Industrial Control Systems (ICS) play a vital role in industries such as oil, utilities, and manufacturing, forming the backbone of critical infrastructure. With the increasing integration of network capabilities in ICS, their exposure to cyber-attacks has grown significantly. However, due to the sensitivity of these systems, access to detailed technical information is limited, making cybersecurity research challenging. To address this, researchers have employed various physical, hybrid, and virtual testbeds to simulate and analyze cyber threats. This systematic review, conducted following PRISMA guidelines, aims to evaluate the effectiveness of these testbeds in mitigating cybersecurity risks in ICS, particularly within the context of a clean water supply system. The findings reveal that physical testbeds offer a comprehensive understanding of the behavior and dynamics of ICS components, such as sensors and actuators, under real-world conditions affected by external factors like pressure, temperature, and mechanical wear. However, physical testbeds' high cost and complexity limit their widespread use. While more cost-effective, hybrid testbeds fail to capture crucial physical dynamics, which may lead to incomplete assessments of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Virtual testbeds provide the most affordable option, offering scalability and ease of implementation. However, they deliver a limited view of ICS operations that can impair the development of accurate detection and prevention mechanisms. The results underscore the trade-offs associated with each testbed type, suggesting that an integrated approach, blending physical and virtual elements, may offer the most effective framework for cybersecurity research in ICS while balancing cost and realism.
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