Host Country Welfare Research Articles

Tariff-induced capital inflow and welfare under variable returns to scale

This paper extends recent studies on tariff-immiserization in the presence of internationally mobile sector-specific capital to include the possibility of non-constant returns to scale. It is shown that Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro's (1977) proposition does not necessarily hold; that is, under certain conditions tariff-induced capital inflow improves the host-country's welfare even if the foreign capital receives the full (untaxed) value of its marginal product.

Welfare gains from capital inflows under import quotas

The presence of tariffs was assumed in the literature which examined the effect of additional foreign investment on the welfare of the host country in the small-country setting. However, this paper analyzes the case of import quotas and shows that additional inflows of foreign capital improve the host country's welfare when import quotas are kept constant.

Pricing policies of multinational enterprises: Host country regulation and welfare

This paper examines host country price-regulation policies towards a foreign subsidiary. The analysis considers two prices, namely the transfer prices charged to the subsidiary, and the market price of the subsidiary's products. It is shown that host countries should regulate both of these prices. Regulation of the transfer price alone may induce an increase in the subsidiary's market price and cause a loss of host country welfare. Regulation of both prices is more efficient for it enables the host country to attain a higher level of welfare and allows the foreign firm to earn the same level of profits as would regulation of only one of those prices.

Tariffs, foreign capital and immiserizing growth

For a small tariff-imposing country, within the standard two-commodity two-factor model of international trade, this paper reconsiders the implications of an inflow of capital from abroad. When the host country continues to import the capital-intensive good while remaining incompletely specialized, the analysis shows that the capital inflow must reduce host-country welfare, assuming that the foreign capital receives the full (untaxed) value of its marginal product. Under other circumstances considered, however, the inflow may have different consequences for welfare.

Some Aspects of Mexican Immigration

Previous articleNext article No AccessSome Aspects of Mexican ImmigrationPaul S. TaylorPaul S. Taylor Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 38, Number 5Oct., 1930 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/254142 Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Caf Dowlah Temporary Cross-Border Labor Mobility Since World War I, (Jun 2020): 141–168.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36506-6_7Christian Brannstrom The Discovery of Hispanic Child Labor in Agriculture in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, Texas: A Life Geography Approach, Annals of the American Association of Geographers 106, no.33 (Mar 2016): 705–721.https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2015.1131142Brian Gratton, Emily Klancher Merchant An Immigrant's Tale: The Mexican American Southwest 1850 to 1950, Social Science History 39, no.44 (Dec 2015): 521–550.https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2015.70Thomas J. Carter Undocumented Immigration and Host-Country Welfare: Competition Across Segmented Labor Markets*, Journal of Regional Science 45, no.44 (Nov 2005): 777–795.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-4146.2005.00392.xThomas J. Carter Illegal immigration in an efficiency wage model, Journal of International Economics 49, no.22 (Dec 1999): 385–401.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00069-5Vilma S. Martinez Illegal Immigration and the Labor Force, American Behavioral Scientist 19, no.33 (Jul 2016): 335–350.https://doi.org/10.1177/000276427601900307Mark Hendrickson Promising Problems, (): 248–294.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236690.008