The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the biggest economic cooperation initiative undertaken in the history of Pakistan. The strong fraternal bonds between Pakistan and China have, since 2015, galvanized into a shared economic future. The corridor will link China’s western region of Xinjiang to Pakistan through the Karakoram crossings, traversing Gilgit Baltistan (GB), through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and all the way to Gwadar in Balochistan at Pakistan’s south western coastline. The projects envisaged under CPEC are estimated to be worth US$ 62 billion including energy projects, railway lines, road networks, with the Gwadar port as the culmination point. Several other projects, such as Special Economic Zones (SEZs), knowledge exchanges and optic fibre network, are also part of CPEC. Financing all the CPEC projects, planned between 2015-2030, will be a huge undertaking for Pakistan’s economy, which continues to suffer from chronic structural issues, a burgeoning external debt, low revenue, negative balance of trade and negative current account deficit. While CPEC has been termed as a “game changer” for Pakistan’s economic future, it has faced criticism on account of its financial sustainability and lack of transparency, with fears that it may lead Pakistan into a Chinese “debt trap”. This research paper examines whether the issues related to financing of CPEC could outweigh the socio-economic benefits to Pakistan’s economy. A deeper examination of this topic reveals that Pakistan’s financial obligations arising out of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) include direct loan repayments of US$ 5.8 billion. This is in addition to the sovereign guarantees, subsidies and other concessions etc. that have been offered by the Government of Pakistan to Chinese firms investing in CPEC. Economic growth projections reveal that successful execution of CPEC projects will generate sufficient fiscal space for the Government to pay off these liabilities by 2035. This will be made possible due to higher growth rates, creation of employment and higher trade volume (both bilaterally with China as well as through enhanced regional trade). While there may be no “debt trap” for Pakistan from CPEC, however, policy makers in Islamabad must remain mindful that it is essentially a commercial undertaking. Pakistan, therefore, needs concrete policy measures to ensure best use of this opportunity to build its infrastructure and human capital. This paper offers several policy recommendations to the Government of Pakistan, including regular followup of progress at leadership level, pursuing regional integration to expand CPEC to Afghanistan and Central Asia, macroeconomic reforms to stabilize the economy, use of innovative methods to manage CPEC debt and liabilites, counter the negative narrative against CPEC, capacity building and technology transfer, capitalize on industrial development through SEZs, early implementation of ML-1 and inclusion of Diamer Bhasha dam in CPEC.