Happiness Of Others Research Articles

A Study on Young Children's Perceptions and Experiences of Happiness

The purposes of this study were to analyze individual interviews about how young children perceived the meanings of happiness and when they felt happy, to understand the characteristics of their thoughts and experiences of happiness, and to make plans to promote their happiness. The subjects included 274 young children aged 3-5 at two kindergartens and one daycare center in Seoul. The findings were as follows: first, young children explained the meanings of happiness with positive emotional states such as feeling good, loving, feeling glad, liking, having fun, and excited. A considerable number, however answered that they didn’t know. Secondly, young children felt happy when engaging in their favorite play, being together with their favorite person, having emotional supports, receiving presents, going to some special place, having their favorite food, their body and mind felt comfortable, and achieving what they wanted through efforts. Happiness is an essential factor for good and full life. It is necessary to provide young children with happy experiences so that they can maintain a happy life. There is a need for education to help them realize that true happiness comes from taking an interest in and making a contribution to the happiness of others beyond the pursuit of personal happiness and to increase their power of execution.

Happiness and education: Troubling students for their own contentment

Currently higher education strategies seem to concentrate on the expedient, developing skills that can secure employment in the world of work. This may have immediate advantages, but in totalising pedagogic practice, it may restrict our openness to people and to our own contentment with ourselves. Valuable as this may be as a way to satisfy politicoeconomic policy imperatives, it strays from education as an edifying process where personal development represents, through the facing up to distress and despair, an unsettling of our developing identity and a negation of our immediate desire satisfaction. Such an unsettling is not intended to give pleasure or satisfaction in the normative way in which the imperative of happiness has been used in student satisfaction surveys, nor in the wider societal context that this totalisation represents. What I propose for higher education is not a dominant priority to feed the happiness for others, but a mission to personal contentment revealed through realising student potentialities for them and so recognising their limitations, as part of seeking an attunement to contentment.

How Interdependent are Cross-Country Happiness Dynamics?

We characterize evolution of cross-country happiness dynamics by two important factors. The first one concerns inertia, which we model in a non-linear and stochastic environment to reflect on how an agent’s own past level of happiness adapts to the current level. Second, we allow an explicit role of socio-economic ‘distance’ in facilitating dynamic interdependence among happiness levels. A series of hypotheses are tested on a long-time series data for a sample of twelve European countries. We find that inertia has a strong positive and non-linear effect on countries’ steady-state happiness convergence. The effects are more pronounced when relative income and macroeconomic variables are allowed to determine the correlation structure of happiness. The main novelty is the consideration of spatio-temporal dynamic aspects of happiness where complementarity in the latter across economies is rigorously tested and established. We find that after accounting for the effects of heterogenous socio-economic dynamics, cross-country happiness is indeed complementary: a unit rise in happiness level in one country raises happiness in others. Our analytical model and empirical findings have interesting socio-economic policy implications.

A Critical Review on Civic Friendship andthe Liberal Theory of Justice : AnExploration of Self Identity and the Basis of Fair Share

Within modern liberal political philosophy, discussions on justice have been centered upon an individualism-based distributive justice and the ‘fair share’ due to each person. According to the liberal theory of justice, the individual is an entity of rational reason and moral autonomy and considers the interests of others and of the community from a viewpoint that is focused on one`s own interests. As practical principles of justice, the principle of desert has attempted to separate the individual`s natural and inherent abilities (merit) from the individual`s intentional efforts (desert); while the principle of needs has transmuted into a set of minimum exclusivity rights to protect the individual`s autonomy from serious harm and injury. Procedural justice theorists such as Rawls have attempted to invalidate the merit of the individual in an attempt to establish the identity of individuals whom are independent of the community, in the effort to promote their ideas on how to mitigate the social inequality that results from natural arbitrariness. The requirement to finalize this logical process is a strong moral reason equipped individual with the capacity of rational action. However, paradoxically, the logic of excessive reason has created an individual who is exclusive-rights-empowered but becomes ‘isolated and selfish’. The issues resulting from this situation are, first, the rational individual who is equipped with moral autonomy now becomes hidden behind a system-guaranteed set of exclusive rights; and second, the individual who should have been a rational actor and actively participating in cooperation and reciprocal relationships, does not find it easy to overcome the temptations of becoming a strategically located but passive and selfish actor within the mass market order. The result is that individuals easily relinquish their moral autonomy and exhibit a tendency to focus on personal gain. This has resulted in an increase in the polarization of society, and an increase of conflict between classes; and has engendered a crisis in the common good of the family and the political community. The true ‘good life’ and the ‘well-ordered community’ cannot be obtained by individuals who are only interested in their ‘share’, but requires ‘good citizens’ who are concerned about the happiness of others and of the society. When we are able to understand that the rational and selfish individual is necessarily non-self-sufficient; and acknowledge that there is a need for mutual philia with others, we will then be able to overcome rational reason and embrace civic friendship. The good citizen of a healthy community that is based on civic friendship, is an individual who has assimilated the virtue of justice, and will be able to aid in overcoming the limitations of modern liberalism, assist in the resolution of the pressing societal and individualistic crises and contribute to the establishment of a ‘well-ordered community’.

Women as the Oppressed Lot in theGod of Small Things

In the orthodox and conservative society like ours, women have always been undervalued due to patriarchal assumptions. They have been tutored that their greatness lies in their sufferings and therefore, happiness of others is always prioritized to their own. In fact, their perceptions of their aspirations and expectations are within the framework of Indian social and moral commitments.In this paper, an attempt is made to study the lot of women in Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things. The paper also depicts the inner life and conflicts of the self sacrificing women who desperately crave for their identity. How the female characters rebel towards the patriarchal norms and what is their ultimate fate is also highlighted in the present paper.

The Memory of Feeling: Envy and Happiness

This essay explores how happiness is maintained as a memory of the first relationship and when that memory is disturbed, envy can set in. Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable—the envious impulse being to take it away or to spoil it. The thought of Melanie Klein and her 1957 work, Envy and Gratitude, guides the inquiry. Happiness in one person can offend when another experiences the happiness as goodness of life that is being withheld from them. Since all persons carry the memory of happiness, seeing the happiness of others reminds us of something once owned or experienced, but now lost. Envy becomes a defense against the painful memory of happiness once known. The biblical figure King Saul is identified as someone who experienced envy in the face of a young David’s happiness. Envy not only robs a person of happiness, it removes a sense of gratitude.

Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue

In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant declares that “Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue” (MS 6:383). In the same text Kant refers to the duty of respect for others as a duty of virtue. It follows that the duty of respect must correspond to some end that is also a duty. What is this end? This paper endeavors to answer this question. Though Kant explicitly identifies two obligatory ends—one’s own perfection and the happiness of others (MS 6:385)—neither is a good candidate for the end which corresponds to the duty of respect. This paper examines two plausible candidates—others’ humanity and others’ self-esteem—arguing that the latter is preferable insofar as it accords better with what Kant says about the vice of defamation, respecting others in the logical use of their reason, and respectful beneficence.

Kant’s sacrificial turns

This paper addresses the role of the notion of sacrifice in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, and in his account of religion. First, I argue that kenotic sacrifice, or sacrifice as ‘withdrawal’, plays a hidden and yet important role in the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Second, I focus on Kant’s practical philosophy, arguing that the notion of sacrifice that is both implied and explicitly analyzed by Kant is mainly suppressive sacrifice. However, Kant’s account is fundamentally ambiguous, as sometimes the kenotic meaning of sacrifice seems to resurface, especially in the context of Kant’s discussion of the happiness of others as an end in itself. Because religious notions are regarded by Kant as necessary transitional forms (Darstellungen) to be used to make moral ideas applicable to the world, I then scrutinize Kant’s view of sacrifice as an improper symbol, and I analyze Kant’s arguments for such a dismissal and discuss the subject matter in recent literature. Finally, I examine the role of sacrifice in Kant’s account of Christ as the prototype of pure moral disposition. I conclude by arguing that Kant indeed grasped the importance of including kenotic dynamics in practical philosophy but was somehow unable or unwilling to integrate it into the formal grounding of his ethics. This tension, however, effectively provides an entry point for features that can be found in the post-Kantians.

Sustainable Happiness: How Happiness Studies Can Contribute to a More Sustainable Future

Sustainable happiness is an altruistic philosophy that promotes social, individual, and community happiness for the betterment of all. It is a guide to rational decision making that promotes actions by individuals, community and country that reinforces positive ways that can lead to happiness, promising relationships, and the wellbeing and delight of self and others. (Brown & Kasser, 2005) There are challenges with this concept, because everyone has a diverse way of finding happiness and not all are concerned about the happiness of others. However, finding ways to sustain a standard of living or sustaining “lifestyles and livelihoods” (O'Brien, 2008) that promotes the security and wellbeing of neighbors is one way. Another way is being eco-friendly or living a healthy lifestyle, which always bring about a positive mindset. More importantly, finding ways to connect and cooperate with others may promote a sense of security. (Flavin, 2007; Hulse, 2007; O'Brien & Leichenko, 2007). This paper will explore the ways of finding that simple pleasures in life can promote the wellbeing of self and contribute to the overall happiness of those we interact with by our actions.

High hostility among smokers predicts slower recognition of positive facial emotion

High levels of trait hostility are associated with wide-ranging interpersonal deficits and heightened physiological response to social stressors. These deficits may be attributable in part to individual differences in the perception of social cues. The present study evaluated the ability to recognize facial emotion among 48 high hostile (HH) and 48 low hostile (LH) smokers and whether experimentally-manipulated acute nicotine deprivation moderated relations between hostility and facial emotion recognition. A computer program presented series of pictures of faces that morphed from a neutral emotion into increasing intensities of happiness, sadness, fear, or anger, and participants were asked to identify the emotion displayed as quickly as possible. Results indicated that HH smokers, relative to LH smokers, required a significantly greater intensity of emotion expression to recognize happiness. No differences were found for other emotions across HH and LH individuals, nor did nicotine deprivation moderate relations between hostility and emotion recognition. This is the first study to show that HH individuals are slower to recognize happy facial expressions and that this occurs regardless of recent tobacco abstinence. Difficulty recognizing happiness in others may impact the degree to which HH individuals are able to identify social approach signals and to receive social reinforcement.

Moses, happy man?

This article exams the Biblical figure Moses in the light of both ancient and modern understandings of happiness, asking whether Moses himself was happy, and what that might mean, and whether he may be considered an example of a “felicitator,” one who works successfully for the happiness of others.

Stop Violence against Hospitals

Every disease has an inherent danger of death. That probability and possibility varies with different diseases. Medical science has over the time tried to take away or prolong the possibility of death by appropriately intervening in its course and complications of diseases. It had been successful in several areas but still there are situations where the science has no answer. In spite of powerful tools, research and technology in this era, the doctor’s task is much more challenging and gratifying than ever, as in the current scenario the diseases and their complications are aggravating day by day. In this situation doctor’s commitment and perseverance for the care and happiness of others has to be greatly appreciated. Medical service providers have to be given courage and support to deal with the unfortunate situation of disease and death, to save the patient.The government should bring stringent laws to punish the miscreants and should make them compensate for the damages adequately. Such atrocities cannot be tolerated any more. Society should voice their concern against such organized crime so that patients can comfortably stay in the hospitals to get rid of their agony. The violence against the hospitals should be stopped at any cost.

If money doesn't make you happy, then you probably aren't spending it right

The relationship between money and happiness is surprisingly weak, which may stem in part from the way people spend it. Drawing on empirical research, we propose eight principles designed to help consumers get more happiness for their money. Specifically, we suggest that consumers should (1) buy more experiences and fewer material goods; (2) use their money to benefit others rather than themselves; (3) buy many small pleasures rather than fewer large ones; (4) eschew extended warranties and other forms of overpriced insurance; (5) delay consumption; (6) consider how peripheral features of their purchases may affect their day-to-day lives; (7) beware of comparison shopping; and (8) pay close attention to the happiness of others.

Kim są potrzebujący pomocy

The standard view of the duty to help those in need suggests that it is acceptable to refuse to help others who are known to be in need and who can be assisted. This conclusion can be avoided if helping is seen from the perspective of Kant’s idea of the duty of beneficence. On this view help should not be seen as stemming from the recognition of contingent differences between those who are inclined to help and those who are in need, nor as a one-time response to evil, or as an act close to heroism. Help should be seen as an element of the pursuit of one of the ends which are also duties, i.e. as the promotion of the happiness of others and, at the same time, the self-perfection of the helping person. Helping results from a stable readiness to act for the benefit of others, which stems from one’s recognition of the weakness, limitation, and lack of self-sufficiency which are common to all humans, and so are shared by both the helper and the person in need.

Personality and the Happiness of Others: A Study among 13‐ to 15‐Year‐Old Adolescents

This study was designed to assess the level of concern for the happiness of others among a sample of 13‐ to 15‐year‐old adolescents in England and Wales (N = 3,095) and to test the theory that concern for the happiness of others occupies a different psychological space (within Eysenck's three‐dimensional model of personality) from the space occupied by personal happiness. The data demonstrated a high level of concern for the happiness of others, with 84 per cent of the adolescents saying that, “It is important to me to make other people happy”. While high levels of personal happiness are generally shown to be associated with low neuroticism and high extraversion (stable extraversion), these data demonstrated that high levels of concern for the happiness of others tend to be associated with high neuroticism, high extraversion, high social conformity, and low psychoticism.

Hutcheson's Relation to Stoicism in the Light of his Moral Psychology

Without questioning Hutcheson's general affinities with the Stoics, this article focuses on two important differences in moral psychology that show the limits of the appropriation of Stoicism in Hutcheson's ethics of benevolence. First, Hutcheson's distinction between calm affections and violent passions does not fully match with the Stoic distinction between constantiæ and perturbationes, since the emotion of sorrow remains in Hutcheson's table of the calm affections. As far as sorrow as a public affection is concerned, this first point is tied to a second point, which Hutcheson highlights himself: His conception of virtue as benevolence and the general importance of the public affections seem to be in conflict with a Stoic conception of virtue as an internal good, since the happiness of others, which is the object of both Hutchesonian benevolence and the public sense, is external for the Stoics.

From wealth to well-being? Money matters, but less than people think

While numerous studies have documented the modest (though reliable) link between household income and well-being, we examined the accuracy of laypeople's intuitions about this relationship by asking people from across the income spectrum to report their own happiness and to predict the happiness of others (Study 1) and themselves (Study 2) at different income levels. Data from two national surveys revealed that while laypeople's predictions were relatively accurate at higher levels of income, they greatly overestimated the impact of income on life satisfaction at lower income levels, expecting low household income to be coupled with very low life satisfaction. Thus, people may work hard to maintain or increase their income in part because they overestimate the hedonic costs of earning low levels of income.

L'invidia

- The author with extraordinary ability renders a delicate subject like envy accessible, defining a human experience as old as humankind. Traces are found in the oldest myths. The history of man is described in the Bible as a story of invidious personages. And like all that is human it is a fleeting and variegated reality. Since it cannot be declared, we can only look again at the traces that it left in literature, art and myths. Envy has to do with the experience of seeing. Etymologically it means looking sideways. The envious glance presents an aspect of illusion, both when it is directed at others and when it is directed at the self. Envy has to do with the experience of saying. It is not confessable. And slander is a way of destroying the envied one. It presents a constant characteristic: suffering, which pervades all of the relationships of the envious one who suffers for the happiness of others and takes malignant pleasure in others' suffering. This prevents him from loving and being loved and conducts him inexorably to self impoverishment. Envy springs from a sense of lack whether real or perceived and from intolerance for ones own Copyright © FrancoAngeli N.B: Copia ad uso personale. Č vietata la riproduzione (totale o parziale) dell'opera con qualsiasi mezzo effettuata e la sua messa a disposizione di terzi, sia in forma gratuita sia a pagamento. 30 Il Ruolo Terapeutico N. 112 limits. However, within envy positive factors can be hidden, like emulation and the desire to better oneself which must be worked through in order not to be perverted.KEY WORDS: suffering, illusion, not confessable, slander, acceptance of limits

A note on interdependent happiness

Based on two models of interdependent utilities [Becker, G., 1974. A theory of social interaction, Journal of Political Economy 82, 1064–1093; Fehr, E., Schmidt, K., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868] we derive a functional relationship between average happiness and the standard deviation of happiness within a country. This hypothesis is supported by an empirical investigation of 71 countries which shows that the average happiness in these countries depends only on income and on the standard deviation of happiness σ. The latter may be partly based on influences beyond income, for which no data are available. Income has the expected positive influence and σ has the expected negative influence, i.e. large differences in “autonomous” happiness have a dampening influence on “effective” happiness which also takes into account the happiness of others.

Active Sympathetic Participation: Reconsidering Kant's Duty of Sympathy

In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant divides duties of love into three categories: beneficent activity (Wohltätigkeit), gratitude (Dankbarkeit) and Teilnehmung – commonly referred to as the duty of sympathy (MS 6: 452). In this paper I will argue that the content and scope of the third duty of love has been underestimated by both critics and defenders of Kant's ethical theory. The account which pervades the secondary literature maintains that the third duty of love includes only two components: an obligation to make use of our natural receptivity to sympathetic feelings as a means to fulfilling other duties of love, and an indirect duty to cultivate these feelings. As a result, Kant's duty of sympathy has been widely regarded as a duty whose value is derived from the way in which it serves other duties, in particular, the duty of beneficent activity, which obliges agents ‘to promote according to one's means the happiness of others in need’ (MS 6: 453). Teilnehmung has thus assumed something of a second-class status among the duties to others. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the prevailing account of Kant's third duty of love is incomplete.