Higher-order Evidence Research Articles

Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution

Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is relevant to the epistemic status of the pertinent first-order beliefs. This helps to show why a standard argument for the rationality of epistemic akrasia does not work. Finally, I shall try to show how considerations involving Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation bear on the question of the rationality of epistemic akrasia.

Medical marijuana patient counseling points for health care professionals based on trends in the medical uses, efficacy, and adverse effects of cannabis-based pharmaceutical drugs.

The purpose of this report is to present a review of the medical uses, efficacy, and adverse effects of the three approved cannabis-based medications and ingested marijuana. A literature review was conducted utilizing key search terms: dronabinol, nabilone, nabiximols, cannabis, marijuana, smoke, efficacy, toxicity, cancer, multiple sclerosis, nausea, vomiting, appetite, pain, glaucoma, and side effects. Abstracts of the included literature were reviewed, analyzed, and organized to identify the strength of evidence in medical use, efficacy, and adverse effects of the approved cannabis-based medications and medical marijuana. A total of 68 abstracts were included for review. Dronabinol's (Marinol) most common medical uses include weight gain, chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (CINV), and neuropathic pain. Nabiximol's (Sativex) most common medical uses include spasticity in multiple sclerosis (MS) and neuropathic pain. Nabilone's (Cesamet) most common medical uses include CINV and neuropathic pain. Smoked marijuana's most common medical uses include neuropathic pain and glaucoma. Orally ingested marijuana's most common medical uses include improving sleep, reducing neuropathic pain, and seizure control in MS. In general, all of these agents share similar medical uses. The reported adverse effects of the three cannabis-based medications and marijuana show a major trend in central nervous system (CNS)-related adverse effects along with cardiovascular and respiratory related adverse effects. Marijuana shares similar medical uses with the approved cannabis-based medications dronabinol (Marinol), nabiximols (Sativex), and nabilone (Cesamet), but the efficacy of marijuana for these medical uses has not been fully determined due to limited and conflicting literature. Medical marijuana also has similar adverse effects as the FDA-approved cannabis-based medications mainly consisting of CNS related adverse effects but also including cardiovascular and respiratory related adverse effects. Finally, insufficient higher-order evidence to support the widespread use of medical marijuana was found, but a limited amount of moderate-level evidence supports its use in pain and seizure management.

Respecting all the evidence

Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence have rational bearing. This sacrifice is both costly and unnecessary. We propose a principle, Evidential Calibration, which requires rational agents to accommodate first-order evidence correctly, while allowing rational uncertainty about what to believe. At the same time, it rules out irrational tensions between epistemic levels. We show that while there are serious problems for some views on which we can rationally believe, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P”, Evidential Calibration avoids these problems. An important upshot of our discussion is a new way to think about the relationship between epistemic levels: why first-order and higher-order attitudes should generally be aligned, and why it is sometimes—though not always—problematic when they diverge.

A Dilemma for Calibrationism

The aim of this paper is to describe a problem forcalibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I argue, has the implausible consequence that, in a wide range of cases, calibrationism is theonlyconstraint on rational belief. The second version, in addition to having some puzzling consequences, is unmotivated. At the end of the paper I sketch a possible solution.

Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 88, Issue 2 p. 314-345 Article Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio University of Michigan, Ann ArborSearch for more papers by this author Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio University of Michigan, Ann ArborSearch for more papers by this author First published: 26 March 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12090Citations: 114Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume88, Issue2March 2014Pages 314-345 RelatedInformation

An Arrovian Impossibility Theorem for the Epistemology of Disagreement

According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order evidence for a proposition always suffices to determine the proper rational response to disagreement about that proposition within a group of epistemic peers. Using an analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, I shall argue that no conciliatory and pure higher-order evidence view about the epistemology of disagreement can provide a true and general answer to the question of what disagreeing epistemic peers should do after fully disclosing to each other the (first-order) reasons for their conflicting doxastic attitudes.

Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

ABSTRACTConciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).

Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement

ABSTRACTEvidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and that there are no true general principles about justified responses to disagreement other than the general evidentialist principle. I then argue that the puzzles about disagreement are primarily puzzles about the evidential impact of higher-order evidence–evidence about the significance or existence of ordinary, or first-order, evidence. I conclude by arguing that such higher-order evidence can often have a profound effect on the justification of first-order beliefs.