We study contract menu design by a vendor leasing production equipment to its clients who serve customers. The equipment can fail which can cause delays to clients' customers. The equipment vendor can offer its clients three types of lease-and-repair contracts: equipment lease with an immediate replacement upon failure, repair with a redundant unit on client premises (parallel layout), and repair without a backup unit on the premises. The vendor does not have full information about each client but knows that clients fall into two types. ‘High’ (vs. ‘Low’) type clients have a higher (vs. lower) willingness to pay but have customers who are more (vs. less) delay-sensitive. Modeling the interaction between the vendor and its clients as a leader-follower game and using queueing theory, we show that a monopolistic vendor can increase its expected profit through second-degree price discrimination by offering a menu of contracts to its clients. We find that when the distribution of customers with low and high willingness to pay is not skewed (one-sided) and either the cost of repair or cost of equipment is low the vendor can increase its profit by inducing price discrimination through offering the menus proposed in the paper.