Hazardous Installations Research Articles

Assessment And Management Of ‘at Risk’Populations Using A Novel GIS BasedUK Population Database Tool

This paper presents a study of how a novel tool for identifying and estimating population levels, developed for the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE), has been used for risk assessment and management. The HSE’s National Population Database (NPD) tool provides population data from a local to a national level in England, Scotland and Wales. It is a Geographical Information System (GIS) based tool, which uses a number of different source data sets to produce detailed estimates of a variety of populations. The data sets incorporated in the NPD include tables from the UK census, national mapping on a range of scales, address and transport network data and commercial and business data sets. The methodology developed for the rool involves identifying and locating a range of features, including building types, infrastructure and land use areas, to which population multipliers are applied to produce estimates of the different populations. The population multipliers provide differentiation between population levels at different levels at different time of day and between populations of different sensitivity. The NPD was initially developed for deriving populations for major accident hazard modeling on a wide range of scales. It can provide population estimates on a 100m grid or on an individual building basis, fro some population types. The populations that are available from the tool include residential, workplace, retail, transport system, leisure and sensitive populations, such as schools, hospitals, care homes and prisons. The tool has been used for a range of tasks including providing estimates of the population around hazardous installations for societal risk calculations and identification of at risk populations and scenario planning. This paper will discuss the NPD tool and present a selection of case studies to illustrate how this new tool has aided the whole risk assessment process from risk policy and development to regulatory and enforcement duties.

Human Factors Integration for a New Top Tier COMAH Site: Optimizing Safety and Meeting Legislative Requirements

The successful integration of human factors (HF) into the design, construction and operation of any hazardous installation is essential in order to optimize operability and personal safety. It is also critical for ensuring that the risks of a major accident are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Furthermore, it is a requirement under the COMAH Regulations to identify and address any HF issues for the site. In September 2002, Atkins Consultants began working with a client to address HF for a new chemical plant being built in the UK. This had been prompted by HF specialists within the HSE who, in reviewing the pre-construction safety report, identified a number of areas where specialist HF input was required. The work Atkins conducted on behalf of the client involved the development and implementation of a human factors integration plan (HFIP) to specify how HF activities would be integrated within the project lifecycle. The areas covered included operator selection and training, control room design, DCS interface assessment, human error analysis, procedure review and workload assessment. This paper describes HSE's role in assessing and promoting HF for COMAH sites, and details the analyses conducted by Atkins to satisfy the requirement of the regulator, ultimately helping to optimize plant safety. It highlights the advantages of ensuring human factors issues are considered from an early stage in plant design.

Important meteorological data for use in risk assessment

Abstract This paper presents a methodology for the calculation of atmospheric stability classes in correlation with wind velocities for six sites of the Greek territory, namely Ellinikon (Athens), Elefsis, Megara, Heraklion, Chania and Patras, based on real data obtained from meteorological observations in these sites and on computations related with their geographic position. In addition to that, a comparison is presented of the atmospheric stability classes produced with online measurements for the Ellinikon (Athens) site with significant coincidence in the results. These calculated values of the meteorological parameters (particularly of atmospheric stability) are most appropriate for uncertainty calculations in quantified risk assessments (QRAs) of hazardous installations sited in the above-mentioned areas, especially when risk and safety-related decisions need to be taken. Consequent results obtained with these parameters are more realistic compared to the “classical” assumption of D5/F2, which leads to significant diversification in the estimation of risk.

Risk assessment and risk decision-making process related to hazardous installation in France

The chemical process industry gathers critical infrastructures since chemical plants represent for the society both an instrument to generate activity and benefits (production of goods, employment, services …), and an instrument that can harm people and the environment. This paper describes the risk assessment approach need in France for licensing hazardous installations, in particular those covered by the Seveso II Directive and the implication for land-use planning. The first part explains why the French risk assessment procedure is based on the quantitative evaluation of major accident scenarios with explicit criteria, and only on qualitative analysis of the risk reducing measures without explicit criteria. The second part shows some on-going evolutions in the risk assessment process in particular for the analysis of the safety barriers. In the third part, the authors share some thoughts on the risk decision-making process.

7.5.2 Testing a Requirements Pattern Language through Reverse Engineering

AbstractThis paper looks at a case study to reverse engineer an IT system that supports the Health and Safety Executive in making planning recommendations with respect to hazardous installations. It compares a Use Case model created from a requirements specification with a Use Case model derived from an inspection of the built system. The objective is to discover how accurately the final system could be predicted using a series of requirements patterns. Through the application of requirements patterns, it was possible to predict the functionality delivered to a high degree, which suggests this is a useful contribution to the prediction of functionality and thereby to system sizing. This work is part of a bigger project for the Health and Safety Executive investigating improvements to system sizing/effort estimation and its impact on the management of complexity.

Major hazard control: the Malaysian experience

Malaysia plans to be a fully developed and industrialized country by year 2020. Malaysia has achieved good progress in the industrial sector. The industrial sector is operating plants and factories using and storing hazardous substances in quantities exceeding the threshold quantities. The plants that are dealing with hazardous substances exceeding the threshold quantity are classified as major hazard installations (MHIs). Some MHIs are located in heavily populated areas. Experience shows that MHIs pose a risk to the workers and the neighbors of the plants. Malaysia has taken the preventive measures to protect the workers and the public. The preventive measures have been taken through establishment of authorities to set major hazard control regulations, enforcing the regulations, assessing the safety reports and emergency plans, conducting audits and accident investigations. This paper reviews, in brief, the international regulations and guidelines of major hazard control. The paper also reviews the Malaysian experience of major hazard control.

I-Risk: development of an integrated technical and management risk methodology for chemical installations

This paper presents an integrated quantitative risk assessment method for hazardous installations, taking into account management as well as technical design and producing risk level measures. The key components of the I-Risk methodology are the technical model, the management model and their interface. The technical model consists of developing a master logic diagram (MLD) delineating the major immediate causes of loss of containment (LOC) and associated quantitative models for assessing their frequency. The management model consists of the tasks, which must be carried out systematically in the primary business functions (such as operations, emergency operations, maintenance and modifications). A management audit quantifies the quality of these management tasks. The management–technical interface modifies certain parameters of the technical model on the basis of the quality of the safety management system of the specific installation. The methodology is exemplified through its application to the risk assessment of an ammonia storage facility. A detailed technical model simulating the response of the system to various initiating events is developed along with a detailed management model simulating the influence of the plant-specific management and organisational practices. The overall effect is quantified through the frequency of release of ammonia as a result of a loss of containment in a storage tank and in a pipeline.

Life quality index for the estimation of societal willingness-to-pay for safety

The engineering and management of human safety is an important societal objective that includes extensive efforts by governments, both legislative and administrative, to enhance the health and safety of the public. Although the achievement of safety goals depend primarily on individuals and organizations responsible for safety, much support is drawn from expertise in diverse scientific and engineering disciplines. The activities range from structural safety (dams, tunnels, bridges to tall buildings) to safe operation of hazardous industrial installations (energy generation facilities, LNG terminals, petrochemical plants) to transportation systems (airline, rail, car safety) to technologies designed to minimize adverse impacts on the environment. All these activities are crucially concerned with risk: with the likelihood and the probable effects of various measures on life and health. We have developed a unified rationale and a clear basis for effective strategic management of risk across diverse sectors. Safety is an important objective in society but it is not the only one. The allocation of society's resources devoted to safety must be continually appraised in light of competing needs, because there is a limit on the resources that can be expended to extend life. The paper presents the Life Quality Index (LQI) as a tool for the assessment of risk reduction initiatives that would support the public interest and enhance safety and quality of life. The paper provides an intuitive reformulation of the LQI as equivalent to a valid utility function that is consistent with the principles of rational decision analysis. The LQI is further refined to consider the issues of discounting of life years, competing background risks, and population age and mortality distribution. The LQI is applied to quantify the societal willingness-to-pay, which is an acceptable level of public expenditure in exchange for a reduction in the risk of death that results in improved life-quality.

Technological disaster factors

Abstract Major Hazard Installations (MHIs) deal with the hazardous substances which exceed the threshold quantity. Although MHIs are safe organizations, they cannot fail due to a single error. However, due to their high complexity, the designer and the operator make errors during the design, and operation of the plants. Consequently, the technical, operational and organizational errors may lead to a major accident. The world has seen many incidents due to the operation of the MHIs. Malaysia has experienced several technological disasters. Four investigation reports have been reviewed in detail. This paper reviews the causes of the technological disasters in general. This paper also summarizes the causes of the technological disasters in Malaysia. Finally the paper rearranges the technological disaster causes and errors.

Technological disaster’s criteria and models

Disasters are classified as natural and man‐made disasters. Man‐made disaster, which occurs at the major hazard installation, is a technological disaster. For an incident to be classified as technological disaster criteria are required to be met. Several criteria have been proposed by researchers and agencies defining the disasters in terms of casualties, economic loss and environmental impact. Few models have been drawn describing the sequence of development of the technological disaster. This paper reviews in detail the proposed criteria, which define the disaster. The paper also summarizes the models which describe the disaster stages. Finally the paper summarizes a proposed model of the technological disaster precondition phase for major accidents.

Fire incident at a refinery in West Malaysia: the causes and lessons learned

Abstract Refineries are major hazard installations (MHI) which possess large quantities of hazardous substances. Refineries are characterized by high complexity and tight-coupled organization. Due to the high complexity and level of interaction among subsystems, designers and operators are unable to predict failures at the refinery units. The world has seen many incidents in refineries through leakage, fire and explosions. The consequences of the accidents sometimes extend beyond the boundary of the property and reach the neighboring residents. This paper reviews refinery incidents worldwide and also outlines the causes of a fire incident at a refinery in West Malaysia and the lessons learned.

Review of an incident at a petrochemical plant

Major hazard installations (MHIs) are dealing with hazardous substances which exceed the threshold quantity. MHIs are characterized by tight coupling and high complexity. Due to their complexity, MHIs require well trained managers who have good experience at all levels to manage the operations successfully. The managements of major hazard installations play a vital role in the success or failure of their installation. The world has witnessed many incidents in major hazard installations due to failure of the management at all levels. This paper summarizes in brief the management errors for several incidents which occurred worldwide. Also, the paper reviews the management errors which led to an incident at a petrochemical plant in East Malaysia.

Fire and explosion at mutual major hazard installations: review of a case history

Abstract In industry, it is common that there are independent but related major hazard installations which compliment each other. The link between the major hazard organizations is an interface between the installations. This interface is a critical area for the mutual major hazard installations. Examples of such organizations are chemical cargo ships and their terminal storage yard, the supply vessels and platforms, floating storage tanks at offshore areas and oil tankers, two offshore platforms tied together etc. This paper summarizes the major accident at M. T. Choon Hong III Ship and Tiram Kimia Sdn. Bhd. (TKSB), and also discusses the causes which led to this major accident. It was found that the lack of integrity is the main cause behind the escalation of the fire and explosion at the Choon Hong III Ship and the TKSB. It was noted that the disaster which involved mutual major hazard installation was preceded by two incubation periods.

Technological man‐made disaster precondition phase model for major accidents

Major hazard organizations are dealing with hazardous material exceeding the threshold quantity. Major hazard organizations are relatively secure areas and cannot fail from single error. However, failure of an organization to control hazardous material usually results in a technological man‐made disaster. The conditions preceding the onset of technological man‐made disaster are collectively called the technological man‐made disaster precondition phase “incubation period”. A model has been developed representing the technological man‐made disaster pre‐condition phase where it focuses on the origin of the technological man‐made disaster. The model was based on detailed analysis of four technological man‐made disasters at major hazard installations in Malaysia.

Bund overtopping — the consequence of catastrophic tank failure

Abstract The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has considerable interest in predicting the consequence of releases of hazardous liquids from storage tanks ( HSE, 1998 ), because of its responsibilities as a statutory adviser to local planning authorities on the siting of hazardous installations and on the control of development in their vicinity, and because of its responsibilities alongside the Environment Agencies as the Competent Authority in the assessment of COMAH safety reports. As a result, HSE has commissioned a number of studies, including: experimental studies of the behavior of liquid spills ( Lee and Kountouris, 1992 , Skitt and Wheeler, 1989 , Bentinck and Crow, 1991 , Clark and Savery, 1993 , Law and Johnskareng, 1994 , Ruddle and Widowson, 1985 , Ruddle and Elms, 1985 , Cleaver, Cronin, Evans and Hirst, 2001 ), a review of overtopping data and theoretical models used to study liquid flow ( Thyer & Jagger, 1997 ), the characterization of the profile of the leading edge of the spreading liquid ( Thyer, MacMillan, & Jagger, 1999 ), and the development and use of complex mathematical models to predict overtopping fractions and liquid spill behavior ( Daish et al., 1998 , Ivings and Webber, 2001 ).This paper summarizes the consequences of catastrophic tank failure, the current position on the availability of liquid spill data for model validation, and indicates how such data may be used to predict the often considerable fraction of liquid that could overtop retaining bunds around real tanks.

Mutual misconceptions between designers and operators of hazardous systems

An important causal factor in many failures of complex engineered systems and the subsequent accident sequences is a mismatch between the intentions of the system designers and operators. A study was conducted of the misconceptions that designers appeared to have about operators' intentions and the operating environment, and the misconceptions that operators had about the system's design or the designers' intentions. Inferences about these mutual misconceptions were made from a set of accident investigations in the marine, offshore and onshore process industries. The result was a taxonomy of misconceptions that suggested a variety of systematically flawed assumptions in the decision making of both designers and operators. A prompting tool was developed to help both designers and operators structure the examination of their assumptions. This tool was assessed in conjunction with 20 firms operating or designing hazardous installations in a range of industries.

A “worst case” methodology for obtaining a rough but rapid indication of the societal risk from a major accident hazard installation

This paper describes a methodology developed to provide a rough but rapid indication of the magnitude of the societal risks at and in the vicinity of a major accident hazard installation. It is intended to be used by the UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE) as a first screening tool when examining safety reports submitted under The Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999. These are the Regulations which implement in the UK the major aspects of Council Directive 96/82/EC, the “Seveso II” Directive. Within the methodology a new weighted risk integral parameter is defined, suitable for comparison with criteria, and its value calculated. The paper includes examples to illustrate the use of the methodology.

Characterizing failures in design activity

A study was conducted of errors made during the design process in an organization that designed complex, hazardous installations. About 90 errors were investigated, and all were represented individually by a causal tree. Each case was categorized according to the particular activity that was implicated in the error in order to find out how error was distributed over the design process. The more fundamental causes of these errors—those without more basic causes in the causal trees—were compared, and an attempt was made to identify their instrumental elements. These instrumental elements included properties of the design task (such as idiosyncrasy, uncertainty and redundancy), properties of the inferences designers drew from their experience, properties of the organizational environment and properties of the models used by designers.

Cold-weather effects on Class I hazardous electrical installations

With electrical hazardous area installations in different climates around the world, it is increasingly difficult to test products for all temperature extremes. When standard testing for Class I explosion-proof equipment generally covers the temperature range of +40 to -25/spl deg/C (104 to -13/spl deg/F), how do you design for climates which may encounter much lower temperatures? In cold climate areas such as Alaska, Northern Canada, and Siberia, temperatures as low as -50 to -70/spl deg/C (-58 to -94/spl deg/F) may be encountered. Engineers are faced with making choices in specifying equipment for these areas with much greater extremes in ambient temperature conditions than standard testing accounts for, how do we ensure that the equipment will meet the intent of the standards involved? Some low-temperature testing has been done to determine the effect of low temperatures on explosion-proof equipment. However, there has not been sufficient work done to develop factors to predict performance at low temperatures that can be applied to normal temperature test results. Designers applying equipment in low-temperature applications will find it difficult to find complete information on low-temperature test results to assist them in applying equipment at temperatures below -25/spl deg/C (-13/spl deg/F).

A “worst case” methodology for risk assessment of major accident installations

AbstractThis paper considers the application of one of the weighted risk indicators used by the Major Hazards Assessment Unit (MHAU) of the United Kingdom's Health & Safety Executive (HSE) in formulating advice to local planning authorities on the siting of new major accident hazard installations. In such cases the initial consideration is to be assured that the proposed installation would not be incompatible with existing land uses in the vicinity, as determined by the categorization of the existing populations and the estimated levels of individual risk which the proposed installation would impose upon them.An analysis of the consequences and likelihood of a single “worst case” event, coupled with MHAU's “Risk Integral,” is then undertaken. This enables the societal risk aspects of the proposal to be considered at an early stage and, in many cases, allows a prompt response. The paper describes the methodology and includes several case studies based on MHAU's day to day work which illustrate its use.