared. It constitutes a basis for a taxonomy of cognitive models. It offers a checklist to help scholars build new cognitive process models. And it can advance currently unresolved debates about model types.

A conceptual model for translating omic data into clinical action

Genomic, proteomic, epigenomic, and other “omic” data have the potential to enable precision medicine, also commonly referred to as personalized medicine. The volume and complexity of omic data are rapidly overwhelming human cognitive capacity, requiring innovative approaches to translate such data into patient care. Here, we outline a conceptual model for the application of omic data in the clinical context, called “the omic funnel.” This model parallels the classic “Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom pyramid” and adds context for how to move between each successive layer. Its goal is to allow informaticians, researchers, and clinicians to approach the problem of translating omic data from bench to bedside, by using discrete steps with clearly defined needs. Such an approach can facilitate the development of modular and interoperable software that can bring precision medicine into widespread practice.

THE ‘EXTENDEDNESS’ OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

AbstractIn recent years, the idea has been gaining ground that our traditional conceptions of knowledge and cognition are unduly limiting, in that they privilege what goes on inside the ‘skin and skull’ (Clark 1997: 82) of an individual reasoner. Instead, it has been argued, knowledge and cognition need to be understood as embodied (involving both mind and body), situated (being dependent on the complex interplay between the individual and its environment), and extended (that is, continuous with, rather than separate from, the world ‘outside’). Whether these various interrelations and dependencies are ‘merely’ causal, or are in a more fundamental sense constitutive of knowledge and cognition, is as much a matter of controversy as the degree to which they pose a challenge to ‘traditional’ conceptions of cognition, knowledge and the mind. In this paper we argue that when the idea of ‘extendedness’ is applied to a core concept in epistemology and the philosophy of science—namely, scientific evidence—things appear to be on a much surer footing. The evidential status of data gathered through extended processes—including its utility as justification or warrant—do not seem to be weakened by virtue of being extended, but instead are often strengthened because of it. Indeed, it is often precisely by virtue of this extendedness that scientific evidence grounds knowledge claims, which individuals may subsequently ascribe to themselves. The functional equivalence between machine‐based gathering, filtering, and processing of data and human interpretation and assessment is the crucial factor in deciding whether evidence has been gathered, rather than the distinction between intra‐ and extracranial processes or individual and social processes (or combinations thereof). To prioritize biological processes here, and to assert the superiority of human cognitive capacities seems both arbitrary and unwarranted with respect to gathering evidence, and ultimately would lead to an unattractive skepticism about many of the methods used in science to gather evidence. In other words, conceiving of scientific evidence as ‘impersonal’ (or at least not necessarily personal) not only better captures the character of evidence‐gathering in practice, but also makes sense of a large amount of evidence‐gathering that ‘personal’ accounts fail to either acknowledge or accurately describe. Whilst we suggest it is likely that all internally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are merely contingently internal processes, a significant number of externally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are necessarily externally‐distributed. Some evidence can only be gathered by extended epistemic agents.

Re-conceptualizing Neurosis as a Degree of Egocentricity: Ethical Issues in Psychological Theory.

Psychology's historical rejection of ethics has led to an oversimplification of the origins and treatments of mental disorders. In this article, we present an analysis of how classical neurosis can be reformulated from an ethical and psychological interaction. We focus on the crucial role that egocentricity plays and argue that this term can help to clarify how ego defensive ethical decisions can undermine psychological capacities and contribute to a progressive depersonalization that can result in typical clinical disorders. In Christian anthropology, the virtues, especially humility and love have a crucial role in the positive growth of human affective and cognitive capacities. In addition, the person in his/her nature is endowed with the capacity to transcend the self and to escape egocentricity through self-giving love of God and of others. This capacity of self-giving is diametrically opposed to egocentricity and opens a new way for possible psychological recovery.

Empathy and compassion

As humans we are a highly social species: in order to coordinate our joint actions and assure successful communication, we use language skills to explicitly convey information to each other, and social abilities such as empathy or perspective taking to infer another person's emotions and mental state. The human cognitive capacity to draw inferences about other peoples' beliefs, intentions and thoughts has been termed mentalizing, theory of mind or cognitive perspective taking. This capacity makes it possible, for instance, to understand that people may have views that differ from our own. Conversely, the capacity to share the feelings of others is called empathy. Empathy makes it possible to resonate with others' positive and negative feelings alike--we can thus feel happy when we vicariously share the joy of others and we can share the experience of suffering when we empathize with someone in pain. Importantly, in empathy one feels with someone, but one does not confuse oneself with the other; that is, one still knows that the emotion one resonates with is the emotion of another. If this self-other distinction is not present, we speak of emotion contagion, a precursor of empathy that is already present in babies.

Forty Years after Lee's Requiem: Are We beyond the Seven Sins?

This paper ended an initial period of wide enthusiasm in attempting to realise the potential of computer innovations to revolutionise urban planning (Harris, 1960). It was an era when both the planning and the computer domains were strongly influenced by strong positivist ideas about the nature of scientific progress. Planning was mainly a comprehensive�rational, linear but also cyclical process in which experts examined all possible (or politically defined) problems and relevant solutions, which in turn would lead to optimal decisions (Faludi, 1973). Even then this was extensively questioned in academic research that emphasised the limits of human cognitive capacity: that is, information processing (Simon, 1969).

IMAGO DEI AND HUMAN RATIONALITY

AbstractThere is a pervasive trend in Western theology to identify imago Dei with human intellectual and cognitive capacities. However, several contemporary theologians have criticized this view because, according to the critics, it leads to a truncated view of humanity. In this article, I shall concentrate on the question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Lutheran Robert Jenson, and second, in some branches of recent cognitive psychology. I will argue that there is a significant overlap between contemporary scientific interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. Consequently, it is possible to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of structuralism point out.

Point/Counterpoint. Future radiotherapy practice will be based on evidence from retrospective interrogation of linked clinical data sources rather than prospective randomized controlled clinical trials.

Andre L. A. J. Dekker, Sarah L. Gulliford, Martin A. Ebert, and Colin G. Orton Citation: Medical Physics 41, 030601 (2014); doi: 10.1118/1.4832139 View online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1118/1.4832139 View Table of Contents: http://scitation.aip.org/content/aapm/journal/medphys/41/3?ver=pdfcov Published by the American Association of Physicists in Medicine Articles you may be interested in Response to “Comment on ‘Future radiotherapy practice will be based on evidence from retrospectiveinterrogation of linked clinical data sources rather than prospective randomized controlled clinical trials’” [Med.Phys.41(3), 030601 (3pp.) (2014)] Med. Phys. 41, 057103 (2014); 10.1118/1.4871786 Response to “Comment on ‘Future radiotherapy practice will be based on evidence from retrospectiveinterrogation of linked clinical data sources rather than prospective randomized controlled clinical trials’” [Med.Phys.41(3) 030601 (3pp.) (2014)] Med. Phys. 41, 057102 (2014); 10.1118/1.4871785 Comment on “Future radiotherapy practice will be based on evidence from retrospective interrogation of linkedclinical data sources rather than prospective randomized controlled clinical trials” [Med. Phys.41(3) 030601 (3pp.)(2014)] Med. Phys. 41, 057101 (2014); 10.1118/1.4871784 PET-based GTV definition is the future of radiotherapy treatment planning Med. Phys. 39, 5791 (2012); 10.1118/1.3694666 Determination of prospective displacement-based gate threshold for respiratory-gated radiation delivery fromretrospective phase-based gate threshold selected at 4D CT simulation Med. Phys. 34, 4247 (2007); 10.1118/1.2794169

Cognitive Function and Beliefs in Luck in the Consumer Context

Dual-process attribution theories suggest that attributional reasoning involves automatic judgments that are adjusted by a controlled correction process. However, this corrective process is vulnerable to failure because human cognitive capacity is of a limited pool of resources. Three experiments test whether there is a corrective process for people who hold beliefs in luck, and if so, whether cognitive constraints inhibit this process. Results suggest inhibited executive function impedes the usual correction of beliefs in luck, which facilitates future expectations of success. As such, factors within our environment that tax cognitive resources may enable people to act on beliefs in luck. This finding holds important theoretical and practical implications for gambling because these factors could range from the mindset created by financial distress or the ambient casino environment.

Real-time emergency response: improved management of real-time information during crisis situations

The decision-making process during crisis and emergency scenarios intertwines human intelligence with infocommunications. In such scenarios, the tasks of data acquisition, manipulation, and analysis involve a combination of cognitive processes and information and communications technologies, all of which are vital to effective situational awareness and response capability. To support such capabilities, we describe our real time emergency response (rtER) system, implemented with the intention of helping to manage the potential torrents of data that are available during a crisis, and that could easily overwhelm human cognitive capacity in the absence of technological mediation. Specifically, rtER seeks to address the research challenges surrounding the real-time collection of relevant data, especially live video, making this information rapidly available to a team of humans, and giving them the tools to manipulate, tag, and filter the most critical information of relevance to the situation.

Processing of hierarchical syntactic structure in music

Hierarchical structure with nested nonlocal dependencies is a key feature of human language and can be identified theoretically in most pieces of tonal music. However, previous studies have argued against the perception of such structures in music. Here, we show processing of nonlocal dependencies in music. We presented chorales by J. S. Bach and modified versions in which the hierarchical structure was rendered irregular whereas the local structure was kept intact. Brain electric responses differed between regular and irregular hierarchical structures, in both musicians and nonmusicians. This finding indicates that, when listening to music, humans apply cognitive processes that are capable of dealing with long-distance dependencies resulting from hierarchically organized syntactic structures. Our results reveal that a brain mechanism fundamental for syntactic processing is engaged during the perception of music, indicating that processing of hierarchical structure with nested nonlocal dependencies is not just a key component of human language, but a multidomain capacity of human cognition.

How to think about mental content

Most theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as �representation� and �information-using� are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are �mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information� (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so have causal powers; (2) they are intentional, in other words, they have meaning or representational content. This presumes a distinction between a representational vehicle�a physical state or structure that has causal powers and is responsible for producing behavior�and its content. Consider the following characterization of a device that computes the addition function.

The origins of human cooperation

Biological explanations of cooperation are based on kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, and mutualism, all of which apply to human and nonhuman species alike. But human cooperation is based in part on capacities that are unique to, or at least much more highly developed in, Homo sapiens .W e seek an explanation of cooperation that works for humans, but does not work for other species, or works substantially less well. Central to our explanation will be human cognitive, linguistic and physical capacities that allow the formulation of general norms of social conduct, the emergence of social institutions regulating this conduct, the psychological capacity to internalize norms, and the basing of group membership on such non-kin characteristics as ethnicity and linguistic behavior, which facilitates highly costly conflicts among groups. We show that these could have co-evolved with other human traits in a plausible representation of the relevant environments. The forms of cooperation we seek to explain are confirmed by natural observation, historical accounts, and behavioral experiments. Our account is based on a plausible evolutionary dynamic involving some combination of genetic and cultural elements, the consistency of which can be demonstrated through formal modeling. Moreover, the workings of the models we develop account for human cooperation under parameter values consistent with what can be reasonably inferred about the environments in which humans have lived.

Clinical Analysis and Interpretation of Cancer Genome Data

The scale of tumor genomic profiling is rapidly outpacing human cognitive capacity to make clinical decisions without the aid of tools. New frameworks are needed to help researchers and clinicians process the information emerging from the explosive growth in both the number of tumor genetic variants routinely tested and the respective knowledge to interpret their clinical significance. We review the current state, limitations, and future trends in methods to support the clinical analysis and interpretation of cancer genomes. This includes the processes of genome-scale variant identification, including tools for sequence alignment, tumor-germline comparison, and molecular annotation of variants. The process of clinical interpretation of tumor variants includes classification of the effect of the variant, reporting the results to clinicians, and enabling the clinician to make a clinical decision based on the genomic information integrated with other clinical features. We describe existing knowledge bases, databases, algorithms, and tools for identification and visualization of tumor variants and their actionable subsets. With the decreasing cost of tumor gene mutation testing and the increasing number of actionable therapeutics, we expect the methods for analysis and interpretation of cancer genomes to continue to evolve to meet the needs of patient-centered clinical decision making. The science of computational cancer medicine is still in its infancy; however, there is a clear need to continue the development of knowledge bases, best practices, tools, and validation experiments for successful clinical implementation in oncology.

A shape grammar approach to computational creativity and procedural content generation in massively multiplayer online role playing games

With rapid growth in both production costs and player populations over the last decade, the computer games industry is facing new scalability challenges in game design and content generation. The application of computers to these tasks – called procedural content generation – has the potential to reduce the time, cost and labor required to produce games. A range of generative algorithms have so far been proposed for procedural content generation. However, automated game design requires not only the ability to generate content, but also the ability to judge and ensure the novelty, quality and cultural value of generated content. This includes factors such as the surprise-value of generated content as well as the usefulness of content in the context of a particular game design. Studies of human designers have identified that the ability to generate artefacts that are novel, surprising, useful and valuable are facets of the human cognitive capacity for creativity. This suggests that computational models of creativity may be an important consideration for developing tools that can aid in or automate design processes. However, such cognitive models have not yet been widely considered for use in procedural content generation for games. This paper presents a framework for procedural content generation systems that use computational models of creativity as a part of the generative process. We demonstrate an example of such a system for generating instances for massively multiplayer, online role-playing games. The system combines the generative shape grammar formalism with a computational model of interest based on the Wundt curve to select new designs that are similar-yet-different to existing human designs. The approach aims to capture the usefulness and value of an existing human design while introducing novel or surprising variations through the model of interest. The system incorporates a metric that permits generated designs to be evaluated in terms of both their similarity to human designs and their novelty in the context of existing designs.

Human-Specific Transcriptional Networks in the Brain

Understanding human-specific patterns of brain gene expression and regulation can provide key insights into human brain evolution and speciation. Here, we use next-generation sequencing, and Illumina and Affymetrix microarray platforms, to compare the transcriptome of human, chimpanzee, and macaque telencephalon. Our analysis reveals a predominance of genes differentially expressed within human frontal lobe and a striking increase in transcriptional complexity specific to the human lineage in the frontal lobe. In contrast, caudate nucleus gene expression is highly conserved. We also identify gene coexpression signatures related to either neuronal processes or neuropsychiatric diseases, including a human-specific module with CLOCK as its hub gene and another module enriched for neuronal morphological processes and genes coexpressed with FOXP2, a gene important for language evolution. These data demonstrate that transcriptional networks have undergone evolutionary remodeling even within a given brain region, providing a window through which to view the foundation of uniquely human cognitive capacities.

Categorial Compositionality III: F-(co)algebras and the Systematicity of Recursive Capacities in Human Cognition

Human cognitive capacity includes recursively definable concepts, which are prevalent in domains involving lists, numbers, and languages. Cognitive science currently lacks a satisfactory explanation for the systematic nature of such capacities (i.e., why the capacity for some recursive cognitive abilities–e.g., finding the smallest number in a list–implies the capacity for certain others–finding the largest number, given knowledge of number order). The category-theoretic constructs of initial F-algebra, catamorphism, and their duals, final coalgebra and anamorphism provide a formal, systematic treatment of recursion in computer science. Here, we use this formalism to explain the systematicity of recursive cognitive capacities without ad hoc assumptions (i.e., to the same explanatory standard used in our account of systematicity for non-recursive capacities). The presence of an initial algebra/final coalgebra explains systematicity because all recursive cognitive capacities, in the domain of interest, factor through (are composed of) the same component process. Moreover, this factorization is unique, hence no further (ad hoc) assumptions are required to establish the intrinsic connection between members of a group of systematically-related capacities. This formulation also provides a new perspective on the relationship between recursive cognitive capacities. In particular, the link between number and language does not depend on recursion, as such, but on the underlying functor on which the group of recursive capacities is based. Thus, many species (and infants) can employ recursive processes without having a full-blown capacity for number and language.

Hans Ulrich Vogel and Gunter Dux, eds., Concepts of Nature: A Chinese-European Cross-Cultural Perspective

Hans Ulrich Vogel and Gunter Dux, editors, Introduction and Overview by Mark Elvin, Concepts of Nature: A Chinese-European Cross-Cultural Perspective. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010, 566pp. US $241 hardcover (ISBN 978 90 04 18526 5) The ongoing debates over the great between Europe and--the rest of the world continue to generate scholarly light as well as considerable polemical heat. Some scholars appear to be alarmed by what they perceive to be the dilution or even the destruction of some allegedly pure European culture by multicultural barbarians who are well within the gates. Others seek to exorcise the allegedly pernicious effects of some homogenous European or Western culture on their allegedly pristine and hermetically sealed existence. Overwrought accusations of Orientalism, Occidentalism, Eurocentrism, and Nativism continue to be traded. Despite the proverbial exceptions that alert us to the rules, many proponents on each side of the divide have couched their arguments in a culturalist mode in which culture is assumed to be relatively unhinged from social structure. In stark contrast to the prevailing intellectual mood, the fifteen contributors to Concepts of Nature enter this debate with a calm demeanour that, in addition to enhancing our understanding of the important issue of patterns of culture and cognition, promises to considerably cool the temperatures raised by unrestrained polemics. Deploying conceptions of nature and science as the criterion, the contributors to this volume seek to analyze the varying degrees of convergence and divergence between cultures in imperial China and ancient Greece in particular and Europe until 1700 in general. The overall conceptual framework that broadly informs all the papers is sociologist Gunter Dux's Historical-Genetic Theory of Culture which deploys and develops Jean Piaget's argument that all cultures share a broadly similar pattern of development in the childhood of individuals up until a latency period during and after which, cultural variations or divergences emerge. The contributors to the volume also implicitly adopt the sociology of knowledge framework deployed by Joseph M. Bryant in his Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece by explicitly exploring the complex interconnections between patterns of intellectual culture, knowledge, and social structure. As the renowned China specialist Mark Elvin points out in his lucid and engaging Overview, despite the differing emphases, the general intellectual goal of all the contributors to this volume is to pursue the question of whether it is possible to identify some general underlying trends in the development of human cognitive capacities beneath the seemingly infinite global cultural variations. Not unexpectedly, the findings of this important yet complex quest are unlikely to satisfy those who prefer to live in ideologically sealed either Orientalist or Occidentalist tents. As Mark Elvin points out (p.2), those searching for an overall, definitive resolution to the questions will be disappointed mostly because the project itself is as yet not quite developed to satisfy the demand or even expectations of complete answers. However, this in itself does not mean that such questions should not be pursued with the help of existing research and empirical material with the aim of provoking further research as well as the identification of the strengths, possible problems, perils, and pitfalls of comparative historical sociology. According to Elvin, one of these pitfalls is the frequent comparison of the intellectual culture of China in the imperial age with modern rather than Europe in late antiquity or the medieval era. For example, predictive and interpretative astrology based on the assumption of a complex web of links between events in the heavens above and the earth below was widely accepted in late Western antiquity through the eleventh century. As Elvin points out, it disappeared or went underground only to be revived during the Renaissance. …

Economic Exchange as an Evolutionary Transmission Channel in Human Societies

This paper argues that the (epi)genetic, cultural, symbolic, and environmental transmission channels are insufficient to explain the structure of modern human societies. Economic exchange of knowledge embodied in goods and services constitutes an additional transmission channel that makes more efficient use of limited human cognitive capacity. Economic exchange results in a gradual shift in societies from task-based division of labor to cognitive specialization. This shifts scarce cognitive resources away from production and into learning. It accelerates learning and reinforces the drive towards specialization. Cognitive specialization may constitute another 'major transition' towards a higher level of aggregation in human societies, with properties that differ from symbolic transmission.

Oswald Spengler, Technology, and Human Nature

Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) is a neglected figure in the history of European philosophical thought. This article examines the philosophical anthropology developed in his later work, particularly his Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life (1931). My purpose is twofold: the first is to argue that Spengler's later thought is a response to criticisms of the “pessimism” of his earlier work, The Decline of the West (1919). Man and Technics overcomes this charge by providing a novel philosophical anthropology which identifies technology as the highest expression of human cognitive and creative capacities. The second is to suggest that in his later period Spengler presents an affirmatory account of modern technology as the final stage of human cultural evolution. I conclude that by providing a philosophical anthropology that reconciles technology with human nature, Man and Technics represents an important development of Spengler's theory of human culture.