Higher Pay-performance Sensitivity Research Articles

How Does Risk Tolerance Reflected in National Culture Affect Pay-Performance Sensitivity?

ABSTRACTThe standard principal-agent model predicts that, ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists between firm risk and CEO incentives or pay-performance sensitivity. We examine how a CEO’s risk tolerance (captured by national culture) affects pay-performance sensitivity using international data from 29 countries. We find that CEOs from countries with high (low) risk tolerance are associated with high (low) pay-performance sensitivity, suggesting that they require a low (high) risk premium. We contribute to the CEO compensation literature by introducing CEO risk tolerance, an overlooked factor, into CEO compensation contracts.

Why more restricted stocks, less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?

This paper provides an empirical explanation of the more frequent use of restricted stock plans for executives than stock option plans, to reveal the determinants of a restricted stock plan and understand its subsequent effects. We find that firms with higher growth opportunity, smaller size, higher executive ownership, smaller rent-seeking probably, and dividend payment prefer to grant restricted stock plans. Moreover, the preference of regulators drives the tendency of using restricted stock plans, designed to have higher pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and lower pay-risk sensitivity (vega). Under the intensive regulation, the restricted stock plans designed by firms with executive ownerships and large agency debt costs are more sensitive to risk. As a result, granting restricted stock plans rather than stock options helps improve firm performance and the preference of regulators on restricted stock plans can also enhance firm performance and decrease firm risks.

Short-Termism Spillovers from the Financial Industry

Abstract To meet short-term benchmarks, lenders may alter their monitoring behavior, providing a channel for short-termism to spill over to their borrowers. We find that short-termist lenders are significantly more likely to enforce covenant breaches. This behavior is pronounced when performance benchmarks are precise or salient, and when managers have high pay-performance sensitivity, but not when they face strong shareholder governance. Affected borrowers are more likely to switch lenders, pay higher spreads on renegotiated loans, and reduce investment. Our findings suggest that bank managers trade off relationship capital for income-boosting fees and term changes from covenant enforcement to meet earnings benchmarks.

Dynamic Compensation Under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment

AbstractThis article studies dynamic compensation and risk management under cash-flow volatility shocks. The optimal contract depends critically on firms’ ability to make good on promised future payments to managers. When volatility is low, firms with full commitment ability implement high pay–performance sensitivity to motivate effort from managers, and they impose large penalties on the arrival of volatility shocks to incentivize prudent risk management. In contrast, firms with limited commitment may allow excessive risk taking in exchange for low pay–performance sensitivity. When volatility becomes high, firms with full commitment defer compensation more, whereas firms with limited commitment must expedite payments.

How and Why Do Managers Use Public Forecasts to Guide the Market?

We compare public managerial forecasts with internal forecasts collected by a large-scale government survey. Although both forecasts are mandatory, predict corporate investment, and are overoptimistic on average relative to realizations, public forecasts tend to be pessimistic relative to internal forecasts. Managers under more shareholder pressure and with higher pay-performance sensitivity are more publicly pessimistic. The relative pessimism predicts higher stock returns, positive earnings surprises, and more executive compensation. However, managers decrease pessimism when issuing secondary equity offerings and become publicly optimistic when they are financially constrained, consistent with an inter-temporal trade-off between beating managerial targets versus maintaining financial flexibility.

On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay

We study how friendly boards design the structure of optimal compensation contracts in favor of powerful CEOs. Our study yields unexpected results. First, powerful managers receive higher pay and a contract with a higher pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) if firm performance is low and vice versa. Moreover, we identify conditions where expected pay and expected PPS are both increasing in the friendliness of the board. Second, we show that friendly boards provide managers with higher salaries, more shares, but less options. Third, friendly boards offering contracts with a higher PPS also make more intensive use of relative performance evaluation (RPE). Overall, our results suggest that frequently used indicators of poor (or sound) compensation practices should be interpreted with care. Extending the scope of our model beyond executive pay, we show that powerful managers underinvest in capital but have less incentives to manage earnings.

Optimal Information Design and Incentive Contracts with Performance Measure Manipulation

We study how a firm owner motivates a manager to create value by optimally designing an information system and a compensation contract based on a manipulable performance measure. In equilibrium, the firm either implements a perfect or an uninformative system. The information system and the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of the compensation contract can be substitutes in a sense that the firm optimally combines a perfect information system with a low PPS or an uninformative system with a high PPS. Because the information design is endogenous, firms facing relatively high manipulation threat may offer financial incentives that are higher-powered than the ones offered by their peers facing lower manipulation threat. If the manager is in charge of implementing the information system, he chooses a perfect one unless the firm uses the information for internal control. The firm may prefer to commit to an internal control level before observing any information.

Compensation consultants’ reputation, non-compensation consulting services and CEO pay

ABSTRACTIn this study, we draw on the reputation and product quality literature to examine whether compensation consultants with higher reputation have incentives to provide higher-quality services in terms of CEO pay level and pay performance sensitivity (PPS). Using 1,827 US firm-year observations for 2009 and 2010, we find that consulting firms with a higher reputation, proxied by consultant size, are associated with lower compensation and higher PPS. We also find that the PPS for consultants that also provide non-compensation-related services (NCS) is significantly positive for consultants with a higher reputation, consistent with the reputation protection explanation, and significantly negative for the other consultants with a lower reputation consistent with the conflict of interest argument.

Does executive directors from controlling shareholders improve corporate governance?

PurposeThe existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement.Design/methodology/approachIn the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management.FindingsThe authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team.Originality/valueAs the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

Does CEO compensation suppress employee wages?

PurposeThis study aims to examine the impact of CEO equity-based compensation (EBC) on employee wages. It also examines the impact of EBC on average employee wages in different industries and business cycles.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) to measure for CEO EBC and run OLS models with year and industry dummies. As many firms do not report labor expenses, the authors conduct the two-step analysis as in Heckman (1979) to overcome the potential selection bias.FindingsThe authors find that CEOs with higher EBC tend to pay their employees lower wages. They also find that such an impact is more evident in non-technology firms than in technology firms. Finally, they find that CEOs with higher PPS are more likely to depress employee wages when the business cycle shows a downturn.Originality/valueNo study examines the impact of EBC on employee wages directly to date. The authors add to the existing stream of literature regarding employee wages and managerial compensation. Hence, they purport that the findings support existing literature suggesting EBC contributes to, rather than alleviates, the classic agency conflict. Finally, the evidence suggests an unexplored manifestation of that agency conflict and an additional source of CEO rent extraction.

Investments and Risk Transfers

ABSTRACTWe demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-à-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced risk premium (we label this a “risk transfer”), whereas the principal internalizes both managers' incremental risk premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers' incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. The optimal PPS, thus, trades off investment and effort incentives.

Investments and Risk Transfers

We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that, if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-a-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced premium (we label this a risk transfer), whereas the principal internalizes both managers' incremental premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers' incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. The optimal PPS thus trades off investment and effort incentives.

Managerial Power and CEO Pay

We study how the CEO's power over the board of directors affects pay levels and the structure of optimal compensation contracts and derive unexpected results. First, a more powerful CEO generally receives more pay and a contract with a higher pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) if firm performance is low. In contrast, if firm performance is high, more CEO power translates into less pay and a lower PPS. Second, considering a special case of our general model, we show that more powerful CEOs receive higher salaries, more stocks but a nonincreasing number of options. Third, we find that the presence of a powerful CEO generally leaves the optimal use of relative performance evaluation unaffected. However, we identify conditions under which the sensitivity of CEO pay to peer performance can be increasing in the CEO's power over the board. Overall, our results suggest that frequently used indicators of poor (or sound) compensation practices should be interpreted with care.

To Separate or Not to Separate Investment from Commercial Banking? An Empirical Analysis of Attention Distortion Under Multiple Tasks

In the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, a number of policy reports (Vickers, Liikanen, Volcker) proposed to separate investment banking from commercial banking to increase financial stability. This paper empirically examines one theoretical justification for these proposals, namely attention distortion under multiple tasks as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Universal banks can be viewed as combining two different tasks (investment banking and commercial banking) in the same organization. We estimate pay-performance sensitivities for different segments within universal banks and for pure investment and commercial banks. We show that the pay-performance sensitivity is higher in investment banking than in commercial banking, no matter whether it is organized as part of a universal bank or in a separate institution. Next, the paper shows that relative pay-performance sensitivities of investment and commercial banking are negatively related to the quality of the loan portfolio in universal banks. Depending on the specification, we obtain a reduction in problem loans when investment banking is removed from commercial banks of up to 12 percent. We interpret the evidence to imply that the higher pay-performance sensitivity in investment banking directs the attention of managers away from commercial banking within universal banks, consistent with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Separation of investment banking and commercial banking may indeed be associated with a reduction in risk in commercial banking.

CEO control, corporate performance and pay-performance sensitivity

Agency theory suggests that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO's compensation is an important motivation mechanism to the CEO to improve corporate performance. We develop a simple model that suggests that reverse causality should also be considered. Specifically, our model predicts that when good performance is expected, a powerful CEO will push for a contract with higher PPS. Data from 135 Israeli companies over a five-year period confirm the model's main prediction. Our empirical analysis shows that when the CEO is the chairman of the board of directors and thus is more powerful in affecting his compensation scheme, he achieves a high PPS in good periods (in terms of corporate performance), compared to similar powerful CEOs in periods of bad performance, and also compared to less powerful CEOs in good periods.

Venture Capital, Property Rights, and Managerial Compensation Contracts1

Abstract This paper investigates the impact of venture capital on managers’ compensation contracts. The results show that pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) is higher in venture-capital-backed companies than in non-venture-capital-backed companies. A higher PPS may bring managers of venture-capital-backed companies a higher extra emolument compared with that offered by other companies in the same industry. A further test shows that the positive effect of venture capital on PPS and extra emolument exists in (1) private enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and (2) in firms backed by highly reputable venture capitalists (VCs) rather than in firms backed by VCs with a low reputation. The findings indicate that even after initial public offerings (IPOs), venture capital still has a positive impact on corporate governance and affects managerial compensation contracts.

Do regulatory policies on auditing affect executive pay?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact on pay-performance sensitivity of a commitment by regulatory bodies to monitor the auditing of managers’ financial reporting. Executive incentive pay is often analysed in isolation of the regulatory environment of auditing and financial reporting; this omission implies an assumption of no significant relation between the two. In this paper, we show that the effects of an imposed mandatory audit of the auditor could reach the incentive pay of executives in the firms being audited. We construct a model to depict two distinct regulatory environments: a pre-commitment economy in which the regulator checks auditors on a random basis; and a post-commitment economy in which the regulator commits to the inspection of auditors’ work. The model predicts that a more rigorous audit environment leads to more reliable auditing and reporting, and to an increase in pay-performance sensitivity for executives. Consequently, the corresponding managerial effort under higher pay-performance sensitivity will also increase. The study provides insight into some positive aspect of the changes resulting from the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.

Too Much Pay-Performance Sensitivity?

Abstract We examine the relation between pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), the convexity of managerial compensation (Vega), and future stock risk and returns for a large sample of firms between 1992 and 2004. Higher PPS and Vega are both associated with lower future stock returns. Part of this negative relation can be explained by risk-averse managers decreasing equity risk in response to increases in PPS and Vega. However, even after correcting for lower future risk, future stock returns are negatively associated with the magnitude of option sensitivity. This finding is consistent with previous studies that link high option compensation to manager-owner agency problems.

Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?

This paper investigates how corporate governance plays a role in long-run tax management and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we add insight into the horizon problems related to executive and director compensation and show that incentive compensation provides long-term incentives to improve performance by establishing a link between higher pay-performance sensitivity and lower taxes. Second, this is one of the first papers, to our knowledge, to empirically examine the role of governance in corporate tax management from a long-term perspective in order to better understand the lasting effects of governance. We find that incentive compensation drives managers to make investments into longer-horizon pay outs such as tax management. Furthermore, we find that this investment into tax management benefits shareholders; better tax management is positively related to higher returns to shareholders. We also address the endogeneity issues of corporate governance and performance measures. Finally, our paper is unique in examining which type of tax management strategy (domestic or foreign) different firms focus on. Our results shed light into how governance can improve firm performance and increase shareholder value in the long run.

Institutional Monitoring and REIT CEO Compensation

Our objective in this paper is to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and CEO compensation structure of REITs. Based on detailed analyses of data on institutional ownership, performance, CEO and board characteristics over the 10 year period 1998–2007, we find significant evidence that large institutions influence governance through CEO compensation—greater institutional ownership is associated with greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation (higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation), and higher cash and total compensation for CEOs. Further, we find that institutions are less active when managers are performing in a superior fashion. Two important conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, similar to unregulated firms, institutional owners do act as monitors in REITs. Broadly, this result suggests that governance is necessary for REITs. Second, institutional investors set a high pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs, but are willing to pay higher cash compensation to induce managers to take risk.