High Commissioner In London Research Articles

Australia, Britain, and Alternatives to European Integration, 1960–73

From 1960 to 1973, opponents of Britain joining the European Economic Community (EEC) made an unsuccessful case for the “Commonwealth alternative” — a renewed program of economic, strategic, and political cooperation that would allow Britain to remain outside the Common Market. This article examines two of the leading proponents of this idea in Australian politics — the Liberal MP James Killen and Australia's High Commissioner in London from 1963 to 1972, Sir Alexander Downer — and examines how their arguments for cooperation among Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom relate to the historical and contemporary opposition to European integration in Britain. It further considers how the idea of a Commonwealth alternative to the EEC conflicted with the changes to immigration policy that took place in Australia and the United Kingdom during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The things that batter.

Over 20 years ago, the Australian Liberal/National Party Federal Opposition had a set of policies with which it hoped to persuade the Australian people to return it to government in the election due in 1996. This particular collection of proposed initiatives was called "The things that matter". When the then leader of the opposition, Alexander Downer (later Australia's Foreign Minister 1996-2007 and now Australian High Commissioner in London), launched the Opposition's policy on family violence (the Coalition parties, like their Labor opponents, were and are against it in principle), his introductory line was: "From the things that matter to the things that batter". Not long afterwards he lost his job as Opposition Leader, his engagement with what was and is a serious and troubling issue having been deemed too glib by half by the shapers of public opinion.

Between Vanity and Sensitiveness: Indo–British Relations During Vijayalakshmi Pandit’s High-Commissionership (1954–61)

Studies of Indo–British relations in the 1950s have been usually dominated by the personalities of Jawaharlal Nehru and, after him, VK Krishna Menon. This article instead focuses on Vijayalakshmi Pandit and her tenure as India’s High-Commissioner in London. Pandit came to London having served as Nehru’s envoy to the Soviet Union, the USA and the United Nations. Based on government records and private papers in India, Britain and America, this article shows that her time in London offers insights into the wider context of changes in Indo–British relations and presents her High-Commissionership as a microcosm of the inter-governmental relations.

‘A Century of Canadian Art’: the Tate Gallery exhibition of 1938

An exhibition of 263 works of Canadian art opened at London's Tate Gallery in October 1938. These showed how European traditions of portraiture, landscape and religious carving had interacted with Canada's geography and First Nations to create a distinct national aesthetic epitomised by the Group of Seven and Emily Carr. The exhibition had been envisioned by Vincent Massey, Canada's foremost arts patron and collector, who had lent many works to the show. He was an ardent Anglophile who, as High Commissioner in London, believed in fostering Anglo-Canadian understanding as war loomed. He had also seen the impact of cultural propaganda launched by European governments in the mid-1930s. While Canada lacked a similar programme, Massey believed that ‘the force of culture’ could promote Canada's unique identity within an imperial heritage. Modern Canadian art had been exhibited in London and Paris in the mid-1920s and critics had greatly admired works they did not completely understand. By providing a century of...

‘Cinematographic Calamity’ or ‘Soul-Stirring Appeal to Every Briton’: Birth of a Nation in England and South Africa, 1915–1931

D.W. Griffith's Birth of a Nation (1915) remains one of the most controversial films ever made, widely condemned for its offensive and racist representations of African Americans in its fictional recreation of the American Civil War and its aftermath. Whilst the reception of the film in the United States has been well documented, far less attention has been paid to the wider impact of the film outside the USA. I investigate the impact of the film in the UK and the issues this raised, shedding light on the protests that were made by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society, by Sol T. Plaatje (the well-known black South African writer and political leader who was in London at the time), and by several other concerned individuals. These protests brought the film to the attention of the British Colonial Office and the South African High Commissioner in London, W.P. Schreiner. I explore the reaction of the Colonial Office to the film, and the reasons for its decision not to recommend a blanket ban on showing the film in the colonies. W.P. Schreiner, however, took a different view, and as a result of the steps he took the film was not shown in South Africa until 1931. I then consider the reception of the film when it was eventually shown in South Africa, paying attention to the views expressed by Sol Plaatje and in the press more generally. I conclude with an assessment of the impact the film may have had on Plaatje's engagement with the medium of film, evidenced particularly in his ‘travelling bioscope’ in the 1920s and early 1930s.

Stanley Melbourne Bruce in London, 1938–41

This article examines Stanley Melbourne Bruce's role as Australian high commissioner in London during the approach to the Second World War and the European War from 1939 to 1941. It argues that Bruce in this period was an influential high commissioner who strongly influenced Australian foreign policy and exercised some influence, albeit with limitations, on the British government. After 1933, Bruce had transformed the office of Australian high commissioner in London from a largely commercial position into one with real diplomatic influence. In the approach to war, Bruce tended to bolster the policy of appeasement on which the Chamberlain government was already decided and in the Phoney War his cautious arguments contributed to the delay of the Allied intervention in Norway. With the accession of Winston Churchill to the prime ministership in May 1940, Bruce lost some of the influence he had had with Neville Chamberlain and he was on the losing side of the argument inside the British Cabinet about the possibility of a negotiated peace in May–June 1940. Despite the limitations of his personal relationship with Churchill, he was nonetheless an influential voice with other British ministers and senior officials and with the US ambassador in London and key members of the Roosevelt administration. This equipped him to play an effective part in the emerging Anglo-American alliance and issues of post-war international reconstruction.

Directing the War from Trafalgar Square? Vincent Massey and the Canadian High Commission, 1939–42

This article explores a number of key facets of Vincent Massey's tenure as Canada's wartime high commissioner in London between 1939 and 1942. Using the personal tensions and mutual suspicions which existed between Massey and the mercurial Canadian prime minister, W. L. Mackenzie King, this essay analyses how Massey and his dedicated staff coped with the increasing and punishing workload during the first three years of the Second World War. Wheat, wartime finance and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan dominated Anglo-Canadian relations during the early stages of the war when the British Empire/Commonwealth stood almost alone against the European dictators. What emerges is that, despite King's attempts to restrict Massey's authority in wartime London, the pressure of prime ministerial work in Ottawa allowed Massey, for the first time since his appointment in 1935, to exert the authority and responsibility he so desperately craved prior to the war. However, this essay is not just about high policy and the tensions between Trafalgar Square and Ottawa or within the Commonwealth alliance. Massey and his wife Alice also responded magnificently to the needs of off-duty Canadian service personnel while on leave in London. At the centre of this analysis is the changing and at times frustrating part played by the Canadian high commissioner in London and Massey's role in modernising the office of high commissioner.

Offline: 41 Portland Place

You surely have to be intelligent to be a good scientist. But at a recent reception, hosted by James R Wright, Canada's High Commissioner in London, to celebrate the 2010 Canada Gairdner Awards, Peter Ratcliffe disagreed: “confidence is important…you don't need to be intelligent”. Ratcliffe won his Gairdner for discovering the mechanism of hypoxic sensing in cells. There are many good reasons for not doing experiments, he said. It is confidence, not intelligence, that overcomes those reasons. Nick White was also a Gairdner winner, receiving his award for work on artemisinin.

Race and South African rugby: a review of the 1919 “all black” tour

In as much as British civil rugby leagues were suppressed during the First World War, rugby in military guise experienced a revival. The highlight was the Interservices Tournament in 1919 in which Great Britain and the Dominions competed for the King George V Cup. New Zealand was the eventual winner of this trophy. In South Africa the South African Rugby Board wanted to boost local rugby after a lull caused by the war. Thus they invited the New Zealand Services team to tour South Africa for six weeks on their way home. The negative aspect of this tour was the prior request of the South African Rugby Board for them not to bring any coloured players. The South African High Commissioner in London, W.P. Schreiner, extended the invitation and was satisfied with the coloureds being included in the team, but it was his son, Bill Schreiner, who voted against it at the Rugby Board meeting. The players concerned were Ranji Wilson and Parekura Tureia. This scandal would rock the rugby world only years later. The positive aspect of the tour was the new ideas and enthusiasm the tour brought to South African rugby. South African forward play and tackling were subsequently improved. It also gave new impetus to the Springboks’ desire to tour New Zealand. This tour only became a reality in 1921.Key words: Rugby; New Zealand; South Africa; 1919 “All Black” tour; Ranji Wilson; Parekura Tureia; First World War.

The Politicians and the “Pearsonalities”: The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations

Après vingt-deux ans de règne Libéral, les Conservateurs, sous John Diefenbaker, prirent le pouvoir en 1957. Ils héritèrent d'un Ministère les affaires extérieures qui avait été fortement influencé par les attitudes, les techniques et la personnalité du leader Libéral d'alors, Lester Pearson. Diefenbaker fut profondément méfiant à l'égard du présumé caractère partisan du ministère, et inquiet de l'influence que les protégés de Pearson, les Pearsonalities. Malgré son inexpérience, le premier ministre assuma d'abord la responsabilité du portefeuille, afin d'en amorcer la transformation. Même après la nomination de Sidney Smith au poste de secrétaire d'Etat, Diefenbaker continua d'être intéressé aux affaires du ministère, dont il s'occupait activement. Après la décès inattendu de Smith en 1959, le portefeuille fut confié à Howard Green, auquel le premier ministre accordait une plus grande confiance. L'auteur affirme que, dans l'ensemble, Green réussit à maintenir une saine indépendance face au contrôle de ses hauts fonctionnaires. S'ils n hésitaient pas à présenter leurs propres initiatives - l'aide à l'Afrique francophone est citée en exemple - les hauts fonctionnaires semblent avoir prudemment évité tout élément partisan. Au même moment, l'intérêt sélectif mais prononcé que le premier ministre portait à certains aspects de la politique étrangère fit que les décisions sur ces questions furent parfois soustraites à l'influence du ministère. Dans des questions telles l'appartenance de l'Afrique du Sud au Commonwealth et les relations avec l'Union soviétique, les opinions et les actions du premier ministre pouvaient avoir un effet décisif. Dans des questions de politique, comme l'entrée de la Grande Bretagne à la CEE, les fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures devaient tenir compte d'une autre influence puissante: Vintervention parfois indépendante du Haut commissaire du Canada à Londres, George Drew, qui était très respecté et qui avait accès direct au premier ministre. Cette concurrence entre les centre du pouvoir portait parfois à confusion; le meilleur exemple en est peut-être la façon dont le gouvernement a mené le débat sur les armes nucléaires. Ce débat a contribué à la démission du gouvernement et à sa subséquente défaite électorale. Les questions de politique étrangère n'ont pas dominé l'élection, mais le réputation d'indécision du gouvernement découlait largement de sa conduite en matière d'affaires extérieures. En ce sens, la façon dont Diefenbaker s'occupa des décisions de politique étrangère influença profondément l'élection.

A man for all cultures: the careers of learie constantine

Constantine (1902–1971) established himself on tour in England with the West Indies in 1928 as the first ‘superstar’ of Caribbean cricket. Employed as a professional by the Nelson club in the Lancashire League, he drew huge crowds from 1929 to 1937 and became perhaps the highest-paid cricketer in the world and one of the highest-paid sportsmen in Britain. During the Second World War he served the British Government by looking after West Indian workers in Britain for the Ministry of Labour. Afterwards he moved to London, was a highly successful broadcaster, and qualified as a barrister at the age of 52. Returning to his native Trinidad, he became chairman of Eric Williams's People's National Movement, a minister in Williams's first two administrations and finally Trinidad High Commissioner in London, resigning after a quarrel with Williams. He was elevated to the House of Lords with the title Baron Constantine of Nelson and Maraval, expressing is dual identity as Trinidadian and Black Briton. He was a principled Black Nationalist and Pan-Africanist whose historical significance has been oddly neglected, perhaps his fame was based on his prowess as the greatest entertainer among cricketers, with bat, ball and in the field. Black entertainers were acceptable in Britain during his lifetime as black politicians weren't.

Canada and War Crimes

AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, Canada found itself in a position to develop for the first time an appropriate role for a middle power in world affairs. Free of a colonialist past and committed to world peace, Canada sought to contribute to the resolution of conflict through moral suasion, mediation, and strong support for justice through international law. An active role in the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize for Canadian diplomacy during the Suez crisis in 1956, and Canada's continuing enthusiasm for peacekeeping operations are three examples frequently cited in support of this conventional wisdom. The fact that the one-worldism associated with Pearson and his Ottawa colleagues was moderated by a sharp sense of the realities of power politics is less often mention. In practice, their liberal idealism was tempered behind the scenes with a considerable scepticism about the wisdom of crusades and an emphasis on agreements among sovereign nation states as the basis of international relations. The attempt by the Allied powers to punish the 'arch villains' of the Second World War for 'crimes against humanity' is a case in point.The first warning of what was to come surfaced when Great Britain, under pressure from the governments-in-exile in London, proposed in October 1941 that the Commonwealth and Allied governments issue a formal declaration condemning German atrocities and promising punishment by organized justice: 'brutalities which are being committed in occupied countries are contrary to the dictates of humanity; are a reversion to barbarism and will meet with sure retribution... Careful record is being kept... so that in due time the world may pronounce its judgment. With victory will come retribution.'(1)The American president, Franklin Roosevelt, responded with a guarded public statement condemning what he called the frightful acts of desperate men, which only sowed the seeds of hatred and which would one day bring 'fearful retribution.' Britain's prime minister, Winston Churchill, was less cautious. He immediately declared that 'Retribution for these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major purposes of the war.' Meanwhile, the governments of the occupied countries jointly declared that punishment of those responsible for war crimes was among their principal war aims. With this encouragement, Churchill raised the issue again in his meeting with Roosevelt in July 1942; the Americans suggested establishing a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes to investigate atrocities and report from time to time to the Allied governments. On 7 October 1942, Lord Symon, Britains' lord chancellor, announced the establishment of the commission and the determination of the Allies to punish those whose 'actions violated every tenet of humanity.'Canada responded to these initiatives hesitantly and reluctantly. The Cabinet agreed in principle to support an Allied statement condemning atrocities. Vincent Massey, the Canadian high commissioner in London, would be allowed to attend the public signing ceremony for the exiled governments' joint declaration, but strictly as an observer. In general, Ottawa regarded war crimes as a European problem, of concern mainly to the occupied countries. Canada's interest in the issue was slight, at best. Moreover, talk of revenge stirred up memories of the attempt to 'Hang the Kaiser' as the chief war criminal at the end of the First World War - a misguided Imperial policy, the wisdom of which Sir Robert Borden and others had doubted at the time, and, in hindsight, sight, a fiasco.(2) The threat of retribution might have some potential utility as a weapon of political warfare, which could be used to drive a wedge between the Axis leadership and ordinary people. 'By punishing these war criminals, we are trying also to divide the German people and their leaders whom we brand as criminals,' noted one official: 'we hope that when things really start to go bad for the Axis, these people will remember our statements that we are only after the war criminal and that they will get rid of them. …

He Served: A Biography of Macu Salato (review)

Macu Salato was born in 1915 into a family of commoner status in the Moala group of Lau, Fiji. He died in Auckland in 1990 after a distinguished career in Fiji's medical services, as mayor of Suva and a member of the Great Council of Chiefs, as acting high commissioner in London, and as secretary general of the South Pacific Commission (now the Secretariat of the Pacific Community). He was an active member of the Anglican Church, and was awarded the CBE in 1973. After his term at the South Pacific Commission he spent time as a Fulbright scholar in residence at the University of Hawai'i, Mânoa, as honorary research fellow at the East-West Center and interim director of that Center's Pacific Islands Development Program.

Andrew Fisher, the High Commissionership and the Collapse of Labor

The appointment of Andrew Fisher as High Commissioner in London in October 1915 might be regarded as an early, if familiar, example of the use of that office to reward or remove a failing senior politician. In a period when Australia's external interests were still focused almost exclusively on Great Britain, however, the High Commissionership was a unique and potentially important office. Although its holders were invariably political appointees, they often made significant contributions to the conduct of Australia's external relations. The first High Commissioner, Sir George Reid (1910-16), represented the Commonwealth during an important phase in the establishment of the Royal Australia Navy and oversaw the creation of a network of trade representatives in Europe; Stanley Melbourne (Lord) Bruce (1933-45) shouldered the burden of Australia's commercial, financial and diplomatic representation throughout the 1930s.1 The term of Andrew Fisher (1916-21), however Labor's first and only appointee until 1946 was not similarly distinguished.2 The breakdown of his health and his difficulty in adapting to London were largely the reasons for this. But less personal factors were also at play. His resignation as Prime Minister in October 1915 marked a watershed in federal politics. It closed the era of the early Commonwealth with its virtual hegemony of Liberal-Protectionist and Labor governments, and commenced a realignment of political forces which left the federal parliament dominated between 1917 and 1939 by the conservative ministries of Hughes, Bruce and Lyons. The purpose of this article is to examine the ways in which Fisher's appointment and term as High Commissioner both reflected and were influenced by these changes. To a lesser degree, it also highlights the continuity in Fisher's attitude towards some of the major issues confronting the labour movement during the period: conscription, coalition with non-labour parties, and relations between Australia and the British Empire. The first part of the article analyses Fisher's role and significance as leader of the Federal Labor Party. The second examines the factors leading to his appointment as High Commissioner. The third discusses his subsequent relationship with his successor as Prime Minister, W. M. Hughes. Finally, the concluding section comments on the impact of Fisher's term on popular perceptions of the High Commissionership.

LESOTHO AND HER NEIGHBOURS

Journal Article LESOTHO AND HER NEIGHBOURS Get access J. R. L. KOTSOKOANE J. R. L. KOTSOKOANE High Commissioner in London for the Kingdom of Lesotho Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar African Affairs, Volume 68, Issue 271, April 1969, Pages 135–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a095863 Published: 01 April 1969

A Memorandum

Not all the messages to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa from its officers abroad deal with issues of foreign policy or with matters under negotiation between the Canadian and other Governments. Sometimes they are more impressionistic. What follows is a memorandum prepared in October 1947 by Mr D V LePan when he was a First Secretary on the staff of the Canadian High Commissioner in London after a trip to the Continent with the Hon. D. C Abbott, who was at that time Canadian Minister of Finance. The memorandum has been released for publication by the Department of External Affairs with only a few excisions.

African Mental Ability

No question is more vital to the future of Africa than the mental capacity of its original inhabitants, whose two main groupings are the Negro and the Bantu-speaking peoples. Nor is any question less exactly known. It was therefore with surprise that many people learned earlier this year that Colonel Deneys Reitz had made the following statement in a war review at the Guildhall in London: “I am not an anthropologist and therefore not qualified to say whether our native tribes will ever be capable of evolving up to European standards. Indeed the balance of scientific evidence appears to lean to the contrary opinion.” The Union High Commissioner in London speaks with the authority of a former South African Minister of Native Affairs. Nevertheless this statement has not gone without challenge. The following article was written at our request by the Principal of the Adams Native College in Natal, who also represents the Natives of Natal and Zululand in the South African Senate. But the subject is of such importance and such complexity that we have added an extended summary of a book by Dr. S. Bieshcuvel, a psychologist now working with the R.A.F., on “African Intelligence”.Dr. Bieshcuvel‘s work, which has been delayed by the war, is a reply to some of the “scientific evidence” cited by Colonel Reitz. Although in his article Dr. Brookes mentions other work (by Dr. van Rensburg) more recent than Dr. Fick’s, the summary may give some idea of the complexity of the work of investigation required before it acquires a true scientific validity.