Higher Decision Thresholds Research Articles

Teleological reasoning bias is predicted by pupil dynamics: Evidence for the extensive integration account of bias in reasoning.

Teleological reasoning is the tendency for humans to see purpose and intentionality in natural phenomena when there is none. In this study, we assess three competing theories on how bias in reasoning arises by examining performance on a teleological reasoning task while measuring pupil size and response times. We replicate that humans (N = 45) are prone to accept false teleological explanations. Further, we show that errors on the teleological reasoning task are associated with slower response times, smaller baseline pupil size, and larger pupil dilations. The results are in line with the single-process extensive integration account and directly oppose predictions from dual-processing accounts. Lastly, by modeling responses with a drift-diffusion model, we find that larger baseline pupil size is associated with lower decision threshold and higher drift rate, whereas larger pupil dilations are associated with higher decision threshold and lower drift rate. The results highlight the role of neural gain and the Locus Coeruleus-Norepinephrine system in modulating evidence integration and bias in reasoning. Thus, teleological reasoning and susceptibility to bias likely arise due to extensive processing rather than through fast and effortless processing.

Episodic Memory Retrieval Affects the Onset and Dynamics of Evidence Accumulation during Value-based Decisions.

In neuroeconomics, there is much interest in understanding simple value-based choices where agents choose between visually presented goods, comparable to a shopping scenario in a supermarket. However, many everyday decisions are made in the physical absence of the considered goods, requiring agents to recall information about the goods from memory. Here, we asked whether and how this reliance on an internal memory representation affects the temporal dynamics of decision making on a cognitive and neural level. Participants performed a remember-and-decide task in which they made simple purchasing decisions between money offers and snack items while undergoing EEG. Snack identity was presented either visually (value trials) or had to be recalled from memory (memory trials). Behavioral data indicated comparable choice consistency across both trial types, but considerably longer RTs in memory trials. Drift-diffusion modeling suggested that this RT difference was because of longer nondecision time of decision processes as well as altered evidence accumulation dynamics (lower accumulation rate and higher decision threshold). The nondecision time effect was supported by a delayed onset of the lateralized readiness potential. These results show that both, decision and nondecision, processes are prolonged when participants need to resort to internal memory representations during value-based decisions.

Explicit and implicit attitudes toward smoking: Dissociation of attitudes and different characteristics for an implicit attitude in smokers and nonsmokers.

Smoking is a global health risk for premature death and disease. Recently, addictive behaviors, like smoking, were considered to be guided by explicit and implicit processes. The existence of a dissociation between the two attitudes in nonsmokers and the causes of the differences in implicit attitudes toward smoking have not been fully investigated. We investigated the explicit and implicit attitudes toward smoking via a self-reported scale and the single category implicit association test (SC-IAT), respectively, among undergraduate and graduate health sciences students. In addition, we applied the drift-diffusion model (DDM) on the SC-IAT and examined the behavioral characteristics that caused differences in implicit attitude toward smoking between smokers and nonsmokers. The results showed the existence of a dissociation between explicit and implicit attitudes toward smoking among nonsmokers. In addition, nonsmokers had a higher decision threshold than smokers and a higher drift rate in the condition where negative words were associated with smoking. Nonsmokers engaged in SC-IAT with more cautious attitudes and responded more easily in a negative condition since it was consistent with their true attitudes. Conversely, smokers did not show a significant difference in the drift rate between the conditions. These results suggested that the differences in an implicit attitude between smokers and nonsmokers were caused by differences in evidence accumulation speed between the positive and negative conditions. The existence of dissociation between implicit and explicit attitudes toward smoking may indicate the difficulty of measuring true attitude in nonsmokers in a questionnaire survey. Additionally, the DDM results explained the difference of implicit attitude between smokers and nonsmokers; it may provide information on the mechanisms of addictive behaviors and a basis for therapy. However, whether these results are affected by cultural differences requires further investigation.

The influence of reward anticipation on conflict control in children and adolescents: Evidences from hierarchical drift-diffusion model and event-related potentials

Reward is deemed a performance reinforcer. The current study investigated how social and monetary reward anticipation affected cognitive control in 39 children, 40 adolescents, and 40 adults. We found that cognitive control performance improved with age in a Simon task, and the reaction time (RT) was modulated by the reward magnitude. The conflict monitoring process (target N2 amplitudes) of adolescents and the attentional control processes (target P3 amplitudes) of adolescents and adults could be adjusted by reward magnitude, suggesting that adolescents were more sensitive to rewards compared to children. Reward magnitudes influenced the neural process of attentional control with larger P3 in congruent trails than that in incongruent trials only in low reward condition. The result of hierarchical drift-diffusion model indicated that children had slower drift rates, higher decision threshold, and longer non-decision time than adolescents and adults. Adolescents had faster drift rates in monetary task than in social task under the high reward condition, and they had faster drift rates under high reward condition than no reward condition only in the monetary task. The correlation analysis further showed that adults’ non-decision time and decision threshold correlated with conflict monitoring process (N2 responses) and attentional control process on conflicts (P3 responses). Adolescents’ drift rates associated with neural process of attentional control. The current study reveals that reward magnitude and reward type can modulate cognitive control process, especially in adolescents.

Mutual gaze with a robot affects human neural activity and delays decision-making processes.

In most everyday life situations, the brain needs to engage not only in making decisions but also in anticipating and predicting the behavior of others. In such contexts, gaze can be highly informative about others’ intentions, goals, and upcoming decisions. Here, we investigated whether a humanoid robot’s gaze (mutual or averted) influences the way people strategically reason in a social decision-making context. Specifically, participants played a strategic game with the robot iCub while we measured their behavior and neural activity by means of electroencephalography (EEG). Participants were slower to respond when iCub established mutual gaze before their decision, relative to averted gaze. This was associated with a higher decision threshold in the drift diffusion model and accompanied by more synchronized EEG alpha activity. In addition, we found that participants reasoned about the robot’s actions in both conditions. However, those who mostly experienced the averted gaze were more likely to adopt a self-oriented strategy, and their neural activity showed higher sensitivity to outcomes. Together, these findings suggest that robot gaze acts as a strong social signal for humans, modulating response times, decision threshold, neural synchronization, as well as choice strategies and sensitivity to outcomes. This has strong implications for all contexts involving human-robot interaction, from robotics to clinical applications.

The dissociation of temporal processing behavior in concussion patients: Stable motor and dynamic perceptual timing

Temporal processing is an integral aspect of human cognition and perception. Recent studies have suggested that patients suffering from concussion exhibit a deficit in temporal processing, characterized by poor performance on a variety of timing tasks. However, the majority of studies focusing on temporal processing deficits in concussion have focused on visual timing mechanisms. As temporal processing may be dominant for auditory-based processing, and so less susceptible to noise, we investigated patients with TBI and compared them to normal healthy controls on a battery of temporal processing tasks, including paced finger tapping and temporal bisection with sub-second intervals. The results of our investigation found that traumatic brain patients were unimpaired on the paced finger tapping task, suggesting that temporal processing deficits do not extend into motor timing and rhythmicity domain. In the temporal bisection task, TBI patients maintained precision but had a significantly higher bisection point, characterized by a greater propensity to judge stimuli as “short” and were significantly slower than controls. Analysis with a drift-diffusion model of perceptual decision-making revealed that TBI patients were specifically impaired in evidence accumulation, suggesting a smaller signal to noise ratio. Specifically, it demonstrated that patients had higher decision threshold and slower drift rates for accumulating evidence in order to arrive at a decision. Patients had to surmount higher evidence thresholds to reach a decision and were slower than controls in their rate of evidence accumulation. These results suggest specific deficits in temporal perceptual decision-making may predict the neural temporal pathways that may be compromised or unaffected, paving the way for designing targeted therapies to address these impairments.

Having More Choices Changes How Human Observers Weight Stable Sensory Evidence.

Decision-making becomes slower when more choices are available. Existing models attribute this slowing to poor sensory processing, to attenuated rates of sensory evidence accumulation, or to increases in the amount of evidence required before committing to a decision (a higher decision threshold). However, studies have not isolated the effects of having more choices on sensory and decision-related processes from changes in task difficulty and divided attention. Here, we controlled task difficulty while independently manipulating the distribution of attention and the number of choices available to male and female human observers. We used EEG to measure steady-state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs) and a frontal late positive deflection (LPD), EEG markers of sensory and postsensory decision-related processes, respectively. We found that dividing attention decreased SSVEP and LPD amplitudes, consistent with dampened sensory responses and slower rates of evidence accumulation, respectively. In contrast, having more choices did not alter SSVEP amplitude and led to a larger LPD. These results suggest that having more options largely spares early sensory processing and slows down decision-making via a selective increase in decision thresholds.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT When more choices are available, decision-making becomes slower. We tested whether this phenomenon is due to poor sensory processing, to reduced rates of evidence accumulation, or to increases in the amount of evidence required before committing to a decision (a higher decision threshold). We measured choice modulations of sensory and decision-related neural responses using EEG. We also minimized potential confounds from changes in the distribution of attention and task difficulty, which often covary with having more choices. Dividing attention reduced the activity levels of both sensory and decision-related responses. However, having more choices did not change sensory processing and led to larger decision-related responses. These results suggest that having more choices spares sensory processing and selectively increases decision thresholds.

Increased decision thresholds trigger extended information gathering across the compulsivity spectrum

Indecisiveness and doubt are cognitive phenotypes of compulsive disorders, including obsessive–compulsive disorder. Little is known regarding the cognitive mechanisms that drive these behaviours across a compulsivity spectrum. Here, we used a sequential information gathering task to study indecisiveness in subjects with high and low obsessive-compulsive scores. These subjects were selected from a large population-representative database, and matched for intellectual and psychiatric factors. We show that high compulsive subjects sampled more information and performed better when sampling was cost-free. When sampling was costly, both groups adapted flexibly to reduce their information gathering. Computational modelling revealed that increased information gathering behaviour could be explained by higher decision thresholds that, in turn, were driven by a delayed emergence of impatience or urgency. Our findings show that indecisiveness generalises to a compulsivity spectrum beyond frank clinical disorder, and this behaviour can be explained within a decision-theoretic framework as arising from an augmented decision threshold associated with an attenuated urgency signal.

Neural Correlates of Decision Thresholds in the Human Subthalamic Nucleus

SummaryIf humans are faced with difficult choices when making decisions, the ability to slow down responses becomes critical in order to avoid suboptimal choices. Current models of decision making assume that the subthalamic nucleus (STN) mediates this function by elevating decision thresholds, thereby requiring more evidence to be accumulated before responding [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. However, direct electrophysiological evidence for the exact role of STN during adjustment of decision thresholds is lacking. Here, we show that trial-by-trial variations in STN low-frequency oscillatory activity predict adjustments of decision thresholds before subjects make a response. The relationship between STN activity and decision thresholds critically depends on the subjects’ level of cautiousness. While increased oscillatory activity of the STN predicts elevated decision thresholds during high levels of cautiousness, it predicts decreased decision thresholds during low levels of cautiousness. This context-dependent relationship may be mediated by increased influence of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)-STN pathway on decision thresholds during high cautiousness. Subjects who exhibit a stronger increase in phase alignment of low-frequency oscillatory activity in mPFC and STN before making a response have higher decision thresholds and commit fewer erroneous responses. Together, our results demonstrate that STN low-frequency oscillatory activity and corresponding mPFC-STN coupling are involved in determining how much evidence subjects accumulate before making a decision. This finding might explain why deep-brain stimulation of the STN can impair subjects’ ability to slow down responses and can induce impulsive suboptimal decisions.

The Civil Standard of Proof – What is it, Actually?

Common Law distinguishes two standards of proof applicable in civil and criminal matters, respectively. The criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt is much higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard used in civil cases. Continental European Civil Law, on the other hand, recognizes just one standard of full applicable in both criminal and civil cases. This study is the first to look at the standard of proof actually used by judges and judicial clerks in a Civil Law country (Switzerland). It is shown that, when asked directly, the members of court express a high decision threshold in line with legal doctrine and case law. But when Swiss judges are asked to estimate the error costs associated with each outcome and the error-cost-minimizing decision threshold is calculated based on the responses, the resulting standard is no different from the Common Law’s preponderance of the evidence standard. When using the stated degree of belief in the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations as a predictor for the grant of the plaintiff’s request in a civil action, the probability of grant is 50% at a stated conviction of only 63%. It is further shown that the decision threshold is influenced by the individual’s loss aversion, with individuals with a higher loss aversion having a higher decision threshold. No difference between the estimated decision threshold for members of the courts and members of the general population is found. The results suggest that the standard of proof actually employed by Swiss judges is not much different from the Common Law’s preponderance of the evidence standard, despite the doctrinal insistence to the contrary.

Binding, Stimulating and Blocking TSH Receptor Antibodies to the Thyrotropin Receptor as Predictors of Relapse of Graves’ Disease after Withdrawal of Antithyroid Treatment

TSH-receptor autoantibodies (TRAbs) are a valuable diagnostic tool for confirming a diagnosis of Graves' disease (GD). While there is evidence that high TRAb levels are associated with relapse of GD, whether a discrimination of TRAb into stimulating (TSAb) and blocking (TBAb) autoantibodies would benefit the clinician in terms of outcome prediction remains unclear. To address this issue, we have determined TRAb, TSAb and TBAb levels in serum samples of ninety-six euthyroid patients with GD taken four weeks after antithyroid drug withdrawal (ATDT). Forty-seven patients (49 %) underwent relapse of GD within two years. Amongst those, forty-one (87 %) had been positive for TRAb and thirty-five (74 %) for TSAb after treatment. All patients except one were negative for TBAb. The correlation between TRAb and TSAb in those treated GD patients was relatively weak (r = 0.268, p < 0.001). Based on a cut-off limit of 1.5 IU/l, the positive and negative predictive values with respect to prediction of relapse were too low for any clinical relevance (TRAb: 49 % and 54 %; TSAb: 51 % and 55 %). However, when a cut-off level above 10 IU/l was used, the positive and negative predictive values increased to 83 % and 62 %. The additional measurement of TSAb or TBAb in those samples after therapy did not add additional information, even at higher decision thresholds. In conclusion, differentiation of TRAb into TSAb and TBAb is of no help in the prediction of relapse of GD in euthyroid patients at the end of ATDT, and only high TRAb levels are associated with relapse.