Most of the project, engineering, and systems management literature has traditionally taken the approach of “one size fits all,” assuming that a universal set of management procedures can apply to all projects. The complexity of a project alone alters the management style and strategy of a project; therefore, it should become clear that no one approach can solve the problems of project management, and thus no one strategy is best for any one project (Drejer 1996). This has become even more important as there has been increasing attention on complex systems projects in the economic activities of firms, industries, and nations (Hansen and Rush 1998). Hobday, Rush, and Tidd (2000) state conventional innovation wisdom is derived from research on high volume consumer products; new evidence, models, and concepts are needed to properly understand the innovation process in complex products and systems. These complex systems are commonly characterized by customized, interconnected subsystems; carry high cost; designed for one customer; produced in low volume; require broad and deep knowledge and skills; engage multiple collaborators; involve the customer and suppliers throughout the life cycle; and have strong political considerations (Floricel and Miller 2001; Miller and Lessard 2000). The knowledge base of these systems projects is limited in the area of systems engineering, how they develop, and how they are managed. To explore this body of knowledge, this case study will use a system engineering management framework to describe the success and lessons learned of a complex systems project at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (i.e., Lunar Prospector).