Hashemite Regime Research Articles

THE TRIBAL SYSTEM IN THE FACE OF THE STATE-FORMATION PROCESS: MANDATORY TRANSJORDAN, 1921–46

The tribe was the main solidarity group in Transjordan on the eve of the establishment of the modern state in 1921. As in many tribal societies in the Middle East, the creation of the state system in the aftermath of World War I brought about dramatic changes in the lives of tribespeople, and nomads in particular. The emergence of colonial governments with centralizing ambitions; the creation of international borders; rapid economic changes; and the spread of national ideologies were among the factors that threatened the survival of old tribal order and indeed put enormous pressures on tribespeople everywhere. Nevertheless, in the case of Transjordan, twenty-five years after the process of state-formation and modernization had been launched, tribal identities had not disappeared. Rather, tribes remained important social and cultural categories, having adapted to new realities and transformed in the face of them. Moreover, in the course of this process, the tribal population of Transjordan became the backbone of the Hashemite regime and among the most enthusiastic supporters of the kingdom. Even today, tribal identities, though significantly modified since the days of the Mandate, continue to play a major role in Jordanian politics. Scholars of modern Jordan have acknowledged the special relations between the tribes and the Hashemite monarchy. They have also emphasized the centrality of tribes and tribal political culture in contemporary Jordan. The historical roots of these phenomena, however, deserve further exploration.

The IDF Raid On Samu': The Turning-Point In Jordan's Relations With Israel and the West Bank Palestinians

BETWEEN 1949 AND 1967 TWO issues dominated Israel's relations with its Arab neighbor to the east, Jordan: security along the border and the fate of the West Bank in case of a radical change in the Jordanian regime. Throughout these years, a complex relationship developed between the two states based on their common interest in safeguarding the integrity of the Royal Hashemite House of Jordan. Israel regarded Jordan as an ally in the handling of daily security issues and as a potential partner in a lasting peace agreement. Israel further believed that Jordan's independence and territorial integrity under King Hussein were strategic assets, and let it be known that any change in the Hashemite regime by military take-over, foreign subversion (Egyptian-Syrian), or the introduction of Iraqi army units would be seen as a major security threat to Israel and, therefore, justification for Israeli occupation of all or parts of the West Bank. At the same time, Israel held the Jordanian government responsible for maintaining a peaceful border and preventing any form of infiltration or sabotage. Although the Israelis were keenly aware of Hussein's serious efforts to stanch guerrilla attacks, Jerusalem persisted in punitive-retaliatory acts that sometimes had a jarring effect on the Jordanian regime. Hussein inherited from his grandfather, King Abdullah, a special relationship with Israel characterized by dialogue for dealing with routine security matters, the exchange of intelligence data, either directly or through third parties, and the mutual pursuit of a political solution. In contrast to other Arab leaders, Hussein harbored no offensive designs against Israel and, like his grandfather, preferred to settle the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict by peaceful means through the recognition of

The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude toward the Kingdom of Jordan

T HE YEAR 1958 WAS A period of turmoil and disruption in the Middle East. In Israel, events in the region stimulated expectations about rectifications on the eastern border. After careful consideration of the changing situation, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion decided to preserve the status quo along Israel's eastern frontier. This decision signaled the start of a shift in his attitude toward the Kingdom of Jordan. At the beginning of the decade, Ben-Gurion had defined the border with as ridiculous, He claimed that Jordan is an artificial state with no future.1 Toward the end of the decade, he had come to perceive Jordan's independent existence as an important factor for contributing to Israel's security, and worked to maintain the status quo along the borders of the two states. There were many indicators of significant change in the region. On 22 February, Egypt and Syria merged to become the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). The rulers ofJordan and Iraq reacted to this move by proclaiming a union between their two kingdoms. An armed uprising, fueled by support from neighboring Syria, raged in Lebanon.3 A military coup erupted in Iraq, wiping out the monarchy and its leading figures. There was a distinct danger of the takeover of and Lebanon by the U.A.R., a threat which exemplified the sturm und drang of Arab nationalism. In these fluid conditions around her borders, Israel had to re-examine her policy in the light of possible changes in Jordan's status. In 1958, too, American Marines landed on the Lebanese coast to block Syria from taking control of the country. At the same time, Britain flew in thousands of soldiers to defend the Hashemite regime in Jordan. In response to an American request, Israel permitted British planes carrying troops and military equipment to fly to through Israeli air space. This consent elicited sharp criticism from the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, who demanded an immediate cessation of the flights; and when

A Palestinian Entity?

For those who look to the Middle East for an imminent resolution to the Palestinian question, there would seem to be little hope. Israeli Prime Minister Begin's settlement policy, the adamant Palestinian-state-or-nothing stance of the PLO, the stubbornness of the Arab rejectionist front, American vacillation, and Jordanian reluctance to enter the Camp David negotiations-all are reasonable causes for pessimism. The solution to this difficult question of Palestinian autonomy, however, may exist. The framework for an autonomous Palestinian entity is now firmly in place. The precise boundaries, the extent of jurisdiction, and day-to-day administrative functions-including internal security-of such a Palestinian entity must be defined in the context of ongoing negotiations. The answers to these questions will take shape as a function of the dynamics-internal and external-of the area, and of the policies of the United States and Israeli leaderships. The creation of an autonomous Palestinian entity will, in my view, occur with the active participation and partnership of Jordan. Jordan's assumption of this critical role is founded, not on the present public postures and actions of King Hussein's Hashemite regime, but on the track record of the Hashemite monarchy over the past 60 years. What is argued here is that an autonomous Palestinian entity in a confederate Arab state of Jordan will take precedence over the stubborn dream of an independent Palestinian state. This development will be the result of six decades of closely intertwined relationships between Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian aspirations.

Development planning in Iraq under the Hashemite regime

Development planning in Iraq under the Hashemite regime