Hegel's Concept Research Articles

Bungen—An East Asian Philosophy of Culture in Terms of Intercultural Interactions and a Reinterpretation of Watsuji’s Concept of Aidagara

Influenced by Hegel, modern Chinese philosophers (e.g., Mou Zong-San, Lao Sze-Kwang, etc.) and Japanese philosophers (e.g., Nishida Kitaro) were inclined to narrate Chinese or Japanese culture in terms of the Hegelian concept of ‘spirit’. Nevertheless, the Hegelian philosophy of culture assumes the existence of an unchangeable cultural spirit and was therefore criticised by Watsuji Tetsuro. Watsuji denies the existence of an unchangeable cultural spirit and argues that cultures arise from the aidagara (interactions) between Ningen (human society) and Fudo (nature). Yet Watsuji’s narration of culture overemphasised the aidagara between Ningen and Fudo but disregarded that culture may also arise from the aidagara among cultures. Therefore, by reinterpreting Watsuji’s concept of aidagara, this paper proposes the concept of Bungen to explain the formation of cultures in terms of intercultural interactions and therefore highlight the diversity of East Asian cultures.

Freedom's Course: Hegel's Concept of World History and the Greek War for Independence (1821–1831)

Abstract: A little-remarked aspect of Hegel's lecture courses on the philosophy of world history is that he delivered them five times during a nine-year period (1822–1831) that aligns almost perfectly with the years of the Greek War for Independence. If Hegel was tracking the French and Haitian Revolutions while writing The Phenomenology of Spirit , then he may have been similarly tracking the Greek Revolution when delivering these lectures. What Hegel had done conceptually in 1807 in his Phenomenology of Spirit , he now intended to do historically in this lecture course: namely, to theorize the historical course of human freedom. Since these lectures represent the first text of Hegel's to be translated into English (in 1857), and since they had been translated into Italian even earlier (1840), Hegel's contention that freedom from domination was the moral aim of world history would provide philosophical support for abolitionist and other emancipatory freedom movements in Europe and the Americas. Equating domination by tyrants with slavery would also inspire national independence movements from Greece to Italy and New Spain. Hegel's romantic account of Greece's emancipation from domination, in antiquity and the present, seemed to speak in favor of such nationalist uprisings. At the same time, his concern with the devolution of the French Revolution left him ambivalent about revolution as a political praxis. His lectures would strike both notes as the Greek Revolution unfolded.

Hegel e o caráter

This paper is devoted to a systematic analysis of the notion of “character” within Hegel's thought. So far, this notion has been considered marginal within Hegelian philosophy and has hardly been addressed in the critical literature. This article, however, attempts to argue in favor of the thesis that character plays a prominent role in Hegel's thought. In this paper we therefore aim to provide (i) a systematic reconstruction of the concept of “character” in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History and Lectures on the philosophy of Subjective Spirit in order to show that (ii) the notion of character in Hegel has a greater relevance than hitherto acknowledged, a relevance which invests central notions of his philosophy. Our thesis, more specifically, is that the notion of character turns out to be closely related to load-bearing notions in Hegel's thought – namely, the notion of self-consciousness (as distinctive element of human rationality) and the notion of the spirit of a people (as a set of sociocultural and dispositional factors that allow different levels of understanding of the autonomy of human rationality). Precisely on the basis of this relevance and the critical issues it brings, such an operation provides the basis for arguing that iii) the Hegelian concept of character has important repercussions both on the contemporary debate on Hegel and on contemporary hegelianisms.

Hegel, Selbstischkeit, and the experiential self

ABSTRACT In this essay, I offer a corrective to the standard reading of Hegel as a social constructivist when it comes to matters of the self by shifting the focus from the Phenomenology to his ‘Philosophy of Spirit’ and ‘Anthropology.’ There, a kind-of self or Selbstischkeit is revealed, anticipating the pre-reflective, experiential of the likes of Zahavi and, by extension, Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Hegel's conception of the self enhances our understanding of the relationship between the pre-reflective, experiential self and the self of self-consciousness, contributing to the discourse on the continuity between biological and mental life. The self, as it emerges in consciousness, traces its origins to a primarily bodily selfness which is foundational to psychical life. Habit emerges as a vital bridge between this selfness and the self of self-consciousness, offering a dynamic, dialectical framework for thinking the development of the self of self-consciousness in and out of its bodily context.

El espacio mítico y efectivo de la personalidad como derecho

This article aims to inquire into the relationship between the institution of the mythological power of law and the concept of personality, which is a properly rational element for the constitution of the person that, when passing to the realm of duty, desubjectivizes an element that can be justified by the Hegelian concept of Wirklich. The setup of the individual and their contranatural element is a fundamental hypothesis define the genealogy of the rights of personality. This work departs from the hypothesis of the effective relationship between legal personality as derived from a bibliographic review.

Autonomy and Habit

Abstract An enduring puzzle for theorists of autonomy in the broadly Kantian tradition is how to theorize failures of practical reason. If norms of practical rationality are supposed to be constitutive of agency itself, how can failures to live up them nonetheless be understood as expressions of that agency? Hegelian diagnoses of these difficulties typically emphasize the dichotomies that structure Kantian theories of autonomy, between activity and passivity, reason and nature, norm and desire. They seek to flesh out an alternative that preserves a recognisably post-Kantian notion of autonomy whilst understanding freedom as something that essentially comes in degrees, insisting that self-determination always involves elements of other-determination, and stressing how free subjectivity is inseparable from socio-historically and institutionally bounded character-formation. This article contributes to articulating a Hegelian corrective to Kantian theories of autonomy by beginning to explain the role of habit in Hegel's conception of agency. Building on recent work on Hegel's metaphysics of expression, it shows how he allows us to see conative responses to the world as integral to character development and thus as expressive of free agency, rather than as interruptions to the proper functioning of practical reason. On Hegel's account, the expressive behaviour of mature, reflective agents is grounded in a pre-intentional, affective dimension of subjectivity and presupposes processes of habituation, which he locates at the level of the human ‘soul’. Habit, far from being ‘lifeless, contingent and particular’, is the means by which agents come to make objective contents their own. Understanding the role of habit in Hegel's system is integral to allowing an alternative conceptualization of autonomy to come into view, one on which rational agents express themselves through their affective and emotional responses, rather than merely being a contingent site of those responses.

Hegel and the Hatäta Zär'a Ya‛ǝqob: Africa in the Philosophy of History and the History of Philosophy

Abstract This article explores an episode in the reception of Hegel's philosophy of history and historiography of philosophy with reference to the question of the possibility of non-Western philosophy, in particular African philosophy. Section I briefly outlines the contents of the Hatäta Zär'a Ya‛ǝqob and the controversy over its authorship, focusing in particular on the argument of the Ethiopianist and scholar of Semitic languages Carlo Conti Rossini that ‘rationalistic’ philosophy was impossible in Ethiopia. In section II I suggest that a major component of the intellectual background to this notion of the impossibility of philosophy in Africa can be traced to Hegel's philosophy of history. To substantiate this claim I begin by providing an account of the broader historiographical shift between 1780 and 1830, in which Africa and Asia came to be excluded from the history of philosophy, and I suggest that Hegel's philosophy of history was decisive in this process. I examine how Hegel's account of history as the realization and actualization of freedom goes together with the development of cultural production culminating in philosophy, and how both of these processes (if they are really separate processes at all), can be mapped onto particular historical-geographical populations and cultures. I suggest that, even though this was not Hegel's intention, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this served as a cultural justification for political domination: those who are unfree are unfree because they are unthinking (unphilosophical), and those who are unthinking cannot be free. Finally in section III I connect this Hegelian conception to Conti Rossini's work, both his article on the Hatäta and as apologist for Italian imperialism. I conclude by reflecting on what this underexplored connection between Hegel and early twentieth-century theorists of culture might mean for attempts to construct global histories of philosophy.

Concrete Freedom at Work: Hegel’s normative conception of freedom and its relevance to organization studies

In organization studies, the prevailing understanding of freedom has revolved around a specific concept of autonomy. However, we propose an alternative and normative concept of freedom, drawing inspiration from the philosophy of Hegel and a reinterpretation of his ideas by Robert Brandom. We begin by diagnosing the liberal conceptions of freedom as opportunity and autonomy that shape the predominant understanding of freedom at work within organization studies. We then follow Hegel and conceive freedom as the expansive realization of oneself through the commitment to meaningful constraints. In contrast to the dominant liberal notions of freedom, Hegel allows us to understand professional commitments and communal obligations at work as the medium of freedom. We argue that concrete freedom at work requires (a) that workers see their work as intrinsically valuable and (b) that neither they nor their employers are unconditionally free to define norms for how work is to be organized and pursued. We then demonstrate the theoretical implications of shifting from the liberal conceptions of freedom prevalent in organization studies to a Hegelian conception of freedom. The Hegelian theory leads to a more nuanced understanding of worker decision-discretion, motivation and the meaningfulness of work. Additionally, it has implications for research on bureaucracy and institutional logics. We end by considering the limits of the empirical applicability of our Hegelian theory, and by highlighting its normative value for practitioners and critical management scholars.

Where Did Hegel Go Wrong on Race?

AbstractWhere exactly did Hegel go wrong on race? Moellendorf helpfully tells us that Hegel's treatment of race begins systematically in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and that he went wrong philosophically in the use of the biological category of race. This is basically correct but requires precisification. This article considers why Hegel's category of race is not unambiguously biological. Race's biological status can be problematized from the standpoint of contemporary biology and from the standpoint of Hegel's system. The textual placement of Hegel's systematic discussion of race in the philosophy of spirit makes clear that Hegel conceived of race in spiritual terms. Hegel took race to be a biospiritual category. Hegel was clearly committed to the now-controversial proposition that there is such a thing as human biological race, that there is a plurality of biological human races. He regarded race as a robust natural kind. His preferred list of races includes Caucasians, Negros, Mongolian, Malaysians and Americans. One noteworthy feature of his understanding of race's physical aspect was his focus on the formation of the skull and the face. At the same time, he clearly held that there were other deeper physical differences that accounted for the spiritual differences of race. Hegel was perfectly clear that race has a spiritual as well as physical aspect. He held that that the members of racial groups essentially shared certain fundamental, heritable, moral, intellectual and cultural characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any other race and that these differences were such as to support an objective ranking. This shows that Hegel took the category of race to be the sort of category we today would characterize as ‘racialist’. Hegel's concept of race was the racialist concept of race.

Hegel, Colonialism and Postcolonial Hegelianism

AbstractThis article aims to shed light on Hegel's conception of colonialism and its implications for the postcolonial reception of Hegel. Drawing on the abundant literature on the topic, it begins by engaging with Hegel's understanding of colonialism through a close reading of relevant passages of his works, in particular the Heidelberg Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft (1817–18), the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts (1819/20, 1821/22, 1822/23, 1824/25) and the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (1822/23, 1830). Having mapped and reconstructed Hegel's conception of colonialism through his writings and lectures, the article argues that his account of Europe's modern colonial expansion is based primarily on economic considerations, rather than on civilizational assumptions proclaiming the spiritual superiority of European peoples—to which Hegel nevertheless subscribes. The conclusion explores distinct and divergent postcolonial perspectives for engaging with the contemporary legacy of Hegelianism. It addresses, on the one hand, Tibebu's critical reading of Hegel's philosophical enterprise as ‘the coldest rationalisation of genocidal murder and carnage’ based on ‘paradigmatic apartheid’ and, on the other, Brennan's redemptive reading of Hegel, which values his theoretical contribution to the shaping of 20th century anticolonial thought. After contrasting these two interpretations, the article argues in favour of postcolonial strategies for critical reappropriation and sabotage of the legacy of Hegel's philosophy.

The role of experience in Hegel's conception of the relation to nature

AbstractThis article explores Hegel's conception of experience, positing it as the entry point for grasping the implications of the philosophy of nature. The article briefly examines Hegel's view of nature, focusing on its transformative journey from externality to integration with the conscious I. Subsequently, the purpose of Hegel's philosophy of nature is discussed, and recent interpretations are compared. The article unfolds the notion of experience as a bridge between the subjective dimension explored in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the understanding of reality presented in the Encyclopedia. Experience, considered in its threefold meaning of unveiling, actively interpreting, and generating rationality within nature, dynamically shapes both the self‐conscious subject and the natural world across logic, nature, and spirit. Finally, the article highlights experience as mediating both the epistemological and the metaphysical relationship between nature and spirit. The article concludes by arguing that the transformative power of experience plays a central role in overcoming the separation between spirit and nature, fostering a mediated unity between the human subject and the natural world.

Deleuze and the Hegelian state

This paper analyses Gilles Deleuze?s political philosophy in relation to the Hegelian concept of the State. To do this, we identify three interpretations of the term ?State? in Deleuze?s work: 1) as the reference point defining the three forms of socius presented in Anti-Oedipus (primitive territorial, barbarian despotic, and civilized capitalist); 2) as a defining trait of the despotic socius form; and 3) as the internalization of this form (Urstaat). Deleuze emerges as a harsh critic of the State in each of these interpretations. However, the subsequent part of the paper reveals that this critique does not advocate for societal fragmentation. By comparing Deleuze?s political philosophy with Hegel?s, we demonstrate that the forms of socius in Deleuze?s system occupy the conceptual place of the State in Hegel?s framework. Through an exploration of the role of differential calculus in the ontology of both philosophers, we establish the groundwork for a philosophical examination of the dominant social relation in the modern world (which is capitalism and not the State) and the prerequisites for a novel political socius.

Hegel in the Mirrors of Soviet Philosophy

The attitude to Hegel in Soviet philosophy was contradictory and depended to a considerable extent on ideological conjuncture. Waves of love and hate for Hegel alternated periodically. At different times emphasis was placed on the “revolutionary” method, dialectics, or on the “reactionary” system, the justification of the old world. On one page Lenin admired Hegel’s logical discoveries, on the next page he scolded him with harsh words for idealism, mysticism and “goddikin”. The article draws a parallel between the stylistics of Lenin’s philosophical works and the avant-garde artists and poets who gave a “slap in the face” to public taste. Philosophy becomes in Lenin’s hands the servant of politics; later on, the “principle of partisanship” became the credo of Marxist dogma and the criterion of the truth of philosophical doctrines. The Hegelian wing of Soviet Marxism was formed in the 1920s. The party leader of the “Dialecticians”, Abram Deborin, initiated the publication of Hegel’s Collected Works, which was published with a number of large and small interruptions over the course of 30 years (and the last, 15th volume never saw the light of day). After the defeat of the Deborinites in 1931, Hegel’s popularity gradually declined. However, some original studies coloured by love for Hegel appeared. Vygotsky used Hegelian concepts of “mediation” and “cunning of reason” to create a cultural-historical psychology; he believed that Hegel “walked lamely to the truth”. Mikhail Lifshits regarded Hegel as a “great conservative of mankind”, and Georg Lukács, who came to the Soviet Union, wrote his famous Young Hegel here and defended this book as his doctoral thesis (1942). Lifshits and Lukács concentrate on Hegel’s “historical dialectic” and on his comprehension of the revolutionary events of his epoch. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, Hegel’s philosophy had been declared an “aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution” (Stalin), and hatred of Hegel became reflexive. The party of persecutors of “Hegelianshchina” was led by Zinovy Beletsky, Professor at Moscow State University. It was only after Stalin’s death that serious research into Hegel’s philosophy could be resumed. E. V. Ilyenkov interpreted dialectics as “the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete” and traced how this — materialistically reinterpreted — method works in Marx’s Das Kapital. It was Neo-Hegelians who brought to the fore the category of the concrete, understood as “diversity fused into unity” (Ivan Ilyin); in this respect, Lenin was in full solidarity with them. In parallel with European Marxists, Ilyenkov criticised the interpretation of dialectics as a universal picture of the world, a new metaphysics cultivated by “diamat” and “istmat”. He did not, however, share the anti-Hegelian sentiments of the schools of G. della Volpe and L. Althusser. For Ilyenkov, Hegel is the greatest revolutionary in logic since Aristotle. At the end of the article are the facts showing that interest in “Soviet Hegel” is still alive today.

‘The intelligence of the people’: Marx’s early political thought and the young Hegelian concept of state

ABSTRACT This paper has two purposes: to provide a contextualised account of the Young Hegelian theory of the state, and to argue that Marx began working on the manuscript known as his ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law’, not in the Summer of 1843, as most commentators assume, but at least as early as the Spring of 1842. The established narrative describes the Young Hegelians as ‘liberals’, and suggests that Marx ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law’ represents his rejection of their liberalism and turn towards a more radical democratic and revolutionary position. Conversely, I argue that the Young Hegelians (notably Arnold Ruge and Bruno Bauer) were never liberal (at least not by any standard definition of that term) but articulated a radical and revolutionary theory of the state from the outset – one that understood freedom, not as independence, but as political participation, and that characterised the modern state, not as the guarantor of private rights, but as the institutional framework in which all citizens could realise their public freedom. In this sense, Marx’s ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy Law’ does not represent a break with the Young Hegelians theory of state, but a contribution to it.

Subjectivity and Dialectic: Hegel in Dialogue with Gadamer

Abstract In this article, I defend the contemporary significance of Hegel's thought on subjectivity and dialectic by involving Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Hans-Georg Gadamer in a dialogue, and then, by clarifying the characteristics of spirit and concept. Hegel's theory of subjectivity and his thought on dialectic face many criticisms. One such critic is Gadamer; however, Gadamer's philosophy is, in fact, quite close to Hegel's. I take the Hegel-Gadamer relationship as one illustration of Hegel's relevance and influence. I then further demonstrate Hegel's contemporary importance by analyzing the characteristics of spirit and concept. Finally, I propose that Hegel's absolute spirit and concept remain significant.

Individual freedom against liberalism: Hegel's nonliberal individualism

AbstractIn this article, I argue that the main contribution of Hegel's philosophy of right to the contemporary political debate is that it opens a window on the idea that liberalism and individual freedom are incompatible. My main thesis is that the liberal conception of the State and law, structured from a nonrelational account of singularity, ends up denying the individual freedom that it claims to defend. I begin by reconstructing the Hegelian concept of freedom from its most general lines, showing that being free consists in wanting to become someone and not so much in wanting to do something. After showing that the purpose of becoming someone can only be fulfilled in a social medium, I focus on Hegel's critique of the liberal state (as expounded in the section on “civil society”). I argue that civil society structurally impedes individuals from realizing their purpose of becoming someone: the economical interactions of civil society give rise to impersonal and inscrutable mechanisms, which take the social conditions of people's individuation beyond their control. Finally, I claim that (rational) individual freedom consists in being able to thematize and democratically control the very social conditions of individuation through the State and law.

Why is Hegel still relevant: contract and value in the Philosophy of Right

This article offers a reading of the theories of contract and value developed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. We show how the circular shape emblematic of Hegel’s philosophy allows both to make sense of the ambiguous stance of Hegel towards liberalism and to clarify the relationship between the Hegelian conception of value and that developed by Marx and some of his continuators. The article then studies how Hegel’s analyses of contract and value shed light on the dynamics of neoliberalism. These analyses are shown to anticipate both early descriptions of neoliberal capitalism (Bourdieu, Foucault) and contemporary works (Fraser, Honneth, Jaeggi).

The same content in two different languages? Hegel's conception of religion and philosophy and its critique by D.F. Strauss

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to contribute to debate on Hegel's conception of the relationship between religion and philosophy by proposing that it can be a read as a division of labour between Christian religion and speculative philosophy. This reading allows us to understand better Hegel's idea that religion and philosophy have the same content in two different forms. I distinguish between the institutional and the intrapersonal dimensions of Hegel's claim of a division of labour between religion and philosophy. I then turn to a critique of Hegel's philosophy of religion by showing how David Friedrich Strauss's concluding dissertation from The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined can call our attention to some internal tensions within Hegel's conception. Although Strauss's interpretation does not present an insurmountable objection against Hegel's conception of a division of labour, it can help to illuminate to what extent Hegel oversimplified the practical implications that his conception might have for the priest's attempt to continue his instruction to the members of his community.

The Sociality of Madness: Hegel on Spirit's Pathology and the Sanity of Ethicality

Abstract Despite a profound concern for the epistemological, ontological and ethical conditions for being-at-home-in-the-world, G.W.F. Hegel published very little on a particularly serious threat to being-at-home: mental illness and disorder. The chief exception is found in Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). In this work, Hegel briefly provides an ontology of madness (Verrücktheit), wherein madness consists in the inward collapsing of subjectivity and objectivity into the individual's unconscious and primordial feeling soul. While there has been an increasing number of studies on Hegel's conception of madness, I propose that there is another overlooked way to understand madness in Hegel's system: as social pathology. I argue in this article that Hegel offers a compelling social account of madness in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), which arises at the elevated, self-reflective and community level of spirit. This sociality of madness, as I call it, occurs when spirit is unable to reconcile two contradictory yet equally essential aspects of its reality, resulting in spirit's structural homelessness. I argue that by examining this overlooked sociality of madness, we may read Hegel's political-philosophical project in a new light: on the one hand, the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) presented in the Philosophy of Right (1821) becomes understood as a political therapeutic. On the other hand, if the ethical life fails to live up to the demand of being an adequate spiritual therapeutic, then the traditional reading of the Philosophy of Right as a reconciliatory hermeneutic becomes problematized, opening up new avenues for the proliferation of social pathology.

Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic by Karen Ng (review)

Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic by Karen Ng (review)