Honest Behavior Research Articles

Faktor Penentu Keberhasilan Pasar Fashion Tradisional

The purpose of this study to reveal the opinions of visitors or potential buyers of fashion at traditional markets are located in PasarBaru Trade Center, Bandung. The population is all visitors in one day with the criteria you have shopped over three times a month and the age of an adult. This research uses a descriptive method with purposive sampling technique, with an average analysis.The findings show that the products offered, locations, promotions, the services provided by merchant included in the criteria fairly well. The advantages of fashion PasarBaru Trade Center only includes lower prices and compete. Meanwhile, weakness of the infrastructure is minimal. The implication for retailers is that they need to sell more quality products, fashion is full of innovation, conduct joint promotions shows honest behavior in business.

How Perception of Academic Honesty at the University Linked with Student Engagement: Conceptualization and Empirical Research Opportunities

Academic dishonesty among university students is a major problem for higher education and has negative economic impacts in a lot of countries including Russia. While exploring why students choose dishonest ways of obtaining good grades instead of getting involved in the learning process and acquiring as much knowledge and experience at the university as possible, most researchers focus on academic dishonest practices, ignoring the reasons for and factors of honest learning behavior. We regard student engagement as the opposite of academic dishonesty and propose a conceptual model of how academic honesty at the university influences various aspects of student engagement in learning. We conduct an empirical study to test the hypothesis on the correlation between characteristics of honesty at the university and parameters of student engagement suggested as part of the conceptual model. We use the data collected by the Monitoring of Student Characteristics and Trajectories carried out in universities included in the Russian Association of Leading Universities in Economics and Management. Having analyzed the data on management and economics students in eight Russian universities, we conclude that the suggested hypothesis has been largely confirmed, and the proposed conceptual model may serve a productive basis for empirical research on the correlation between academic environment parameters and student learning behavior.

Safeguarding Buyers with Attack-Resilient Reputation Parameters

Agent-mediated reputation systems provide the necessary decision making support to facilitate the automation of processes, and to improve the quality of services in an information asymmetric e-market. Reputation systems encourage honest behavior and discourage malicious behavior of buyer and seller agents by safeguarding honest participants and by laying a foundation for security through social control mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a reputation system that aims to safeguard honest buyers from rogue behavior by counterparties and deceptive buying peers. It employs reputation functions with attack-resilient parameters based on the e-market parameters like value of the transaction and varying experience of agents. These parameters help to reduce the incentive for dishonest behavior, and to minimize harm in case of attacks by rogue sellers in order to improve the trustworthiness among participants in the e-market.

PENGARUH KUALITAS PELAYANAN TOUR LEADER TERHADAP LOYALITAS KONSUMEN PADA TRAVEL AGENT KENCANA WISATA TANJUNG DUREN JAKARTA

The increasing amount of traveler is affecting the tourism sector.The role of tour leader is very significant to support the success of a tour. Tour leader as a front liner of the company is needed to maintain the consumer’s satisfaction which is also affect the consumer’s loyalty to the company. The purpose of this study is to find the effect of Service Quality toward Consumer’s loyalty from Kencana Wisata Tanjung Duren Jakarta. Data was collected by using the questionnaire. The types of data are quantitative which obtained by calculating data from the questionnaire. The method of sampling used purposive with the determination of respondents .The data method analyzed used double regression analysis techniques , double correlation, analysis of determination ,T- test and F-test with significant level of 5 percent .Assisted by using data processing program SPSS ( statistical package for social science ) 15. The research result indicates that service quality of tour leader and consumer’s loyalty has a positive relation partially. Simultaneously,indicates that tangible (X1), empathy (X2), reliability (X3), responsiveness (X4) and assurance (X5) loyalty (Y) with value 0,834 which means significantly affecting consumer’s at travel agent Kencana Wisata Tanjung Duren Jakarta. The writer’s suggestion is Kencana Wisata management should give special attention to maintain the honest behavior and make the tour leader more trustable to boost the consumer’s satisfactian which by the end can affect the consumer’s loyalty to the company.

Changing a ‘culture’ of corruption: Evidence from an economic experiment in Italy

Empirical evidence demonstrates that bribery, extortion and graft are often the outgrowths of a deeper ‘culture of corruption’ which has proved disconcertingly resilient in the face of public sector reforms. This article investigates whether changing collective beliefs about how ‘most people in society’ will behave can reform prevailing cultural practices. Employing an economic experiment involving northern and southern Italian university students, this study shows that (costly) honest behavior can be sustained by conditional beliefs about the honesty of others. I also hypothesize that, given southern Italians’ reputation for corruption, informing participants that they are interacting with southerners should increase the level of bribery in the experiment. However, surprisingly, I find the opposite effect: when exposed to information about the identity of their fellow participants, southern Italians are not only less corrupt, but they are also more likely to believe that their counterparts are less corrupt. I discuss several explanations which may account for these unexpected findings. Overall, the paper provides theoretical foundations and experimental support for how new cultural practices might emerge.

A Trust Game Model and Algorithm for Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks

The existence of malicious secondary users will bring damage to the performance of cooperative spectrum sensing and spectrum access in cognitive radio networks, so effectively curbing malicious behavior of secondary users become the key to success for cooperative spectrum sensing mechanism. Inspired by economics of repeated game theory, a trust game model and algorithm of distributed cooperative spectrum sensing oriented to malicious secondary users named FRTrust is proposed. In FRTrust, the reputation status is used to describe the performance of a secondary user in cooperative spectrum sensing process. It encourages secondary users to choose positive and honest behavior strategies for greater and long term benefits. Simultaneously, a ‘differentiation’ punishment mechanism is presented to respond malicious behaviors of secondary users. By this way, the ‘first offender’ secondary users and the ‘recidivist' secondary users can be distinguished effectively. If a secondary user departs from the normal times in its life period, it will be punished superimposed. Simulation results show that the FRTrust algorithm can encourage secondary users to participate in spectrum sensing in a cooperative attitude, improve the transaction success ratio of cooperative spectrum sensing, and guarantee the fairness and spectrum access performance for cognitive radio networks.

(Dis-)honesty: Measuring overcharging in a real-world market

The present research investigates the occurrence of honest vs. dishonest behavior in a real-world competitive retail market involving the sales of loose candy that is priced according to a pay-per-weight scheme. Our results provide evidence for a high degree of honesty among sellers. There are only a few cases of overcharging, in particular when scales are hidden from the buyer (Study 1). Further details suggest that many sellers are consistently honest over repeated sales, and that honesty is robust to the appearance of the buyer or the amount that was purchased (Study 2). We discuss sellers’ concerns for reputation as a plausible explanation for our results.

Reputation and social (dis)approval in feedback mechanisms: An experimental study

Several previous studies have highlighted the role of feedback mechanisms in the success of electronic marketplaces. This paper contends that the effectiveness of online feedback mechanisms passes through two channels, namely a ‘reputational’ effect that has been largely documented in the literature, but also a ‘(dis)approval’ effect that has received less attention. We attempt to isolate these two effects using an experimental approach. For this purpose, we compare two experimental feedback systems that differ in the set of information available to participants. In the first feedback system, each player can observe the feedback profile of the other party, whereas in the second feedback system, this information is private. Our findings indicate that both systems improve cooperation. However, we observe that Private Feedback is less efficient in enhancing trust and trustworthiness than systems in which rating profiles are observed by partners. This finding is due to both a reduction of the number of assigned ratings and a lower impact of private ratings on subsequent decisions. All these results suggest that even if social (dis)approval matters, rating observability – and thus reputation – remains critical to induce honest behavior and improve efficiency in markets characterized by imperfect information.

Executivecontrol- and reward-related neural processes associated with the opportunity to engage in voluntary dishonest moral decision making.

Research has begun to examine the neurocognitive processes underlying voluntary moral decision making, which involves engaging in honest or dishonest behavior in a setting in which the individual is free to make his or her own moral decisions. Employing event-related potentials, we measured executivecontrol-related and reward-related neural processes during an incentivized coin-guessing task in which participants had the opportunity to voluntarily engage in dishonest behavior, by overreporting their wins to maximize earnings. We report four primary findings: First, the opportunity to deceive recruited executivecontrol processes involving conflict monitoring and conflict resolution, as evidenced by a higher N2 and a smaller P3. Second, processing the outcome of the coin flips engaged reward-related processes, as evidenced by a larger medial feedback negativity (MFN) for incorrect (loss) than for correct (win) guesses, reflecting a reward prediction error signal. Third, elevated executivecontrol-related neural activity reflecting conflict resolution (i.e., an attenuated executivecontrol P3) predicted a greater likelihood of engaging in overall deceptive behavior. Finally, whereas elevated reward-related neural activity (the reward P3) was associated with a greater likelihood of engaging in overall deceptive behavior, an elevated reward prediction error signal (MFN difference score) predicted increased trial-by-trial moral behavioral adjustment (i.e., a greater likelihood to overreport wins following a previous honest loss than following a previous honest win trial). Collectively, these findings suggest that both executivecontrol- and reward-related neural processes are implicated in moral decision making.

Full development of the theory of accounting and auditing

Lending and public funds for political purposes, taxation, etc., require reports on new and authentic. Increase the number of uses and users of financial reports, information and capital and money market boom, accounting and auditing the objective of meeting the needs of a limited number of owners of capital to meet the needs of the community, has been upgraded. The audit will validate the information contained in the financial statements that are prepared by accountants. Audit process of accountability, and accountability requires the establishment of a social welfare system. With such interpretations role in auditing and accounting features are outstanding (Derby, 1388). To improve the reporting procedure, it is essential that the performance, resource utilization and costs and income related record. Evidence must be documented to prove liability is fully done. After thorough research and a comprehensive learning and accountability, the proposed system must be responsive to environmental, structural responsive, honest behavior and control systems have responsibility (Qu, 2006).

The output-agreement method induces honest behavior in the presence of social projection

The output-agreement method has been successfully used to reward agents in a variety of crowdsourcing settings. This method consists of a simple payment function that randomly matches two agents' reported information and rewards agreement. In this letter, we discuss how the output-agreement method might induce honest behavior when there exists social projection, i.e ., when each agent believes that his private information is the most popular one amongst his peers.

Behavioural economics: Professional identity can increase dishonesty.

An experiment shows that although bank employees behave honestly on average, their dishonesty increases when they make decisions after having been primed to think about their professional identity. See Letter p.86 Popular opinion has it that unethical business practices are prevalent in the culture of the financial sector. Ernst Fehr and colleagues sought scientific evidence to support this claim. They find that in a laboratory game designed to reveal dishonest behaviour, employees of a large international bank behaved by-and-large as honestly as the rest of us. But in tests designed to mimic the competitive nature of their profession, many of the bankers began to act dishonestly. Those from other industries and student volunteers did not show this effect. The authors conclude that if financial institutions are to regain our trust, they need to encourage honest behaviour by changing the norms associated with their workers' professional identity.

Dishonest responding or true virtue? A behavioral test of impression management

Impression management or social desirability scales have been used widely to assess and control for self-favoring biases in self-reports, both in low and high demand situations. Recently, however, substantive interpretations of impression management scores have surfaced, including the simple but troubling proposition that high scores in impression management scales actually reflect honesty rather than dishonest responding. In line with findings indicating that respondents answer to personality questionnaires rather accurately in typical low demand situations, we herein suggest that high impression management scores indeed reflect true virtues rather than dishonesty under such conditions. We found support for this idea by replicating previous correlations between impression management scores and virtue-related basic personality traits (including honesty–humility), and additionally provided conclusive behavioral evidence: We linked scores on an impression management scale administered under typical low demand condition to behavior in an incentivized, anonymous cheating task. The results clearly indicate that low scores in impression management are associated with more cheating. That is, high – and not low – scores on the impression management scale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding are aligned with more virtuous, honest behavior.

Damage to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex affects tradeoffs between honesty and self-interest.

Substantial correlational evidence exists suggesting a critical role for prefrontal regions in honest and dishonest behavior, but causal evidence specifying the nature of this involvement remains absent. Here we show using the lesion method that damage to the human dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) decreased the effect of honesty concerns on behavior in economic games that pit honesty motives against self-interest, but did not affect decisions where honesty concerns were absent. These results point to a causal role for DLPFC in enabling honest behavior.

Credit rating dynamics and competition

I analyze the market for credit ratings with competition between more than two rating agencies. How can honest rating behavior be achieved, and under which conditions can a new honest rating agency successfully invade a market with inflating incumbents? My model predicts cyclic dynamics if sophisticated investors have a high impact on agencies’ reputation. In contrast, if trusting investors have the main impact, then the dynamics exhibits a saddle point rather than cycles. In this case, regulatory support for honest rating agencies is only needed for a limited time, but the effect is sustainable in the long run.

Improving Trustworthiness in E-Market Using Attack Resilient Reputation Modeling

Asymmetric information is a major problem in e-commerce transactions as it gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Reputation mechanisms provide a solution to this problem by discouraging fraudulent behavior and encouraging honest behavior of participants in the uncertain and un-trusted environment of e-market. This paper discusses trust and reputation relationships, and highlights the importance of key reputation building parameters to enhance trustworthiness of participants. Finally, it proposes reputation metrics that guard reputation systems from various attacks by malicious participants to improve the quality of e-market and presents a working prototype.

Identity changes and the efficiency of reputation systems

Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency of reputation systems. We compare two markets in which we exogenously vary whether sellers can erase their rating profile and start over as new sellers. Buyer trust and seller trustworthiness decrease significantly when sellers can erase their ratings. With identity changes, trust is particularly low towards new sellers since buyers cannot discriminate between truly new sellers and opportunistic sellers who changed their identity. Nevertheless, we observe positive returns on buyer investment under the reputation system with identity changes, and our evidence suggests that trustworthiness is higher than in the complete absence of a reputation system.

(Dis)Honest Information Transmission: An Experimental Analysis

In this paper, I suggest a new experimental method for measuring (dis)honest information transmission. Subjects play a variant of the dictator game in which the dictator’s decision whether to lie (either to or against his advantage) or whether to be honest, when communicating private information to a game partner, determines the division of payoffs. Using this set-up in analysing deception has some advantages: First, it allows to clearly isolate an individual’s motivation for (dis)honest behaviour from other possible sources of influence. Second, to my best knowledge this is the first experiment which investigates white lies and black lies in one single setting.

To boast or not to boast: Testing the humility aspect of the Honesty–Humility factor

Interest in the HEXACO Model of Personality has consistently grown in the past decade – with a particular focus on the newly proposed sixth basic factor: Honesty–Humility. In essence, this factor was proposed as the driving force behind cooperative, honest behavior and the basis for a modest, unassuming nature. However, whereas recent research has accumulated substantial evidence for the prediction that Honesty–Humility drives non-exploitative behavior, there is little conclusive evidence for the proposition that it also signals humility. We tested this conjecture in a web-based study – assessing modest behavior in terms of people’s over- vs. under-representation of their actual abilities. As hypothesized, the Honesty–Humility factor scale and the Modesty facet scale of the HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised predicted the degree to which participants’ self-appraisals matched their actual general mental ability in the expected direction: those low in Honesty–Humility and/or Modesty overstated their ability.

A Strategic Interaction Model of Punishment Favoring Contagion of Honest Behavior

The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as a dishonesty deterrence mechanism. In order to capture the intrinsic uncertainty of social environments, payoffs are described as random variables. New dynamics, with a new relation between punishment probability and punishment severity, are revealed. Punishment probability proves to be more important than punishment severity in guiding convergence towards honesty as predominant behavior. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence and reported experiments. Critical values and transition intervals for punishment probability and severity are identified and analyzed. Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes.