High-technology Exports Research Articles

T2Transfer of high technology from the united states to the soviet bloc: A public policy issue

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet-bloc states are engaged in an extensive effort in the legal as well as illegal acquisition of United States high technology. This study examines the importance to the U. S. of such losses; the manner in which the Soviets acquire our high technology; benefits of such acquisitions to the Soviet Union; steps being taken by the U. S. to reduce its loss of high technology; and the author's recommended course of action to reduce high-technology transfer. The transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union is recognized as one of our most serious national security problems. This problem is complicated, however, when considering our free enterprise system and the need to promote free trade. On the one hand high technology represents a substantial share of our current exports, while on the other, the United States has relied on technological superiority to offset the Soviet-bloc edge in military might. An equilibrium must be established to ensure protection of both economic and national defense interests of the United States. The Soviet effort to acquire U. S. high technology is broad based, supported by the Military-Industrial Commission and State Committee for Science and Technology (in legal acquisitions), as well as the Soviet Intelligence Service (in illegal acquisitions). Such techniques as review of U. S. publications, U. S.-Soviet exchange programs, as well as extensive clandestine intelligence operations, are utilized by the Soviets in obtaining our high technology. The Soviet acquisition of U. S. high technology has greatly benefited the USSR. This is clearly seen in U. S. Government estimates that the Soviets may have saved as much as $100 million in research and development of advanced microcircuitry. Several examples of savings to the Soviet defense industry as a result of high-technology transfer are elucidated in this work. In short, the Soviets have been able to save billions of defense dollars by utilizing proven U. S. designs with none of the risks experienced in the research and development of this technology. Because of the paradoxical nature of this question of high-technology transfer, U. S. Congressional reaction to renewal of the Export Administration Act of 1979 has been mixed. On one side of the aisle, there has been support of looser controls on high-technology exports to promote free trade. On the other side of the aisle, tighter controls on such exports have been supported to protect critical U. S. high technology. At the same time, the U. S. Government has undertaken steps to strengthen its agreement with the COCOM nations. Another effort undertaken by the U. S. and other Western governments is the expulsion of accused Soviet spies from various Soviet diplomatic establishments (at least 67 Soviets from January to May, 1983). Additionally, the U. S. Department of State, Defense, Commerce, and Customs, as well as the American Intelligence Community, have undertaken efforts to reduce high-technology transfer to the Soviet Union. U. S. industry has attempted to increase security of high-technology; however, because of the Defense Investigative Service's workload, the quality of background investigations on individuals, working in firms handling defense contracts, has suffered. The author recommends establishment of an ad-hoc matrix organization to integrate the resources and efforts of all of the federal agencies, as well as industry, in controlling the transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc states. The author also includes recommendations as contained in various Congressional bills. The author's suggestions are made with a view toward creating a balance necessary to the protection of our free market system and protection of the national defense of the United States.

U.S.-Sovlet technology trade: new dilemmas

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, the irksome question has been what the U.S. should and shouldn't trade with the Soviet Union. Phosphate exports were stopped almost immediately. Additional grain sales beyond the 8 million tons already being sent and contracted for through 1981 were banned. And, of course, all licenses for the export of high technology were suspended. Last week the Administration was putting the final touches on its new, stiffer guidelines for high-technology exports. But even as they were being written, doubts continued to surge through Washington whether the new rules would do any good. They were seen as only another reflection of Administration indecision, confusion, and misperception of purpose in dealing with the Soviet Union. Says Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson (D.-Ill.): In the eyes of the world the U.S. looks like fools. Princeton economist Robert Gilpin: Our allies feel they can't depend on the U.S. ...

Japan's Foreign Policy: Adjustments to a Changing Environment

THE LAST QUARTER of the 20th Century may well bear witness to an inversion in international politics by which the exercise of power and influence shifts away from those states whose industry and armaments have predominated since World War I toward a new group of actors. The outlines of this new combination have already appeared. They consist of scarce raw material and energy suppliers at the state level and multinational corporations at the transnational level. The latter provide the technology, organization, and international marketing arrangements necessary for successful industrialization, while the former control the raw materials and petroleum without which production could not occur. Insofar as the multinationals' home offices are located within the traditionally powerful states of this century, they serve to sustain the influence of those governments. Unlike traditional instruments of power such as armed forces, however, they are not creatures of their home governments and may make business and financial decisions which affect those governments' relations with others without necessarily either consulting them or following their preferences. The multinationals are autonomous actors whose behavior can influence the foreign policies of the states in which they reside as profoundly as other areas of the globe in which they do business. A country such as Japan-highly industrialized; totally dependent on the exchange of finished goods and high technology exports for

Patent Statistics as a Measure of Technical Change

This paper examines a question of long standing: How can one obtain operational indexes of inventive and innovative activity and technical change? Specifically, for a sample of fifty-seven pharmaceutical manufacturing firms, we attempt to determine how well a simple count of invention patents serves as a surrogate for two alternative measures of technical change: the number of research and development personnel employed, reflecting inputs into the innovative process, and the value of new product sales, which reflects outputs of the process.