This paper compares the effectiveness of the fixed transaction fee strategy (F) and quality-based transaction fee strategy (Q) stipulated by a manufacturing capacity sharing platform in a capacity sharing supply chain (SC), considering the influence of capacity availability, quality fluctuation, and demand uncertainty. The SC is composed of a platform supplier with available capacity, a manufacturer releasing capacity request, and a platform operator. Game-theoretical models are built under both constant price and quantity discount price charged by the platform supplier to investigate decisions of the quality promise, the order quantity, the reserved quantity and the unit penalty, and the transaction fee rate. Through the comprehensive comparisons of equilibrium results in different models, the findings show that Q can incentivize the platform supplier to promise higher quality in each scenario, while F is always more profitable to the manufacturer. When the fixed transaction fee rate is within a specific range, F is a more profitable strategy for each SC member. F is more beneficial to the entire SC in all scenarios except the scenario with uncertain sufficiency of the platform supplier’s available capacity. When the available capacity is not excessive, the impact of quality fluctuation depends on the mean value of the random factor, and the demand uncertainty has no influence on the equilibrium solutions and profits; otherwise, the quality fluctuation exerts no impact on equilibrium solutions, and the influence of demand uncertainty depends on the stochastic distribution of demand. When adopting quantity discount pricing, the platform supplier will benefit from setting a relatively high initial price. The quantity discount pricing exerts no essential impact on the comparison results among different models and the coordination of the SC. This paper proposes the quality-target contract and its combination with the two-part tariff contract to achieve the coordination of SC under both F and Q in different scenarios.