House Races Research Articles

Multiple Defects Detection in Outer Race of Gearbox Ball Bearing Using Time Domain Statistical Parameters

Multiple defects are introduced on the outer race of vehicle gearboxes. The effect of the number of outer race defects in deep groove ball bearings are investigated using experimental and numerical methods. A three-dimensional model of the housing and outer race is developed using ABAQUS. Firstly, single defect located at 0Ëšand two defects located at 0Ëš and 67.5Ëš are analyzed. Then the number of defects was increased to three and the locations of the local defects are 0Ëš, 67.5Ëš and 225Ëš. Finally the model with four defects located on the outer race at the angular positions 0Ëš, 67.5Ëš, 225Ëš and 270Ëš, was investigated. The simulated data were also used to validate the experimental results.

Mediating the Electoral Connection: The Information Effects of Voter Signals on Legislative Behavior

We develop and assess an information account of representation. Accordingly, politicians face uncertainty about voter opinion and use previous vote margins to gauge future electoral outcomes. Losses in vote support elicit ideological moderation given new information about electorates. To test this account, we use rain around Election Day as a natural experiment in voting in the US House races from 1956 to 2008. We find that each additional inch of rainfall exogenously dampens Democratic vote margins by 1.4–2.0 percentage points and shifts incumbents rightward in their roll call positions in subsequent Congresses. We find responsiveness mainly in competitive districts with the greatest risk of defeat, and by Democrats rather than Republicans, suggesting an asymmetry in party representation. Overall, we highlight the importance of elite information uncertainty as a mechanism driving the electoral connection, and we show that idiosyncratic electoral effects can meaningfully impact legislative behavior.

The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections

In Citizens United v. FEC, the US Supreme Court ruled that restrictions on independent political expenditures by corporations and labor unions are unconstitutional. We analyze the effects of Citizens United on state election outcomes. We find that Citizens United is associated with an increase in Republicans’ election probabilities in state house races of approximately 4 percentage points overall and 10 or more percentage points in several states. We link these estimates to on-the-ground evidence of significant spending by corporations through channels enabled by Citizens United. We also explore the effects of Citizens United on reelection rates, candidates’ entry, and direct contributions and discuss implications for national elections and economic policy.

The effect of intergroup contact on secondary group attitudes and social dominance orientation

The current study tested the extent to which intergroup contact reduces social dominance orientation (SDO), producing secondary transfer effects. Participants were first-year undergraduate students randomly assigned to live with either a same-race roommate or a roommate of a different race in university housing. Participants completed a feeling thermometer and a measure of SDO at the beginning and end of the fall semester. Participants in interracial rooms reported lower levels of SDO and more positive attitudes toward secondary groups (i.e., racial/ethnic groups other than their roommates’ group) than participants in same-race rooms at the end of the semester. Those in interracial rooms exhibited a significant change in SDO levels and attitudes across time, whereas those in same-race rooms exhibited no change. Furthermore, SDO fully mediated the effect of intergroup contact on attitudes toward secondary groups. These findings provide causal evidence of secondary transfer effects and indicate SDO as an underlying mechanism.

The Rule of 13 in House and Senate Elections

As I document in this note, the party of a candidate for a U.S. House or Senate seat cannot be too out-of-line with his or her district. Specifically, if the district is more than 13 points different from the candidate’s party (as judged by the most recent presidential election), then he or she has essentially zero chance of winning. In an earlier version of this note (published on Ricochet.com, approximately one week before the 2014 midterm elections), I used the Rule to make predictions about four races: the Kentucky and Arkansas senate races and the 2nd and 3rd House races in West Virginia. All four predictions were correct even though many pundits called the races tossups or near-tossups. The rule predicts that Senator Joe Manchin (D-W.V.) has no chance of winning reelection in 2018 (unless Manchin becomes a Republican or West Virginia voters trend significantly leftward during the next few years).

Election Fundamentals and Polls Favor the Republicans

Election Fundamentals and Polls Favor the Republicans

On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects: New Evidence from Over 40,000 Close Races

The regression discontinuity (RD) design is a valuable tool for identifying electoral effects, but this design is only effective when relevant actors do not have precise control over election results. Several recent papers contend that such precise control is possible in large elections, pointing out that the incumbent party is more likely to win very close elections in the United States House of Representatives in recent periods. In this article, we examine whether similar patterns occur in other electoral settings, including the U.S. House in other time periods, statewide, state legislative, and mayoral races in the U.S. and national or local elections in nine other countries. No other case exhibits this pattern. We also cast doubt on suggested explanations for incumbent success in close House races. We conclude that the assumptions behind the RD design are likely to be met in a wide variety of electoral settings and offer a set of best practices for RD researchers going forward.

Rain and Representation: The Effect of Margin of Victory on Incumbent Legislative Behavior

We develop and assess an elite-information account of representation. Accordingly, politicians face uncertainty about voter opinion, and use previous vote-margins to gauge their future electoral prospects. Unexpected losses in prior support will elicit ideological moderation given new information about an electorate. To test this account, we use rain around Election Day as a natural experiment in congressional voting. In studying U.S. House races from 1956 to 2008, we find each additional inch of election rainfall exogenously dampens Democratic vote-margins by 1.3 to 2.9 percentage points, and shifts incumbents rightward in their roll call positions in subsequent Congresses. We find this responsiveness mainly in competitive districts with the greatest risk of defeat, and by Democrats rather than Republicans suggesting asymmetry in party representation. Overall, we show that idiosyncratic electoral effects can meaningfully impact legislative behavior, and highlight an information mechanism that may help explain representation.

The Enduring Effects of Competitive Elections

Research on U.S. congressional elections has placed great emphasis on the role of competitiveness, which is associated with high levels of campaign spending, media coverage, and interest group and party involvement. Competitive campaigns have been found to increase citizens' participation, engagement and learning. However, little is known about whether the effects of competitive campaigns have enduring consequences for citizens' attitudes and behavior. Analyzing a survey of citizens conducted one year after the 2006 congressional elections that includes an oversample of respondents from competitive House races, we examine whether exposure to a competitive House campaign affects voters' political knowledge and political interest as well as their consumption of political news. We find that competitive elections have positive effects that endure for at least a year beyond the campaign season, reinforcing the idea that political competition plays a robust role in American representative democracy.

Electoral Competition in Connecticut’s State House Races: The Trial Run of the Citizens’ Election Program

The Citizens Election Fund, Connecticut’s version of a clean elections law, was established in 2005 in the wake of the corruption scandal during the administration of Governor John Rowland. Modeled after the public financing systems of Maine and Arizona, Connecticut’s law has been touted as the most comprehensive in the nation. Scholars have hypothesized that states with public funding of campaigns have more competitive elections (Werner & Mayer, 2007). This paper will address whether the introduction of the Citizens’ Election Program has increased the level of electoral competition by specifically focusing on state house seats in Connecticut during the 2008 and 2010 election cycles. Contestation for seats in the Connecticut General Assembly is a particularly salient issue due to the fact that many seats typically go unchallenged and as Mayer (2007) observed “a seat in the Connecticut House or Senate had become one of the safest offices anywhere, approaching if not exceeding the security of membership in the U.S. Congress.” The findings suggest that the hypothesized positive relationship between public financing and electoral competition show mixed results. After the introduction of the Citizens’ Election Program, the number of uncontested seats decreased slightly with more challengers emerging to contest incumbents in the 2008 and 2010 election cycles. While some positive effects are seen by the 2010 election cycle with the margin of votes cast for winners narrowing in 41% of house races, the vast majority of house incumbents continue to win and do so by larger vote margins. Finally, the overall reelection rate for incumbents remained largely unchanged. Further research with a longer time horizon that is inclusive of more state house elections will have to be conducted before any firmer conclusions can be drawn regarding the efficacy of the Citizens’ Election Program.

Candidates, Competition, and the Partisan Press

Congressional elections have occurred every 2 years since the nation’s founding, yet we know surprisingly little about these electoral contests outside of the modern era. This is unfortunate as our understanding of how Congress performs and has evolved over time is directly linked to how its elected representatives reach and maintain office. In an effort to better understand early U.S. House elections, we revisit the era of the “partisan press” where newspapers were the main source of news for American voters and were typically operated by one of the two major parties. Using a data set linking the geographic location of partisan newspapers with electoral data during the early 19th century, we examine district-specific factors impacting the competitiveness of House races. We uncover previously unidentified evidence of candidate-specific effects during this historical era along with confirmation of media influence in the context of early American elections.

The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections

In Citizens United v. FEC (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that restrictions on independent political expenditures by corporations and labor unions are unconstitutional. We analyze the effects of Citizens United on state election outcomes. We find that Citizens United is associated with an increase in Republican election probabilities in state House races of approximately four percentage points overall and ten or more percentage points in several states. We link these estimates to “on the ground” evidence of significant spending by corporations through channels enabled by Citizens United. We also explore the effects of Citizens United on reelection rates, candidate entry, and direct contributions. Implications for national elections and economic policy are discussed.

On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects: New Evidence from Over 40,000 Close Races

The regression discontinuity (RD) design is a valuable tool for identifying electoral effects, but this design is only effective when relevant actors do not have precise control over election results. Several recent papers contend that such precise control is possible in large elections, pointing out that the incumbent party is more likely to win very close elections in the U.S. House of Representatives in recent periods. In this paper, we examine whether similar patterns occur in other electoral settings, including the U.S. House in other time periods, statewide, state legislative, and mayoral races in the U.S., and national or local elections in a variety of other countries. No other case exhibits this pattern. We also cast doubt on suggested explanations for incumbent success in close House races. We conclude that the assumptions behind the RD design are likely to be met in a wide variety of electoral settings and offer a set of best practices for RD researchers going forward.

The Impact of Legislative Tenure and Seniority on General Election Success: Econometric Evidence from U.S. House Races

The last four election-cycles in the U.S. House of Representatives (2004–2010) witnessed two shifts in political party control of that legislative body—from the Republicans to the Democrats in 2006 and then back to the Republicans in 2010. Nevertheless, U.S. House incumbents of both parties running for re-election tended to enjoy a sizeable advantage over their general-election challengers during the period. The advantage is even greater for incumbents who are members of the leadership, key committees, or have lengthy tenure. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, membership in the House leadership is worth on average 6.8 percentage points towards the incumbent’s expected vote-share, and that membership in either of the two top committees is worth an additional 1.3 such percentage points. A ten-term incumbent can expect another 2.0 percentage points of vote share. Lastly, our results also indicate the existence of a wave effect favoring Democratic incumbents in 2006, and a slightly smaller wave effect favoring Republican incumbents in 2010.

Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close U.S. House Races, 1942–2008

Following David Lee's pioneering work, numerous scholars have applied the regression discontinuity (RD) design to popular elections. Contrary to the assumptions of RD, however, we show that bare winners and bare losers in U.S. House elections (1942–2008) differ markedly on pretreatment covariates. Bare winners possess largeex antefinancial, experience, and incumbency advantages over their opponents and are usually the candidates predicted to win byCongressional Quarterly's pre-election ratings. Covariate imbalance actually worsens in the closest House elections. National partisan tides help explain these patterns. Previous works have missed this imbalance because they rely excessively on model-based extrapolation. We present evidence suggesting that sorting in close House elections is due mainly to activities on or before Election Day rather than postelection recounts or other manipulation. The sorting is so strong that it is impossible to achieve covariate balance between matched treated and control observations, making covariate adjustment a dubious enterprise. Although RD is problematic for postwar House elections, this example does highlight the design's advantages over alternatives: RD's assumptions are clear and weaker than model-based alternatives, and their implications are empirically testable.

Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: Congressional Forecasts: Theory Versus Tracking in 2010

In our recent article forecasting the 2010 U.S. congressional elections, we argue for a model based on theory rather than tracking (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2010). A sound theoretical explanation of vote choice in House races should, ceteris paribus, predict better than a simple dependence on variables that proxy the vote, such as the generic ballot question. We posited a simple but classical explanation of the 2010 House vote—the referendum model—in which voters punish or reward the party in power according to its performance in office and the time available for that performance. In words, the model reads: House Seat Change = f(Economy, Popularity, Midterm). A measurement of these variables, at lags appropriate for forecasting, yields the estimates (OLS) of model 1, shown in column 1 of table 1. Model 1 gives a forecast of −22 seats for the Democrats in 2010, when, in fact, they scored about −60 seats. The model 1 forecast appears “wrong” in two senses. First, substantively, it fails to predict the Republican takeover of the House. Second, scientifically, it is off by over two standard errors of estimate (i.e., 38/17 > 2.0). Why did the model get it wrong this time, when the forecast was off by only one seat in the last midterm in 2006? To answer this question, the specifications of the model need consideration. Such consideration signals the scientific value of the forecasting exercise in providing a systematic trial-and-error method for model improvement.

Divisive Primaries and Incumbent General Election Performance: Prospects and Costs in U.S. House Races

Do divisive primaries hurt incumbents? If so, does the electoral calendar condition their effects? Potential challengers are predatory and estimate their electoral chances before running against an incumbent, meaning electoral prospects influence both primary divisiveness and general election performance. However, divisive primaries may waste precious campaign resources and damage the primary winner’s reputation. The evidence suggests that although divisive primaries generally hurt incumbents and help challengers as electoral prospects theory predicts, these effects wane and eventually disappear the closer the primary is to the general election.

Testing the Effects of Ballot Access Reform on Non-Major Party Electoral Fortunes: The Case of Florida's Revision 11

The research tests the effects of egalitarian ballot access on the electoral fortunes of non-major party candidates for U.S. House seats. In 1998, Florida voters passed an amendment to the state constitution that removed all auxiliary barriers to ballot access for non-major parties. In bivariate and multiple regression testing, the reform is associated with a statistically significant increase in the number of non-major party candidates and their vote-share. The change, however, is small. Moreover, these increased contestation rates and vote support occur primarily in the first election cycle after the reform was adopted. Output from Tobit and GLS regression suggests that the best case scenario is about a 1.3 percent increase in the non-major party vote share in U.S. House races in Florida. The study concludes that states’ pursuit of egalitarian ballot access laws will not likely create substantive expansion of minor-party electoral success.

Gender, Context, and Television Advertising: A Comprehensive Analysis of 2000 and 2002 House Races

Are men and women portrayed differently in campaigns? Much scholarship and commentary expects that this is so, yet previous studies provide ambiguous evidence on the extent of gender difference.The authors provide a comprehensive analysis of gender differences in television advertisements in congressional races in 2000 and 2002 with data that allow them to take into account the frequency of airings, the sponsorship of the advertisements, partisanship, and competitiveness of the race. Although some gender differences emerge, the analysis reveals undeniable similarity in the presentation of male and female candidates in television advertisements.

Incumbency is No Advantage: Michigan's 7th Congressional District

In the four elections from 2002 through 2008, four different candidates were elected to the United States House of Representatives seat representing the Michigan’s 7th congressional district. Such turnover is rare in U.S. House races, where a large majority of incumbents easily win reelection and many districts are not considered to be competitive. In fact, the 7th district is the only one in the nation that has seen this type of turnover in this four-election span. The turnover in representation has occurred even though the district has been considered a leaning Republican district after both the 1992 and 2002 re-districting plans went into effect. The district’s turnover in representatives is due in part to the nature of the district and its voters, but also because of the candidates in each election, and a combination of events that began after the 2002 election.