The Problem of Force Posture Generation If Soviet-American relations since the end of World War II have been structured by ideological differences as well as by contrasting perceptions of national interest and Realpolitik, military forces and armaments have formed an important component in the concrete expression of such antipathies. In examining postwar superpower interaction, Western analysts have devoted considerable attention to ideology and its relation to state interests. Other studies have explored questions of civil-military relations as well as concepts of military strategy or the application of force with respect to both nations. But insofar as force posture generation is concerned, there has been a relative paucity of empirically grounded analyses.1 Indeed, it has not been uncommon for Western analysts to employ the presumption, though frequently in an unconscious fashion, that public pronouncements of political leaders must in fact accurately reflect the way in which each nation would employ its armed forces should the decision to do so ever be made. But if overlooked by analysts, the point has been made painfully clear to decision-makers from time to time that the application of armed force, or, for that matter, restraint