Hu Jintao Research Articles

Can diplomatic activities promote foreign direct investment? Empirical evidence from China

PurposeThis study investigates the impact of Chinese senior leaders’ diplomatic visits on outward and inward foreign direct investment (OFDI and IFDI, respectively). Additionally, it aims to discern the differential impacts of diplomatic visits on FDI across different Chinese administrations.Design/methodology/approachWe utilize data about the diplomatic visits of Chinese senior leaders to 146 host countries. The dataset was divided into two leadership eras: the tenure of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao from 2003 to 2012 and the period from 2013 to 2021 under President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang. We employ generalized least squares, lagged effect, and two-stage least squares methods to estimate the econometric model. This analytical framework assesses the influence of high-level diplomatic visits on FDI flows, addressing potential time-serial and endogeneity concerns.FindingsThe findings reveal that senior leaders’ diplomatic visits significantly boost Chinese OFDI. The effect on IFDI in China is not statistically significant. The administrations of Hu and Xi played positive roles in promoting OFDI. However, only Hu’s administration showed a statistically significant positive relationship with IFDI. The result suggests a potential increase in IFDI between China and host countries within two to three years following diplomatic visits.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the understanding of how Chinese senior leaders’ diplomatic activities affect foreign direct investment. It provides a deeper understanding of Chinese senior leaders’ diplomatic efforts to compensate for investment across two administration periods. It offers insights into the potential influence of diplomatic efforts on FDI, enriching the understanding of diplomacy’s role in international business contexts.

Decoding Xi Jinping's Idiosyncratic Foreign Policy: Analyzing the Interplay of Centralized Decision-Making, Soft Power Dynamics, and Regional Security Implications

Comparative historical analysis will trace the foreign policy orientation of Xi Jinping: the orientation that, by the nature of things, must be different from that of his predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Xi's ideological motivations and strategic objectives will be analyzed qualitatively using a systematic review of scholarly articles and policy documents. It describes the shift from a narrative of peaceful rise to a more assertive foreign policy that aims to change the international order according to the vision of realizing national rejuvenation in China. The focus is on two critical components of Xi's policy: the soft power, on the one hand, and military modernization, on the other. Together, they reflect his dual playing of economic cooperation and territorial aspirations. This paper also explores how evolving domestic politics and the increasing competition between the United States and China shape the impact of China's soft power campaigns and its broader security strategies in the region. Findings indicate that under Xi, centralized decision-making and assertive diplomacy are redefining China's role in global governance and transforming international relations in the fast-changing multipolar world. These policies are compared with those of previous leaders to bring forth valuable insights into the dynamic change experienced by the foreign policy of China and its consequences on the international political configurations. Key Words: Idiosyncrasy, Xi Jinping, Soft power, Military modernization, Decision making

BEYOND RHETORIC: CHINA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN KENYA THROUGH A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC LENS (2013-2020)

This article explores the evolution of China-Kenya relations within the context of China's broader public diplomacy strategy, focusing particularly on the period from 2013 to 2020. The foundation for these bilateral relations was laid as China opened up to developing countries and African nations gained independence. While formal diplomatic relations between China and Kenya were established in 1963, it was during the 2000s that these relations diversified significantly under the leadership of Chinese President Hu Jintao and Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki. This diversification spanned commercial, cultural, and political domains, becoming a notable example of public diplomacy. With the ascension of Chinese President Xi Jinping, China's public diplomacy experienced a strategic shift towards a more assertive and politically oriented approach. This study argues that under Xi Jinping, new initiatives and strategic plans were introduced, enhancing the existing framework of China's public diplomacy. A key element of this transformation was the increased emphasis on foreign aid, which gained momentum through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Between 2013 and 2020, China's foreign aid to Kenya played a pivotal role in reshaping the structure of Chinese public diplomacy. This period saw a continuation and expansion of activities in culture and media, established in earlier phases, alongside a growing focus on infrastructure development, humanitarian aid, healthcare assistance, and educational and cultural projects. The study begins by examining traditional public diplomacy tools such as cultural exchanges, high-level visits, and educational initiatives. It then discusses specific projects implemented between 2013 and 2020, analyzing their contributions to public diplomacy efforts. Finally, the article provides an overview of these projects, as documented in AidData, highlighting their impact on the bilateral relations between China and Kenya.

Going Local: Policy Intellectuals’ Adaptive Strategies under Xi Jinping

During the Hu Jintao era, policy intellectuals participated in public debates, openly criticizing existing government policies. During the Xi Jinping era, despite regime efforts to tame intellectuals, some critical voices have retained influence over policymaking processes. What adaptation strategies have they utilized to circumvent the regime’s control over public speech? This article points to two strategies. First, policy intellectuals formed shifting collaborations with both state and nonstate actors. Second, they utilized collaborations with state actors to enter consultative forums. The article finds that policy intellectuals not only formed Beijing-based alliances but also cultivated closer cooperation with local officials. By “going local” in this way, they bypassed Beijing’s tightening political environment. This article focuses on two important policy intellectuals in the healthcare arena who have gone local. It also includes a comparison between these two policy intellectuals and seven of their prominent peers who did not go local, as well as with intellectuals from another policy arena: education.

Diplomatic Geography of Xi Jinping: What the Statistics of the Chinese Leader’s Foreign Visits Reveal

This article seeks to delineate the foreign policy priorities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by analyzing the international visits of Chinese President Xi Jinping. It posits that the evolution of a state's foreign policy can be traced through the foreign engagements of its leaders. This is particularly pertinent for China, where presidential visits are historically significant. The article offers an overview of China's traditional diplomacy and the foreign policy activities of Xi Jinping's predecessors. It concludes that Xi Jinping continues to undertake foreign visits in alignment with the «openness» policy, similar to his predecessors. Through a detailed analysis of the frequency and destinations of Xi Jinping's international visits over his two terms, the authors present a periodization of his foreign policy priorities. A comparative analysis is conducted on the visit frequencies of Xi Jinping and his predecessor, Hu Jintao, with adjustments for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. With Xi Jinping's re-election for a third term in 2023, this study provides insights into the nature and priorities of China's foreign policy for his current term and potential developments in the ongoing five-year political cycle. The findings indicate that from 2018 to 2023, Xi Jinping increased his visits to Southeast Asian countries, particularly Indonesia and Vietnam, while maintaining a consistent focus on Russia and the United States, akin to the approach under Jiang Zemin. The enduring partnership with Russia, spanning over two decades, corroborates the assertion that Sino-Russian relations are at their strongest in the history of bilateral ties. Data for this study were sourced from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, and materials from the Chinavitae and China Power research projects.

Nationalism in China: Changing Parameters from 1993 to Present

This paper examines the promotion of different nationalist discourses in China by three generations of CCP leadership: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. It analyzes the changes in Chinese nationalist discourses through the lens of CCP legitimacy and in light of the ongoing struggle in China to modernize while retaining its identity. The paper finds that nationalist discourse varied under different Chinese leadership in response to the changing domestic and international environment. Furthermore, these changing nationalist narratives highlighted China’s tussle with its modern identity and its traditions.

ჩინეთის საგარეო პოლიტიკის ევოლუციის ძირითადი ისტორიული ეტაპები

Formation and evolution of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is examined. The historical stages of China’s foreign policy and the dynamics of its interaction with the leading international actors is analyzed. During the seventy years of the PRC’s existence, four main stages of foreign policy have been distinguished. In particular, the revolutionary diplomacy of Mao Zedong, the development-oriented diplomacy of Deng Xiaoping and his strategy of Maintaining Low Profile continued by his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and finally, Xi Jinping’s the Major Country Diplomacy. The international, domestic and historical context of each stage is presented, the analysis of the evolution of China's relations with the key international actors is provided, and the concepts and guiding principles of China's modern foreign policy is examined, as well as its main course, priorities and goals.

From Teachers to Preachers: Xi Jinping and Changing Priorities in Chinese Ideo-Political Education

Ideo-political education is the CCP’s school-based system for inculcating China’s next generation with the Party-state’s official ideology. What effect if any has Xi Jinping’s leadership had on this system? This paper compares key policy documents from the Hu Jintao (2002-2012) and Xi Jinping eras, identifying their key differences. Hu’s leadership promoted improved pedagogy, professionalization and textbook reforms as solutions to ongoing problems with ideological education. Xi instead emphasizes the political loyalty and ideological discipline of political subject teachers and ensuring that his “thought” permeates their classes and textbooks. The focus on “correct” politics in hiring decisions and promotion to leadership positions within universities stems from a broader obsession with political loyalty and ideology in the Xi era, suggesting that Chinese education will continue down the road of tightening ideological control and the penetration of politics into other subjects.

Identity-policy discrepancy: crisis perception, third-order change and the shifting foreign policy trajectories of China and Japan toward Northeast Asia

ABSTRACT Although common, the identity-policy discrepancy has yet to be systematically theorised in the Identity Constructivist literature. This article bridges this gap, leveraging insights from Historical and Sociological Institutionalism, Norm Constructivism, and Post-structuralism to explore the theoretical and empirical weight of such discrepancies. I argue that discrepancies tied to a nation’s hegemonic narratives can spark crises, engender compelling expectations upon recognition, and drive third-order changes as actors endeavour to address these discrepancies. The article illuminates the significant role that discrepancies played in molding the foreign policies of China and Japan, with a focus on regional institution-building in Northeast Asia. The article emphasises the stark contrast between Hu Jintao’s Peaceful Riser identity and his assertive policy actions, alongside the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) Pacifist State identity juxtaposed with policies akin to those of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). These discrepancies significantly shaped the policy approaches and identity construction of their successors.

엘리트 변동과 정책 변화

What is the relationship between elite transformation and policy change? Also, what effect does a transformation in elite type in a specific direction have on changes in policy orientation? This study is conducted to establish a theory about this relationship and influence, which is intuitively clear but academically and logically unclear.Of course, this study will provide only one example, and accumulation of this process will be necessary in the future. In China, according to existing research, changes in elite types have occurred in the latest period. The level is also evaluated as qualitative variation between types, not within types. Meanwhile, changes in policy orientation due to the change of top leader from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping were also confirmed in existing studies. In this respect, it is judged to be of considerable value as an example for the above-mentioned research questions.
 As a result of the study, in terms of elite type variation, the Chinese elite type has a low degree of integration, a narrow level of differentiation, a wide range of circulation, and a gradual type of circulation type with a high degree of integration, low degree of differentiation, and cyclical type. While its scope is wide, the method of circulation has changed to a radical type. In addition, the change in policy orientation changed from conservative/left-wing to progressive/right-wing in terms of attitudes and values in foreign policy, and in domestic political policy, it changed from conservative/left-wing to progressive/right-wing in the same aspect. This result is significant in that, despite the limitations of a single case, it shows that it is possible to theorize changes in elite types and policy orientations, and realistically suggests a specific method for doing so.

From Victim to Victor. Changing the Narrative in 21st Century China

The paper analyzes the transformation of the victim narrative present in the Chinese political discourse, all along the 20th century, both prior and during the first decades of the People’s Republic founded in 1949, into a narrative of success. Used to motivate and rally people around the Communist Party, the victim narrative lost its luster once the economic reforms and opening initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s started bearing fruit, during Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao governments. Thus, the party needed to find a new narrative as a means of legitimation. Based on the reports made at the Party Congresses in 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 by two of the Secretaries-General, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the paper analyzes how the economic success attained by China at the beginning of the 21st century triggered a shift in the elite political discourse, toning down the image of China as a victim of internal or external forces, in favor of that of a rejuvenated and strong country. The new image projected was not that of a besieged China any longer, but one of a victorious country which managed to overcome major obstacles. However, the victim narrative did not totally disappear. The paper also looks at how the victim narrative was reflected into the public discourse on the internet, immediately after Hu Jintao’s rule, when the space for debate on the micro blogging platforms was much more unrestricted than it is today, in order to understand how the victim narrative was differently used by the people in order to reevaluate various events from their recent history.

From Subculture to Mass Culture? How Hanfu Became a Focus of Cultural Policy under Xis Administration

Hanfu, represented as a prominent aspect of traditional culture, has gained immense popularity within Chinese society, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping. In comparison to his predecessors, Xi Jinping has demonstrated an unprecedented emphasis on culture. Based on the three self-confidences proposed by Hu Jintao, cultural confidence was added by Xi, thereby expanding the Party Central Committees theory of state governance to encompass four confidences. It is worth mentioning that the discourse culture in Xis context has differentiated from the predecessors, which refers to the deficiencies that need to be paid attention to match rapid economic development. However, Xis administration has clearly pointing the influential object of soft power, particularly traditional culture. Within this context, Hanfu has gradually transitioned from a subculture predominantly embraced by the youth to a mainstream cultural symbol endorsed by the government in last two decades. In Chinas present cultural policy, Hanfu assumes a pivotal role as a quintessential representation of traditional culture. The Chinese governments stance on Hanfus gradual revival has been influenced by three key factors: public sentiment, market demand and response, and Chinas global reputation.

Инаугурационный дискурс РФ и КНР в аспекте современной прагмалингвистики

Abstract
 The authors of the article focus on a comparative analysis of linguistic constructs representing communicative strategies and tactics, the combination of which determines the unique synergistic structure of the inaugural discourse in different language cultures (Russian/Chinese). The relevance of this work is defined by the object of the study itself. The act of inauguration, being a crucial marker in the political culture of society, represents a complex institutional phenomenon. On the one hand, it records the transition and legitimation of state power, and on the other hand, it ensures the generation and acceptance of ideas that manifest the conventional system of values, thereby ensuring the stability of a specific linguocultural space. Through the linguopragmatic analysis of the inaugural speeches of the state leaders of the Russian Federation and China, such as V.V. Putin, D.A. Medvedev, B.N. Yeltsin, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin (from 1991 to 2023), the authors of the article prove that the invariant goal-setting of the inaugural address determines a strict implementation of genre canons. However, the external symbolic framework of the procedure adheres to nationally significant axiological constants, whereas the ritual intentional message of the inaugural discursive practice is inevitably modified by each leader of the country during the individual speech formulation in accordance with the expectations of the electorate. This leads to linguistic variability both in the inaugural speech and in the inaugural discourse as a whole. The present research is believed to enable the identification of general trends in the development of forms of civil society governance, to examine specific cases of their implementation in a particular linguocultural space, to describe the process of conceptualizing the “key words” of the main agents of political communication, and, as a result, to forecast the development vector of collective and individual consciousness of civil society representatives.

From Hu’s Outward-Looking Pragmatism to Xi’s Ambitious Nationalist Leninism: Contrasting Agendas in Politburo Collective Study Sessions

ABSTRACT This article examines the changes in policy orientations in China since the 2000s. It explores whether these changes are influenced by China’s shifting relative power or by leadership transitions. The analysis focuses on the agenda of the Politburo Collective Study Session (PCSS) during the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. This article reveals a shift from outward-looking pragmatism in Hu’s era to ambitious nationalistic Leninism in Xi’s era. These distinct policy orientations persisted throughout their 10-year rule, despite changing international environments and China’s economic growth. This underscores the significance of leadership in shaping policy orientations in China.

How the "Rise of Great Power" Restrains Bilateral Trade Flows: Evidence from China and its Trading Partners

Abstract: This article employs the gravity model of trade to examine how political relations have impacted international trade in the Chinese context, specifically by incorporating discussion of China's political relations with its major trading partners. Using data from China's trading partners obtained between 1990 and 2019, the article uses the generalised method of moments (GMM) and lagged vector autoregression (VAR) model to investigate whether the associated geopolitical risks appear to be temporary or enduring. Empirical results have shown that political conflicts present lagged effects (three months later) on China's exports to other countries and total trade volume with other countries, but have instantaneous effects on China's imports from other countries. Additionally, Chinese President Xi Jinping has much greater political influence on trade compared to his two predecessors (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao). Such an increased level of power is due to a diplomatic policy shift in which the nation has moved away from "keeping a low profile" (taoguang yanghui) to focus on the "rise of great power" (daguo jueqi). The escalation of political tension between China and its major trading partners will continue to have negative impacts on trade until hegemony is fully realised.

George W. Bush’s post-9/11 East Asia policy: enabling China’s contemporary assertiveness

It is commonly argued that China’s foreign policy and behaviour have become increasingly assertive since Xi Jinping took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This strategic transformation is seen as paving the way for a direct confrontation between China and the USA since the Trump presidency. Drawing on the logic of international order-building, however, this article argues that the groundwork for this strategic change was laid when Hu Jintao was leading the CCP and that what made it possible was George W. Bush’s China and East Asia policy after 9/11. Bush’s subsequent reduced interest in East Asia enabled China to fill the void left by an absence of US presence and influence in the region. This article asserts that American policy-makers may need to ponder what their order-building project to weaken and exclude an illiberal China should include.

Leninism for the 21st Century: Xi Jinping’s Ideological Party-building

For a long time, people outside China often forgot that China is a communist state. In many ways it was more capitalistic than some paragons of capitalism—for example, the United States and Great Britain. However, since 2012, the Communist Party of China (CPC) under General Secretary Xi Jinping’s stewardship has abruptly—seemingly—reverted to the grand tradition of communism. Ideology and politics once again take command in China. Unlike the half-hearted efforts of his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has given top priority to Party rectification, integrating it within his grand plan for “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era”. This ideological and policy turn has strained China’s relationship with liberal democracies and brought China to the brink of a new Cold War with the United States and some US allies. Arguably, it has also contributed to the drastic slowdown of the Chinese economy. Why did the CPC make such a move that appears detrimental to China’s rise?

Provinces in Command: Changes in Prefectural Appointments from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping (2003-2020)

ABSTRACT China’s ‘Xi-Li era’ is said to be defined by both the concentration of power in the center and the strengthening of Party authority. In this paper, we ask whether these trends have been evident in local appointment practices since Xi Jinping took office in 2013. By comparing the career histories of 3,682 prefectural mayors and Party Secretaries under the Hu-Wen and Xi-Li administrations, we find that while appointment practices have shifted, the observed changes are not wholly consistent with the center- and Party-strengthening narratives. First, developments in the Xi-Li era suggest that while provincial authorities are increasingly using prefectural appointments for their own ends, the center remains high and far away in these decisions. Second, we do not find evidence that cadres with a strong Party background have a particular advantage in the Xi period. Instead, cadres with strong track records in key functional xitong, particularly those with an economic profile, are still the most likely to attain leadership positions. These findings contribute to the current debate on the nature of power reconfigurations unfolding in Xi’s China.

Emerging Negative Soft Power: The Evolution of China’s Identity in the 2008 and 2022 Beijing Olympics Opening and Closing Ceremonies

ABSTRACT By hosting the Olympics in 2008 and 2022, Beijing became the first city to organise both the Summer and Winter Games. These events offered the People’s Republic of China (PRC) an opportunity to present itself to the world and enhance its attractiveness. However, between the two editions, Chinese self-perception has experienced significant transformations, as has its vision of the world, resulting in the national attitude shifting from adaptation to, to contestation of pre-established norms and paradigms. The symbols, images, scenes and discourses exhibited during the opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing 2008 and 2022 Olympics mirror the broader international communication strategies deployed by the PRC under the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping presidencies as part of their implementation of negative soft power.

The People’s Republic of China’s ‘Green Medal Strategy’: Environmental Discourse during the 2008 and 2022 Beijing Olympic Games within the Soft Power Arena

ABSTRACT Addressing environmental concerns and hosting ‘green’ Olympic Games played a major role in shaping the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) soft power strategy for both the 2008 and 2022 Olympics, although in significantly different ways. Critical discourse analysis suggests a number of tensions and changes in the narratives related to environmental matters built around the two events. Firstly, an analysis of the narratives related to air pollution and artificial snow demonstrates strong differences between the Chinese and Anglophone media discourse. Secondly, the political shift that occurred between 2008 and 2022 – from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping – is reflected in the different environmental discourse and practices developed by the PRC during the two Olympics: from compliance with international standards to the (self-) elevation as a global leader in environmental sustainability.