. . . truly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us.1 With these remarks, Foucault begins the homage to Jean Hyppolite which marks the end of The Discourse on Language. It is clear from this passage that Foucault credits Hyppolite with establishing the possibility of a definitive break with Hegel, of a truly anti-Hegelian philosophy. Also clear is Foucault's claim that his own work during this first, archaeological phase likewise constitutes thinking which is disloyal to Hegel.2 Of course, that Foucault considers himself to be anti-Hegelian will not surprise anyone who is familiar with his work. Indeed, Foucault seems preoccupied with putting as much distance between himself and Hegel as possible. Many of Foucault's followers likewise accept his claim to have escaped Hegel. On one extremely plausible interpretation of the history of Continental philosophy, Foucault's work represents the culmination ofa century-long attempt to kill off the Hegelian subject, an attempt that had been begun with the work of Sartre, Hyppolite, Lacan, and Derrida.' On this reading, Foucault drives home the final nail in the Hegelian subject's coffin. Although I find this reading of the historical trajectory of Continental philosophy in general and of Foucault's project in particular tempting, I find it equally as troubling. The troubling aspect of this account emerges when we consider the following questions: What happens to the plausibility of this reading if it turns out that Hegel's subject was already, in some sense, and even in a very Foucaultian sense, dead? Furthermore, what becomes of this reading if we find that there is life in Foucault's subject yet? If either of these possibilities holds true, and I will suggest here that both of them do, then the claim that Foucaultian constructivism kills the Hegelian subject fails to convince. I should note at the outset that my aim in discussing these questions will not be to establish that Foucault is nothing more than warmedover Hegel; nor will it be to completely rescue Foucault from his unwanted proximity to Hegel. To jump to such conclusions would, in my estimation, make matters too easy. Rather, my aim will be to show that a discussion of the subject provides a point of reference from which we can begin to rethink the extent to which Foucault remains indebted to Hegel. Language and the Death of the Subject in Hegel and Foucault Let me begin by noting a curious convergence: both Hegel and Foucault claim that, in some sense, to speak is to die, that language entails the death of the speaking subject. In this claim they are certainly not alone. Indeed, Heidegger notes in his 1957-58 lectures on the Nature of Language that mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do so. But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought.4 Although they are not alone in this claim, given Foucault's persistent desire to escape the clutches of the Hegelian system, their agreement on this point is intriguing. What are we to make of this agreement? Should we make anything of it, or is it merely a coincidence? There is a strong temptation to regard the agreement between Foucault and Hegel on this particular point as insignificant, as a mere surface convergence masking the deeper incompatibility of their philosophical approaches. However, this response is unsatisfactory. After all, language plays a pivotal role in the reconciliation which consciousness seeks in the Phenomenology of Spirit. …