Healthy Firms Research Articles

The Life and Death of Zombies – Evidence from Government Subsidies to Firms

We analyze the demographics of zombie firms and durations of zombie spells as well as their determinants, including an application on public subsidies using firm level population panel data from Finland. Firm-level analysis of firm demographics reveals that zombie-firms, as commonly defined in the literature, are often not truly distressed firms but rather companies with temporarily low revenues relative to interest payments. More importantly, we find that roughly a third of these firms are in fact growing companies and two thirds recover from the zombie status to become healthy firms. We also show that the increase of zombie firms over the past 15 years has mainly been driven by cyclical factors, as opposed to a secular trend. In our policy application on government subsidies to firms, estimation results strongly suggest that subsidy-receiving firms are less likely to die, regardless of the type of subsidy. However, with regard to recovery there is heterogeneity in the effects depending on the type of firm and the type of subsidy received. Thus, we do not find a robust positive association of subsidies with zombie recovery.

Zombie Credit and (Dis-)Inflation: Evidence from Europe

We show that cheap to impaired firms has a disinflationary effect. By helping distressed firms to stay afloat, credit can create excess production capacity, and in turn, put downward pressure on markups and prices. We test this mechanism exploiting granular inflation and firm-level data from twelve European countries. In the cross-section of industries and countries, we find that a rise of zombie is associated with a decrease in firm defaults and entries, firm markups and product prices; lower productivity; and, an increase in aggregate sales as well as material and labor cost. These results hold at the firm-level, where we document spillover effects to healthy firms in markets with high zombie credit. Our partial equilibrium estimates suggest that without a rise in ...

Discriminant Analysis and Firms’ Bankruptcy: Evidence from European SMEs

Using two research methodologies - the Altman’s z-score discriminant analysis, in the revised version referring to non-listed firms, and the Bayesian approach Diagnostic Distribution - the paper investigates the possibility of discriminating between healthy and bankrupt European SMEs based on financial statements and using a Bayesian discriminant model inspired by Altman’s model. It also aims to verify whether the geographic location of European SMEs influences the ability to discriminate between healthy versus bankrupt firms. The work finds a significant homogeneity regarding the capability of the new discriminant models to classify healthy and bankrupt SMEs within the Euro Area and in different geographic locations. The empirical observations confirm that financial statements are a relevant channel by which SMEs communicate information to the financial system, even if they cannot provide all the information that allows for healthy and bankrupt SMEs to be distinguished.

Does good corporate governance pay off in the long-run? Evidence from stock market segment switches in Brazil

We investigate the long-run effects of higher standards of corporate governance in the stock market. We consider Brazilian firms that switched from the traditional segment to the Nível 1, Nível 2 or Novo Mercado since 2000. We document that higher standards of governance result in significantly higher abnormal stock returns in the long run, controlling for firm and time fixed effects. The positive impact increased after the Global Financial Crisis, market microstructure has improved, and the market impact is stronger for financially healthy firms. Evidence suggests that committing to higher standards of corporate governance paid off for Brazilian firms in the long run.

Effect of Financing Costs and Constraints on Real Investments: The Case of Inventories

This paper studies the effects of bank credit availability, trade credit and the capital cost on inventory decisions. There are two competing theories on the effect of bank credit lines on investments. While one (Lins et al. 2010) suggests that the primary role played by undrawn credit is to finance new opportunities, the other (Acharya et al. 2014) suggests that undrawn credit serves primarily as a bank monitored liquidity insurance. We attempt to resolve these two conflict views in the context of inventory investments. Using empirical data, we show that the primary role of undrawn credit depends on the individual firm’s financial status. When a firm is financially constrained, its inventory decisions are linked to the additional bank credit available to the firm—echoing the insurance nature of bank credits. On the other hand, when a firm is financially healthy, two other inventory financing factors play more significant roles than undrawn credits. For financially healthy firms, inventory investments are significantly negatively related to the financial cost of inventory and positively related to the credit offered by suppliers. Additionally, we study the financial crisis of 2007–2008 as a systematic shock in the credit market to identify the effects of a firm’s financial credits. We show that during the financial crisis, the inventory turnover and working capital levels of US retailers were related to the availability of bank credit. However, immediately after the crisis, the evidence demonstrates the positive relationship between firms’ inventory level and the trade credit they are offered.

Management discussion and analysis: a tone analysis on US financial listed companies

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether financial companies of the USA are inclined to manipulate the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) tone and thus to follow impression management behaviours. Also, the paper proposes a tone analysis of MD&As conducted by comparing the tone of MD&As of one year with financial conditions of the same year and the next.Design/methodology/approachThe tone analysis is conducted on two sub-samples of US-listed financial companies, unhealthy firms and healthy firms, which experienced different financial conditions between 2002 and 2011.FindingsWith regard to healthy firms, MD&A tone is useful to explain the current year’s performance and helps to predict next year performance, whereas, with reference to unhealthy companies, managers use the tone to pursue impression management strategies, by using more positive words and more future-oriented words than healthy companies.Research limitations/implicationsThis study analyses the correlation between MD&A tone at time t and financial performance at time t and t+1, it does not investigate other time spans. The empirical results of this study cannot be generalized to other countries.Practical implicationsMain implications are addressed to regulators and policy makers, which may contrast impression management through a more effective regulation. Another implication regards investors, who cannot fully rely on MD&As of unhealthy companies.Originality/valueThis study analyses financial companies, rather neglected by the literature on MD&A tone. Results suggest that financial firms are also inclined to engage in impression management. This research would be useful for investors who base their decisions on qualitative analysis, interested in understanding to what extent the MD&A narratives are reliable.

Shuffling through the Bargain Bin: Real-Estate Holdings of Public Firms*

Abstract Constructing a novel database on the real-estate holdings of public firms, we show that distressed firms sell their real-estate assets at a discount relative to healthy firms. We find that distress discount in real-estate assets is less pronounced for sellers with less liquidity-constrained industry peers and in machinery-heavy industries. We also document that asset redeployability and the availability of potential buyers are two important property-specific determinants of the distress discount. Additionally, firms’ property portfolios that are less redeployable with less potential buyers exacerbate the negative impact of financial distress on the cost of borrowing.

Leverage and employee compensation – the perspective of human capital

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the predictions in Titman (1984) and Berk et al. (2010) which indicate that firms with higher leverage will pay chief executive officer (CEO) and employee more. In addition, this paper examines whether financial distressed firms utilize leverage as a bargaining tool to reduce labor costs. Design/methodology/approach This paper conducts ordinary least squares regression analysis to investigate: CEO compensation which represents critical employees and lower-level employee compensation which represents less critical employees. Empirical data consist of US publicly held companies during the period between 2006 and 2013. Findings This paper finds that firms with higher levels of leverage tend to compensate employees for their human capital risk and that financially distressed firms consider leverage a bargaining tool by which to depress labor costs, which leads to lower employee compensation as compared to that of financially healthy firms. Research limitations/implications This paper highlights the importance of keeping balance between human capital and labor costs. In the case that human capital risk might not be fully compensated by firms facing financial distress, vicious cycle could occur because a failure of considering human capital might invite unrecoverable consequence. This could be done in future research. Originality/value This paper has three contributions. First, this paper supports the Titman (1984) and Berk et al. (2010) by empirically documenting that high-leveraged firms compensate their employees for potential human capital risk. Second, this paper adds to the literature by empirically providing that human capital risk might not be fully compensated if the firms are facing financial distress. Finally, this paper contributes to the authorities by showing that employees’ interests may be sacrificed if the firm is under financial distress.

Breaking the Shackles: Zombie Firms, Weak Banks and Depressed Restructuring in Europe

This paper explores the connection between firms (firms that would typically exit in a competitive market) and bank health and the consequences for aggregate productivity in 11 European countries. Controlling for cyclical effects, the results show that zombie firms are more likely to be connected to weak banks, suggesting that the zombie firm problem in Europe may at least partly stem from bank forbearance. The increasing survival of zombie firms congests markets and constrains the growth of more productive firms, to the detriment of aggregate productivity growth. Our results suggest that around one-third of the impact of zombie congestion on capital misallocation can be directly attributed to bank health and additional analysis suggests that this may partly be due to reduced availability of credit to healthy firms. Finally, improvements in bank health are more likely to be associated with a reduction in the prevalence of zombie firms in countries where insolvency regimes do not unduly inhibit corporate restructuring. Thus, leveraging the important complementarities between bank strengthening efforts and insolvency regime reform would contribute to breaking the shackles on potential growth in Europe.

Political connection and the walking dead: Evidence from China's privately owned firms

Using a sample of privately owned listed firms in China, we document that firms’ political connections have a positive effect on their likelihood of becoming insolvent and inefficient (which we call zombies or zombie firms). The results are more pronounced for firms that are located in regions with extensive government intervention or weak institutional environment. In addition, for firms without political connections, the presence of zombie firms has larger negative spillover effects on the investment and productivity of healthy firms compared with zombie firms in the same industry. Curiously, such differential negative spillover effects are not observed for firms with political connections.

Political Connection and the Walking Dead: Evidence from China's Privately Owned Firms

Using a sample of privately owned listed firms in China, we document that firms’ political connections have a positive effect on their likelihood of becoming insolvent and inefficient (which we call zombies or zombie firms). The results are more pronounced for firms that are located in regions with extensive government intervention or weak institutional environment. In addition, for firms without political connections, the presence of zombie firms has larger negative spillover effects on the investment and productivity of healthy firms compared with zombie firms in the same industry. Curiously, such differential negative spillover effects are not observed for firms with political connections.

Creditor rights, financial health, and corporate investment efficiency

This paper analyzes the influence of creditor rights on investment efficiency and how firms’ financial health shapes this influence. Using time-series changes within a country and cross-country variations in creditor rights, I find that stronger protection of creditors improves investment efficiency in healthy firms but worsens it in distressed firms. The impact on investment efficiency operates more through changes in overinvestment than in underinvestment. Alternative proxies for creditor rights control for both contractual and enforcement rights. The results are robust to alternative model specifications and to controls for omitted variables.

A three-stage dynamic model of financial distress

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explain the multi-stage dynamic process of financial distress. An attempt is made to explore multiple adverse heterogeneous events of financial distress leading a firm closer to bankruptcy progressively.Design/methodology/approachSample comprises 321 ongoing, 54 suspended and 91 delisted non-financial firms from Pakistan Stock Exchange. Financial distress is segregated into three stages, i.e. profit reduction, mild liquidity (ML) and severe liquidity (SL). Flow diagrams are used to explain the transition of healthy firms through proposed stages of financial distress.FindingsResults showed that firms liquidated/winding-up by court documented SL problems and closed their operations well before the delisting year. It is found that healthy firms are more likely to face SL when faced ML problem at first stage. Distressed firms can recover to a healthy position at any stage, however after approaching to SL, recovery is less expected.Practical implicationsThe proposed process will provide a foundation for future studies to develop more relevant, robust and accurate early warning system of corporate failure that will help stakeholders to respond potential crisis accordingly and timely.Originality/valuePreviously, most of the studies used the ex post definition of bankruptcy that is criticized due to the contextual application, sample bias and non-segregation by the degree of liquidity problems. The originality of the proposed ex ante model is its segregation into a three-stage process that can be generalized regardless of specific bankruptcy law.

Do Debt Covenants Constrain Borrowings Prior to Violation? Evidence from SFAS 160

ABSTRACT Prior evidence shows a reduction in leverage after covenant violations, but we do not know whether covenants affect leverage before they are violated. In this study, we use an exogenous accounting-based shock to debt covenants that relaxed covenant tightness (SFAS 160) and examine whether covenants constrain leverage for borrowers that are close to violation, even when the borrower is financially healthy. We find that SFAS 160 increased debt levels in firms that were close to violation. This increase in debt was driven by financially healthy firms, suggesting the likelihood of future covenant violations could impede borrowing by firms. We also find an increase in investment sensitivity to Q after SFAS 160 in firms close to violation, suggesting the additional debt was used to make legitimate investments. Because SFAS 160 was passed in the midst of the financial crisis, it is difficult to generalize our findings to more normal financial periods. JEL Classifications: G01; G30; G31; G33; M21; M41.

Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial Crisis

Since the Financial Crisis of 2008, most reform measures and discussions have asked how the law of financial regulation could be improved to prevent or mitigate future crises. These discussions give short shrift to the role played by corporate law during the Financial Crisis of 2008 and other financial crises. One critical regulatory tool during the crisis was “regulation by deal,” in which healthy financial firms (“acquirers”) would hastily acquire failing firms (“targets”) to mitigate the crisis. The deals were governed by corporate law, so corporate law played an outsize role in the response to the crisis. But few observers have asked how corporate law—in addition to financial regulation—should govern dealmaking in financial crises. To fill in this gap, this Article focuses on the role played by corporate law during the Financial Crisis of 2008, and asks whether corporate law should be different during a financial crisis than in ordinary times. Using an externality framework—failure of a systemically important firm can harm the entire economy, and not just the shareholders of the failed firm—this Article identifies a key problem with the current corporate law regime as applied in financial crises: the shareholder value maximization principle as applied to failing target companies. This principle, manifested in the form of shareholder voting rights on mergers and board fiduciary duties to shareholders, is inapplicable to systemically important target firms whose failure would have enormous negative externalities on the rest of the economy. This Article contends that corporate law as applied to systemically important, failing target firms during crises should change as follows: (1) replace shareholder merger voting rights with appraisal rights, and (2) alter fiduciary duties so that directors and officers of those failing target firms consider the interests of the broader economy.

Analysis of corporate viability in the pre-bankruptcy proceedings

Companies in financial difficulties can avail themselves of the pre-bankruptcy procedure, prior to its entry in the legal process of insolvency. The objective of this paper is to look for a possible diagnosis of some common distressed firm’s characteristics in order to be successful at pre-bankruptcy procedure through artificial intelligence methodologies. Using a Spanish sample of bankrupt and healthy firms, our results show that financial viability and working capital ratios are fundamental for the effectiveness of pre-bankruptcy legal procedure. These findings may help to shed light on the implications for all the stakeholders involved in a pre-bankruptcy procedure.

Credit Shocks, Employment Protection, and Growth: Firm-Level Evidence from Spain

We offer new evidence on the real effects of credit shocks in the presence of employment protection regulations by exploiting a unique provision in Spanish labor laws: dismissal rules are less stringent for Spanish firms with fewer than 50 employees, lowering the cost of hiring new workers. Using a new dataset, we find that during the financial crisis, healthy firms with fewer than 50 employees borrowing from troubled banks grew faster in sectors where capital and labor were sufficiently substitutable. This result does not obtain when we use a different cut-off for Spain or the same cut-off for firms in Germany. Our evidence suggests that labor market flexibility can dampen the negative effect of credit shocks by allowing firms to keep growing by substituting labor for capital. JEL Classification: G21, J80, D20

The impact of corporate governance on earnings management in emerging economies: the Greek evidence

This study tries to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanism effects on decisions that may manipulate earnings in Greek listed firms. To do so, the board of directors and the audit committee were taken into account, together with the total accruals of 46 Greek listed firms for the years 2011-2015. For the analysis, three research hypotheses have been made to investigate where the independent members do not use earnings management tactics and if financially healthy firms try these tactics. The main finding of the study is that firms with a strong and independent board of directors combined with an active audit committee, together with financial soundness and the presence of a large audit firm, are deterred from practices related earnings management.

Predicting financial distress: Applicability of O-score model for Pakistani firms

Predicting financial distress have significant importance in corporate finance as it serves as an effective early warning system for the related stakeholders. The study applies the most admired financial distress prediction O-score model and compares its predictive accuracy with estimated logit model. The study estimates logit model by including the profitability ratios, liquidity ratios, leverage ratios, and cash flow ratios. This study filled the gap by using the cash flow ratios to predict financial distress for Pakistani listed firms. The sample for the estimation model consists of 290 firms with 45 distressed and 245 healthy firms for the period 2006-2016 and covers all sectors of Pakistan Stock Exchange. The study provides important insights on the role of different financial ratio in predicting financial distress and shows that estimated logit model produces higher accuracy rate in predicting financial distress.

Does Transparency Pay Off in the Long-Run? Evidence from Stock Market Segment Switches in Brazil

We investigate the long-run effects of higher standards of corporate governance in the stock market. We consider Brazilian firms that switched from the traditional segment to the Nivel 1, Nivel 2 or Novo Mercado since 2000. We document that higher standards of governance result in significantly higher abnormal stock returns in the long-run, controlling for firm and time fixed effects. The positive impact has increased after the Global Financial Crisis, market microstructure improved, and the market impact is stronger for financially healthy firms. The evidence suggests that committing to higher standards of corporate governance paid off for Brazilian firms in the long-run.