The paper studies how a person's concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job. In the model, the person's productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance. There are no explicit output-contingent contracts, but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability, an implicit links today's performance to future wages. An incentive problem arises from the person's ability and desire to influence the learning process, and therefore the wage process, by taking unobserved actions that affect today's performance. The fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual's concern for human capital returns and the firm's concern for financial returns. The two need be only weakly related. It is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental, depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned. It is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange. Simple price-mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information. In that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system. Lately, considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system. The analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development.' Moral hazard problems arise when, for some reason or another, transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good. For instance, in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable, precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour. As a partial remedy to this problem, an imperfect, mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract. Frequently, output is taken as such a proxy. The drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input, which induce undesirable risk into the contract. One is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour. Gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small (e.g. managerial incentive schemes), but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole. While our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years, it is clear that much work remains. An important question that has received little attention until
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