Occupational licensing laws erect barriers to entry into various labor markets, impeding the upward mobility of welfare recipients seeking to transition into employment. This paper, recognizing that labor market interventions have often been used precisely because of this effect, proceeds to examine various restrictions which directly affect low-skilled workers in the U.S. economy who now have stronger incentives to participate in labor markets in response to recent welfare policy reforms. Three distinct types of labor market restrictions are identified: (1) the licensing of professional, high-skilled occupations tends to crowd workers into lower-skilled occupations, lowering such wages and thus weakening work incentives among the welfare population; (2) quantity license restrictions (permits which set quotas limiting the overall number of suppliers in a market) suppress demand for low-skilled workers, and may substantially reduce work opportunities and, thus, incentives. Taxi license restrictions alone, for instance, may result in several hundreds of thousands of lost employment opportunities throughout the United States; and (3) quality license restrictions, where entrants face higher entry costs (typically through educational requirements above the requirements of the market), may paradoxically provide welfare recipients with enhanced opportunities for employment, particularly when coupled with job-training subsidies typically extended to welfare recipients. This we call a “de facto liberalization” of occupational licensure. While incumbent workers are certain to resist enhanced entry by welfare recipients into licensed occupations, vocational schools should aggressively support such entry, affording a possible realpolitik to the migration path envisioned. More interestingly, once entry has accelerated under de facto liberalization, occupational license rents will predictably decline, thus increasing the likelihood of explicit liberalization, and further opening labor markets to competitive entry.