Abstract
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of venture capital on managers’ compensation contracts. The results show that pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) is higher in venture-capital-backed companies than in non-venture-capital-backed companies. A higher PPS may bring managers of venture-capital-backed companies a higher extra emolument compared with that offered by other companies in the same industry. A further test shows that the positive effect of venture capital on PPS and extra emolument exists in (1) private enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and (2) in firms backed by highly reputable venture capitalists (VCs) rather than in firms backed by VCs with a low reputation. The findings indicate that even after initial public offerings (IPOs), venture capital still has a positive impact on corporate governance and affects managerial compensation contracts.
Highlights
It is widely believed that the success of the venture capital industry is an important factor for innovation and economic growth
This indicates that venture capitalists (VCs) have a greater effect on managerial pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) in private enterprises than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2
A rapid growth in the venture capital industry has been witnessed in China
Summary
为了检验假说 1 和假说 2,本文借鉴国内外研究高管薪酬―业绩敏感度的模型 (Ke et al, 2012;辛清泉,2009;方军雄,2009),建立基本模型(1),在此模型的 基础上,加入 VC 哑变量以及 VC 哑变量与业绩变量的交乘项构建模型(2)。. 模型(1)中,因变量 LNPAYi,t 为高管薪酬的自然对数,用收入最高的前三名董 事的年度薪酬总额来衡量。在稳健性的检验中,我们还分别用 CEO 的薪酬、收入 最高的前三名高管人员的薪酬总额来衡量。自变量中,PERFORMANCEi,t 为净资产 收益率(ROE),等于扣除非经常损益后的净利润与期末净资产之比。6 在稳健性检 验中,我们还用了总资产收益率(ROA)来衡量会计业绩。控制变量(CONTROLi,t) 选取了公司年末总资产的自然对数(SIZE)、年末净资产的市场价值与账面价值比 (TQ)、企业年末的资产负债率(LEV)、第一大股东持股比例(FRSHD)、一般机 构投资者持股比例(INSTI)、董事会规模(BDS)、董事长与总经理两职兼任情况 (CBD)、独立董事比例(OUTDIR)、是否为民营企业(PRIV)等变量,分别用来 控制公司的规模、成长机会、债务杠杆、一般机构投资者、公司治理、企业性质等 因素对高管薪酬合约的影响。变量 YEARt、INDj 则分别用来控制年度及行业效应。. 模 型 ( 2 ) 在 模 型 ( 1 ) 的基础上增加的两个变量分别是 VCi,t 、 VCi,t×PERFORMANCEi,t,其中 VCi,t 是哑变量,第 t 年公司的第 2 到第 10 大股东中 有风险投资机构则 VCi,t 取 值 为 1 , 否 则 为 0 。 我们关注的是交互项 VCi,t×PERFORMANCEi,t 的系数 β3 的正负方向及显著性。根据假说 1 和假说 2,我们 预期交乘项的系数为正且主要体现在民营企业样本中。. 对经理提供激励最好的方式(Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010),因为它容易受经理人无法控制的外部 因素影响。相比股票回报,会计回报对基薪与奖金有更多的影响(Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Antle and Smith, 1986)。在国内,由于国内股票市场的特殊性,股票回报很难反映公司高管的业绩, 股票回报与高管薪酬的业绩敏感度很低(权小锋等,2010;吴育辉等,2010)。所以,现有研究 基本上采用会计业绩(方军雄,2009;谢德仁等,2012;卢锐等,2011)。而且,国内股票期权 等权益激励并不普遍。综上,本文也仅采用利润指标来衡量公司业绩。. REPUTi,t 是哑变量,如果在第 t 年,参与公司的 VC 是高声誉的风险投资机构则 取值 1,否则取值 0。我们关注的是交互项 REPUTi,t×PERFORMANCEi,t 系数 β3 的正 负方向及显著性。根据假说 3,我们预期 β3 显著为正。
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