High-level Task Force Research Articles

Universal institutional mechanism for ensuring the right to development

The article describes the institutional mechanism for ensuring the right to development at the international universal level. The functions and mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Working Group on the Right to Development, the High-level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development, the Expert Mechanism on the Right to Development, etc. are described. It is noted that the right to development is the only human right specifically mentioned in resolution 48/141 of the UN General Assembly, by which it established the position of High Commissioner and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is highlighted the functions of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in ensuring the right to development. It is described the mandate of the Working Group on the Right to Development, which includes: monitoring and analysis of progress made in the promotion and implementation of the right to development at the national and international levels, making recommendations and further analysis of obstacles to its full implementation; review of reports and any other information submitted by States, UN agencies, other relevant international organisations and non-governmental organisations on the relationship between their activities and the right to development, etc. It is noted that the High-level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development was established within the framework of the Working Group on the Right to Development to assist it in fulfilling its mandate. It is stated that the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development contributes to the realisation of the right to development by developing practical guidance to implement the right and to integrate it within development policies and programmes at local, national, regional and international levels. The functions and mandate of the Special Rapporteur are highlighted. It is described the activities of the Expert Mechanism on the Right to Development, which provides the Human Rights Council with thematic expertise on the right to development in searching for, identifying and sharing best practices with Member States and promotes the implementation of the right to development worldwide.

COVID-19 and Africa's aviation and tourism sectors: A new agenda for the future?

Although the impact of COVID-19 is inordinately enormous, there remains a lack of attention to the new governance architecture, the African Union High-Level Task Force (AU-HLTF), in Africa's aviation and tourism sectors in its wake, which this paper primarily examines. We foregrounded governance themes of political economy within the African Union High-Level Task Force (AU-HLTF) through secondary data, observing 90 key industry leaders and 10 purposively sampled semi-structured interviews. We found the insignificant priority in tourism restart via LCCs first, the incongruent holistic relationship between the restart of the aviation and tourism sectors. Secondly, the historical-geographical material relationships within the new governance framework. Thirdly, the AU-HLTF intervention is actor-biased towards the aviation sector and rooted in path dependency. A hierarchical-mixed market governing typology we propose by arguing is a steering mechanism of public sector reform that alternatively reboots a balanced path towards sustainability by prioritizing intra-tourism promoted by low-cost carriers.

The ASEAN Charter: A Commentary

The ASEAN Charter: A Commentary. By Walter Woon. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2016. Softcover: 295pp. Walter Woon's The ASEAN Charter: A Commentary is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on the ASEAN Charter, which came into force in 2008 and formally bestowed legal personality on the organization. As a lawyer, an academic and also a participant in the drafting process, Woon is able to discuss the Charter with confidence and authority. In the preface, he declares that this is not a law (p. ix) to prevent readers from expecting a run-of-the-mill legal commentary book. Indeed, is impossible to write a legal text, he states, when there is so little law (p. ix), indicating that ASEAN may not be the fully rule-based organization it aims to be. Instead he explains, provision by provision, how each article was drafted using ASEAN's diplomatic practices. Material from his previous work, Towards a Rules-Based Community: An ASEAN Legal Service, is also rehashed, resulting in some similarities. The first part of the book is dedicated to an overview of ASEAN, namely its short history, the development leading to the drafting of the ASEAN Charter and the process of drafting the document itself. Readers will benefit most from his insights in the commentary section, where the author proceeds to elaborate the background of each provision, including the key persons involved and the documents that serve as the basis for the various provisions. Notably, readers can also glean the major differences between what was previously suggested by the Eminent Persons Group--the group of experts tasked to come up with the recommendations for the ASEAN Charter--and what was actually included in the final document by the High Level Task Force, the national delegates responsible for drafting the Charter. The author compares some of the articles in the ASEAN Charter with those contained in the United Nations Charter, pointing out along the way some examples of the odd phraseology (p. 40). It seems that some of the terms which appear in the final version of the ASEAN Charter are not up to his lawyerly standard, the result, in his opinion, of non-English-speaking non-lawyers who insist on drafting legal documents by committee (p. 40). The drafting of the Charter was by and large a compromisation among ASEAN delegates representing their national interests, hence some muddled parts in the actual document. Where the provisions themselves are brief, such as the ones stating that separate ASEAN agreements will be needed to describe what the Charter already codifies, Woon also provides readers with updates of those agreements or documents designed to realize those provisions after the Charter came into force. …

The ASEAN Charter: A Commentary

The ASEAN Charter:A Commentary Andrew Harding Walter Woon Singapore: NUS Press, 2016. xi + 295 pp. ISBN: 978-981-4722-08-7 (pb) ASEAN has been in existence for almost half a century, and has progressed via a system of consultation and non-confrontation, rather than by implementation of a highly legalist structure such as that which governs the European Union. This modus operandi was often referred to as ‘the ASEAN way’. However, since 2008, when the ASEAN Charter came into effect, ASEAN has inched towards a more legalist approach. For example, a Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism was added in 2010. In a real sense, this Charter is the organization’s constitution. This book provides a thorough commentary on the Charter and, if we understand (as we should) the Charter as a major development in ASEAN’s history, it is a very timely book. In the intervening seven years several developments have made the Charter even more significant. It follows from the same author’s Towards a Rule-Based Community: An ASEAN Legal Service (2014), and Tommy Koh, Rosario Manalo and Walter Woon (eds), The Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, 2009). Walter Woon is currently David Marshall Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore, the Dean of the Singapore Institute of Legal Education, and President of the Goethe Institute Singapore. He was formerly Attorney-General of Singapore, ambassador to the European Communities and several European countries, a member of the High-Level Task Force to draft the ASEAN Charter, and a nominated Member of Singapore’s Parliament. As such he is eminently qualified to provide us with this welcome commentary. The commentary itself is embedded within a helpful historical and contextual narrative provided in the Introduction and continued in detail throughout the book, which also provides a timeline of ASEAN’s development and details of the process that led to the drafting of the Charter. Interestingly enough, this process began as early as 1974, when it was proposed by the then Philippines Foreign Minister. It took the multiple crises of 1997–8 (political change in Indonesia and Thailand; economic and environmental disaster across the region); and the adding [End Page 180] of four new members (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar), coming in at a lower level of economic development than the existing six, to propel the idea of a Charter towards realization. It was, as the express intention of the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on the Establishment of the Charter in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 showed, to create a legal and institutional basis for ASEAN, codify ASEAN norms and values, and provide for the legal identity of ASEAN itself. Naturally enough, given the prevalence in SE Asia since the 1990s of the Asian values debate on human rights, it was this topic which created the most difficulties, with member states expressing different preferences, the principal issue being whether there should be a human rights commission. The CLMV countries were against having a commission; Indonesia and Thailand wanted one; the other states took an intermediate position. This potential deal-breaker was finessed into an agreement to deal with the issue of human rights via a separately developed ‘mechanism’. In a move that proved interesting in light of further developments, a principle of rejecting unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government was modified into a general support for constitutional and democratic government (Thailand experienced a military coup in 2006, and again in 2014; Myanmar experienced its ‘saffron revolution’ in 2007). The Charter finally came into effect in December 2008. Apart from some useful appendices and the index, the balance of the book— more than 200 pages—sets out the text of each provision of the Charter in bold with a commentary by the author. The commentary provides information about the background of each portion of text, including its progenitors, comparative information, and extensive footnotes. The author discusses the controversial issue of human rights at length. His discussion reveals strongly how the settling of this issue represents a compromise between the positive and negative views and explains a good deal about the half-hearted and almost symbolic nature of ASEAN’s embrace of human rights following the ASEAN...

A Call for Change in a Changing World.

The practice of obstetrics and gynecology in the United States has changed substantially over the past 50 years, but the structure of our residency programs has not evolved at a comparable pace. The number of hours available for training during the workweek has decreased significantly, whereas the amount of essential material to learn and clinical skills to acquire has increased dramatically. The switch to minimally invasive surgical approaches has reduced the number of open abdominal cases available for training, and the aptitude required to perform difficult laparoscopic and robotic cases for benign disease is such that many programs do not have enough surgical patients to teach all of their residents how to adequately master those procedures. Obstetric patients are older and heavier than those encountered several decades ago, and the comorbidities of some of these women make their antepartum and intrapartum management extremely complex. Furthermore, the explosion of genetic knowledge has made prenatal counseling infinitely more challenging. In this commentary we review these and related issues and then address the question of whether current training programs are preparing our graduates to optimally perform in the clinical arena they will enter after finishing their residencies. Some ways in which the current system could be modified are suggested, and a plea is made for the creation of a high-level task force to address this problem on a national level.

The Taming of the Shrill: From Indicators to Indicatorization

This article addresses the specific norm-generation function of indicators in a human rights context, focusing on ways that indicators foreground and legitimize as ‘truth’ particular worldviews or values. It describes the stakes of this process through elaborating on the concept of ‘indicatorization’, focusing on one moment in which the relationship between human rights and development was defined through indicators: the indicatorization of the Right to Development by a un High Level Task Force in 2010. In this initiative, different perspectives on human rights, equality, participation and development from within the un and the World Bank were brought together. This resulted in a subtle but significant re-articulation of ideas contained in the 1986 un Declaration on the Right to Development. The article argues that how indicatorization happens, matters, and has important implications for the potential role of human rights discourse within international economic relations.

Putting health policy and systems research on the map

Putting health policy and systems research on the map

Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems: what next?

The high-level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems was set up in 2008 and chaired by Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Robert Zoellick, President of The World Bank. Its aim was to identify innovative and additional sources of funding for health systems strengthening in the 49 lowest-income countries of the world. The taskforce delivered its final recommendations in September 2009 together with two detailed working group papers.1,2 Here we summarize the main outputs and recommendations of the taskforce according to three areas: (i) costing the financing gap; (ii) new and innovative sources of finance; and (iii) making development assistance for health work better (Box 1). We then examine their limitations and propose further actions for the international health community. Box 1 Summary of recommendations by the high-level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems3 New sources of finance: Extend the mandatory solidarity levy on airline tickets to more countries (currently in place in several countries and used primarily to finance paediatric AIDS treatment through UNITAID); Explore the viability of levies on tobacco and currency transactions; Encourage voluntary private giving through: (i) voluntary levies on the purchase of airline tickets and mobile phone minutes (expected to raise US$ 3.2 billion by 2015); and (ii) a scheme called a “de-tax” which would earmark a share of value added tax receipts when participating businesses agree to add a share of their profits (estimated potential of US$ 220 million in 2010); Secure more private investment in health systems through establishing capital/risk mitigation fund(s). Out-sourcing to non-government providers and encouraging greater use of advanced market commitments, such as for vaccine purchases, were also mentioned as ways of securing investment from private sector actors. Making development assistance for health work better: More frontloading (i.e. concentrating payments at the beginning of an agreement) and predictability of aid, possibly by expanding the mandate of the International Financing Facility for Immunization. Expand the use of results-based “buy-down” (use of grant funding to reduce the cost of loans when specific performance targets are met) funding and more performance-based donor funding for the health sector. Establish a common health systems funding platform for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the GAVI Alliance and The World Bank. Undertake a review of technical assistance, in view of evidence that it consumes a large proportion of aid and appears to be poor value for money. Gaps and challenges Costing Three issues stand out. The first relates to the models used for calculating the costs of scaling-up essential health services, including the assumptions on what is required to achieve that scale-up.1 The different models used by the taskforce did not just produce alternative costings, but also reflected different approaches to health systems strengthening as well as different levels of ambition. The World Health Organization (WHO)’s normative approach, for example, was bolder and advocated the simultaneous scaling-up of facility and community-based services, while The World Bank and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) were less ambitious and advocated expanding low-cost, community-based services before undertaking any strengthening or expansion of facility-based services. In addition to the confusion of having different costing models, the taskforce reveals fundamental differences in opinion about the minimum requirements to strengthen health systems and the best way to expand coverage of essential health services. The second issue is that the individual country costings used to produce an aggregated “price tag” for all low-income countries are unavailable. And yet a full and proper discussion about the best way to fund and scale-up essential health services can ultimately only be conducted at the country level. In addition, the costings generated for health systems inputs such as “governance” are novel and need further empirical testing. A disaggregation of the data by country is therefore a vital next step. Third, an implicit recommendation of the taskforce is that a significant proportion of funding should come from private expenditure, in spite of the need to reduce the burden of health expenditure on poor households. This suggests that the required future funding from governments and donors has been underestimated.

Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems: showing the way forward

When the high-level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems was launched in September 2008, with a 12-month timetable, it faced a vast array of challenges. A global financial crisis was gaining momentum, leading many to think that there was no chance of getting political support for raising additional funds for the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for low-income countries. Other challenges included differing views on how to define and handle international investments in “health systems”, concerns by some donors on the value for money of much official development assistance, and a growing number of competing priorities such as the food crisis and climate change. However, by the end of the 12-month period, a large number of world leaders met in New York to announce expanding support to several initiatives valued at more than 5 billion United States dollars (US$) in low-income countries, with a particular focus on maternal and child health services. These announcements came at the end of a year of detailed analyses by some leading figures in international health and a series of lively consultations and debates that have brought much needed energy to previously ignored areas. This paper summarizes how the taskforce was conducted, its key achievements and progress made since the work was completed. A detailed description of the challenges the workforce faced has already been published.1

Health systems financing and the path to universal coverage

Donor commitments to health have increased more than fourfold since the Millennium Declaration was signed in September 2000, reaching more than US$ 20 billion in 2008.1 Despite this, progress towards some of the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been disappointing in many settings.2 The simple act of raising more international funds cannot, by itself, achieve the Goals if the health system is too weak to support the rapid scale-up of service coverage.3 Where there are insufficient health workers and health facilities, or where people can’t obtain health care because they cannot afford to pay, supporting actions are needed. Domestic health financing systems must be robust enough to attain and sustain increased coverage. Financing for universal coverage is based on two interlinked foundations. The first is to ensure that financial barriers do not prevent people from using the services they need – prevention, promotion, treatment and rehabilitation. The second is to ensure that they do not suffer financial hardship because they have to pay for these services.4 Health services cost money and someone has to pay. Even with the recent increase in external funds for health in low-income countries, these countries still have to find almost 75% of their health funding in domestic sources. The way that countries raise those funds is critical. Direct payments required when people obtain care (e.g. user charges) prevent many people from seeking care in the first place, and may result in financial catastrophe, even impoverishment, for many.5 Improving universal coverage requires systems that raise the bulk of funds through forms of prepayment (e.g. taxes and/or insurance), and then pool these funds to spread the financial risk of illness across the population. They require health financing systems with inbuilt incentives to ensure that these funds are used efficiently and equitably. The World Health Organization’s next world health report will be on health financing and will argue that almost every country, rich and poor, can improve service coverage or financial risk protection by addressing one or more of the core tasks of a financing system – raising sufficient funds, pooling these funds to spread financial risks and spending wisely. The Bulletin of the World Health Organization has been running a series of news stories since December 2009, showing how health financing systems affect people’s lives. Reports have been published in the following order from Spain,6 China,7 Thailand,8 the Republic of Korea,9 Switzerland,10 Nigeria11 and, in this issue, the United States of America.12 In addition, some of the issues that policy-makers inevitably face as they develop their health financing systems are highlighted in perspectives published this month. In terms of raising more funds, Fryatt & Mills13 outline the main achievements of the high-level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems. They claim that it has helped maintain momentum for increased international financial support for health in low-income countries at a time of the financial crisis. In response, McCoy & Brikci14 argue that the Taskforce report was disappointing. It gave only lukewarm support to a financial transactions levy, an option targeting the banking sector, while supporting consumer taxes affecting the poorer population groups. The focus on innovative financing could also backfire by encouraging countries to renege on their commitments to provide official development assistance – in fact only a few of them have kept their international promises to date. Yates15 focuses on how funds for health are raised and makes a case for abolishing user fees, starting with services for women and children. On the other hand, Jowett & Danielyan16 claim that the debate about user-charges is not so straightforward. For example, Armenia has developed an official fee schedule for health services as a way of countering unofficial or under-the-table payments. Finally, Leatherman & Dunford17 report that microfinance increasingly provides relatively poor people, often women, with income-earning opportunities and suggests that it might also help people to access health services where they must pay for them. Many countries are very close to universal coverage and others are making good progress. The Bulletin’s articles on this topic raise fundamental questions that must be considered when thinking about how best to develop and adapt national health financing systems for universal coverage.

The Global Food Crisis: The Role of the UN in Humanitarian Assistance

The world has faced the big F’s during the past two years: Fuel, Food and the Financial crises. Though the financial crisis has taken a forefront in 2009 and signs of recession seem to be diminishing, one cannot say the same of the Global Food Crisis. Over a year has passed since the international community began to find solutions to the food crisis, unfortunately, there are more hungry people in the world than any given time in history. The impact felt all over the world, especially on those who are the most vulnerable of all populations has been tremendous. In mid 2009, FAO estimated that 1.02 billion people, almost 60 million more people than this time last year, have been plunged into hunger. While there are a number of initiatives launched by various actors all over the world, it has becoming evident that a more planned, coordinated and cohesive effort is required in finding sustainable solutions to combat the food crisis. The United Nations, as the international body mandated to lead and coordinate response to crises formed the High-Level Task Force (HLTF) on the Global Food Security Crisis under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary General. The HLTF formulated a set of short-term and long-term outcomes and actions under the Comprehensive Framework of Action (CFA) that could be followed by the international community to combat the food crisis. Complex emergencies, natural and man-made disasters have already compounded the ability of the most vulnerable populations such as women, children, refugees, displaced and poor to cope with the food crisis. This study attempts to evaluate the role taken on by the UN when providing humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable populations in the context of the Global Food Crisis. The UN has had to evolve with such complex situations and has had to re-think the way they deliver humanitarian assistance. However, this study highlights the need for the UN to change the way it works by revisiting existing humanitarian and food architecture, policies and programmes, especially in the face of the Global Food Crisis.

Financing of health systems to achieve the health Millennium Development Goals in low-income countries

Concern that underfunded and weak health systems are impeding the achievement of the health Millennium Development Goals in low-income countries led to the creation of a High Level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems in September, 2008. This report summarises the key challenges faced by the Taskforce and its Working Groups. Working Group 1 examined the constraints to scaling up and costs. Challenges included: difficulty in generalisation because of scarce and context-specific health-systems knowledge; no consensus for optimum service-delivery approaches, leading to wide cost differences; no consensus for health benefits; difficulty in quantification of likely efficiency gains; and challenges in quantification of the financing gap owing to uncertainties about financial commitments for health. Working Group 2 reviewed the different innovative mechanisms for raising and channelling funds. Challenges included: variable definitions of innovative finance; small evidence base for many innovative finance mechanisms; insufficient experience in harmonisation of global health initiatives; and inadequate experience in use of international investments to improve maternal, newborn, and child health. The various mechanisms reviewed and finally recommended all had different characteristics, some focusing on specific problems and some on raising resources generally. Contentious issues included the potential role of the private sector, the rights-based approach to health, and the move to results-based aid. The challenges and disagreements that arose during the work of the Taskforce draw attention to the many issues facing decision makers in low-income countries. International donors and recipient governments should work together to improve the evidence base for strengthening health systems, increase long-term commitments, and improve accountability through transparent and inclusive national approaches.

Can private equity deliver on equity?

In June 2009, a new Health in Africa Fund was launched by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the branch of The World Bank group mandated with supporting and expanding the private for-profit sector. This Fund will be managed by Aureos Capital, a private equity fund manager focusing on emerging markets. Through investment in small- and medium-sized private providers, the Fund will attempt to“[help] low-income Africans gain access to affordable, high-quality health services.”1 The Fund, currently supported by the IFC, the African Development Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the German development finance institution DEG, is a key component of the IFC’s US$ 1billion Africa health strategy and it targets initial commitments of US$ 100–120 million. The Fund’s establishment was inspired by the IFC’s health strategy, which entails harnessing private capital and private sector providers to improve quality and coverage of health services.2 The IFC clearly sees a potential for the private sector to improve health outcomes for the poor; less clear are the theoretical and empirical bases on which this enthusiasm is grounded. The main underlying assumptions behind a greater role of the private sector in provision of health services are: that the market can ensure optimal allocation of resources; that private firms can improve quality of care through their focus on measurable results; and that the private sector can use its flexibility to adapt to changing supply and demand factors. Market forces, however, can determine the most appropriate allocation of resources only under the assumption of perfect market conditions and in the health sector this assumption doesn’t hold. Asymmetric information between consumers (patients) and suppliers (health professionals) prevents consumers from adequately determining their own needs and making rational choices; and many key health interventions have a high propensity to positive external benefits, which tend to be under-provided by private for-profit markets.3 Economic theory also predicts that the profit-making incentive, dominant in the private sector, creates challenges to health care by segmenting access along income/quality lines. Accordingly, there is no empirical basis to argue that private providers outperform the public sector in terms of access to, quality and equity of health care.4,5 On the contrary there are concerns on the quality of privately provided care,6 as the poor generally use the lowest quality and most informal end of the private-sector spectrum.7 The new Fund is unlikely to improve access or quality of care unless it is complemented by initiatives to strengthen the public sector capacity to regulate, train, oversee and sub-contract (where appropriate) private providers, interventions that, according to a recent systematic review,8 have the potential to improve the impact of private sector provision in poor communities. In addition the Fund would also require the development of risk-pooling and subsidy mechanisms, so that privately-provided services can be offered free at the point of delivery. If it fails to do so, there is a concrete risk that the Fund, contrary to its objectives, will contribute to the entrenchment of two-tier health-care systems and to a further concentration of human and financial resources in services catering to affluent urban dwellers. The establishment of the Fund has not been accompanied by a public debate about its appropriateness and little information is available on its accountability mechanisms. A new initiative disjointed from other aid mechanisms doesn’t seem consistent with the process of streamlining the aid architecture envisaged under the International Health Partnership and related initiatives; and its focus doesn’t align with the recommendations by the High Level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems, which expressed caution on the role of the private for-profit sector.9 Making the private sector work equitably for the poor is no simple task: it is not immediately apparent that the fund manager, Aureos Capital,10 possesses sufficient experience in health financing and health systems to succeed in its objectives. The objectives of the health strategy of The World Bank (of which the IFC is part) include leveraging its comparative advantages in fostering better collaboration between the public and the private sectors.11 Strengthening stewardship and oversight capacity in the public sector to work more effectively with the private sector is a worthy endeavour. But the IFC’s raison d’etre is private sector growth. It is not clear whether, in case private sector provision is seen as an objective in itself, a sufficient focus can be kept on the public sector dimension of public–private collaboration. The new Fund’s progress should be monitored closely by a separately funded and independent third party evaluator, to ensure that its benefits truly accrue to the poor and that additional resources flowing to the private sector don’t exacerbate the loss of public sector health workers. ■

The High Level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems

‘Up to ten billion dollars a year’. That was the headline figure produced by the High Level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems, indicating the additional funding required to strengthen health systems and scale-up essential health care in 49 low-income countries (LICs) (Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems 2009). Not a lot of money, especially in the context of the bail-out of US and UK banks, or the assets of the richest 0.1% of the world’s population. Launched in September 2008, the Taskforce was established to come up with practical proposals for new and innovative sources of finance for health systems, and for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of aid to health. Two expert Working Groups were set up to produce detailed reports—one on the constraints to health systems strengthening and the costs of scaling-up essential health care, and the other on the sources of finance and the options for channelling such funding (Working Group 1, 2009; Working Group 2, 2009). Both reports cover a lot of ground and are worth reading in full before examining the report and 10 recommendations of the Taskforce itself.

The Global Food Crisis and International Agricultural Policy: Which Way Forward?

World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, World Bank, 2007; online at http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR_00_book.pdf. International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), Agriculture at a Crossroads, Island Press, 2009 (includes Global Report, Synthesis Report, Global Summary for Decision Makers, and 5 regional reports); summaries online at www.ag assessment.org/. UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, Comprehensive Framework for Action, July 2008; online at www.un.org/issues/food/ taskforce/Documentation/CFA%20Web.pdf. G8, G8 Leaders Statement on Global Food Security, July 2008; online at www .canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/assets/pdfs/G8_Leaders_Statement_Global _Food_Security-eng.pdf. Declaration of the High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy, June 2008; online at www.fao .org/fileadmin/user_upload/foodclimate/HLCdocs/declaration-E.pdf. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Rising Agricultural Prices: Causes, Consequences and Responses,” August 2008; online at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/36/41227216.pdf.

Towards a Just Institutional Order: A Commentary on the First Session of the UN Task Force on the Right to Development

A novel mechanism that brings together human rights experts with the representatives of the international development, finance and trade institutions was recently established within the United Nations (UN) under the auspices of the Working Group on the Right to Development. At its first session, this High-Level Task Force adopted a range of recommendations on challenges to the Millennium Development Goals and on the importance of human rights impact assessments. In so doing, it took some initial steps towards integrating the international law of human rights, including the framework provided by the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, into the priority areas of these other international actors. The aim of this commentary is to provide insight into the conclusions adopted by the Task Force and to highlight the contribution of the human right to development to the topics under its consideration. It also seeks to reflect on the significance of human rights law to issues that were tabled, such as, accountability for human rights at the international level, international cooperation, economic growth, and trade-offs in the allocation of resources. In concluding that the Task Force must face head on the impediments to the realisation of human rights posed by the institutional arrangements for the governance of the international economic order, the article ends by offering suggestions for its future work.

Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020: ISEAS and ASEAN‑ISIS Approaches

At the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali, ASEAN leaders have agreed to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020. The idea of an AEC was first proposed by Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in last year's ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh. The AEC is one of three pillars (the other two being the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community) that make up the ASEAN Community as declared by ASEAN leaders in the Bali Concord II. In line with the ASEAN Vision 2020, it is envisaged that the AEC will be a single market and production base with free flow of goods, services, investments, capital, and skilled labour. (1) Annexed to the Bali Concord 11, the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on ASEAN Economic Integration had unveiled bold and ambitious economic initiatives with clear deadlines (many within the next two years) to expedite the economic integration process and realize the AEC. These initiatives include: * Fast-track integration of eleven priority sectors? * Faster customs clearance and simplified customs procedures. * Elimination of barriers to trade. * Accelerated implementation of the Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) for key sectors (e.g., electrical and electronic equipment and telecommunications equipment). * Harmonization of standards and technical regulations. In the area of trade in goods, improvements in the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) Scheme Rules of Origin (ROO) will be finalized by end 2004. This would include making the ROO more transparent, predictable, and standardized and taking into account the best practices of other Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) including the World Trade Organization's (WTO) ROO. To ensure transparency on Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) and eliminate those that are barriers to trade, the following measures will be undertaken: * Establish an ASEAN Database on NTMs (by mid-2004). * Set clear criteria to identify measures that are classified as barriers to trade (by mid-2005). * Set a clear and definitive work programme for the removal of such barriers (by 2005). * Adopt the WTO agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary and Import Licensing Procedures and develop implementation guidelines appropriate for ASEAN (by end-2004). One of the most important recommendations by the HLTF was the creation of a more effective ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) with powers to make legally binding decisions in resolving trade disputes among member states. The existing DSM has yet to be used by any ASEAN member country. The number of trade disputes will likely rise significantly as the region moves towards a higher level of economic integration. Hence, a credible DSM would be absolutely critical for the AEC to succeed. By end-2004, the following measures will be undertaken to enhance the DSM: * Establish a legal unit within the ASEAN Secretariat to provide legal advice on trade disputes. * Establish the ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues in order to provide quick resolution to operations problems (similar to the EU mechanism). * Establish the ASEAN Compliance Body (modelled after the WTO Textile Monitoring Body). Besides the ASEAN-X formula, ASEAN may also use the 2+X approach where two member countries that are ready to integrate certain sectors can go ahead first. In fact, the latter approach would particularly benefit Thailand and Singapore as both countries are keen to integrate their economies before 2020. All these initiatives do seem to indicate that ASEAN is committed in getting the AEC project off the ground as soon as possible. Also, many of these initiatives were formulated with the business community in mind. For example, faster customs clearance and the harmonization of product standards and technical regulations are clearly aimed at reducing the transactions cost of doing business in the region to make it attractive to multinational corporations as well as domestic enterprises that want to become regional players. …

AIDS Task Force Fizzles Out

In November 1993, the Clinton Administration appointed with great fanfare a high-level task force to help identify and remove barriers to the development of anti-HIV drugs. The task force recently disbanded, and many of its own members acknowledge that it achieved few concrete results. Its history holds some lessons for the multitude of other efforts currently under way to reorganize the sprawling AIDS research enterprise.

The Metamorphosis of PIRO into MSRC

ABSTRACT In reaction to the March 1989 oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, the oil industry formed a high-level task force to study the problems associated with maritime transportation of petroleum. The task force recommended the creation of a Petroleum Industry Response Organization (PIRO), financed entirely by industry. This company would have three missions: response, readiness, and research and development. PIRO was conceived to fill the void in the nation's capability to manage catastrophic offshore spills of persistent oils. Bringing the PIRO concept to reality required resolving many organizational, legal, and operational issues. PIRO was originally conceived as an industry initiative. However, passage of federal legislation made the creation of an organization—broadened in scope and renamed the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC)—a necessity for those that ship and handle bulk oil in the maritime environment of the United States. The federal law also provided the states with important powers, especially in determining the liability limits that affect shippers, handlers, and responders. Original assumptions about PIRO's resources requirements for response and cleanup were adjusted as more detailed analyses were completed. MSRC has considerably more capability than was originally contemplated for PIRO. PIRO was estimated to require $250 million in its first five years to cover its operating, capital, and research and development costs. The corresponding estimate for MSRC is $800 million.