No one has ever accused Heidegger of being just. To the contrary, perhaps more than any other thinker, Heidegger is accused of being decidedly unjust, and at precisely a historical moment when justice mattered the most. Most recently, Emmanuel Faye has resuscitated with fresh vitriol the charge, present already in France not long after the end of the second World War, that Heidegger's thought is so unjust - so racist, eugenic, and radically deleterious to the existence of human reason - that it ought to be pulled from the library shelves and kept at far remove from impressionable young minds.1 By no means an thesis (though perhaps breathing new life into this old issue by presenting previously un-translated lectures and letters),2 Faye's book is symptomatic of a tendency to read Heidegger's philosophical thought in light of his political involvements of the 1930s. Heidegger's thought, it is supposed, is no less unjust than were his actions. Whether or not Heidegger was just in the sense of morally righteous is an exceedingly important which this essay shall not at all address. Rather, these pages shall explore Heidegger's own rethinking of justice and the manner in which such a rethinking informed his phenomenology. Whether and to what extent such a rethinking of justice bore upon Heidegger's own political activities of the 1930s is a that shall remain here, as perhaps everywhere, undecided. Where does one look to find Heidegger's engagement with justice? At various times and in various contexts Heidegger undertook to rethink the meaning of justice in light of his destructuring of Western metaphysics. While a rigorous analysis of Heidegger's experience of justice would require a careful consideration of each of these contexts,3 for purposes of brevity the first part of this essay shall deal only with the 1942 lecture course on Parmenides wherein Heidegger deals extensively with justice in terms of the Greek understanding of d???.4 However, to simply look for occasions where Heidegger explicitly addressed justice is to miss the very point of Heidegger's rethinking of the concept. Given that Heidegger's thoughts on justice always occur alongside his reawakening of the of the meaning of Being, one must attempt to come to an understanding of justice as it relates to that general project. As a result, in order truly to follow Heidegger's rethinking of justice, one must turn to Heidegger's engagement with Being - that is, his fundamental ontology (or, as it will come to be conceived after Being and Time, his metontology).5 Heidegger himself intimates this path in his Letter on Humanism, wherein he argues that his thinking in general is concerned with original as the unity of ontology and ethics that precedes the metaphysical division and delimitation of those terms.6 That Heidegger considered ethics and ontology to be intimate neighbors is evident in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, where he claims that it is only within metontology that the question of an ethics may properly be raised for the first time.7 The sort of thinking thus intimated (if not enacted) by Heidegger is one which seeks to experience the very ground of the ontological, the ethical, the political (cf. Letter on Humanism, 259) and hence, it shall be seen, justice. If this is so, then Heidegger's fundamental ontology - that is, his phenomenology (cf. Being and Time, section 7} - would entail a rethinking of justice along the way toward a rethinking of the meaning of Being. Accordingly, one must look to Heidegger's phenomenology to see his understanding of justice at work. It is precisely to this end that the second part of this essay shall deal with one of Heidegger's most startling phenomenological analyses, that of the wine-jug offered in the 1950 essay das Ding.* In the third and final section of this essay the briefest of attempts will be made to consider how listening to Heidegger's phenomenology, itself an enactment of his own understanding of justice, might help place us into a more just relationship with our world. …