This study examines the diffusion of governmental self-regulation policy, specifically the Administrative Power List System (APLS) in China, which has received less focus than economic or social policies within horizontal and vertical pressure frameworks. By employing event history analysis and case studies, the research compares local government adoption behavior before and after the central intervention. The findings reveal that, in the absence of strong central directives, local governments are often reluctant to replicate neighboring policies, as they strive for distinctiveness in their innovations. However, once the central government issues mandates, local governments quickly adapt and implement practices observed elsewhere. The study also highlights significant vertical influences from provincial and county governments. During the exploration stage, top-down pressure from provincial governments enhances municipal adoption, although this influence is eventually surpassed by central mandates. Bottom-up learning from county-level pilot programs significantly improves adoption efficiency, especially when local governments face pressure for rapid implementation. This study contributes to the policy diffusion literature by analyzing the diffusion of governmental self-regulation policy and highlighting the mixed impacts of horizontal and vertical pressures on policy learning and adoption, with central intervention playing a crucial role.
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