Heidegger's Philosophy Research Articles

The experience of rural midwives in dual roles as nurse and midwife: “I’d prefer midwifery but I chose to live here”

To explore and describe the experiences of working in the dual role as nurse and midwife in rural areas of far north Queensland, Australia. The methodology was informed by Heidegger's interpretive phenomenological philosophy and data analysis was guided by van Manen's analytical approach. Data was generated by conversational interviews. Eight midwives working in a dual role as midwife and nurse were interviewed individually. Three themes were identified: Making choices between professional role and lifestyle: "Because I choose to live here"; Integration of maternity and general nursing: "All in together this fine weather" and: "That's part of working in a small place". Participants recognized that in rural areas it is important to be a multi-skilled generalist; however they were concerned that midwifery skills could be eroded or even lost with the diminishing amounts of midwifery work available. Appropriate re-structuring of maternity services could provide better use of the midwifery workforce in rural centres, and reduce the current problems associated with transferring birthing mothers to larger facilities. Further research is needed to examine the extent to which the requirement to work in a dual, or multifaceted role is an impediment to the recruitment and retention of midwives to rural areas.

L’ émergence du concept de “es gibt” chez le jeune Heidegger (1919-1920)

Abstract Our goal is to point out the tremendous importance of the “es gibt” concept in heideggerian philosophy through the analysis of few texts of the 1921 to 1923 period. It will lead us to the emerging heideggerian conceptualization of phenomenology, where “seeing” means interpreting or understanding. To be able to see is the same as to be able to interpret. Right from the first courses, this terme is associated to the word “phenomenology”. What does it mean? The understanding of life as pre-theoretical sphere with the philosophy’ conceptual and objectivizing tools, included those of the husserlian phenomenology, unsatisfied Heidegger: for him, we need to emancipate ourselves from the deeply anchored obsession of theoretical. Is the phenomenological seeing not a topicalization, thus an objectivation, namely a theoretical activity? We have to regain the possibility of an a-theoretical intuition which shows a phenomenology considered in the specifics terms of the “opening to the experiential real life sphere”, as a behavior, an attitude, a “to relate to something’‘.

Reading Cassirer's philosophy of myth: early signs of Heidegger's late philosophy?

Abstract Reading Cassirer’s philosophy of myth: early signs of Heidegger’s late philosophy? In 1928, Heidegger’s book review of the second volume of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (The Mythical Thought) was published in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung. Cassirer’s text date of 1925, hence it is possible that Heidegger had read it even before the publication of Being and Time. What makes both texts worthy of a closer examination is the fact that several central motifs and terms of Heidegger’s later philosophy are already present in these two texts. Heidegger focuses particularly on Cassirer’s reflections on the representation of mana (Mana-Vorstellung) in mythical thinking. This representation involves not only the distinction between the familiar and the unfamiliar, the ‘uncanniness’ or ‘not-at-homeness’ that befalls mightily the Dasein, but also the distinction between the sacred and the profane and that of the four world regions (Weltgegenden) and its organization in form of a cross. Although not everything that Heidegger announces is interpretable as full awareness of the future impact of these traces, one would wonder if the density with which they appear would be mere accident. Thus, the article contributes to the debate on the issue of the emerging of Heidegger’s late thought and its origins which can be traced back to the stage of genesis, or rather, the final draft of Being and Time.

Negative pressure wound therapy: a study on patient perspectives

to explore patients' lived experience of using negative pressure wound therapy (NPWT). A phenomenological approach based on Heideggerian philosophy was undertaken. The study population consisted of 6 participants who had used NPWT for a minimum of 4 weeks. Semi-structured interviews were transcribed verbatim and investigated for themes using interpretative phenomenological analysis. Three superordinate themes were identified: altered sense of self, new culture of technology and leading a restricted life. Themes associated with an altered sense of self and leading a restricted life were in keeping with other wound care studies. Identification of barriers such as managing technical difficulties, practicalities of daily living, and improved understanding of NPWT for both patient and practitioner, can foster hope and reduce anxiety. Recommendations include holistic assessment of patient suitability for NPWT, education for patients and health professionals on NPWT, use of lighter, quieter devices, and the inclusion of a technology domain in future health-related quality of life studies on NPWT.

The renewal of humanism in psychoanalytic therapy.

The renewal of humanistic values and practices in contemporary psychoanalytic therapy is exemplified vividly by the impact of Heidegger's existential philosophy on a psychoanalytic perspective called post-Cartesian psychoanalysis. This perspective is a phenomenological-contextualist one in which the focus of psychoanalytic inquiry is shifted from Cartesian isolated minds to ways of being-in-the-world, and from endogenously arising drive derivatives to relationally constituted emotional experiences. A phenomenological-contextualist approach is shown to be especially fruitful in the understanding of, and therapeutic approach to, emotional trauma. The establishment of a hospitable relational home in which traumatic emotional pain and excruciating existential vulnerability can find a context of human understanding in which they can be held is crucial for therapeutic transformation.

Huebner’s Critical Encounter with the Philosophy of Heidegger in Being and Time: Learning, Understanding, and the Authentic Unfolding of History in the Curriculum

This paper responds to the following question: “What are the issues concerned with potential educational reform that arise from Huebner’s critical encounter with Heidegger and the tradition in education and curriculum theory?” In attempting a rejoinder, I revisit Huebner’s groundbreaking essay, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” which introduces the phenomenological method in education and curriculum studies, with the goal of examining in detail the underlying themes, issues, and concepts, which ground Huebner’s reconceptualization of curriculum reform, as they emerge from Heidegger’s philosophy. I show that Huebner’s understanding of Beingin-the-world in terms of the design of the educational environment, not only mirrors, but as well, embodies the flux, flow, and rhythmic dynamics of history’s “dialectic” unfolding as a temporal phenomenon, which for Heidegger represents our authentic “historizing” in the “moment of vision,” or Augenblick, and this for Heidegger is the definitive embodiment of Dasein’s authentic mode of existence as historical Being-in-the-world as Being-with Others.

THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF THE PERSON DEPENDENT ON HAEMODIALYSIS

The phenomenon of experiencing life dependent on haemodialysis is infinitely multi-faceted. It effects all aspects of people's lives, and not only their lives, but those of the people around them. Busy dialysis units often do not have time to explore these effects on the lives of their patients outside the clinical setting. The aim of this qualitative study was to step into the lives of seven patients once they were outside the dialysis unit. Seven chronic haemodialysis patients were selected and interviewed using an in-depth semi-structured approach, following the philosophy of Heidegger. Data was analysed using Colaizzi's seven-stage process. The strongest common theme emerged through descriptions of the patient's 'Sense of Self', within which emerged sub-themes; The Future Self, The Living Self, The Mortal/Fragile Self and The Growing/Learning Self. These were further explored and related back to importance of awareness of such findings within the renal haemodialysis practice setting.

Heidegger y la Ecología Profunda

In this article we try to show the untapped potential of Heidegger's philosophy as a theoretical basis for the environmental movement. We focus mainly on the environmental current known as Deep Ecology, from which Arne Naess would be the main representative. To get closer to his thinking we have used the diffusion of his work done in Spanish by Andrea Speranza.

Being in Traditional Chinese Landscape Painting

Visuality is very much a socio-cultural process. Comparing a Baroque landscape painting to a traditional Chinese landscape, one can clearly see that Baroque and ancient Chinese landscape painters perceived nature in two very distinct ways. This paper will first explore the historically and culturally specific nature of the visuality found in the ancient Chinese landscape tradition. It will go on to argue that the meaning of the ancient Chinese painters’ visualisation of nature points to a kind of being in nature which in some respects echoes Heidegger's philosophy of being. Traditional Chinese landscape painting is better known as shanshui (literally meaning mountain and water), the earliest reference to which can be traced back to the fourth century. This paper explores the perspective of ancient Chinese thoughts on nature and the emergence of shanshui as a painting tradition, and its close relationship to classical Chinese philosophy, especially Daoism. It will illustrate that shanshui reveals an experience of the conceptual rather than the visual. The theme of shanshui is thus more about being rather than seeing.

Dwelling and the Sacralisation of the Air: A note on acousmatic music

This paper adapts Martin Heidegger's philosophy of ‘dwelling’ in order to effect a liaison between acousmatic music and ecological concern. I propose this as an alternative to both the propagandist use of music as a means of protest and to using the science of ecology as a domain that might furnish new compositional means. I advance the interpretation that acousmatic music ‘occupies the air’ in ways that transform the meaning of that dimension. It allows the sky to be sky and the earth, earth. I use the precedent of bell ringing as an example of sonic activity that occupies the air in order to further dwelling.

Three Reversals in the Development of Metaphysics: Reflections on Heidegger's Theory of Metaphysics

迄今为止的西方形而上学发展史是由以下三次翻转构成的：首先是以笛卡尔、康德和黑格尔为代表的“主体性形而上学”对柏拉图主义的“在场形而上学”的翻转；其次是在主体性形而上学的内部，以叔本华、尼采为代表的“意志形而上学”对以笛卡尔、康德和黑格尔为代表的“理性形而上学”的翻转；再次是后期海德格尔的“世界之四重整体的形而上学”对其前期的“此在形而上学”的翻转。 关键词: 在场形而上学 主体性形而上学 理性形而上学 意志形而上学 此在形而上学 世界之四重整体的形而上学 So far, three reversals have occurred in the history of Western metaphysics. The first was the reversal from the “metaphysics of presence” represented by Platonism to the “metaphysics of subjectivity” represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The second occurred within the framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity and marked the transformation from the “metaphysics of reason” represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel to the “metaphysics of will” represented by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The third reversal was from the “metaphysics of being‐there” of the earlier phase of Heidegger's philosophy to his later “metaphysics of the world‐fourfold.”

Historical dictionary of Heidegger's philosophy

Historical dictionary of Heidegger's philosophy

Heidegger's technologies: postphenomenological perspectives

Heidegger is the only thinker of his generation whose philosophy of technology is still widely read today. In it, he made three basic claims. First, he asserted that the essence of technology is not technological--that technology is not a neutral instrumentality. Second, he claimed that there is a qualitative difference between modern and traditional technologies. Third and most interestingly, he claimed that technology is a metaphysical perspective, a paradigmatic view of the whole of nature. Although Martin Heidegger remains recognized as a founder of the philosophy of technology, in the last sixty years a whole new world of technologies has appeared-bio-, nano-, info-, and imaging. With technology, time moves fast. Does philosophical time move, too? How adequate is Heidegger's thinking now for understanding today's technological advances?After an extensive Introduction that places Heidegger within the thinking about technology typical of his time, the author, a prominent philosopher of technology, reexamines Heidegger's positions from multiple perspectives-historical, pragmatic, anti-Romantic and postphenomenological. His critiques invert Heidegger's essentialism and phenomenologically analyze Heidegger's favored and disfavored technologies. In conclusion, he undertakes a concrete analysis of the technologies Heidegger used to produce his writing and discovers heretofore undiscussed and ironic results. Overall, the book not only serves as an excellent introduction Heidegger's philosophy of technology and a corrective in outlining its limitations, it indicates a postphenomenological counter-strategy for technological analysis, one that would look at the production of technology in practice, based on observing its forms of embodied activity.

Getting Real with Rouse and Heidegger

Joseph Rouse has drawn from Heidegger's early philosophy to develop what he calls a “practical hermeneutics of science.” With this, he has not only become an important player in the recent trend towards practice-based conceptualisations of science, he has also emerged as the predominant expositor of Heidegger's philosophy of science. Yet, there are serious shortcomings in both Rouse's theory of science and his interpretation of Heidegger. In the first instance, Rouse's practical hermeneutics appears confused on the topic of realism. In the second instance, Rouse suppresses Heidegger's distinction between existence and essence, and hence fails to grasp the latter's corollary distinction between scientific research and everyday practice. I argue that, by accepting a correction in his interpretation of Heidegger, Rouse would find the means to resolve the debilitating tensions in his stance towards realism.

Member checking and Heideggerian phenomenology: a redundant component

Although member-checking has long been accepted as the gold standard in quantitative research, it is not the pinnacle for expressing rigour in Heideggerian phenomenology because it contradicts many o the underpinning philosophies. Similarly, employing 'experts' to confirm findings conflicts with the values of interpretivism. In this paper, th authors argue that member-checking is frequently used to cover poor interview technique or a lack of understanding of the methodology chosen to underpin the study. They debate why member-checking is incongruent with Heideggerian philosophy and suggest strategies that enhance the generation of data and render the follow-u interview redundant.

From Existence To Responsibility

RESTLESSNESS AND SUBJECTIVITY IN THE EARLY AND LATE LEVINAS Emmanuel Levinas's earliest philosophical efforts are largely influenced by his encounter with Heidegger's phenomenology, even if by 1934 Levinas becomes one of Heidegger's harshest critics. It is well known that Heidegger criticizes the alleged primacy of epistemology in Edmund Husserl's philosophy and initiates an ontological turn in phenomenology. According to Heidegger, Husserl privileges intentional consciousness - the idea that consciousness is conscious of something - and in doing so neglects the historical and environmental contexts from which all cognitive relationships emerge. In Heidegger's estimation, Husserl fails to inquire into the mode of of the being that has intentionality. Accordingly, Heidegger's phenomenology uncovers the human being's pre-theoretical involvement with the world, and the historical and environmental structures that are always already in play in each cognitive relationship with a thing. This always already constitutes the of human existence, the fact of being thrown into structures of meaning prior to any knowledge-based relationship with the world. This facticity constitutes the very concreteness of existence, a concreteness that is essentially inaccessible to cognition, but which nevertheless conditions it. Although Levinas travelled to Freiburg to study with Husserl, it was Heidegger's philosophy that shaped his thinking during his stay in Freiburg. As he later puts it in an interview, I came for Husserl and found Heidegger.1 In a 1932 article titled Martin Heidegger and Ontology, which was intended to be the introductory chapter of a book on Heidegger that was never completed,2 Levinas announces that Heidegger's philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement.3 This praise is not to be taken lightly, and despite his well-documented turn against Heidegger, even later in life Levinas appreciates his teacher's accomplishments in phenomenology. One of the central Heideggerian claims that Levinas accepts and never abandons, notwithstanding his persistent need to leave ontology behind from 1934 onwards, is that consciousness is not the defining feature of human existence. In the 1935 essay Escape, Levinas writes that the of existence precedes contemplative thought, and in taking this position he essentially agrees with Heidegger: Contemplative thought, or theory, is at bottom the behaviour of him who forever carries the mark [stigmata] of existence: theory is essentially subservient to the existent and it does not start from being, it anticipates it. Knowledge is precisely mat which remains to be done everything is completed.4 displacement of theory has significant philosophical implications for Levinas because it opens up the possibility for philosophy to examine themes and issues that are usually not considered to be philosophical. Levinas uses the terms and to refer to the kinds of issues that this approach to philosophy opens up. In the 1933 article The Understanding of Spirituality in French and German Culture, Levinas says that when Heidegger speaks about spiritual reality, he does not use the word 'consciousness,' but rather 'existence' . . . wanting to emphasize the concrete and dramatic aspects of the spirit.5 On Levinas's reading of Heidegger, human is not grounded in rationality, which is one of the cornerstones of the modern account of subjectivity, but in the very way that the individual exists concretely in the world. By virtue of this turn, philosophy is now able to talk about forms of experience usually reserved for empirical psychology: pain, sexual restlessness, the concern with death, etc. Levinas says that by taking biological life, sexual restlessness, and the fear of death as experiences worthy of philosophical attention, German thinkers such as Heidegger underline the spiritual importance of the elementary data of consciousness which Descartes and Spinoza confined to the less important levels of psychology (FGC 5). …

Philosophy’s Entanglement in Metaphysics and Ontology and Their Relationship to Science and Technology in Heideggerian Philosophy

This paper argues that science and technology have both failed to acknowledge being according to Heidegger. This failure is underscored by Heidegger in Being and Time and his post- Being and Time works. He laments that science and technology should have shown due credence to a relationship of difference between Being and beings which he calls ontological difference and that science and technology should have, likewise, placed a considerable dose of importance to a relationship of identity – a relationship between Being and the human person. This is why Heidegger has refused to call man man, but Dasein. He places man above the ambiance of rationality. To him, man is a process; he is in a process of fulfilling his mission as the guardian of Being. But this goal is somehow shattered by science and technology. To become a guardian of Being, Dasein should embrace meditative thinking rather than calculative thinking . It is Heidegger’s desire that both science and technology should have served as pathways where the being of beings and the beings of being can be gleaned through. But because of science and technology’s rigorous utility of calculative thinking , they both proceeded to deprive man of the terminal point of his existence, i.e., to become the guardian of Being. Instead, they both reduced man to a mere commodity. Technology authors the resurgence of technological beings, viz.: omputers, cell phones, microwaves, and palm pilots, fax machines, DVDs, VCDs, among others. Consequently, Heidegger laments that science and technology have succeeded in enframing (Gestell) man and eventually they both have achieved to dehumanize man. But this paper maintains that Heidegger is neither antiscience nor anti-technology. Heidegger does not deny the enormous contributions of science and technology to us. However, he is also quick to warn us of the dangers that science and technology may bring to us like inventions that intervene and disrupt the intrinsic flux of nature, including the human body, or those that could bring grand scales of destruction to life, viz.: instruments of war that could surely bring mass destruction to any form of life, hungry and deadly germs that could result from scientific experiments, specifically in bioethics. So, to dispel these disastrous effects man must engage in meditative thinking to soften the appalling and abominable blows of science and technology.

Започаткування екзистенційно-темпоральної проблематики у філософії Мартина Гайдеґера: марбурзька лекція "Поняття часу" (1924)

On the basis of Marburg lecture «The concept of time» (1924) the sources of statement and elaboration of time question in M. Heidegger's philosophy are discovered in the article. The time is examined by a thinker foremost in existentially-philosophical area which is differentiated from the religious one and opposed to the scientifically-physicalistic perspective. In this contrasting the emphasis is made on the question «How?» but not «What?» in relation to the time: on the future, but not on the present. Consequently, there is a demonstration of the philosopher's attainment of the range of problems of human's extremity and deathrate. It is presented made by M. Heidegger an approximation of temporality and existentiality, which manifests itself in the specific features of being-there (Dasein). Also, it is briefly emphasized a connection between ex-amined lecture and «Being and time».

Heidegger's Ontology of Life before Being and Time : Scope and Limits

Heidegger's Ontology of Life before Being and Time: Scope and Limits Roberto Rubio (bio) Translated by Felipe Fernández (bio) In his lecture course of summer 1926, Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger states: From the presentation of the origin of two fundamental determinations of Being, namely, and , it already became clear that thereby receives an exemplary significance. Indeed, this is precisely the first-ever phenomenological grasp of life, and it led to the interpretation of motion and made possible the radicalization of ontology. (1993, 182 / 2008, 153) 1 The cited passage asserts that Aristotle's ontology of motion attains both its motivation and its most radical orientation from the phenomenon of life. Such a statement should not be understood merely in the sense of an historical and philosophical thesis, but as a programmatic approach of Heidegger's philosophy in dialogue with Aristotle. This is suggested by the title of the chapter to which this passage belongs: "Ontology of life and of Dasein." [End Page 65] The characterization of as the exemplary meaning for Aristotle's radicalization of ontology seems to indicate the programmatic orientation of Heidegger toward organic life, more particularly animal life, in continuity with Aristotle. The quoted passage, however, is pointing in a different direction. The context of the passage shows that Heidegger is referring to considered as " in the extreme form of (1993, 175, 178 et seq.). Aristotle's radicalization of ontology from the notion of life thus consists in the foundation of all mobility and change in pure actuality and presence: . . . . Life has a , an . Life as the most proper presence at hand: presence out of itself and constantly complete . . ." (Heidegger 1993, 175 / 2008, 146). This setting out is in continuity with the developments of the Natorp-Bericht of 1922: there, Heidegger criticized Aristotle's radicalization of motion's idea toward the divine nous and theoria, opposing to it the program (also inspired by Aristotle) of a praxis-oriented ontology (1993, 385). Even when the misunderstanding regarding the initial citation and the image of Aristotle that Heidegger presents have been clarified, the question remains: Does Heidegger redirect his critique of Aristotle's notion of toward his own reelaboration of the issue? In other words, is there, accompanying his destruction, a construction of an ontology oriented to life as ? 2 This issue has particular relevance in the light of current ontological debates regarding life, characterized both by a criticism of the anthropocentric orientation and by a renewed interest in animality (see, for example: Agamben 2002; Derrida 2006; Barbaras 2008; Garrido 2009). 1.Early Heideggerian Reception of Aristotle's Ontology Young Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle, just like that of other philosophical referents, combines a double gesture: destructive and constructive. The pars destruens includes at least the following operations: a study of the transmission of concepts and conceptions to be interpreted and oriented to clarify their historical-problematical context; the critique of the internal limits of the conception to be interpreted; and the indication of strategies [End Page 66] or approaches that, even when not explicitly present in the interpretandum, may shed light on it. For its part, this task of démontage carries in itself the impulse for the constructive assimilation of the interpreted conception toward a new proposal. Heidegger's destructive-constructive reception of Aristotle states that the ontology of the Stagirite as a whole is fundamentally oriented toward , that is, toward the motion or process oriented to an end ( ). Even when Aristotle makes a distinction between moved beings proper to the sublunary world and incorruptible beings proper to the superior region, extending to the Unmoved Mover, Heidegger understands that such a distinction only makes sense from the question of processual motion and its origin. Aristotle's ontology revisited thus consists in a "pandynamics . . . of Being in general" (1993, 170 / 2008, 143). 3 Heidegger's next step in his transformative reception of Aristotle consists in showing that the universal ontological field of the being in motion is articulated in three modes: the production and productive knowledge , the praxis and practical knowledge , and lastly, the contemplation and theoretical knowledge (sofiva). At the base of such interpretation of the ontological division of sciences in Metaphysics (VI...

The Task of Ordinary Mind: Rethinking Authenticity through the Mumonkan

This essay explores the nature of authenticity through a comparison of Martin Heidegger and the classical Buddhist text, the Mumonkan (The Gateless Gate). As Stanley Cavell's interpretations of Heidegger have developed, the peculiarity of Heidegger's sense of authenticity lies in the fact that it requires us, not to negate the inauthentic everydayness into which we are fallen, but to learn to inhabit this everydayness in a new way. The task of authenticity, Cavell argues, involves a recovery and a transformation of this original condition. But just what this transformation involves is tricky. To what extent does authenticity involve taking particular, concrete actions in the world? And insofar as we are never in complete mastery of our actions, how can we ensure that they are authentic? Through a comparison with the Mumonkan, this essay considers how the task of authenticity can be understood as a gateless gate, a way of dwelling in the everyday which affirms our thrownness into a plurality of ways. The essay, thus, argues for different roots than those Cavell finds manifest in Heidegger's philosophy (the traditions of early American transcendentalism and Anglo-American ordinary language philosophy) and thus contributes to the current conversation on the under-appreciated convergences between Heidegger and the Buddhist tradition.