Helmand Province Research Articles

Preliminary radiogenic isotope study on the origin of the Khanneshin carbonatite complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan

The REE-mineralized Khanneshin carbonatite complex in southern Afghanistan is an economically light rare earth element (LREE)-enriched carbonatite complex of Quaternary age. Geological studies have suggested that the LREE-enriched rocks at Khanneshin are comparable in grade to many economic REE deposits, including parts of the world-class Bayan Obo (China), and Mountain Pass, California (United States) deposits. The extent of mineralization at Khanneshin is unknown; however, mineralized areas delineated as part of a reconnaissance study are estimated to contain ~1.29Mt REE ore. We have determined for the first time the radiogenic isotope compositions (Pb–Sr–Nd) of bulk rocks and mineral separates (barite, strontianite, carbonate, etc.) of this carbonatite complex and propose the likely source of radiogenic isotope reservoirs associated with the REE mineralization. This study provides an opportunity to establish fundamental isotopic features of this highly mineralized system to aid in regional exploration efforts and to identify other comparable mineralized systems that shared similar source reservoirs, origins, and evolution in southern Afghanistan.The carbonatite complex consists of coarse-grained sövite and brecciated and agglomeratic barite–ankerite alvikite. Small satellitic intrusions of biotite–calcite carbonatite and rare leucite phonolite also crop out. The massif is encircled by alkali metasomatized Neogene sedimentary strata. A peripheral apron of volcanic and volcaniclastic strata extends farther away from the complex. Present-day Pb isotopic compositions of bulk rocks (dikes, welded tuffs, sövite, and mineralized rocks) and mineral separates exhibit a narrow range in 206Pb/204Pb (18.814–18.877), 207Pb/204Pb (15.616–15.674), and 208Pb/204Pb (38.892–39.094). The results show that the source region of the carbonatite had a moderate compositional variation (most samples overlapping within the level of analytical precision). Present-day neodymium isotopic compositions from the Khanneshin carbonatite show a range in 143Nd/144Nd (0.512374–0.512462). Present-day strontium isotopic compositions also have a moderate range in 87Sr/86Sr (0.708034–0.709577); the mineral separates and ore are somewhat less radiogenic in 87Sr/86Sr (0.707954–0.708686) than the whole rocks.A fundamental feature of the Khanneshin carbonatite is the overall high degree of isotopic homogeneity evident for the Nd–Sr–Pb isotopic systems and we regard this consistency as a diagnostic feature related to its evolution. The carbonatite constitutes a unique isotopic target for identification of other mineralized systems that might have shared the same source. The bulk rocks and minerals in the deposit are generally analytically isotopically indistinguishable, regardless of the mineralogical complexities. All rocks and minerals shared radiogenic isotopic reservoirs, a common evolution, and have remained in isotopic equilibrium. Isotope variations eliminate the source of MORB rocks, or depleted mantle (DMM), as a significant reservoir to the Khanneshin carbonatite. Compared to model mantle reservoirs, the Pb and Nd isotopes of the Khanneshin carbonatite roughly suggest source combinations of enriched mantle, type EMI and HIMU. Sr isotopic data highlight the contribution of another source (EMII?) to account for the relatively high values of 87Sr/86Sr. The radiogenic isotope compositions of the Khanneshin carbonatite differ from world-class REE-mineralized systems such as Bayan Obo (China) and Mountain Pass (California).

The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004-2012

In seeking to explain why and how the war in Afghanistan has dragged on, most analysis has focused on the western and Afghan government effort. In this article, we examine how the war looks from the perspective of the insurgency. Using Helmand province as a case-study, we draw on a large number of original interviews with Taliban field commanders and fighters to produce a uniquely detailed picture of the Taliban at war. In the first section, we explore how the Taliban returned to Helmand from 2004 to 2006, and show how the British made the situation far worse when they deployed forces to Helmand in 2006. In the second part of the article we examine the evolution of the Taliban insurgency in Helmand since 2006. We show how the Taliban has developed an increasingly centralized organizational structure, a more militarized shadow government and greater professionalism of field units. The overall picture that emerges is of a resilient insurgency that has adapted under immense military pressure. The Taliban have suffered very heavy attrition in Helmand, but they are far from defeated.

An unusual case of anaemia and lymphadenopathy in a soldier on deployment

We describe the case of a British soldier, originally from southeast Africa, who presented to the British military hospital in Helmand Province, southern Afghanistan, with a history of constitutional upset,...

Trauma treatment in a Role 1 medical facility in Afghanistan

BackgroundMost of the emergency care delivered in Afghanistan is currently provided by the military sector and non-governmental organisations. Main Operating Base (MOB) Price in Helmand Province has a small medical...

Medical Evacuation and Triage of Combat Casualties in Helmand Province, Afghanistan: October 2010–April 2011

Medical evacuation of combat casualties in Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan is achieved primarily by helicopter, because of distances involved as well as ground-based threats. In Helmand Province, evacuation from the point of injury may occur on a variety of helicopter evacuation platforms with disparate levels of attendant medical expertise. Furthermore, triage to a medical treatment facility may involve varying echelons of care before definitive management. Consequently, considerable differences in medical care may be encountered between point of injury and definitive treatment. We discuss the role of helicopter-based medical evacuation in Helmand, Afghanistan, as well as triage and timelines to the most appropriate medical facilities. Based on our experience and available evidence, we have made recommendations to regional commanders which favor the utilization of prehospital critical care teams aboard helicopter-based evacuation platforms and direct triage to the highest echelon of care available when feasible.

‘This place isn't worth the left boot of one of our boys’: Geopolitics, militarism and memoirs of the Afghanistan war

This paper argues for the continued significance of the text as a source and focus in critical geopolitical inquiry. It establishes the utility of the military memoir in explorations of popular contemporary geopolitical imaginaries, and considers the memoir as a vector of militarism. The paper examines the memoirs written by military personnel about service in Afghanistan with the British armed forces, specifically about deployments to Helmand province between 2006 and 2012. The paper explores how Afghanistan is scripted through these texts, focussing on the explanations for deployment articulated by their authors, on the representations they contain and promote about other combatants and about civilian non-combatants, and the constitution and expression of danger in the spaces and places of military action which these texts construct and convey. The paper then turns to consider how a reading of the military memoir with reference to the genre of testimonio might extend and inform our understanding and use of these texts as a source for exploring popular geopolitics and militarism.

Return to Combat Duty after Concussive Blast Injury

Little data exist regarding the acute assessment of blast concussion and the course of recovery in the combat zone, as most research has examined service members long after they have returned home. This manuscript examined a case series of 377 service members seen for acute concussion evaluation following medical evacuation from the battlefield in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Of these, 111 were assessed for concussion prior to their return to the continental USA for other severe physical injuries. Of the remainder, and when comparing those who returned to duty (RTD)/recovered from concussion in the combat zone and those who did not, data indicate that those who did not RTD were older and were more likely to endorse symptoms of combat stress. Quicker recovery times were associated with less severe headaches and fewer acute symptoms at the time of injury as well as the absence of combat stress reaction. Variables that were not associated with RTD and/or recovery were Military Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE) cognitive scores and whether or not individuals suffered loss of consciousness. While MACE scores were not associated with recovery, they were deemed clinically useful as a part of a serial concussion evaluation if the initial MACE was given within 6 h of the blast. Implications for battlefield concussion assessment and management as well as future research directions are discussed.

Managing Helmand province: From Bost to Bastion

A survey of the long history of Helmand province in southern Afghanistan suggests there are common patterns in the causes of violence amongst Afghans of the region. The hypothesis of this article is that there are three broad historical factors that influence outbreaks of violence and their resolution: patronage, control of land and preservation of local autonomy. Each element is in dynamic tension, and today the character of their inter-relationship has been altered by narco-profits, foreign military intervention and Afghan Government officials seeking to maximize their local power. The prospects for the province are linked intrinsically to these elements, so that, while foreign forces aim to provide a transition to Afghan Government control and security, there is every likelihood that traditional areas of dispute will reassert themselves.

‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army

This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.

Afghanistan: Voiceless and Displaced

Afghanistan: Voiceless and Displaced

The Gendering of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

February 2009, a team of women Marines first set out to meet with Afghan women in Farah province to find out what their concerns and needs might be. A number of so-called female engagement teams (FETs), haphazardly drawn together from those few women Marines already in Afghanistan (and generally assigned to other jobs which they continued to carry out), started operating in Afghanistan in subsequent months. The teams were poorly trained but highly motivated and were attached to male units mainly in the southern and eastern provinces that are known to be particularly dangerous. They began conversations with Afghan women wherever possible but were rarely part of any coordinated effort. They were often confronted with problems they had no capability to address and repeatedly failed to deliver on promises made to residents, as their mission was not the primary concern of military commanders. It was not until March 2010 that forty Marine Corps women formally began to train for duty on FETs and subsequently deployed to Helmand province in April 2010. 1The effort to deploy FETs is a recent consequence of the adoption of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine in Afghanistan.2 David Petraeus, commander of the ioist Airborne Division in Iraq in 2003-4, resurrected COIN, a traditional mainstay of colonial war fighting, as an appropriate strategy. His success with the populationcentric strategy in Mosul no doubt influenced his subsequent career, including a brief stop to supervise operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan 2010-11, as well as the later adoption of COIN, and not just in Iraq.3 The 2006 U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) outlines the key concepts of COIN doctrine. FM 3-24 repeatedly points out the limits of standard military strategy and seeks to mitigate the often unintended consequences of military force by proposing a broader strategy of development and reconstruction. Unlike pure counterterrorist warfare, the aim of which is to kill as many insurgents as possible, counterinsurgency aims to build confidence and win the hearts and minds of the population, whose support is crucial to the continuation of the insurgency the United States is trying to stop.As Laleh rChalili points out, This coding of counterinsurgency as the civilianised option which aims at winning the hearts and minds of civilian populations and persuading them to support the counterinsurgents has a particular gendered character.4 Where traditional warfare - and especially tactics often associated with counterterrorism efforts - is coded as hypermasculine, counterinsurgency is presented as the gentler, feminine option. Since the focus of the counterinsurgency is the transformation oi civilian allegiances and remaking of their social world, a further feminization is underway: In the binary categorization of war which forms the basis of mainstream discourses about war, civilian (feminine) is the opposite of combatant (masculine).5In this essay, we argue that looking at the gendering of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan provides insight into the assumptions, strategies, and anxieties about the U.S. involvement in this particular war. We see in the gendering of counterinsurgency, exemplified most strikingly in the deployment of FETs, an attempt to reframe the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan as a humanitarian, even progressive, mission. Gendering counterinsurgency efforts as a gentler (feminine) option helps to sell the current campaign to a war-weary authence in the United States (and allied countries). It is also a way of marking U.S. civilizational superiority - and the attention lavished upon FETs deployed in Afghanistan is a significant aspect of this gendered narrative.6 Besides exploring how the operational objectives of the deployment of FETs are gendered, we pay particular attention to the signaling function of their deployment directed toward authences in Afghanistan as well as citizens of the United States and its allies. …

Lower limb injuries caused by improvised explosive devices: Proposed ‘Bastion classification’ and prospective validation

BackgroundComplex lower limb injury caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has become the signature wounding pattern of the conflict in Afghanistan. Current classifications neither describe this injury pattern well, nor correlate with management. There is need for a new classification, to aid communication between clinicians, and help evaluate interventions and outcomes. We propose such a classification, and present the results of an initial prospective evaluation. Patients and methodsThe classification was developed by a panel of military surgeons whilst deployed to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Injuries were divided into five classes, by anatomic level. Segmental injuries were recognised as a distinct entity. Associated injuries to the intraperitoneal abdomen, genitalia and perineum, pelvic ring, and upper limbs, which impact on clinical management and resources, were also accounted for. ResultsBetween 1 November 2010 and 20 February 2011, 179 IED-related lower limb injuries in 103 consecutive casualties were classified, and their subsequent vascular and musculoskeletal treatment recorded. 69% of the injuries were traumatic amputations, and the remainder segmental injuries. 49% of casualties suffered bilateral lower limb amputation. The most common injury was class 3 (involving proximal lower leg or thigh, permitting effective above-knee tourniquet application, 49%), but more proximal patterns (class 4 or 5, preventing effective tourniquet application) accounted for 18% of injuries. Eleven casualties had associated intraperitoneal abdominal injuries, 41 suffered genital or perineal injuries, 9 had pelvic ring fractures, and 66 had upper limb injuries. The classification was easy to apply and correlated with management. ConclusionsThe ‘Bastion classification’ is a pragmatic yet clinically relevant injury categorisation, which describes current injury patterns well, and should facilitate communication between clinicians, and the evaluation of interventions and outcomes. The validation cohort confirms that the injury burden from IEDs in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan remains high, with most casualties sustaining amputation through or above the knee. The rates of associated injury to the abdomen, perineum, pelvis and upper limbs are high. These findings have important implications for the training of military surgeons, staffing and resourcing of medical treatment facilities, to ensure an adequate skill mix to manage these complex and challenging injuries.

Serum neutrophil gelatinase–associated lipocalin in ballistic injuries: A comparison between blast injuries and gunshot wounds

Neutrophil gelatinase–associated lipocalin (NGAL) is part of a functionally diverse family of proteins that generally bind small, hydrophobic ligands. Neutrophil gelatinase–associated lipocalin is expressed in a number of human tissues including gastrointestinal, respiratory, and urinary tracts and tends to rise in response to inflammation. For this reason, we hypothesized that levels of NGAL might be expressed at higher levels after blast injury compared with other ballistic injury. PurposeThe purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that NGAL may be a marker of injury severity in blast injury. MaterialsTwenty-three combat casualties (13 blast, 10 gunshot wounds) admitted to the multinational role 3 facility in Helmand province were studied. Serum NGAL was measured using a Biosite Triage point-of-care monitor at 5 time points after injury. ResultsNeutrophil gelatinase–associated lipocalin rose in both groups of casualties and was significantly predictive of death or renal failure at intensive care unit admission, 12 and 24 hours after injury. ConclusionsNeutrophil gelatinase–associated lipocalin is not a specific marker of blast injury but is predictive of both renal failure and poor outcome.

Afghanistan's Buried Riches

The article discusses geological research which indicates that Afghanistan has large deposits of critical minerals including rare earth metals, copper, and gold. Jack H. Medlin of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has found that the Helmand province contains deposits of cerium, neodymium, and other light rare earth metals. The article suggests that the development of mining operations in the southern part of the country, which is widely controlled by the Islamist militant group the Taliban, could help end the opium trade and create political stability. The geologist Said Mirzad discusses the Afghanistan Geological Survey.

A Gray Zone between Documentary and Fiction: Interview with Janus Metz

Janus Metz discusses his award-winning film Armadillo (2010), which he shot while embedded with a platoon of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan's Helmand province. He locates the film within the discourse of the War on Terror, the possibilities of documentary style, and the mythologies of war narratives.

Improvised Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002–2009

Homemade bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are staple weapons of conflicts in South Asia and especially Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, where the Taliban, their affiliates, and other armed groups use them to undermine recognized governments and policies. This study establishes IED trends in the Afghanistan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimroz and the Pakistani province of Balochistan between 2002 and mid-2009, using geo-referenced open source IED event information and statistical or geospatial analysis techniques. This study also furnishes assessments of specific IED technologies, techniques, and procedures (TTPs; like explosively formed projectiles or radio-controlled “spider devices”) as well as discussions of their potential causes and observable effects. There are several major trends observed: a continuous increase in volume and lethality of attacks, more expansive geographic distribution of attacks, and multiple bombing campaigns overlapping in Quetta, Balochistan province, that are perpetrated by groups with different means, tactics, and objectives. The most IED-related violence occurred in Kandahar province from 2002–2008; however, Helmand province was the leading location of bomb events by early 2009. Although large population centers—such as the cities of Kandahar, Quetta, and Lashkar Gah in Helmand province—commonly experienced effective bombings, the trans-border routes through Zaranj in Nimroz province and Spin Boldak in Kandahar province were also prone to many lethal attacks. In particular, this study both confirms and scrutinizes the so-called Iraq effect, the phenomenon of knowledge-sharing between fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even though fighters who gained experience in the Iraq insurgency provided assistance and training to Taliban fighters, the evidence indicates that some developments in IEDs predated the Iraq conflict or were original to South Asia or other conflicts in history. This evidence provides support for a more generalized and global phenomenon here called “TTP acceleration,” whereby insurgent and terrorist advances in IED capabilities take progressively shorter periods of time to develop and transfer among groups, usually as a result of increased information-sharing opportunities and coincidental alignment of group objectives.

Durzay Area, Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan

In the morning we headed out again on patrol. I looked off toward the bazaar. The Afghan flag was gone. But Saifoolah soon found a better spot for a flag: the top of what was initially just a numbered key terrain feature on our maps but is now affectionately known as Big Guss, an old ruined hilltop fortress of unknown derivation that dominates the skyline of otherwise flat farmland. We were patrolling toward Haji Hadabad Khalay, a town in Durzay indistinguishable in color from the surrounding desert, built as it is from water and earth. We walked through the dusty central square. It was the first time Americans or ANA had been there. Another Marine patrol crisscrossed the village, spray painting the compound gates, identifying them by number in accordance with our grid reference system maps.

Outcomes following military traumatic cardiorespiratory arrest: A prospective observational study

AimTo determine the characteristics of military traumatic cardiorespiratory arrest (TCRA), and to identify factors associated with successful resuscitation. MethodsData was collected prospectively for adult casualties suffering TCRA presenting to a military field hospital in Helmand Province, Afghanistan between 29 November 2009 and 13 June 2010. ResultsData was available for 52 patients meeting the inclusion criteria. The mean age (range) was 25 (18–36) years. The principal mechanism of injury was improvised explosive device (IED) explosion, the lower limbs were the most common sites of injury and exsanguination was the most common cause of arrest. Fourteen (27%) patients exhibited ROSC and four (8%) survived to discharge. All survivors achieved a good neurological recovery by Glasgow Outcome Scale. Three survivors had arrested due to exsanguination and one had arrested due to pericardial tamponade. All survivors had arrested after commencing transport to hospital and the longest duration of arrest associated with survival was 24min. All survivors demonstrated PEA rhythms on ECG during arrest. When performed, 6/24 patients had ultrasound evidence of cardiac activity during arrest; all six with cardiac activity subsequently exhibited ROSC and two survived to hospital discharge. ConclusionOverall rates of survival from military TCRA were similar to published civilian data, despite military TCRA victims presenting with high Injury Severity Scores and exsanguination due to blast and fragmentation injuries. Factors associated with successful resuscitation included arrest beginning after transport to hospital, the presence of electrical activity on ECG, and the presence of cardiac movement on ultrasound examination.

Water's role in measuring security and stability in Helmand Province, Afghanistan

The purpose of this paper is to assess the role of water in peacebuilding, cooperation and confidence building in the early phases of counterinsurgency operations in Helmand Province from Summer 2009 to Autumn 2010. For post-conflict Helmand to achieve security, it needs water to stabilize population movement, support a change from poppy cultivation to other crops, ensure food security, support public health and generate electricity. However, officials lack critical information that they need to make informed decisions about water, while counterinsurgency efforts and assistance programmes have overlooked the lead role that water can play.

The United Kingdom's stabilisation model and Afghanistan: the impact on humanitarian actors

'Stabilisation' has emerged as a powerful policy framework since 2004. The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of states adopting and developing a 'stabilisation' model and has adapted government policy, processes and structures in its efforts to deliver 'stability' in Afghanistan's Helmand Province and Iraq--as well as elsewhere, such as in Nepal and Sudan. The experience acquired in Helmand in particular is likely to shape both future UK approaches and those of other donor states. The paper argues that the UK's model has evolved significantly since 2006, from a reconstruction strategy towards one that is based on supporting host-nation governance arrangements. Consequently, this paper addresses three principal themes: the origins and conceptualisation of the stabilisation discourse (and its relationship with state-building and early recovery concepts); the role of the UK's experience in Helmand in shaping the British approach; and the impact of the stabilisation model on the humanitarian community.