Highest Valuation Research Articles

Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize

We study contests between groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize in which the contest success function for a group can be represented by a continuous function in each group’s effort level, where each group’s effort level equals the sum of effort levels that the individual players in that group expend. The players expend their effort simultaneously and independently to win the prize or not to win it (or both). Obtaining the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we establish that, in each group, only the player with the highest valuation and the player with the lowest valuation may be active. We further establish that there are only two active players, either in the same group or in different groups, and the rest expend zero effort.

How to sell in a sequential auction market

We characterize an optimal mechanism for a seller with one unit of a good facing N ≥ 3 buyers and a single competitor who sells another identical unit in a second‐price auction. Buyers who do not get the seller's good compete in the competitor's subsequent auction. The mechanism features transfers from buyers with the two highest valuations, allocation to the buyer with the second‐highest valuation, and an allocation rule that depends on the two highest valuations. It can be implemented by a modified third‐price auction, and it raises significantly more revenue than would a standard second‐ or first‐price auction with a reserve price.

LAND USE OPTIMIZATION IN UKRAINE AT THE STAGE OF LAND MARKET FORMATION

In the context of the reform of the sale of agricultural land, the priority is to optimize land use, which is to find a balance of land that would meet their environmental, economic and social compliance with the functions of the agricultural sector. Two main approaches to the optimization process are considered. The first is by intensifying agriculture with significant energy costs, land depletion and the inevitable increase in environmental pressures. And the second is the gradual formation of a balanced agrosphere with alternative agriculture and environmentally friendly livestock.
 The structure of land plots in terms of regions of Ukraine, which in the conditions of the land market does not promote balanced land use, is analyzed. Acquired arable land will not be transferred to other categories of land at auctions, even if it is significantly degraded.
 When forming the pricing policy in the land sector, it is important to compare the value of arable land in Ukraine and European countries. This comparative analysis shows the underestimated value of arable land in Ukraine (the lowest figure in Europe is less than 1 thousand euros / ha) at the initial stage of sale. It is estimated that the six-year lease of arable land at this stage of land reform is more appropriate than their sale.
 The fact of plowing part of pastures under these conditions and increasing the share of arable land in river valleys, drained lands, etc. is alarming. According to the results of the calculations, Table 1 shows the value of arable land, pastures, hayfields by administrative regions. The comparative characteristic of agricultural lands on the available highly productive lands is carried out. The highest share of such lands in Ternopil, Poltava and Cherkasy oblasts was found out, which provides for their highest valuation.
 The created map diagram of the general cost assessment of agricultural lands demonstrates their land resource potential and reflects the spatial differentiation of this indicator by typological groups of regions. The authors analyzed the optimization model of land use in Ukraine, developed by a group of leading domestic scientists under the project "Sustainable Development Programs", and proposed to consider the category of productive lands as basic arable lands, the share of which in Ukraine is 44.8% of arable land.
 The directions of reforming land relations in Ukraine taking into account historical traditions and granting the highest status of the basic land user - the rural community are offered.
 At the same time to make calculations, based on the results of which to identify production types (specialization) of farms, which will be the most objective, as it takes into account local natural and economic conditions;
 - on the basis of specialization of peasant farms, study of types of land use in enterprises of various forms of ownership and data on natural land fertility to perform agricultural zoning of the territory;
 - in each allocated agricultural area, the whole array of land in use, divided into at least 3 groups:
 1) lands of peasant farms, which over time should be granted the right of life ownership with the possibility of inheritance and on which the state should support non-profit, subsistence farming;
 2) lands withdrawn from agricultural circulation due to the destruction of their natural fertility and those to be transferred to the nature reserve fund, and, over time, included in the national ecological network;
 3) lands that have not yet lost their natural fertility and those that are in the use of agricultural enterprises of various forms of ownership.
 Key words: land optimization, monetary valuation of agricultural lands, land resource potential, spatial differentiation of lands, land relations.

Reversing the decline of Canadian public markets

It is the best of times for Canada’s public markets, it is the worst of times for Canada’s public markets. It is an age when markets have been rewarding public companies with the highest valuations seen in generations. It is an age of a rapid decline in Canadian companies opting to go public. Given that Canada’s reliance on public markets is far higher than that of any other country — double that of the next-highest country — we should be alarmed that fewer and fewer companies are choosing to go public. Companies that stay private are, on average, less successful, less productive, less likely to grow into national champions, and more likely to be sold to foreign buyers. The current decline of public markets may go to the heart of what is arguably the biggest long-term policy issue in the country: our innovation gap and declining relative productivity growth. There is no shortage of advantages for a company to go public. Public companies grow faster, grow larger, become both more productive and efficient, and have cheaper access to capital. An IPO permits early investors to exit while allowing managers to continue to build the company. What is evidently causing more and more Canadian executives to avoid going public, despite all these advantages, is a regulatory and governance ecosystem that has grown increasingly hostile to and distrustful of corporate leadership. Executives who consider going public face an environment in which their compensation levels will be high; indeed, pay for senior executives at public companies has grown remarkably in recent years. However, because of increasingly onerous regulatory disclosure requirements, earning those rewards comes at the cost of having their pay disclosed to the public, debated by shareholders and scrutinized by the media. Companies that go public also face a growing loss of control over their own governance due to pressure to adhere to an ever-evolving list of so-called universal best practices that can run dozens of pages long. These practices exact costs but don’t generally improve results. The result is a dominant one-size-fits-all governance model that does not in fact fit many, or even most companies. The key factor creating this hostile environment is a massive intrusion by outside forces on the powers traditionally exercised by boards and executives. Corporate governance used to arise from the bargaining and experimentation of the private parties that coalesce around corporations. Now governance is frequently imposed ex post on public companies by third parties with their own agendas. Particularly problematic are third-party commercial proxy advisors, ostensibly representing the interests of institutional shareholders. Their short-term, faddish, complex, and value-harming governance practices diverge dangerously from the interests of long-term flesh-andblood investors. The innovations over the past three decades in governance rules were designed to reduce agency costs and improve corporate performance. Those that have proven failures at doing so, and there are several, should be scrapped. Rather than helping Canada’s markets become stronger, public markets have grown substantially weaker, and rather than making Canadian companies better, we now face an environment where companies would rather sell to a foreign buyer and leave the country, than go public here. The repercussions can only be adverse for Canada.

REVERSING THE DECLINE OF CANADIAN PUBLIC MARKETS

It is the best of times for Canada’s public markets, it is the worst of times for Canada’s public markets. It is an age when markets have been rewarding public companies with the highest valuations seen in generations. It is an age of a rapid decline in Canadian companies opting to go public. Given that Canada’s reliance on public markets is far higher than that of any other country — double that of the next-highest country — we should be alarmed that fewer and fewer companies are choosing to go public. Companies that stay private are, on average, less successful, less productive, less likely to grow into national champions, and more likely to be sold to foreign buyers. The current decline of public markets may go to the heart of what is arguably the biggest long-term policy issue in the country: our innovation gap and declining relative productivity growth. There is no shortage of advantages for a company to go public. Public companies grow faster, grow larger, become both more productive and efficient, and have cheaper access to capital. An IPO permits early investors to exit while allowing managers to continue to build the company. What is evidently causing more and more Canadian executives to avoid going public, despite all these advantages, is a regulatory and governance ecosystem that has grown increasingly hostile to and distrustful of corporate leadership. Executives who consider going public face an environment in which their compensation levels will be high; indeed, pay for senior executives at public companies has grown remarkably in recent years. However, because of increasingly onerous regulatory disclosure requirements, earning those rewards comes at the cost of having their pay disclosed to the public, debated by shareholders and scrutinized by the media. Companies that go public also face a growing loss of control over their own governance due to pressure to adhere to an ever-evolving list of so-called universal best practices that can run dozens of pages long. These practices exact costs but don’t generally improve results. The result is a dominant one-size-fits-all governance model that does not in fact fit many, or even most companies. The key factor creating this hostile environment is a massive intrusion by outside forces on the powers traditionally exercised by boards and executives. Corporate governance used to arise from the bargaining and experimentation of the private parties that coalesce around corporations. Now governance is frequently imposed ex post on public companies by third parties with their own agendas. Particularly problematic are third-party commercial proxy advisors, ostensibly representing the interests of institutional shareholders. Their short-term, faddish, complex, and value-harming governance practices diverge dangerously from the interests of long-term flesh-and-blood investors. The innovations over the past three decades in governance rules were designed to reduce agency costs and improve corporate performance. Those that have proven failures at doing so, and there are several, should be scrapped. Rather than helping Canada’s markets become stronger, public markets have grown substantially weaker, and rather than making Canadian companies better, we now face an environment where companies would rather sell to a foreign buyer and leave the country, than go public here. The repercussions can only be adverse for Canada.

Determinants of hospitalization in patients diagnosed with bronchiolitis in Barranquilla, Colombia

To describe the frequency of risk factors that have an impact on hospitali-zation of patients diagnosed with bronchiolitis and served in a state hospital located in Barranquilla, Colombia. A retrospective, cross-sectional, descriptive study was perfor-med. The source of information was the medical records of children who were admitted to emergency service and valued by the pediatrics service between 2016 and 2018. 865 medical records were studied. 103 of them were discarded, because they did not meet the inclusion criteria described by the study. The modifiable risk factors were the ones that presented the most in the group studied. The onset of the disease could be the most important. Inadequate exclusive breastfeeding was of great importance for the onset, as well as the severity of the disease. Chronic non-modifiable diseases are relevant because of their relationship to the onset and severity of diseases such as bronchiolitis. Low birth weight, prematurity, and heart disease have the highest valuation and were considered the most important factors in relation to the disease in the studied population. Most risk factors presented by patients could be avoided or reduced with education and strategies of improvement to the community, being able to decrease the appearance of the disease.

Anti-collusion data auction mechanism based on smart contract

Due to the uncertainty of the value of big data, it is difficult to directly give a reasonable price for big data. Auction is an effective method of distributing goods to the bidder with the highest valuation. Hence, the use of auction strategy can not only guarantee the interests of data sellers, but also conform to market principles. However, existing data auction mechanisms are centralized. It is hard to build trust among sellers, buyers and auctioneers. An open and anonymous online environment may cause entities involved in data auctions to collude to manipulate the results of data auctions. This will cause the price of auction data to fail to reach a fair and truthful level. Therefore, the first anti-collusion data auction mechanism based on smart contract is proposed. Through a well-designed anti-collusion data auction algorithm, mutual distrust and rational buyers and sellers safely participate in the data auction without a trusted third party. The data auction mechanism designed in the smart contract can effectively prevent collusion and realize the fairness and truthfulness of data auction. The webpack in the Truffle Boxes is used to implement the data auction mechanism, and the anti-collusion property of the mechanism has been verified. The source code of the smart contract has been uploaded to GitHub.

Valuation accuracy across Europe: a mass appraisal approach

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper was to compare valuation accuracy of eight European markets, using the same time period, data source and methodology. The emphasis was placed on the accuracy of held properties because previous studies showed that sold properties tend to be valued closer to the market. Real sales data was used to derive hedonic sale prices. The Heckman correction was employed to correct for sample selection bias. A comparison of simple differences between actual valuations and fitted prices showed that valuations were on average below fitted prices in all countries except the Netherlands, indicating a possible overvaluation problem of held properties in Europe. A comparison of the absolute difference showed that the Netherlands and Switzerland displayed the highest valuation accuracy. Italy and Sweden on the other hand were the markets with the lowest median valuation accuracy and largest spreads of observations. All countries, except Sweden, had a majority of observations within an absolute difference of 20%. The two most interesting conclusions from the analysis were that Germany and Switzerland did not differ significantly from other markets in terms of valuation accuracy and that Sweden was consistently the market with the lowest valuation accuracy.

Rokok dalam Aspek Sosial-Agama Masyarakat Indonesia

Cigarette has been popular among Indonesian since 8th AD. Along with the times, people are starting to realize the dangers of smoking. Interestingly in Indonesia, one of the companies with the highest valuation on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, PT HM Sampoerna, which is a market leader in the Indonesian cigarette industry with a market share of 35%. This shows that the cigarette industry is still one of the excellent industries in Indonesia. This paper will examine how the impact of external factors represented by economic, demographic, socio-cultural, religious, and governance aspects influences the cigarette industry. This study will provide an overview of external factors that provide opportunities and threats to an industry, especially the cigarette industry. The conclusions of this study will provide a form of attitude towards the influence of external conditions for the cigarette industry so that cigarette manufacturers can formulate strategic steps to maximize the opportunities created by related external aspects.

Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem and Asymmetric FPA Auctions

In this paper Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with asymmetric First price auction (FPA) has been subject of investigation. Bilateral inefficiency trade theorem versus the efficiency of the FPA auctions in which there is supposedly no dominant strategy, where bids are private information, and are made simultaneously, where highest bid wins and winning bidder pays the winning bid. This type of auction may not be Pareto efficient (this condition requires that the item is allocated to the bidder with highest valuation). But in the sealed FPA auctions highest bidder does not know other bidders’ valuations and may lose to another bidder. In the auction setting we set reserve price that causes efficiency loss and decreases probability of trade. The results are ambiguous dependent on the type of the solution method used. Three methods of solution were used: Fixed point finite difference iterations, Backward shooting method, and Constrained strategic equilibrium (C.S.E). The reserve price set was 0.5 since θ_s∈(0,1)and θ_b∈(0,1), so the buyers’ value is likely to be [0.1,1] and the sellers’ value is likely to be [0,0.9],so in such case reserve price would eliminate low bidder types. The results are ambiguous in a sense that under Backward shooting method convergence is not true, so the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem does hold which is not case under Fixed finite difference point iterations, and Constrained strategic equilibrium (C.S.E).Phenomenon known as winner’s curse occurs in a case of incomplete information.

The Impact of Valuation Heterogeneity on Equilibrium Prices in Supply Chain Networks

This paper studies bargaining in two‐sided supply chain networks where manufacturers on the demand side purchase an input from suppliers on the supply side. The manufacturers may have heterogeneous valuations on the input sold by the suppliers. In such a supply chain network, a manufacturer and a supplier must have a business relationship or “link” to bargain and trade with each other. However, a firm on one side of the supply chain network might not have a business relationship with every firm on the other side of the supply chain network. We show that valuation heterogeneity, supply and demand balance, and network structure are the main factors that influence the equilibrium prices, trading pattern, and surplus allocation in such a supply chain network. Valuation heterogeneity among manufacturers can mitigate unfavorable supply and demand balance to protect some surplus for the manufacturers and leads to higher price dispersion in the supply chain network. We demonstrate that bargaining effectively takes place in smaller subnetworks in a general supply chain network and develop an algorithm to decompose the general network into these smaller subnetworks, which simplifies the analysis of the general supply chain network significantly. We then identify types of supply chain networks that are efficient so that only manufacturers with the highest valuations are able to trade and types of links that can be added into a supply chain network to improve its efficiency.

Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects

Strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and envy-free rank mechanisms assign q identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-zero valuations. The smallest efficiency loss $$\frac{n-q}{n^{2}-n}$$ is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assign one object to each of the $$q-1$$ agents with the highest valuations, a large probability to the agent with the qth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the $$(q+1)$$ th highest valuation.

AN APPLICATION OF FULL COST ASSESSMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR

This article seeks to evaluate some plants for electricity generation existing in Brazil, among which wind, thermal, hydroelectric and nuclear power, through the Full Cost Assessment tool. Two studies were prepared, the first deals with the analysis of these plants in view of the technical-economic, environmental and social factors. The second study is the analysis of these plants in view of the cost of energy and energy production in the five Brazilian regions - South, Southeast, Midwest, North and Northeast. The final results show that in the first study the wind farm had the highest valuation, so the best option among the others. However, the second study, wind power was the one that obtained the highest valuation for the Northeast Region, and the thermoelectric and hydroelectric plants had the highest valuation for the Southeast Region.

A multiple-stimulus-without-replacement assessment for sexual partners: Purchase task validation.

The current study developed and tested a multiple-stimulus-without-replacement (MSWO) assessment for potential sexual partners for use in research on human immunodeficiency virus. College students (N = 41) first completed an MSWO assessment and then completed a hypothetical purchase task for encounters with partners identified by the MSWO as high, median, and low preference. Overall, hypothetical purchase task responding was consistent with that from the MSWO, in that the highest valuation was observed for the high-preference partner and the lowest for the low-preference partner. Potentially interesting individual differences in purchase task responding, however, were obtained; some subjects showed differentiated responding among the 3 preference levels (n = 15), whereas others similarly valued high- and median-preference partners (n = 5), and others similarly valued low- and median-preference partners (n = 18).

Auctioning Resource Rights

We review the issues involved in designing a mechanism for allocating resource rights. We focus on the case of exploration and development rights for oil and gas leases in US federal lands to highlight the trade-offs at play. The main issues concern the design of the lease contract, the design of the auction, and the supply of leases. A distinguishing feature of oil and gas leases is that the mechanism must solve not only the adverse selection problem of selecting the bidder with the highest valuation but also the moral hazard problem of ensuring that right holders make efficient investment decisions.

Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts

A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper” securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two highest valuations, yet reduce effort incentives. In view of this trade-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism.

A Combinatorial Auction-Based Mechanism for Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds

Cloud computing providers provision their resources into different types of virtual machine (VM) instances that are then allocated to the users for specific periods of time. The allocation of VM instances to users is usually determined through fixed-price allocation mechanisms that cannot guarantee an economically efficient allocation and the maximization of cloud provider's revenue. A better alternative would be to use combinatorial auction-based resource allocation mechanisms. This argument is supported by the economic theory; when the auction costs are low, as is the case in the context of cloud computing, auctions are especially efficient over the fixed-price markets because products are matched to customers having the highest valuation. The existing combinatorial auction-based VM allocation mechanisms do not take into account the user's demand when making provisioning decisions, that is, they assume that the VM instances are statically provisioned. We design an auction-based mechanism for dynamic VM provisioning and allocation that takes into account the user demand, when making provisioning decisions. We prove that our mechanism is truthful (i.e., a user maximizes its utility only by bidding its true valuation for the requested bundle of VMs). We evaluate the proposed mechanism by performing extensive simulation experiments using real workload traces. The experiments show that the proposed mechanism yields higher revenue for the cloud provider and improves the utilization of cloud resources.

Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts

A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper†securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two highest valuations, yet reduce effort incentives. In view of this trade-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism.

Combinatorial auction-based allocation of virtual machine instances in clouds

Most of the current cloud computing providers allocate virtual machine instances to their users through fixed-price allocation mechanisms. We argue that combinatorial auction-based allocation mechanisms are especially efficient over the fixed-price mechanisms since the virtual machine instances are assigned to users having the highest valuation. We formulate the problem of virtual machine allocation in clouds as a combinatorial auction problem and propose two mechanisms to solve it. The proposed mechanisms are extensions of two existing combinatorial auction mechanisms. We perform extensive simulation experiments to compare the two proposed combinatorial auction-based mechanisms with the currently used fixed-price allocation mechanism. Our experiments reveal that the combinatorial auction-based mechanisms can significantly improve the allocation efficiency while generating higher revenue for the cloud providers.

Selling an asset to a competitor

A seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers. The seller and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if the other possesses the item. We show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2, who does not interact ex post with the seller, and in particular bidder 1 may not obtain the good even if his valuation is highest. The auction is therefore subject to resale. When resale is possible, the seller must distort the original auction. We show that the mechanism depends crucially on the way resale is organized ex post. The seller may decide to always allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation when rents are fully extracted by an intermediary on the resale market. However, she may resort to a stochastic mechanism when the winner of the primary auction has full bargaining power in the resale stage.